Western Assurance Co. v. Ontario Coal Co. (Ont. C. A.), 12 Canadian Law Times (Feb., 1892), p. 68.

Loan on Vessel-Insurable Interest.-Plaintiff advanced money on a vessel and its freight, and took from defendant a policy of insurance against the loss of the vessel from the dangers of the sea. Plaintiff also took from the master an instrument securing the loan on the vessel and its freight earnings, and providing, among other things, that the owner or master should not take any other advances upon the vessel or its earnings at the port of loading, but that, if they did, they should be bound to return the present loan to the plaintiff, even though the vessel should be lost. The master violated this provision by procuring other advances at the port of loading. The vessel was lost. Held, that such subsequent loan being procured without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiff, its insurable interest in the vessel and freight was not impaired thereby, and it might proceed against the master and owner, or against the defendant, at its election.

Same-Same.-Plaintiff's insurable iuterest in such case was not effected by any personal liability of the master in taking the subsequent advances.

Cassa Marittima v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (March 4, 1892), p. 962; 42 New York State Reporter (Feb., 1892), p. 258; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 449.

Proofs of Loss-Waiver.-Refusal of the company to pay a loss on the ground that the policy has been canceled, is a waiver of the right to insist on proofs of loss.

Policy-Approval of Risk-Evidence.-The policy provided that it should cover such risks as should be approved and endorsed thereon. The practice of the company was to enter its approval of risks in a book furnished the assured, in a column headed "Approved;" such approval being evidenced by the initials "D. & P., Att'ys," set opposite a description of the risk. Held, that repeated endorsements by the company of the letter "D" in the column "Approved" sufficiently complied with the policy.

Cancellation-Evidence.—The cargo of coal covered by such policy having been lost, the receipt by the company of premiums on other cargoes of coal subsequently, under the same policy, in the absence of evidence that the same were received by mistake, and of an offer to return the premiums, sufficiently showed that the policy had not been cancelled.

Seaworthiness-Evidence.-The testimony of the captain that the boat was seaworthy, and that of the owner that she had been thoroughly overhauled before the voyage, was sufficient prima facie evidence of her seaworthiness.

Salvage-Defense by Insured - Liability of Insurer.-The boat was sunk, raised by salvors, the insured sued in admiralty for salvage, and the company notified to defend, which it neglected to do, and, judgment being recovered, the assured paid the same, including costs, disbursements, and counsel fees. Held, that the assured had the right to defend, and that the company was liable to reimburse him as well for counsel fees and other expenses incurred in the defense, as for the judgment.

Pleading-Complaint-Practice.—The complaint alleged that by the policy any loss should be paid thirty days after the proof thereof, but contained no averment that such proof was furnished within the required time. Held, that the complaint should have been dismissed on that ground.

Heilner v. China Mut. Ins. Co., (N. Y. City Superior Ct.), 18 New York Supplement (April 7, 1892), p. 177; 45 New York State Reporter, 578.

Policy "New York Harbor”—Jury.—Plaintiff held an open policy, accompanied by a book to contain the risks proposed and taken. A proposal instead of stating that the boat was to run from Brooklyn to Tarrytown, contained the words "New York Harbor," under the heading "from," and the column "to" was blank, except that the word "Harbor" extended into that column. The book was sent to the agents of defendant who wrote "Harbor" in the approval column, and returned the book. The boat sunk on a bar at Tarrytown. Held, that the contract was not void because the duration of the risk was not fixed by time, nor for a voyage between specified places, as a number of cargoes had been previously insured by defendant for plaintiffs in a similar way; and that the question as to whether New York Harbor included Tarrytown was properly submitted to the jury.

Same-Loss Insured Against.-The boat being seaworthy, was moored alongside the dock. It grounded when the tide went out, and broke, and the cargo was destroyed. Held, that this was a loss insured against by defendant.

Petrie v. Phenix Ins. Co., (N. Y. C. A.), 43 New York State Reporter (April, 1892), p. 478; 30 Northeastern Reporter (April 15, 1892), p. 380; 45 Albany Law Journal, 419; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 551.

Maritime Lien-Premiums.-Under the general maritime law there is no lien on a vessel for marine insurance premiums due from her

owner.

The Hope (Sun Ins. Co. v. The Hope), (U. S. Dis. C.), 49 Federal Reporter (March 29, 1892), p. 279.

Pleading-Practice-Amendment.-Where the defendant in an action on a policy of fire insurance, at the close of the testimony, proposed to amend its answer so as to plead cancellation of the policy at the request of the insured, which defense, if true, must have been known

to defendant when it filed its original answer, the trial court properly refused to permit the amendment.

Policy-Forfeiture-Definition. The policy provided that the insurance should be void if the note given for the premium was not paid within 15 days after becoming due. Held, that the word void should be considered as meaning voidable, at the option of the company.

Same-"Unavoidable Dangers of River"-Carelessness of Master.—Where the policy insured a steamboat, and recited that defendant assumed thereunder the unavoidable dangers of the river, and that it should be free from all loss caused by barratry, the fact that the boat was stranded by carelessness or unskillfulness of the master will not preclude a recovery against the company, in the absence of evidence of fraud on such officer's part.

Same-General Average.-Where the cargo, after the boat had stranded, was taken off merely to lighten the boat, and not because the cargo was in danger, no question of general average arises.

