entitled to the amount of such insurance, charged with a lien for the amount of the premiums paid with stolen money.

Same-Consent of Partners-Evidence.-In an action by partners to recover the amount of insurance policies procured with money stolen by the insured from a firm of which he was a member, it appeared that for several years the insured had been taking money from the firm, and deceiving his partners by periodic false statements. Some of the premiums were paid by checks drawn by the insured in the firm name on the firm's deposit and charged to himself in his account in the firm's books. Held, that such evidence did not show a consent by the co-partners to such use, by the insured, of the funds of the firm.

Holmes v. Davenport (N. Y. S. C.), 18 New York Supplement (March 31, 1892), p. 56.

Statute-Insurance for Benefit of Wife and Child.-Code Ala. 1886, sec. 2356, provides: "the husband or father may insure his life for the benefit of his wife, or for the benefit of his wife and children, or for the benefit of his minor child or children." Held, that such section is not declarative of any common law principle, but is enabling, creative of a new right. These statutes confer a special privilege. In their nature they are an exemption of property from the payment of debts; and, to be successful in securing the exemption, the statute must be conformed to.

Same-Same-Assignment of Policy to Minor Child.-The statute allowing a father to insure his life for the benefit of his minor child, does not authorize the assignment by the father of an insurance in his own name to his minor children, he being in debt at the time.

Friedman, et. al. v. Fennell et al. (Ala. S. C.), 10 Southern Reporter (April 6, 1892), p. 649.

Policy-Interest of Assured--Evidence.--A clause in an insurance policy on a debtor's life, reciting that it is payable upon his death to his creditor if living, if an admission at all on the part of the company of the relation of debtor and creditor, is an admission only at the date on which the policy was issued; and, in an action to recover on such policy, the creditor must furnish positive proof of the fact that he is a creditor, and of the amount of his debt, and for this purpose the recital in the policy and the creditor's statement in the proofs of death are not sufficient.

Same--Same--Creditor's Policy.--A creditor named as beneficiary in, or made the assignee of, a policy on his debtor's life, has no further interest after the payment of his debt, and the policy becomes one for the benefit of the insured, and can be collected by his personal representatives.

Proofs of Death--Retention Without Objection-Estoppel.--The fact that an insurance company receives the proofs of the death of the insured without question is an admission only that they are proper in form, and not that all the statements contained in them are true, although such statements are in answer to questions on the printed form sent out by the company. Insurance Company v. Francisco, 17 Wall. 672, distinguished.

Crotty v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. (U. Š. S. C.), 12 Supreme Court Reporter (May 16, 1892), p. 749; Co-Op. Edition U. S. S. C. Reports (May 16, 1892), p. 451; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 645.

Application-Estoppel of Assured-Policy.-Where a policy of insurance declares that no agent is empowed by the company issuing the policy to modify it, or "to bind the company by making any promise, or by receiving any representation or information not contained in the application for this policy," and an agent of the company, in receiving an application of insurance, writes the applicant's answers to certain questions, and the applicant signs his name thereto, the binding force of such answers can not, in an action on the policy, in which defendant alleges that certain answers were false, be avoided by evidence that the applicant did not know the contents of the application, or that they were known to be false by the agent.

Fitzmaurice v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (Texas S. C.); 19 Southwestern Reporter (May 16, 1892), p. 301.

Policy-Suicide--Evidence.-In an action on a policy of life insurance to be void if the assured committed suicide within two years from its date, the evidence showed that the death of the insured resulted from morphine or opium self administered; that, although only a manager in a store and insolvent, he carried $23,000 life insurance; that he was greatly troubled over the matter of his homestead, which had been conveyed in payment of a debt, with right to repurchase; that on a hot Sunday afternoon, complaining of a headache and the noise, he went out, saying that he would take a street car ride; that later in the evening he was found by his brother in the store, with the door locked, lying on a table; that, when asked what was the matter, he said he had a headache, and falsely said he had taken Hofman's Anodyne, and might have taken it too strong; that he never used narcotics, and was opposed to taking medicine, except on the prescription of a regular physician; that when asked by the doctor, whom his brother immediately got, how much morphine he had taken, he said that it was none of his business, but that he had taken so much that he could not get it out of him; that at the time a note in the handwriting of the assured, and evidently written after he went to the store, was found conspicuously stuck in the railing about his office, and had on it the word "sick;" that though this was traced to the possession of assured's brother, and plaintiff was notified to produce it, he failed to do so or ac

count for it. Held, that a verdict finding that assured did not come to his death by suicide would be set aside as manifestly against the weight of the evidence.

Practice-Evidence--Res Gestæ.--Opinions expressed by physicians while attending a patient, engaged in inquiry as to what was the matter with him, are admissible as res gesta.

Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Tillman (Texas S. C.), 19 Southwestern Reporter (May 16, 1892), p. 294.

Misstatement in Application--Evidence--Jury.--The defense was a breach of warranty in the application. The policy was issued on March 20, and insured died of acute tuberculosis, October 7 following. A physician testified for defendant that in February he treated insured for consumption, and at that time discovered what is known as "Koch bacilli." The presence of bacilli was confirmed by another physician. A sister of insured testified that in February insured suffered from a cold, but after treatment his cough disappeared, and he was apparently healthy, continuing his usual employment as a laborer until within a few weeks of his death. Defendant's examining physician testified that on March 19 he made a thorough examination of assured by the usual tests, and found his lungs in a perfectly healthy condition; that he talked with insured several weeks later, and saw nothing to indicate any lung trouble, or disease of any kind. Held, that it was for the jury to determine whether insured was afflicted with consumption when the insurance issued.

