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BUTTER.

every such motor vehicle owned by him, whenever the same shall be driven or used upon the public streets, roads, parks, drives or other public highways in this state, such numbers to be separate Arabic numerals not less than four inches in height and each stroke to be of a width not less than one-half of an inch, and also, as part of such number, the letters "ILL."; such numbers and letters shall be black on white ground, and such letters to be not less than one inch in height. (Sec. 3.) ог

No person shall manufacture or sell any butter that is produced by taking original packing stock butter, or other butter, and melting the same so that the butter fat can be drawn off or extracted, then mixing the butter with skimmed milk and rechurning the mixture, or that produced by any process that is familiarly known as process or renovated butter, unless the words "renovated butter" are plainly branded on the top and sides of each tub, box, pail or other kind of case package in which it is put up. In case such butter is exposed for sale uncovered a placard containing the label so printed shall be attached to the mass of butter in such manner as to be easily seen and read by the purchaser.

PENALTIES.

Any person violating the provisions of the law shall for the first offense be fined not less than $15 nor more than $100 or by imprisonment in jail not exceeding thirty days or by both fine and imprisonment. For the second and each subsequent offense the punishment is a fine of from $25 to $200 or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. (Approved May 14, 1907.)

CATTLE INSPECTION.

For the purpose of preventing the use of meat unfit for human food the board of live stock commissioners may make, or cause to be made by the state veterinarian or any duly authorized livestock inspector, an examination of any animal intended for human food which is believed to be afflicted with any contagious or infectious disease or ailment which would render the carcass unfit for human food. If any animal so inspected is found to be afflicted with any disease it shall be immediately killed and the carcass examined. If it is then found suitable for human food it shall be turned over to the owner for disposition or be sold by the examiner; if unfit for food it shall be condemned and destroyed. (Filed May 27, 1907.) BUTTERINE AND ICE-CREAM FACTORIES. All buildings and rooms occupied by butterine and ice-cream manufacturers shall be drained and plumbed so as to be healthful and sanitary and shall be constructed with airshafts, windows and ventilating pipes sufficient to insure ventilation. Room's must be at least eight feet high, floors must be of cement, tiling or wood saturated with linseed oil, and walls must be plastered and wainscoted. These and other requirements of a like nature are to be enforced by the state factory inspector and his assistants. (Approved June 3, 1907.)

ILLINOIS AUTOMOBILE LAW.
MOTOR VEHICLES.

The term motor vehicle as used in the act includes automobiles, locomobiles and other vehicles not propelled by muscular power, except motor bicycles, traction engines and cars running on tracks. It does not include bicycles or tricycles. (Sec. 1.)

REGISTRATION SEAL.

Every owner of a motor vehicle in the state shall within ten days after he becomes the owner of such a vehicle file in the office of the secretary of state a declaration of his name and address, with a brief description of the vehicle to be registered, on a blank to be furnished by the secretary of state for that purpose, to whom he shall pay a registration fee of $2 for each motor vehicle owned by the person making the declaration. The secretary shall then deliver to the owner without any other fee a seal of aluminum or other suitable metal which shall be circular in form and not to exceed two inches in diameter, having stamped thereon the words, "Registered Motor Vehicle No. Illinois Motor Vehicle Law, with the registration number inserted thereon, which seal shall thereafter at all times be affixed to the motor vehicle to which the number has been assigned. (Sec. 2.)

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DISPLAY OF NUMBERS.

The owner of each motor vehicle shall have a number corresponding with the number of the registration seal issued by the secretary of state conspicuously displayed upon the front and back of

LAMPS AND NUMBERS THEREON.

Every motor vehicle shall carry, during the period from sunset to one hour before sunrise, at least two lighted lamps showing white lights visible at least 200 feet in the direction toward which each motor vehicle is proceeding, and shall also exhibit at least one red light visible in the reverse direction, attached to the rear of such motor vehicle. Upon each of the glass fronts of the lamps showing white lights shall be displayed in such manner as to be plainly visible, when the lamps are lighted, the number of the certificate issued by the secretary of state, and in addition thereto the letters "ILL.," such figures to be in separate Arabic numerals not less than one inch in height. (Sec. 4.)

