by the corporation, he is "unconditional and sole owner" of the building within the provisions of an insurance policy.

Policy-Vacancy-Church Building.-It appeared that the pastor bought the church building at judicial sale, with his own money and in his own name, and continued to hold services until a year before the building was destroyed by fire; that during the time the services were not held the sexton continued to take the same care of the church as formerly; and that the pastor lived in the adjoining building, and frequently visited the church. Held, that a finding by the referee that the church was not vacant, within the meaning of the clause in the policy rendering the policy void if the building should become vacant or unoccupied, would not be disturbed.

Same- -“Levying an Execution.”—The issuing of an execution on real property, followed by an advertisement of sale by the sheriff, does not affect a change of title, nor is it "levying an execution," within the meaning of the clause in a policy of fire insurance. Such clause has reference to personal property only.

Same-Indorsements on Policy.-The policy provided that it should be void if the insured obtained other insurance without the consent of the company indorsed on the policy. There was written on the policy the following clauses: "Other insurance permitted, concurrent in form herewith." "Loss, if any, payable to T., executor, to the extent of his mortgage interest." Other insurance was obtained which was not concurrent in form, and the company claimed a forfeiture. Held, that the indorsements were not part of the policy, and that the provision in the other policies was not required to be concurrent in form.

Ownership of Property-Presumption of Law.-The possession of a church building purchased at judicial sale does not afford a presumption of ownership of an organ standing in the building, but not annexed to the realty.

Caraher et al. v. Royal Ins. Co., and Five other Companies (N. Y. S. C.), 17 New York Supplement (March 24, 1892), p. 858; 44 New York State Reporter, 141.

Policy--Other Insurance.-The policy provided that it should be void if the assured obtained other insurance on the property without the consent of the company. The partner of the insured obtained other insurance on his separate interest. Held, that the clause in the policy regarding other insurance must be construed to mean other insurance on the same interest, and that there was no other insurance within the meaning of the policy.

Same-Proofs of Loss.-The policy provided that proofs of loss were to be furnished within thirty days; that the claim should not be due until "sixty days after the completion of all requirements herein

contained;" and that action thereon should be barred unless brought within six months after loss. Held, that this clause in the policy did not mean that the policy should be forfeited unless proofs were furnished within thirty days, but that the right of action should be postponed until proofs were furnished, which must be done sometime within six months.

Same-Risk-Evidence.-The insurance was written on a stock of eggs "in pickle," and the agent who wrote the policy testified that he understood the insurance was to cover the stock "while being pickled and disposed of." Held, that the entire stock was insured, though only a part of the eggs were in the pickling vats at the time of the loss.

Excessive Judgment--Remittitur-Costs.-The judgment appealed from was excessive by an erroneous computation. In the supreme court the excess was remitted, with appellant's consent, after which the case was brought to a hearing and the judgment was affirmed. Held, that the appellee was entitled to the full costs of appeal.

Hall v. Concordia Fire Ins. Co. (Mich. S. C.), 51 Northwestern Reporter (March 26, 1892), p. 524.

Agency-Evidence-Ratification.-Where a party acting has no authority to act for a third party, and does not profess at the time to be acting for him, the subsequent assent of the third party to be bound as principal has no operation. A ratification is only effectual when the act is done by a person professedly acting as the agent of the party sought to be charged.

Mitchell v. Minnesota Fire Ass'n (Minn. S. C.), 51 Northwestern Reporter (March 26, 1892), p. 608; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 420.

Policy-Divisible Contract-Evidence.-In an action on a policy of insurance covering property located at different places, and in which one sum was specified as the premium on all the property, in order to show that the policy was divisible, and that a breach of condition as to the property in one place would not forfeit the insurance as to the other property, evidence aliunde the policy is admissible to show that different rates of insurance were understood by both parties to be charged on the property, and that the aggregate premium expressed in the policy was an average between higher and lower rates. Affirming 77 Wis. 87; 45 N. W. Rep. 813.

