Exch. of Pleas, 1840. VYSE บ. WAKEFIELD. ALDERSON, B.-I am of the same opinion; and my judgment is founded on the authority of Haule v. Hemyng, as reported in Viner's Abr. " Condition," (A. d.), pl. 15. In this case, the defendant covenants that he will not do any act, deed, or thing, whereby any such insurance may be avoided or prejudiced. The insurance is to be effected at any time or times, or at any office or offices, within certain limits, and is not confined to the then existing offices. The plaintiff has the selection from an indefinite number; and it seems to me, that the person who is to select the office must give notice of his having done SO. If the defendant had received notice that an insurance was effected in the Rock Life Insurance Company, I by no means say that he would not be bound to inform himself of any conditions to which it might be subject. ROLFE, B.-I am of the same opinion. I own that when the case was first opened, my impression was in favour of the plaintiff; and for this reason, that when a party enters into a contract, he is bound to perform it, whether reasonable or not. Where the law casts an obligation upon him, it says that it shall be reasonable: but that is not so where a party contracts to do a particular act; for then it is his own fault for entering into such a contract. In the progress of the argument, my opinion changed; and I think that the plaintiff was bound to give notice. I find it stated in Viner's Abr. "Condition," (A. d.), pl. 10,—" If I am bound to enfeoff such persons as the obligee shall name, he ought to give notice of those he names, otherwise I am not bound to enfeoff them:" and reason seems in favour of this principle of law. The question is, what is the meaning of the contract, where a party covenants to do something at the option of another? It must mean, provided he have notice of that option hav ing been exercised. Judgment for the defendant. Exch. of Pleas, 1840. VANDERSTEGEN and Another v. WITHAM. Where the lady, who had authorized the receive her trustees of a defendant to rents, counter the money re ceived by the defendant un W. H. WATSON applied for a rule to shew cause why the proceedings in this action should not be stayed, in order to enable the defendant to apply for an injunction to restrain the plaintiffs from proceeding in the action. It appeared from the affidavits, that the defendant was the manded his attorney of a Mrs. Vaughan, and had been authorized by auth authority, and her to receive certain rents and money for her; but that tion to recover the plaintiff's, who were her trustees, had countermanded his authority, and brought this action to recover the money which he had so received. A bill in equity had been filed by the defendant against the plaintiff's, to obtain the injunction; and the affidavits stated, that he was advised and believed he had sufficient grounds for obtaining it, but that, by the practice of the Court, it could not be obtained until the lapse of about sixteen days.-Watson referred to, and relied upon, a note at the conclusion of the case of Best v. Thorowgood (a), which is as follows:-" A stay of the postea was afterwards obtained, until answer put in by the plaintiff to a bill in equity filed against him by the defendant." PARKE, B.-It is impossible for us to interfere, and to stop the plaintiffs from proceeding in their action, which, upon the facts stated, they are entitled to bring. If the defendant has any equity, he must apply to the proper Court to restrain the plaintiff's from proceeding with the suit. As to the authority cited from the case of Best v. Thorowgood, the note is very short, and it does not appear upon what ground the rule was granted in that case; nor am I satisfied that the decision of the Court there was correct, or consider it to be a sufficient authority for us to interfere (a) 4 Tyrw. 264; S. C. nom. Best v. Argles, 2 C. & M. 394. See 3 Dowl. P. C. 701. der that autho rity-Held, had no power proceedings in that the Court to order the the action to be stayed, in order to give fendant to obtain an injunc time to the de tion to restrain the action. 1840. Exch. of Pleas, and stop the plaintiffs' proceedings, when we do not know what answer they may give to the bill which has been VANDERSTE- filed against them, and it may turn out that the defendant GEN v. WITHAM. has no equity at all. ALDERSON, B.