REGISTRATION OF MANUFACTURERS AND DEALERS. Each manufacturer of and dealer in motor vehicles doing business in this state shall register one vehicle of each class manufactured or dealt in by him and if a number corresponding to the number of the registration seal is displayed upon every vehicle of the class while it is being operated on the public highway it shall be deemed a sufficient compliance with sections 2, 3 and 4 of this act until such vehicle is sold. Electric. steam and gasoline motor vehicles shall each constitute a class. This section does not apply to a motor vehicle used by a manufacturer or dealer for his private use or for hire. (Sec. 5.)

FICTITIOUS NUMBER.

No motor vehicle shall be used upon the public highways of this state which shall display thereon a number belonging to any other vehicle or fictitious registration number. Any number displayed for any lawful purpose is not prohibited. (Sec. 6.) REGISTRATION BY SUBSEQUENT PURCHASERS The vendor and purchaser of every motor vehicle which has been previously registered by any person other than a manufacturer or dealer shall, within ten days after such sale, join in a statement and send the same by mail to the secreary of state, together with a filing fee of 50 cents, and thereupon said registration shall cease to apply to the motor vehicle so sold, and the purchaser of such motor vehicle shall register the same as in case of an original registration and another and different number than the original registration number shall be assigned by the secretary of state, and the person to whom the original registration number was first issued shall have the right to register any other motor vehicle owned by him as herein provided and have said original registration number assigned thereto at any time within one year thereafter. The statement shall notify the secretary of state of the sale and of the name and address of the purchaser. (Sec. 7.)

NONRESIDENTS AND REGISTRATION. The provisions of sections 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 shall not apply to any motor vehicle owned by nonresidents of this state, provided the owner thereof has complied with the automobile laws of the place of his residence and provided the regis tration number showing the initial or abbreviation of the name of the state, territory or city where he resides is displayed on his vehicle substantially as required in section 3. The carrying of lighted lamps as provided in the first part of section 4 is, however, compulsory. (Sec. 8.)

BRAKES AND HORNS.

Every motor vehicle while in use on a public highway shall be provided with good and sufficient brakes and also with a suitable bell, horn or other signal device. No part of the machinery shall be left running while the vehicle is left standing without an attendant on any public highway. (Sec. 9.)

SPEED.

The following rates of speed may be maintained, but shall not be exceeded, upon any public highway in this state by any one driving a motor vehicle or motor bicycle.

(a) A speed of 1 mile in 10 minutes when turning a corner of intersecting streets or crossroads, and a speed of 1 mile in 4 minutes where any street, road or highway passes through the residence portions of any town, city or village.

(b) A speed of 1 mile in 6 minutes where such street or highway passes through closely built-up business portions of any town, city or village.

(c) Elsewhere and except as otherwise provided in subsections a and b of this section, a speed of 1 mile in 3 minutes. Provided, however, that nothing in this section contained shall permit any person to drive a motor vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable, having regard to the traffic and use of highways, or SO as to endanger the life or limb or injure the property of any person. (Sec. 10.)

RACING ON HIGHWAY.

Any person driving a motor vehicle or a motor bicycle upon a public highway in this state in a race shall, upon conviction, be fined in a sum not exceeding $200. (Sec. 11.)

PASSING HORSES.

Whenever it shall appear that any horse driven or ridden by any person upon any streets, roads or highways is about to become frightened by the approach of any motor vehicle, it shall be the duty of the person driving or conducting the motor vehicle to cause the same to come to a full stop until such horse or horses shall have passed. (Sec. 12.)

NO LOCAL LICENSES OR LAWS.

