a land force; and as the first principles and objects of tactics are the same ashore as afloat, it is probable that the manœuvres of a steam fleet would assimilate with those of field artillery. Each individual steamer might be looked upon as a field battery, and we may imagine a steam fleet (with the allowance of more time and space) forming line from column of divisions, as the artillery might on Woolwich Common.

But of such steam "naumachy" we have no experience; and here, as in many respects, "the next war" is a mighty problem to be solved hereafter.

In so far as the greater motive power of steamers will tend to restore the close hand-tohand encounters of ancient days, the value of British seamanship will be depreciated, and importance of numbers enhanced. But supposing that we man our war-steamers proportionably to the area of their upper decks, as the French do, we have no more to fear from close conflict than from distant cannonade. It was in the period of close combats, and before the introduction of artillery, that we gained over the French (in 1340) the bloody and decisive victory off Helvoetsluys, which, though thrown into the shade by the still greater victories gained on land just afterwards, has never been paralleled

at sea: thirty thousand French perished on that fatal day, the prelude to a century of carnage and disaster. The power, indeed, of embarking her countless thousands of soldiers, and making them thus available at sea, may in some cases, doubtless, be advantageous to France. Instances will probably occur of our ships being captured in calms, at night, or at anchor, by a cloud of soldiers suddenly thrown on their decks from an enemy's steamers; but such successes would be dearly bought, if the assailants, perfectly exposed, as they must be on a steamer's unprotected deck, should receive one discharge of grape and canister in their crowded ranks.

Respecting steamers acting individually against sailing ships, there is much difference of opinion among naval men. It was thought that the steamers' heavy guns, with the power of choosing a position, and the advantage of presenting a comparatively small mark to an enemy's fire, would make them formidable opponents, even to a line-of-battle ship. Recent experiments have controverted this opinion, and, as before said, there is now a reaction against steamers. In the April number of the "United Service Magazine" a letter from a scientific and practical officer (J. C. Hoseason, Commander, R. N.), questions the efficiency of a steamer's shell-guns at long

ranges; and it is admitted that short ranges are unsuited to such vulnerable fabrics as our present war-steamers. This subject is a knotty one, in which experience alone can decide; but, after having naturally reflected much on the subject while commanding a steamer myself, I still think that, with patience and judgment in choosing the time and method of attack, the "smoker" would prove an "awkward customer" to a very large sailing ship. This would require, however, a larger supply of shells than is at present allowed, and which I have known to be expended in a few hours' firing, leaving the ship comparatively useless until supplied from England.

Taking, however, a general view of the consequences likely to result from the introduction of steam in naval warfare, there seems no reason to suppose it will lessen the maritime superiority of this country. Where France could build one steamer, England could easily build four, and of the class of men who, though not able seamen, are indispensable to the proper management of steamers, the supply in England is still larger in comparison. That our trade will suffer greatly, especially until our harbours of refuge are constructed, is too probable. That our coasts will not enjoy the per

fect security of former days is equally so; and, allowing for the increased defensive means given by steam, it must still be allowed to facilitate invasion. Half the difficulties encountered by French expeditions last war was in getting out of their own harbours, and accordingly we find several armaments, though relieved of a blockading force, either baffled or crippled by accidents, in the attempt to get out of port. Steam effectually removes this obstacle; and whether there be a fair wind or foul, or no wind at all, future expeditions will issue from an enemy's harbours as easily as an army issues from a for

tress.

But while this suggests the expediency of coast defences, and a sufficient land force, not to place our existence as a nation on the throw of a die, I agree with the writer before quoted (p. 173.), that steam, so far from lessening, ought to add to our naval preponderance.

176

CHAP. XII.

CONCLUSION.

BEFORE concluding these speculations on the Future of our Navy, it is not foreign to the purpose to say something upon the probability of that event, which would call our fleets into action. We have heard much of a "small cloud in the west" lately, and it is no secret to any one, that precautionary steps have been taken on both sides of the Atlantic. Yet, notwithstanding that visible cloud in the western horizon,-if one might venture a conjecture upon the inscrutable future, it is not from that quarter the greatest danger threatens.

A war with America, as the recent debates in the French chambers sufficiently show, would almost necessarily entail on us a war with France (a dangerous combination of enemies); and, on the other hand, peace with America would not ensure us tranquillity in Europe. The causes of our difference with America are tem

porary and accidental. They lie on the surface,