Tucker v. United Life and Accident Insurance Association (N. Y. C. A.), 30 Northeastern Reporter (May 13, 1892), p. 723 ; 44 New York State Reporter (May, 1892), p. 100; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 569.

Proofs of Death-Evidence.-The insured stated in his application that the last physician that attended him was Dr. L. It appeared by the certificate of death furnished by plaintiff that he was attended at a later date by Dr. F. Held, that as the certificate was put in evidence by the plaintiff, the statements of the physician were made evidence, and tended to prove that the statements of the insured made to the medical examiner were untrue so far as they related to the last time he was attended by a physican for medical treatment, and that it was error for the court to refuse to charge the jury that this statement of the doctor in the proof of death was to be taken into consideration by them.

Same-Same.-The fact that the blank certificate was furnished by the company does not aid the plaintiff on this appeal.

Helwig v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 44 New York State Reporter (May, 1892), p. 439; 30 Northeastern Reporter (May 20, 1892), p. 834; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 660.

Statute-Rebate of Premiums-Constitutional Law.-Laws 1890, c. 401, which makes it a criminal offense for an agent of a life

insurance company to pay a rebate as an inducement to insure in his company, is not unconstitutional, as an abridgement of the natural rights and personal liberty of such agent in the conduct of his business.

Same Same-Indictment-Evidence.-In the prosecution of the agent of a Vermont life insurance company for paying a rebate to induce one G. to insure his life in such company, it appeared in evidence that the company was doing business in New York, and that the policy issued to G. was indorsed by the agent as general agent of the company. Held, that inasmuch as the company could not have done business in New York had it not been a corporation duly authorized, the evidence was sufficient to sustain the allegation of the indictment that the company was a corporation organized under the law of Vermont.

Same--Same.--Where the act applied to agents of foreign as well as to those of domestic life insurance companies,it was immaterial that defendant's company was a foreign corporation.

People v. Formosa (N. Y. C. A.), 30 Northeastern Reporter (April 22, 1892), p. 492; 43 New York State Reporter, 654; 131 N. Y. 478.

Policy--Beneficiary--Conditions as to Payment--Public Policy. -A condition in a policy of insurance that "the company may pay the sum of money insured hereby, to any relative by blood, or connection by marriage of the assured, or to any person appearing to said company to be equitably entitled to the same by reason of having incurred expenses in any way on behalf of the insured, for his or her burial, or for any other purpose, and the production by this company of a receipt, signed by any or either of said persons, or any other sufficient proof of such payment to any or either of them, shall be conclusive evidence that such sum has been paid to the person or persons entitled thereto, and that all claims under this policy have been fully satisfied," enables the insurance company to determine the person entitled to the insurance money, and its decision is conclusive upon the representatives of the assured. Such provision is not against public policy.

Thomas v. Prudential Ins. Co. (Pa. S. C.), 1 Advance Reports (April 29, 1892), p. 628; 24 Atlantic Reporter (May 18, 1892), p. 82.

Application--Other Insurance-Estoppel.-In an application for life insurance one of the questions propounded was, "Is life proposed insured in this company? If so, state number and amount of policies.” The answer written in the application was, "No." The policy issued upon the application contained the provision that it should be void, "while there is in force upon the life of the insured a policy' previously issued by this company, unless the policy first issued contains an indorsement authorizing this policy to be in force at the same time." No such indorsement was made, and, on the trial of an action'

to enforce the policy, it appeared that the insured had another policy in force at the time of the application. Held, that the company must be charged with the knowledge of the existence of a former policy issued by it, outstanding at the time of issuing the policy in suit, and that that condition was therefore waived and can not for that reason be urged as a ground for reversal of judgment.

Lanigan v. Prudential Ins. Co. (N. Y. S. C.), 44 New York State Reporter (May, 1892), p. 234; 18 New York Supplement (April 21, 1892), p. 287.

Prompt Payment of Premium-Waiver.-In an action on a life insurance policy, the plaintiff proved tender of the premium 27 days in arrears, the death of the assured occurring three days later, and claimed waiver of the policy condition requiring prompt payment. The court charged that a waiver might be found if the whole conduct of the company in dealing with the assured had been such as to lead a prudent and reasonable man to believe that premiums would be accepted a few days after due, without regard to the health of the assured; but, if the conduct of the company was such that the insured could believe that he might pay delinquent premiums only when in good health, then there was no waiver. Held, a proper charge, as the company may, by its conduct, waive the condition requiring payments at a specified date.

Tender of Premium.-Evidence-Payment or tender of the premium in arrears being a pre-requisite to a prosecution of an action on the policy, plaintiff's letter enclosing the amount to the company is competent evidence to show such tender.

Error-Instruction.-A charge covering fully the single question involved, and instructing the jury that there is no other question in the case cures error in the admission of evidence bearing on other points.

Practice-Reversal on Evidence.—A judgment will not be reversed, on appeal, as not sustained by the evidence, where the party against whom it was rendered did not ask a peremptory instruction for a verdict in his behalf, but acquiesced in the submission of the case to the jury by asking for a charge on certain points.

Hartford L. & A. Ins. Co. v. Unsell (U. S. S. C.), 12 Supreme Court Reporter (May 2, 1892), p. 671; 36 Lawyers' Co-Op. Edition U. S. Reports (May 1, 1892), p. 354; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 481.

Payment of Premium-Pleading.—In an action on a policy of life insurance which contained a condition that the first premium should be paid on delivery of the policy, an allegation in the complaint that the policy was made, executed and delivered for value received, is sufficient on demurrer, as under such allegation the presumption would arise that such premium had been paid or a credit therefor extended.