No owner of a motor vehicle who shall have obtained a certificate from the secretary of state shall be required to obtain any other license or permit to use the same, nor shall such owner be required to display upon his motor vehicle any other number than the number of the registration seal issued by the secretary of state, or be excluded or prohibited from, or limited in the free use of his said motor vehicle or vehicles, nor limited as to speed upon any public street, avenue, road, driveway or any other public place, at any time when the same is or may hereafter be opened to the use of persons having or using other vehicles, nor be required to comply with other provisions or conditions as to the use of motor vehicles, except as provided in this act. Nothing in this section applies to local speedways. Local authorities having jurisdiction over public parks and boulevards shall not be prohibited from enforcing such reasonable rules and regulations concerning the speed at which motor vehicles may be operated in such parks and on such boulevards, provided such speed shall not be lower than that fixed for other vehicles and provided the rate of speed allowed is indicated by signs conspicuously placed. Motor vehicles may be excluded from cemeteries. Except as in this section provided, no city, town or village shall have the power to make any ordinance, by-law or resolution limiting or restricting the use or speed of motor vehicles and all such local laws are declared of no effect. Municipal corporations, however, have the power to make and enforce ordinances, rules and regulations affecting motor vehicles which are used within their limits for public hire. (Sec. 13.)

CHAUFFEURS.

Every person hereafter desiring to operate a motor vehicle as chauffeur, which is hereby defined to mean any person operating a motor vehicle as mechanic or employe or for hire, shall file in the office of the secretary of state, on a blank to be supplied by such secretary, a statement which shall include his name and address and the trade name and motor power of the motor vehicle or vehicles he is competent to operate, and shall pay a registration fee of $1, and thereupon the secretary shall file such statement, register such chauffeur in a book or index to be kept for that purpose and assign to him a number. (Sec. 14.)

The secretary of state shall forthwith, upon such registration and without other fee, issue and deliver to such chauffeur a badge of aluminum or other suitable metal, which shall be oval in form and the greater diameter of which shall not be more than two inches, which said badge shall have stamped thereon the words, "Registered Chauffeur No. Illinois Motor Vehicle Law." with the registration number inserted therein, and which badge shall thereafter be worn by such chauffeur and pinned upon his clothing in a conspicuous place at all times while he is operating a motor vehicle upon the public highways. The wearing of fictitious or borrowed badges is prohibited. (Sec. 15.)

OWNER'S CONSENT.

No chauffeur or other person shall operate any motor vehicle in the absence of its owner without his consent. No chauffeur having the care of a motor vehicle for the owner shall receive or take indirectly any bonus, discount or other consideration for the purchase of supplies or parts for such motor vehicle, and no persons shall offer or give such bonus or consideration. Any person violating this section shall be fined not exceeding $200 or be imprisoned for six months or both. (Sec. 16.)

MUST GIVE WARNING.

Upon approaching a person walking on a public highway, or a horse or horses, or other draft animals, being ridden, led or driven thereon, the operator of a motor vehicle or motor bicycle shall give reasonable warning of his approach and use every reasonable precaution to avoid injuring such person or frightening such horse, horses or other draft animals; and in case of any injury to a person or property on the public highways, due to the presence or operation of a motor vehicle, the operator of such vehicle shall stop and upon request of a person injured or any person present give his name and address, and, if not the owner of such motor vehicle, the name and address of such owner. (Sec. 17.)

RIGHT TO DAMAGES.

Nothing in this act shall be construed to curtail or abridge the right of any person to prosecute a civil action for damages by reason of injuries to person or property resulting from the negligent use of the highways by the driver or operator of a motor vehicle or its owner or his employe or agent, and in any action brought to recover any damages for injury caused by running any motor vehicle at a greater rate of speed than designated in section 10 the plaintiff or plaintiffs shall be deemed to have made out a prima facie case by showing the fact of such injury, and that such person or persons were at the time of such injury running at a speed in excess of that mentioned in said section 10 or at an unreasonable rate of speed as set forth in clause c of said section. (Sec. 18.)

PENALTIES.

Any person willfully violating the provisions of this act shall, except as otherwise provided, upon conviction be fined in a sum not to exceed the amounts hereinafter set forth:

For violating sections 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 9. $25. For violating section 10, subdivisions a, b and c. and section 12, $200.