Loomis v. Rockford Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 51 Northwestern Reporter (March 26, '92), p. 564; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 564.

Policy-Mortgage-Waiver-Statute.-The policy provided that it should be void if the property became mortgaged without the consent of the company. Held, that Rev. St. Wis., 1977, declaring that whoever solicits insurance on behalf of an insurance company, or transmits an application to a company, or a policy to or from it, or collects or re

ceives any premium, or aids in doing either, shall be deemed an agent for such company, will not, where a policy has been issued by a company through an agent, make the acts of the agent, 10 months afterwards, in assisting the assured to make a mortgage on the property insured, a waiver of the forfeiture for breach of the condition of the policy, where nothing is said about the policy, and the agent testifies that he had forgotten about it.

Same-Indivisible Contract-Forfeiture.-Where a policy of insurance on buildings and on personal property therein, insuring each for a certain amount, is void as to the buildings because of an incumbrance placed thereon without the company's consent, it is also void as to the personal property.

Stevens v. Queen Ins. Co. (Wis. S. C.), 55 Northwestern Reporter (March 26, 1892), p. 555; 21 Insurance Law Journal, 443.

Payment of Loss to Mortgagee-Subrogation.-In an action to foreclose a mortgage, where the court finds that the plaintiff issued a policy of insurance to one of the defendants upon a dwelling-house situated upon the mortgaged premises, and made the loss payable to the mortgagee, and that the mortgagee assigned the notes, mortgage, and such policy to another, with the knowledge of the insurer, and that the property insured was totally destroyed by fire, of which the company had notice, and that it inspected the loss, and, after such inspection, paid the amount of the policy to the mortgagee, and took an assignment of the notes, mortgage, and policy to itself: Held, that such findings are sufficient to show an indebtedness on the part of the plaintiff to the defendant to an amount equal to the amount of the policy, and that such payment should be considered a satisfaction pro tanto of the amount due on the notes and mortgage.

Home Ins. Co. v. Marshall et al. (Kan. S. C.), 29 Pacific Reporter (April 7, 1892), p. 161.

Policy-Change in Title or Interest--Sale by One Partner.-The policy provided that it should be void if there should take place "any change in the title or interest of the assured." One of the partners in the firm sold his interest in the business to his co-partner. Held, that there was no such change in the title or interest as was contemplated by the clause in the policy.

Same-Fraud or False Swearing-Forfeiture.-The policy provided that it should be void if the insured should be guilty of fraud or false swearing in the proofs of loss. On the trial it was shown that the insured had submitted false and altered invoices in his claim for loss. Held, that the policy was avoided.

Virginia F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Vaughan (Va. S. C. A.), 16 Virginia Law Journal (April 14, 1892), p. 231; 14 Southeastern Reporter (April 19, 1892), p. 54.

Application-Policy-Limitations on Agent's Powers-False Answer in Application Inserted by Agent.-Where the application signed by the insured, recites that it is the statement of the applicant, and that the company will not be bound by any act or statement of the agent not contained in the application, and it is a warranty relied upon by the company which the applicant should carefully examine before signing, and the policy contains similar recitals as to the warranty and power of agents, the company will not be bound by false answers inserted by agent as to value, title and incumbrance.

Title-Mortgage Overdue.-In case of a mortgage long overdue, the legal title to the mortgaged property is in the mortgagee.

Breach of Warranty-Rule.-A breach of warranty depends upon the untruthfulness of the statements made, and not on the question of fraud.

Policy-Indivisible Contract.-The policy covered buildings and contents, separately valued. The policy provided that in case of breach of warranty the policy should be void, and no loss should be recoverable on any portion of the property insured. Held, that the contract was entire, and a breach as to part of the insured property forfeits the entire policy. Holloway v. Dwelling-House Ins. Co. (St. L. C. A.), 21 Insurance Law Journal (April, 1892), p. 379.

