Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Saginaw Barrel Company (Ill. S. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Jan. 22, '92), p. 477.

Notice and Proofs of Loss-Waiver-Pleading.-In an action on a policy of fire insurance, the complaint averred that the plaintiff did not immediately notify the company of the loss, because "defendant waived notice and proof thereof in the manner following, to-wit: said defendant had actual knowledge thereof, and notified and told the plaintiff that it would not pay said loss, or any part thereof, and that he need not give said notice in writing or make said proof." Held, sufficient as an averment that notice was waived within the time in which the insured could perform the conditions of the policy and save his rights thereunder.

Practice-Law of Case-Second Appeal.--On a second appeal to the Appellate Court, the ruling of the court on a particular point as to the sufficiency of a pleading must be regarded as the law of the case, though in the interim between the two appeals the Supreme Court may have ruled differently in a case between other parties, involving precisely the same question.

Age of House-Evidence.-The application for insurance stated the building insured to be twelve years old. In an action on the policy the jury found the frame part of the building to be six years old, and the log part twenty-four years old, and that therefore the avarage age of the building was fifteen years. The log building had been entirely reconstructed, and built of new materials, except that the old logs were used in the body. Held, that the jury had no right to consider the age of the materials of which the house was constructed in ascertaining the age of the house.

Practice-Admission of Evidence-Harmless Error.-The admission of the declarations of an agent to show that he was in fact such is harmless error, where the agency is not denied by the principal, and is shown by the testimony of other witnesses.

Notice of Loss-Waiver.-The company's adjuster of losses visited the scene of the fire the day after the loss occurred, in his official capacity, and informed the insured that he need furnish no notice nor proof of loss. Held, a sufficient excuse for not giving notice of loss within fifty days.

Same-Receipt by Company-Evidence.-Notice of loss was duly mailed in an envelope plainly addressed to the company at its general office, and stamped with sufficient postage, and receipt thereof was not denied by the company. Held, that the jury properly found that the notice was received by the company.

Froenix Ins. Co. v. Pickel (Ind. S. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Jan. 22, 1892), p. 432.

Garnishment of Judgment-Jurisdiction.-Plaintiff was a resident of Wisconsin, and there obtained a judgment against an insurance company which was a resident of Massachusetts, where its principal office was. Her creditors in Minnesota sued her in Illinois, and, by process served on the company's agent there, garnished the judgment debt. She did not appear in the action, and no service was had on her except by publication and mailing copies thereof to her. The action was not based on any cause of action arising in Illinois, nor brought to enforce a contract entered into with reference to any subject-matter in that state. Held, that the Illinois court acquired no jurisdiction to render a personal judgment against her, but only as against property or credits within the jurisdiction of that court.

Same-Same-Situs of Debt.-The judgment debt due plaintiff not being property, if it had any situs outside of Wisconsin for the purpose of garnishment it was at the company's home office, but under Rev. St. Wis., 1974, which requires insurance companies to pay final judgments against them in Wisconsin within sixty days from the rendition thereof, or cease issuing policies until the judgment is paid, and provides a forfeiture for violation, the situs of the judgment debt for the purpose of garnishment at the time was in Wisconsin.

Renier v. Hurlbut et al. (Wis. S. C.), 50 Northwestern Reporter (Jan. 16, 1892), p. 783; 34 Central Law Journal (Feb. 19, 1892), p. 149.

Mortgagee's Policy--Personal Property-Assignment in Bankruptcy--Change in Title.--Where, by the terms of an insurance policy on personal property, the loss is made payable to the mortgagee, as his interest may appear, and the amount of the mortgage exceeds that of the policy, an assignment of the property by the mortgagor to a trustee, under an order of court in bankruptcy proceedings, does not avoid the policy under a provision therein that it shall be void if change in the title or possession takes place by legal process or judicial decree, since the title to mortgaged personal property is in the mortgagee, and the assignment by the mortgagor could not vest it in the trustee.

Same--Insurable Interest-Estoppel.-Where an insurance company issues a policy of insurance on personal property to the mortgagor, and by the terms of the policy makes the loss payable to the mortgagee, as his interest may appear, it is estopped to say that the mortgagor has no insurable interest in the property.

Same--Assignment.--The fact that a petition in bankruptcy specifically describes a policy of fire insurance as part of the bankrupt's assets, and that under an order of court he assigns all his property generally to a trustee, if he does not actually deliver the policy to the trustee or assign it, does not amount to an assignment that will avoid the policy under a condition therein that it shall be void if assigned before loss, without the company's assent indorsed thereon.

Appleton Iron Co. et al. v. British America Assurance Co. (Wis. S. C.), 50 Northwestern Reporter (Feb. 13, 1892), p. 1100; 8 Insurance Law Journal, 177.

Assignment of Policy--Garnishment.-A transfer of an insurance policy, with the assent of the insurance company as security for a debt, "as its interest may appear," is valid, and the lien created thereby is superior to that by garnishment by a subsequent creditor.

Same-Powers of Officers of Corporations.--Where the articles incorporating a company provide that all commercial paper and other written instruments shall be signed or indorsed by, and all contracts made by or with the president or secretary, acting jointly or separately, and in no other manner, a transfer of insurance policies by the president of such company will be presumed to have been made by authority.

Same--Consideration.-A pre-existing debt is a sufficient consideration for an assignment of insurance policies after loss of the property insured.

Glover et al. v. Wells et al. (Ill. S. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 12, 1892), p. 680.

Mortgage--"Property Insured"-Policy.--Defendant insured a house and a barn, and certain personal property therein and on the premises. The policy contained a provision that, "if the property shall hereafter become mortgaged or incumbered, this policy shall become void. Held, that the words "the property" meant all the insured property, and a mortgage of a part thereof was not a violation of the conditions of the policy.