For violating section 14, $10.
For violating section 15, $15.
For violating section 17, $100.

For violating any provision not specifically named herein, $100.

Any offender who shall have been found guilty of a violation of the law and fined therefor, and who shall within six months thereafter be found guilty of a second violation, may be fined a sum not exceeding double the penalty provided for the first offense and in addition may have his certificate or license revoked for thirty days. For a third violation he may have his license revoked for three months. All fines collected are to be used for the improvement of the roads in the district where the fines are imposed. (Sec. 19.)

Sections 20 and 21 define public highways and local authorities and repeal the act of July, 1903, regulating speed of automobiles.

(Act filed May 28, 1907. In force July 1, 1907.)

RULES OF THE ROAD.

The rules and regulations established by the south and other park commissioners in Chicago conform to the provisions of the state law regarding the use of automobiles. In addition they establish certain "rules of the road" with which drivers of automobiles should be familiar. These rules, as published by the south park commissioners, are as follows:

No mechanically propelled vehicle shall be operated at a rate of speed exceeding twelve miles an hour in any park or on any boulevard.

No person upon turning the corner of any boulevard or crossing the intersection of any street or boulevard shall operate any vehicle at a greater rate of speed than four miles an hour.

Animals and vehicles shall keep to the right and as near the right-hand curb as possible.

Animals and vehicles meeting shall pass each other to the right.

Animals and vehicles overtaking others shall, in passing, keep to the left.

The driver or person having charge of any animal or vehicle, before turning the corner of any boulevard or driveway or turning out or starting from or stopping at the curb line of any boulevard or driveway, shall first see that there is sufficient space free so that such turn, stop or start may be safely made and shall then give a plainly visible or audible signal.

An animal or vehicle turning to the right into any boulevard or driveway shall turn the corner as near to the curb as practicable.

An animal or vehicle turning to the left into another boulevard or driveway shall pass to the right of and beyond the center of the intersection of said boulevard or driveway before turning.

An animal or vehicle crossing from one side of the street to another shall do so by turning to the left so as to head in the same direction as the travel on that side of the boulevard or driveway.

No animal or vehicle shall stop with its left side to the curb.

In no case shall a vehicle remain backed up to the curb except when actually loading or unloading.

Unless in an emergency or to allow a pedestrian or vehicle to cross its path no animal or vehicle shall stop in any boulevard or driveway except close to the curb lines.

No animal or vehicle shall stop or stand within the intersection of any boulevard, driveway or street nor within ten feet of the corner thereof. In slowing up or stopping a signal shall always be given to those behind by raising the whip or hand vertically.

Vehicles moving slowly shall keep as close as possible to the curb line on the right so as to allow faster moving vehicles free passage on the left.

Every person riding or driving any animal or vehicle shall immediately come to a full stop when any police officer by raising his hand gives the signal for him to do so.

No person under the age of 16 years shall ride or drive any animal or propel any vehicle on any boulevard or in any park unless provided with a permit therefor.

Any person violating any clause or provision of this section shall be fined not less than $5 for each offense.

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MUELLER CERTIFICATE DECISION.

In a decision announced April 18, 1907, the Illinois Supreme court held that that part of the Mueller law relating to the issue of certificates by the city of Chicago for the purpose of buying the street railways was invalid. The essential portions of the decision follow:

This was a bill in chancery filed by Edwin L. Lobdell and others in the Circuit court of Cook County against the city of Chicago, Mayor Edward F. Dunne, Comptroller L. E. McGann and City Clerk Adrian C. Anson to enjoin the printing and issuing of $75,000,000 of street-railway certificates under the provisions of an act entitled, "An act to authorize cities to acquire, construct, own, operate and lease street railways, and to provide the means therefor," approved May 18, 1903; in force July 1, 1903.