Same-Abandonment-Evidence. Where the owner, after the stranding of the boat, gave the defendant notice of his intention to abandon, but retained control thereof, and had it repaired, and thereafter claimed and used the boat as his own, there was no abandonment, and the owner can not recover as for a total loss, but only for so much as he has in fact lost.

Louisville Underwriters v. Pence (Ky. C. A.), 19 Southwestern Reporter (May 2, 1892), p. 10; 14 Kentuck" Law Reporter, 21; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 493.

Unseaworthiness-Evidence-Nonsuit.-Defendant insured a canal boat with privilege to carry lime in barrels, against the usual perils of inland waters and also against fire. The boat was loaded at Troy, and while in tow at Albany was discovered to be on fire. Barrels of lime on deck were removed, when the deck was found to be so hot that further unloading ceased. The boat was then scuttled. The captain of the boat and his son testified that the lime was not wet when loaded; that the hatches were carefully closed, and the barrels on deck covered with canvass. The boat was built in 1881, and was in good repair. Held, that a nonsuit was error, and the court was not justified upon the evidence in holding that the slacking was caused by a leak making the boat unseaworthy.

Loss by Fire-Evidence.-One of the witnesses testified that they found several pieces or heads of barrels that" were burned into charcoal like." Held, that this in connection with the smoke issuing from the hold, with the deck so hot that the pitch oozed from the seams, makes it reasonably certain that a fire had broken out in the vessel before it sank, which was the proximate cause of the loss.

Abandonment-Evidence.-The proof was that on May 9th, L., defendant's agent, was notified of the loss and examined the wreck. May 10th, the captain gave him a verified statement of the loss, and he mailed it to the defendant on the 11th. In June, O., defendant's adjuster, wrote to L. that he had examined the wreck and would in a few days "pick her up," i. e., raise her. July 11th plaintiffs made proofs of loss and assigned all their interest in the boat, which assignment was delivered to and retained by defendant, and in September the captain, at defendant's request, verified and delivered a further detailed statement of loss. Held, that it was error for the court to hold, as a matter of law, that the boat had not been abandoned by the plaintiffs and that defendants had not accepted the abandonment.

Singleton et al. v. Phenix Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 44 New York State Reporter (May, 1892), p. 414; 30 Northwestern Reporter (May 20, 1892), p. 839; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 479.

Cancellation After Loss-Equity.-The cancellation of a policy of marine insurance in consideration of the return of the unearned premiums at a time when both parties were ignorant of the loss of the vessel is a mistake, and will be rescinded in equity, though the mistake was material to the contract of one party only.

Same-Same-Interest on Loss.-Plaintiff having sought relief in equity, thereby assuming that he had no cause of action until the cancellation was set aside, the court erred in allowing interest on the policy from the date of loss.

Duncan v. New York Mutual Ins. Co. (N. Y. City Superior Ct.), 18 New York Supplement (June 2, 1892), p. 863; 46 New York State Reporter, 241.

Policy-Value of Risk.—The risk, a steamboat, was valued for insurance at $30,000, although her actual value was in excess of such amount. Held, that insured was bound by the value placed on the boat by the policies of insurance.

Risk of Owner-Co-insurance.-The insurance being for two-thirds of the value of the boat as fixed by the policies, the interest of the insurer was two-thirds in the wreck, and that of the owner for the remaining one-third, not insured, is one-third in the wreck.

Loss and Abandonment-Neglect of Agent-Pleading.-Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the defendants were notified on the day of the loss, and the steamer was at the time abandoned to the agents of the defendants, who accepted the same, having the authority to take custody and control of the wreck; that it was their duty and their agreement to proceed immediately to the salvage of the wreck of said steamer, for the benefit of themselves and petitioner, who was the owner of the wreck, to the extent of the value of the uninsured portion of the steamer; that in violation of their duty, and in collusion

against petitioner, the said agents delayed and neglected to take any step whatever towards the salvage of the wreck; that by not acting in time, as they should, the wreck went to pieces, and the salvage was made impossible by the rising waters. The defendant filed demurrer to the complaint. Held, that the complaint did not state a cause of action; that the plaintiff, being the owner of one-third of the wreck, and the master of the boat being in charge of the wreck, such master acted as agent of both the plaintiff and the insurers, and, if there was negligence causing loss, such negligence was the negligence of the joint agent of the parties, for which neither could recover.

Natchez and New Orleans Packet and Nav. Co. v. Louisville Underwriters et al. (La. S. C.), 11 Southern Reporter (June 15, 1892), p. 54.

Policy-Excessive Insurance.-The defendant's policy was for $5,000. The ship was valued, for insurance at $100,000, and insurance amounting to $95,000 had been paid by other companies on account of the loss. The libellants had also been paid the sum of $28,750, on account of "advances." The defendant insists that libellants had been paid the full value of the ship as fixed by the policy in suit, and therefore can not recover. Held, that the insurance on "advances" was not to be taken into account in the insurance on the ship, as the advances thus insured are something independent of and distinct from the ship herself.

Same "Advances."-Where marine insurance is effected at Lloyds' "on advances," and those words are written in the valuation clause, which already contains a printed description of all parts of the ship, the policy must be construed to be not upon advances for repairs, but upon something independent of the ship, such as moneys advanced in her business.

Providence-Washington Ins. Co. v. Bowring (U. S. C. C. A.), 50 Federal Reporter (July 12, 1892), p. 613.