first sight, it will appear strange that he should, on a question where he could only defeat England by a victory over her fleet, have looked for success. Did he, as well as the French naval officers and the Prince de Joinville, think victory probable? If so, was his information received through the proper channel, the Admiral Lalande? (And an officer better qualified to give an opinion, France did not possess.) This is a question of some interest. My present object is to show that in 1840 we were nearer a war, or at least a battle, than people generally supposed. The character of the existing French ministry is a better guarantee against such coups de mains, yet circumstances may happen-nay, they may already have happened-which, in the present temper of the French mind, would make peace impossible. The ship may now be on its waymay be already in port—which bears intelligence of something more than "eccentricity"* in some French officers. It is within the bounds of probability that some English commander "ordered away " from some French port in "Oceanie," as having "no mission" there, may have felt justified in refusing to stir. In such case a

*The term applied by the Duke of Wellington to the strange proceedings in Tahiti.

French officer, sure of public sympathy at least, at home, would, if he felt himself strong enough, resort to hostilities. Now, whatever the result, we may doubt whether any government could resist the war-cry, which would resound through France.

Causes of offence will not be wanting where the desire to quarrel exists; and knowing as we do the readiness of French officers to imagine a slight where none is meant, it should never astonish us to hear of a collision with French ships. But if this be possible elsewhere: on the coast of Africa, I should think it all but certain. Something in the climate acting on the temper seems to be wonderfully prolific of quarrels, even among our own officers. But the French coming to a station so abhorrent to all their tastes, and suffering privations they are little accustomed to, will look with anything but friendly fellings upon those of whose humane but somewhat Quixotic policy they are made the unwilling instruments.

Such, then, are some of the causes which have of late nearly brought on war, or which may, in addition to many others, beyond all human foresight, do so hereafter. I mention this merely to show, that the power which is most likely to be the aggressor, has a right to speculate on a "war

suddenly commenced," and that the French writers who reckon on such an event as favourable to their hopes of success have reason to do so. Of the three grounds, then, on which French writers build their hopes, the first may, if I am right, be conceded, — a "war suddenly commenced" seems to be possible.

35

CHAP. IV.

THE SECOND GROUND ON WHICH FRENCHMEN REST THEIR HOPES OF NAVAL SUCCESSES, CONSIDERED.

THE next ground on which French writers, and we may suppose Frenchmen generally, build their hopes is:

"The difficulty which England would experience in manning her fleet, having neglected to organise her resources."

As this difficulty must, of course, be meant comparatively to what France herself would experience, we shall have to examine the means possessed by both countries in case of need.

It must at once be admitted, that this is our weak point-a weakness not of modern days, nor attributable to this or that ministry, but as old as the Navy itself, and originating in the spirit of our institutions. In no point is the opposite system, or rather genius of the two governments more palpable, than in the minute superintendence of the whole maritime population exercised by the French government, compared with the absolute non-interference of our

own.

In the one country, the administrative or bureaucratic system is carried to the utmost pitch. In the other, the laissez-faire system, or no system, is paramount. In France, the whole commercial navy-masters, mates, sailors, mousses even, are under the eye and jurisdiction of the minister of marine. Nay, every fisherman, waterman, ferryman, oyster-dredger, boatbuilder, is registered. I doubt whether, had Loch Katrine been in France, the "Lady of the Lake" would have escaped the "Inscription Maritime " among the "individues non comprises dans les classes anterieures." At all events, her "skiff" would have duly appeared among the boats or wherries of the 145th class. In England we have lately attempted a "registry of seamen," an admirable measure, if enforced, and one which, with several others, will ever do credit to Lord Haddington's late administration. But the very limited powers of an English First Lord, compared with the French Ministre de la Marine et Colonies, does not afford the same field for improvement. It may here be observed, what a singular contradiction appears in the two countries. In maritime England, the First Lord of

* A previous attempt was made by Sir James Graham, but without effect.