This act is commonly called the Mueller law and was adopted by the city of Chicago at an election held on April 5, 1904, and two ordinances of the city of Chicago, bearing date respectively Jan. 18, 1906, and May 28, 1906, which ordinance bearing date of Jan. 18, 1906, was adopted by the votes of a majority of the electors of the said city at an election held on April 3, 1906.

The ordinance of May 28, 1906, was never submitted to the electors of said city for adoption. The defendants filed a general demurrer to said bill, which demurrer was sustained, and the complainants having elected to stand by their bill, the same was dismissed for want of equity, and they have prosecuted an appeal to this court to reverse the decree of the Circuit court.

After quoting the provisions of the Mueller law and giving in full the second section, which regulates the issue of street-railway certificates, the ccurt continues: The council ordinance of Jan. 18. 1906, as supplemented by the ordinance of May 28, 1906, makes provision for the printing and issuing of the street railway certificates of the city of Chicago to the amount of $75,000,000. The ordinance of Jan. 18 contains blank forms of the street-railway certificates which are to be issued and the trust deed or mortgage which is to be executed to secure their payment.

Then the court quotes the modifications made in the certificates by the ordinance of May 28 and the wording of the mortgage which it is sought to spread on any street-car properties to be acquired by the sale of these certificates.

It is averred in the bill that the total assessed valuation of all the taxable property in said city of Chicago, as shown by the equalized assessment for state and county taxes for the year 1905, was the sum of $407,991,625, and that the then total indebtedness of the city was the sum of $20,298,985.86.

It is evident, therefore, that the city of Chicago had so nearly exhausted its debt-creating power under the constitution that if it is held said streetrailway certificates are indebtedness of the city, within the limitations found in the constitution, the issue of said certificates would be in violation of the constitution and void,

We think it self-evident, from a consideration of the statute and the ordinances under which the city of Chicago is proposing to issue said $75,000,000 of street-railway certificates, and the terms of said street-railway certificates, and the trust deed or mortgage which is to be executed to secure their payment, that the object of the legislation, as evidenced by the Mueller law and said ordinances, and the contract relations with the certificate holders which the city proposes to assume by the issue of said certificates and the execution of said trust deed or mortgage, in view of the existing indebtedness of the city, when considered as a whole, is an attempt to provide funds with which to municipalize the street railways of the city of Chicago without violating the provisions of section 12 of article 9 of the constitution of 1870. This is to the effect that no county, city, township, school district or other municipal corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount, including indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding 5 per cent on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment

for state and county taxes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness.

The court quotes the cases of Law vs. people, 87 Ill. 385, page 396, and the city of Springfield vs. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626, page 632. In the latter case it was held:

"A debt payable in the future is, obviously, no less a debt than if payable presently; and a debt payable upon a contingency, as upon the happening of some event, such as the rendering of a service or the delivery of property, etc., is some kind of a debt, and therefore within the prohibition. If a contract or undertaking contemplates, in any contingency, a liability to pay, when the contingency occurs the liability is absolute-the debt exists-and it differs from a present, unqualified promise to pay only in the manner by which the indebtedness was incurred; and, since the purpose of the debt is expressly excluded from consideration, it can make no difference whether the debt be for necessary current expenses something else."

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The doctrine of these cases has been frequently approved by this court. Howell vs. city of Peoria, 90 Ill., 104; Culbertson vs. city of Fulton, 127 id.. 30; Prince vs. city of Quincy, 128 id., 443; city of Chicago vs. McDonald, 176 id., 104. And in this case there could be no reasonable ground for contention that the street-railway certificates which the statute provides may be issued with which to obtain funds for the purchase or construction of street railways would, when issued and negotiated, not be the debts of the city issuing them, were it not for the provision found in the statute, which provision has also, in substance, been incorporated in the ordinance of Jan. 18, and the certificates and trust deed, or mortgage, that such street-railway certificates shall "under no circumstances be or become an obligation or liability of the city, or payable out of any general fund thereof, but shall be payable solely out of a specified portion of the revenues or income to be derived from the street-railway property for the acquisition of which they were issued."