-It seems to me that we ought not to grant this application. It is, in effect, calling upon this Court to grant an injunction now, on the chance that some other Court will grant one at some future period. If we have power to stay the proceedings for sixteen days, there is no reason why we should not stay them for a longer period, and grant a perpetual injunction. If it be thought expedient that the Courts of law should have the power of granting injunctions, the legislature may, if they think proper, confer such a power, but at present they have none. GURNEY, B., and ROLFE, concurred. Rule refused. Assumpsit. The declaration stated, that and at the time GRANGER V. COLLINS. ASSUMPSIT. The declaration stated, that whereas theretofore, and before and at the time of the making whereas before of the agreement thereinafter mentioned, the defendant held the house and premises thereinafter mentioned, for the residue of a certain term of years therein; and thereupon afterwards, to wit, on the 20th day of December, 1837, the defendant agreed to let to the plaintiff, who then of making mentioned, the defendant held the house and premises thereinafter mentioned, for the residue of a term of years, and thereupon afterwards, to wit, on &c., agreed to let to the plaintiff, who then agreed to take of the defendant, the said house and premises at a certain rent; and in consideration of the premises, the defendant promised the plaintiff that he should quietly hold and enjoy the said house and premises during the said term, without any eviction from the parties entitled to the reversion; nevertheless, he the plaintiff was evicted by the party entitled to the reversion:-Held, on demurrer, that the declaration was bad, inasmuch as, the plaintif having declared on the simple relation of landlord and tenant, no such duty as that laid as the defendant's promise arose from that relation. 1840. GRANGER V. COLLINS. agreed to take of the defendant, the said house and pre- Exch. of Pleas, mises, situate and being in Hunter-street, Brunswicksquare, in the county of Middlesex, including the use of the several fixtures therein, for the term of three years from the 14th day of August, 1837, at the rent of 737. 10s. a-year, payable quarterly, [setting forth the days of payment, &c.;] and in consideration of the premises, the defendant afterwards, to wit, on the day and year first aforesaid, promised the plaintiff that he should quietly hold and enjoy the said house and premises during the said term, and according to the true intent and meaning of the said agreement, and without any eviction from or by the party or parties entitled to the reversion of or in the said house and premises, expectant on the reversion of the defendant's lease. And the plaintiff in fact saith, that afterwards, to wit, on the day and year first aforesaid, he entered into and upon the said house and premises, and became and was possessed thereof as such tenant as aforesaid, and that he duly performed all things in the said agreement contained on his part and behalf to be performed; nevertheless the plaintiff in fact saith, that afterwards, and during the said term of three years in the said agreement mentioned, to wit, on the 5th day of July, 1839, he the said plaintiff was evicted from the said house and premises by the party or parties entitled to the reversion of and in the said house and premises expectant on the termination of the defendant's lease, contrary to the promise of the said defendant, &c. The defendant pleaded a plea, to which the plaintiff demurred specially; but as the Court, on a former day, had intimated a doubt whether the declaration could be maintained, and the argument now turned on that question alone, the plea is omitted. The defendant's points of objection to the declaration, appended to the demurrer book, were as follows:-That the declaration states such a promise by the defendant as Exch. of Pleas, the law will not imply, and imposes a much more extensive liability upon the defendant than he is subject to in point 1840. GRANGER v. COLLINS. of law. That the defendant's promise, as stated in the declaration, would render him liable even for a wrongful eviction of the plaintiff by the party or parties entitled to the reversion expectant on the termination of the defendant's lease, or for an eviction (as in the present case) in consequence of the plaintiff's own wrongful act, his breach of the agreement under which he held the premises as the defendant's tenant. That the promise stated in the declaration is not warranted by the introductory statement therein, nor is such a promise as would be inferred or implied by law from the facts stated in the declaration. Kelly, in support of the declaration. It may be admitted that the declaration would be bad, if the promise were laid as resulting from the simple relation of landlord and tenant; but it is submitted that it is not so stated. It may be that the consideration for the promise is ambiguously stated, and might be insufficient upon special demurrer. There is nothing here to shew that the defendant did not enter into a written agreement, to the effect of the promise set forth in the declaration. [Parke, B.-If there had been any special agreement to that effect, it ought to have been stated.] Montagu Smith, contrà, was not called upon. Lord ABINGER, C. B.-If the plaintiff originally became tenant to the defendant, without any agreement as to the eviction, the law would not afterwards impose such a liability on the defendant as is here stated. No such liability arose from the simple relation of landlord and tenant, and that, we think, is the relation on which the |