Phenix Ins. Co. v. Lorenz (Ind. App. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 12, 1892), p. 604.

Completion of Contract--Evidence.--The company denied that there had been a completed contract of insurance. The evidence showed that there had been an application for the policy, and a note given for the premium; that there had been a policy of insurance delivered, but it was not clear by whom; that the note was unpaid at the time of loss; that notice in regard to this note had been sent out, but the record is silent as to its contents. There was no evidence that the policy was countersigned by the agent, as required by the terms of the policy. Held, that the evidence made out a prima facie case in favor of plaintiff.

Policy-Countersigning-Waiver.-Where there has been a delivery of a policy by an agent, or a renewal receipt with his name written upon it, as a completed instrument, neither he nor the company can afterwards object that it was not countersigned by him.

German Fire Ins. Co. v. Laggart (Kas. S. C.), 28 Pacific Reporter (Feb. 11, 1892), p. 718; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 374.

Ownership of Property-Mortgagee's Policy.-R, after mortgaging reality to plaintiff, conveyed all his property to another, in trust to pay

his debts out of the same, and convey back the residue, if any, to R. Subsequently, plaintiff obtained a judgment of foreclosure. Before any sale under the judgment, and after R's death, plaintiff procured the property mortgaged to be insured under the name of "estate of R," loss, if any, payable to plaintiff as mortgagee, the policy providing that it should be void if the interest of the assured, other than the absolute and sole ownership was not stated therein. Held, that plaintiff had an insurable interest as mortgagee, which it would be presumed the parties intended to insure; the words "estate of R.” being used as words of description.

Weed v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (Feb. 18, 1892), p. 206; 42 New York State Reporter (Feb., 1892), p.

477.

Contract-When Complete-Presumption of Law.-The plaintiff made application for insurance to defendant through one N, who had no power to accept a risk. N communicated the application to S, a general agent of defendant, who immediately notified N that, the risk being special, he would have to wait the answer of defendant as to whether it would assume the risk. The defendant refused the risk, and so notified S, but S never communicated the answer of defendant to N or the plaintiff. The plaintiff called on N concerning the insurance, and he said "that it was all right, that he had heard nothing from the company, and consequently it was all right, that he would get the policy in a day or two." The plaintiff claimed that the defendant, by its silence, was estopped to claim there was no contract to insure. Held, that the mere failure to respond to an application raises no presumption that the company accepted and insured the risk. The proper inference from failure to respond to a proposition of any kind is that it is rejected or declined. A proposal for insurance can not become a contract from delay in rejecting or answering it.

Same-Same-Evidence.--On May 12, plaintiffs desiring to insure their premises, applied to one N, who had possession of blanks issued by defendant company, but no written appointment from it; and N made out the application and forwarded it to defendant's agent in a neighboring town, who acknowledged the receipt, and stated that he would notify N as soon as he heard from the company; that the risk was a special one which he could not accept without the company's approval. About May 18 the defendant's agent was notified that the company declined the risk, but omitted to so inform N. until after a loss, which occurred June 6. The premium for the insurance had previously been paid N by plaintiffs, but N had not remitted to defendant's agent. At that time N informed plaintiffs that the policy would be all right. Held, that defendant was not liable.

Same-Same--Payment of Premium.--As N had no power to

bind the company, as plaintiffs knew, the payment of the premium to him did not render the defendant liable. Reversing 10 N. Y. Supp. 44.

More et al. v. New York Bowery Fire Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 19, 1892), p. 757; 42 New York State Reporter (Feb., 1892), p 543.

Policy-Assignment.-Where it is stipulated in a fire insurance policy that it is not assignable as security for a debt, but that in case of actual sale and transfer of title it may be assigned with the assent of the company, an assignment to secure a debt is void, and the assignee can not recover on it, though the company assented to the assignment, supposing it to be absolute.

Lynde v. Newark Fire Ins. Co. (Mass. S. J. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Jan. 1, 1892), p. 222.

Policy-Foreclosure of Mortgage-Forfeiture-Waiver.-After the commencement of foreclosure proceedings by the mortgagee to whom the insurance was made payable under the policy, but which was rendered void by the commencement of such proceedings without consent, application was made to the company for consent to continue such action, to which no reply was made. After the fire, the owner refusing to make proofs of loss, they were made by the plaintiff, whereupon the defendant notified him that it declined to receive said proofs as not having been made by the assured. Held, that this was not a waiver of the condition rendering the policy void in case of a foreclosure without the company's consent. 31 N. Y. St. Rep. 201; 9 N. Y. Supp. 873, reversed.

Consent to Foreclosure-Silence.-The failure of the company to reply to the plaintiff's letter requesting consent to the foreclosure proceedings, raised no inference that the company consented to the foreclosure action.

Armstrong v. Agricultural Ins. Co. (N. Y. C. A.), 42 New York State Reporter (Feb., 1892), p. 555; 29 Northeastern Reporter (March 4, 1892), p. 991; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 431.

Policy-Appraisal of Loss-Estoppel.-The company, as defense to the action, pleaded that the loss had not been appraised in accordance with the provision of the policy. There was evidence tending to show that the defendant's appraiser had refused to agree upon a "disinterested umpire," and had nominated persons who were unknown to the appraisers selected by the assured, and who had been frequently employed as appraisers and umpires by the company. Held, that the court properly refused an instruction that the appraiser did not represent the defendant in the conduct of the appraisal, and that it was not bound by what he had done or failed to do in the selection of an umpire.

Same-Proofs of Loss-Waiver.-The provision in the policy that proofs of loss shall be furnished within a certain time, is waived where, after the expiration of such time, a written agreement is made to sub