It was, however, held in city of Joliet vs. Alexander, 194 Ill., 457, on page 462:

"It is not essential that there should be a right of action on the certificates against the city in order to constitute a debt, where its money or property can be taken in payment. To the same effect is the holding in village of East Moline vs. Pope, 224 Ill., 386."

And, while it must be conceded that there is no liability resting upon the city to pay said streetrailway certificates, the question remains, is not the property of the city pledged or mortgaged for the payment of such certificates in such manner as to make said certificates an indebtedness of the city within the constitutional prohibition?

"One who pawns or pledges his property and who will lose the property if he does not pay is indebted, although the creditor has nothing but the security of the property; and so, also, is a mortgagor who is liable to lose his property if he does not pay the money secured by the mortgage. (City of Joliet vs. Alexander, supra.)"'

If all that is proposed to be done in this case is to pledge the property and its income which is purchased with the proceeds of said street-railway certificates when issued and sold to secure payment of said certificates, then, under the doctrine of Winston vs. Spokane, 41 Pac. Rep., 888, which has been approved in the city of Joliet vs. Alexander and in the village of East Moline vs. Pope, supra, there would be no indebtedness, within the constitutional inhibition, created by the issue and sale of said street-railway certificates and the execution of said trust deed or mortgage, as against the city.

If, however, the property to be acquired with the fund obtained from the issue and sale of said street-railway certificates is all the property that is to be pledged or mortgaged to secure the payment of the certificates, what will be purchased with that fund? Clearly, not the streets of the city of Chicago on which the street-car lines are to be laid, and upon which they will be operated, for the obvious reason that the title to these

streets and the right to control them were vested in the city prior to the issue and sale of said street-railway certificates:

It is clear that the funds derived from the issue and sale of said street-railway certificates will be used for equipment and construction, such as rails, cars, poles, wires, electric appliances, buildings, labor in laying of track, erecting buildings, etc., and we think it equally clear that a trust deed or mortgage covering only such equipment, when constructed, would afford full and adequate security for the repayment of the fund received by the city from the sale of said street-railway certificates. This was well understood by the general assembly when it passed the Mueller law, and by the city of Chicago when it enacted the ordinance of Jan. 18, as by the Mueller law it was provided:

"In order to secure the payment of any such street-railway certificates and the interest thereon, the city may convey, by way of mortgage or deed of trust, any or all the street-railway property acquired or to be acquired through the issue thereof, which mortgage or deed of trust shall be executed in such manner as may be directed by the city council and acknowledged and recorded in the manner provided by law for the acknowledgment and recording of mortgages of real estate, and may contain such provisions of this act as may be deemed necessary to fully secure the payment of the street-railway certificates described therein. Any such mortgage or deed of trust may carry the grant of a privilege or right to maintain and operate the street-railway property covered thereby, for a period not exceeding twenty (20) years from and after the date such property may come into the possession of any person or corporation as the result of foreclosure proceedings; which privilege or right may fix the rates of fare which the person or corporation securing the same the result of foreclosure proceedings shall be entitled to charge in the operation of said property for a period not exceeding twenty years.'

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And the trust deed provides, in case of default in the payment of said certificates:

"There shall be a sale of all the property, both real and personal, and rights and franchises hereby mortgaged, and then and in such event the title to all the property hereby mortgaged, both real and personal (exclusive of franchises and operating rights), shall vest in the purchaser at such foreclosure sale and the purchaser at such foreclosure sale in addition thereto shall have the right to construct, maintain and operate the said street railways, property, rights and franchises hereby mortgaged during the period of twenty years from and after the date of such sale."

If the provision of the statute above quoted does not authorize the city to mortgage the right to operate street cars in the streets of the city, and if the trust deed or mortgage does not carry the right to use the streets of the city for street-car purposes for a period of twenty years from the date of foreclosure under said trust deed or mortgage to the purchaser at said foreclosure sale, then we are unable to understand the legal import of the language found in the statute and the trust deed.

