CHARITABLE USES.

SECTION 19. IN GENERAL.

Charitable uses or trusts have their origin in the Statutes of Charitable Uses,' which enumerated the purposes for which charitable uses might be created as follows:

"The relief of aged, impotent, and poor people; the maintenance of maimed and sick soldiers and mariners; the support of schools of learning, free schools, and scholars of universities; repairs of bridges, ports, havens, causeways, churches, sea-banks, and highways; education and preferment of orphans; the relief, stock, and maintenance of houses of correction; marriage of poor maids; and help of young tradesmen, handicraftsmen, and persons decayed; relief or redemption of prisoners and captives; aid of poor inhabitants concerning payments of fifteenths, setting out of soldiers, and other taxes."

This statute has served as the basis of the law on this subject in the various states of this country. SECTION 20. CHARACTER AND CHARACTERISTICS OF CHARITABLE USES.

The character and characteristics of charitable uses have been thus summarized in a recent treatise on this subject: 2

"Charitable' uses, in the language of English

: 43 Eliz., C. 4.

• "The True Principles of Legislation with Regard to Property

Given for Charitable Uses or

Other Public Uses," by Courtney S. Kenny, L.L. M. (Essay which won the Yorke Prize of the University of Cambridge.)

law, are simply a class of public uses. To be publicthat is, to benefit indefinite individuals-is essential to the legal idea of charity. A gift of a shilling to a poor neighbor, or of a hundred pounds to set up a grandchild in business, may be beneficent, and beneficent in the fuller sense of exceeding those reasonable expectations of his which it would be an act of mere justice to satisfy. In every ordinary sense it may be an act of 'charity.' But such gifts, or even a gift of money for such ten poor curates as the Bishop of London may select, would not be called 'charitable' by English lawyers, since each recipient is an ascertained person, or readily can be rendered such.

"Now as it is this characteristic of indefiniteness that distinguishes public from private uses, it is upon it that whatever is necessarily peculiar and anomalous in the legal treatment of public gifts must depend. There is no definite person who can claim the due application of the gift. Then the law must supply peculiar and anomalous means for securing that due application. Some measure of supervision is needed in the case of property devoted to public uses, which is unnecessary for private property.

"Gifts to public uses, again, are almost always characterised by a real or apparent meritoriousness. Some rare instances may indeed be found-like gifts for diminishing the national debt, or for setting up a monument to the donor-in which the object is so futile or so personal that the gift will not inspire gratitude or admiration in even the most unreflecting observer. But in almost all cases a public gift has at least the semblance of a public benefit, and its donor is regarded by the majority of mankind with the reverence due to a 'pious founder.' This attribute.

of meritoriousness, again, demands the attention of the jurist. The desire of public applause, the hope of divine favor, the impulse of benevolent zeal, may blind the founder to primary but commonplace obligations. As there is this special hazard of his being generous before he is just, the law may have to supply peculiar and anomalous means for limiting his generosity. Some measure of restriction is needed-at any rate in certain stages of a nation's spiritual development-in the case of property devoted to perpetual public uses, which is unnecessary for private property.

"But there is a third and still more remarkable attribute, which, though far from being an essential characteristic of gifts to public uses, is nevertheless attached to the great majority of them, and to all that are of any considerable value. It is that of perpetuity. A charitable foundation is usually intended to escape the fate of all other human institutions, and to continue its work of benficence forever."

"Some measure of revision is needed in the case of property devoted to perpetual public uses which is unnecessary for private property.

"Indefiniteness, meritoriousness,

perpetuity

these, then, are the three peculiarities which make public endowments require a correspondingly peculiar treatment at the hands of the legislator."

SECTION 21. PURPOSES FOR WHICH CHARITABLE USES MAY BE CREATED.

The purposes for which charitable uses may be created are, in general, those enumerated in the Statute of Charitable Uses. This list is not exclusive, however, and many important species of charity at the present time are not included. The three most

important classes of charitable uses are those for religious, educational, and benevolent purposes.

SECTION 22. USES FOR RELIGIOUS PURPOSES.

Formerly, in England, the only charitable uses which could be created were those in favor of the established church. A much more liberal rule prevails in America, and property may be left in trust for any religious sect. This question was discussed by the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case of Hoeffer vs. Clogan, as follows:

3

"The doctrine of charitable uses has been repeatedly held to be a part of the law of this state. The equitable jurisdiction over such trusts was not derived from the statute of charitable uses (43 Eliz., Chap. 4), but prior to and independent of that statute charities were sustained irrespective of indefiniteness of the beneficiaries, or the lack of trustees, or the fact that the trustees appointed were not competent to take (Vidal vs. Girard, 2 How., 127; Heuser vs. Harris, 42 Ill., 425). The statute, however, became a part of the common law of this state. Heuser vs. Harris, supra; Andrews vs. Andrews, 110 Ill., 223; Hunt vs. Fowler, 121 Ill., 269, 12 N. E., 331, and 17 N. E., 491. The statute of charitable uses of Elizabeth has, since its passage, been considered as showing the general spirit and intent of the term 'charitable,' and the objects which come within such general spirit and intendment are to be so regarded. The definition given by Mr. Justice Gray in the case of Jackson vs. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539, was adopted and approved by this court in the case of Crerar vs. Williams, 145 Ill., 625; 34 N. E., 467. It is as follows: 'A charity in a legal sense, may be more fully defined as a gift, to

* 171 Ill., 462, 49 N. E., 527.