Policy-Right to Subrogation.-The policy provided that the loss, if any, should be payable to the mortgagee; that as to the mortgagee the policy should not be avoided by the act or neglect of the mortgagor; and that, if the insurance company paid the amount of the loss to the mortgagee, claiming that, as to the mortgagor, no liability existed, it should, as to the extent of such payment, be subrogated to the rights of the mortgagee. Held, that the insurance company, on payment to the mortgagee, did not become subrogated to his rights unless it was in fact not liable to the mortgagor on the policy.

Same "Vacant and Unoccupied.”—A building insured as a dwelling-house was occupied by a tenant. On March 15th he moved out, and the house was burned on May 5th. During the interval the owner, who lived just across the street, was frequently in the house during the day with some of her family, and the servant slept there at night. Held, that the house was not unoccupied, within the meaning of a provision in the policy that the premises should not be allowed to become vacant or unoccupied, nor cease to be occupied as a dwelling-house.

Traders' Ins. Co. et al. v. Race (Ill. S. C.), 29 Northeastern Reporter (Feb. 26, 1892), p. 846; 21 Insurance Law Journal (April, 1892), p. 363.

Mortgagee's Policy-Payment to Mortgagor-Right of Mortgagee. The mortgagee of property, upon which the mortgagor has

taken out insurance, has a right in case of loss by fire, to such portion of the insurance money as is necessary to pay his mortgage debt, and if the company pay the amount of the loss to the mortgagor, without the consent of the mortgagee, the latter may, nevertheless, compel the company to pay him the loss, or so much thereof as will satisfy his debt.

Same-Arbitration.—The endorsement of such policy by the company for the benefit of the mortgagee, and his acceptance of it, binds him to the terms of the policy. The provision in such policy that in case of fire the amount of the loss shall be ascertained by arbitration upon the request of either "party," requires that the arbitration shall be between the real parties in interest, in this case between the mortgagee and the company. Therefore, the mortgagee is not concluded by an arbitration between the company and the insured, to which he was not a party.

Bergman v. Commercial Ins. Co. et al. (Ky. C. A.), 13 Kentucky Law Reporter (April 1, 1892), p. 720; 18 Southwestern Reporter (Feb. 8, 1892), p. 122; 21 Insurance Law Journal (March, 1892), p. 271; 15 Lawyers' Reports, Annotated, 270.

Policy-Limitation of Action--Waiver.-The policy required that any action brought for loss or damage thereunder should be brought within twelve months next after the happening of the loss or damage. Defendant's agent called on plaintiff to adjust the loss, but the adjustment was delayed because, as the agent claimed, of error in the books of plaintiff. The agent required the plaintiff to procure duplicate bills of invoice, and refused to consider the loss until such duplicates were obtained. The time consumed in procuring such duplicates extended beyond the twelve months' limitation provided in the policy. Held, that the conduct of the agent operated as a waiver of the limitation clause, notwithstanding a provision in the policy that no officer or agent had power to waive any provision in the policy unless such waiver should be endorsed thereon in writing. Merrimon, C. J., dissenting.

Dibbrell et al. v. Georgia Home Ins. Co. (N. C. S. C.), 14 Southeastern Reporter (April 19, 1892), p. 783.

Mutual Company-Constitution-Forfeiture of Membership— Waiver.—The constitution of a mutual fire insurance association provided that insurance in the association should be perpetual, unless a member should withdraw, which he could only do by paying his proportion of all prior losses, and notifying the secretary; and further that, should any member fail to pay his assessments for more than sixty days, he should forfeit his protection until all dues should be paid. Held, that if, while a member was delinquent in the payment of assessments for more than sixty days, he suffered a loss, and the association, instead of declaring his membership forfeited, should adjust the loss and allow the same, this would be a waiver of the forfeiture; and that the forfeiture would also be waived if, while the member was so delinquent,