It is too clear for argument that, under the statute, the ordinance of Jan. 18, and the trust deed, the use of the streets for street-car purposes is to be mortgaged for the benefit of the holders of said street-car certificates for a period of twenty years after a sale shall be made if the trust deed or mortgage is foreclosed; and if the right to this use of the streets of the city is property, then the trust deed given to secure the payment of the $75,000,000 street-railway certificates proposed to be issued is something more than a purchase-money mortgage, and, within the doctrine of the Alexander and Pope cases, these certificates, when issued and sold, and the trust deed or mortgage given to secure them will create an indebtedness of the city within the constitutional prohibition.

In the Alexander ease the city of Joliet had a waterworks system. It was indebted up to the constitutional limit, and in order to extend its waterworks system it sought by mortgage to pledge the income of the existing waterworks sys

tem and that of the extension, and it was held that the certificates thus sought to be secured created a debt within the constitutional inhibition. In the other case the city of East Moline was indebted to the full amount of 5 per cent of its assessed valuation, as provided in the constitution. It sought to issue $35,000 in bonds with which to erect a waterworks system and to provide a tax levy of not more than 1 cent on the dollar annually on all property within the corporate limits of the village for a period of fifteen years, to be used in payment of said bonds. The court said (page 393):

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"In the case at bar it is manifest that if nothing but the income from the waterworks pledged or could be reached to satisfy the principal and interest of the bonds the case would be within the meaning of the language last quoted (the language of the Alexander case), but here revenue of the village, to be obtained by general taxation to the extent of 1 cent on the dollar of taxables, must be applied to the payment of this indebtedness if the income from the waterworks proves insufficient to satisfy it."

The law is well settled in this state that a city. has a property right in streets-that it usually holds the fee; and it has been held that the city may grant a freehold in its streets to a streetrailway company to enable it to operate its streetcar lines thereon.

In support of this statement the court quotes from the opinions in the cases of the village of Harlem vs. Suburban Railroad company, 198 Ill., 337; the city of Chicago vs. Baer, 41 Ill., 306; the Cicero & Proviso Street Railway company vs. city of Chicago, 176 Ill., 501; Rich vs. the city of Chicago, 152 Ill., 18, and New Orleans, etc., Railroad company vs. Delaware, 114 U. S., 501.

It is alleged in the bill that the city of Chicago has heretofore required as a condition precedent to granting licenses for the use of portions of its public streets for public utility corporations the payment of compensation, and that it is now receiving from such sources upward of the sum of $400,000 annually, and that upward of the sum of $100,000 thereof is received annually from surface railroads, It is held that the city of Chicago may grant a permanent and valuable right to a streetrailway company to operate its street railroads in its streets and that it may lawfully charge such railway compensation for such use. In Byrne vs. Chicago General Railway company, 16 Ill., 75, on page 81, the court said:

"It is too late to deny to the city the power to grant privileges to street-railway companies to lay down tracks and operate them in and along the streets of the city, or the power of such companies to agree with the city concerning the terms upon which they will accept such privileges. The city was not limited to a simple denial or granting of the privilege, but might prescribe the terms upon which the privilege should be conditioned if conferred; and by accepting the ordinances so burdened with the terms the railway company became bound to pay the license fee so long as it enjoys the privileges conferred by the ordinances." It would seem clear, therefore, that the city would, in issuing said street-railway certificates and in executing said trust deed or mortgage to secure the payment thereof, be doing more than giving to the holders of said street-railway certificates a purchase-money mortgage upon the prop erty acquired with the fund derived from the issue and sale of said certificates, as it is obvious the most valuable security which the certificate holder is to receive is the right granted by the trust deed to the purchaser at foreclosure sale to operate the street railways which he may acquire at said sale in the streets of the city for the period of twenty years from and after the date of his purchase.

Without that right the certificate holder would only have a lien on the rails in the streets and other equipment of the street railway, which would be of little value without the right to operate said street railways in the streets of the city. By the trust deed or mortgage proposed to be executed by the city to secure the payment of said street-railway certificates, in case of its fore

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