or state sources is immaterial. The rules are truly federal, not state. The cause of action for breach of contract is thus a cause of action arising under federal law, the source of federal judicial power under Art. III of the Constitution.

From the recognition of the power of Congress to regulate matters affecting commerce in Houston & Texas R. Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Doctrine), 234 U. S. 342, 351 (1914), to Labor Board Cases, 301 U. S. 1 (1937), questions as to the power of Congress over local incidents of national commerce plagued advocates of legal changes with doubts as to the constitutional power of Congress to regulate labor relations effectually. With the full recognition of the integration of the local with the national, the power to use national authority in commerce, when needed, was established. I see no occasion, at this late date, to allow the fog of another day to obscure the national interest in these problems-this time by reason of Article III of the Constitution. Cf. subdivision 2 of MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER's opinion.

The reason, I think, that this union cannot recover from the employer in this suit under § 301 is that the claim for wages for the employees arises from separate hiring contracts between the employer and each employee. The union does not undertake to do work for the employer or even to furnish workers. The duty, if any there be, to pay wages to an employee arises from the individual contract between the employer and employee, not from the collective bargaining agreement. Therefore there is set out no violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization as is required to confer jurisdiction under § 301. The facts show an alleged violation of a contract between an employer and an employee-a situation that is not covered by the statute.

The interpretation contained in the preceding paragraph conforms to the words of the section and avoids sug

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DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

gesting constitutional limitations that would cripple the creation of a national system for the enforcement of statutes concerning labor relations.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS, with whom MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs, dissenting.

I agree with MR. JUSTICE REED that Congress in the Taft-Hartley Act created federal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, made the cases and controversies concerning them justiciable questions for the federal courts, and permitted those courts to fashion from the federal statute, from state law, or from other germane sources, federal rules for the construction and interpretation of those collective bargaining agreements.

My dissent is from the refusal of the majority to allow the union standing to bring this suit. The complaint alleged that by reason of a collective bargaining agreement the employer was obligated to pay each employee, whom the union represents, his full salary during April 1951, regardless of whether he missed a day's work, unless the employee's absence was due to "furlough" or "leave of absence." The complaint further alleged that the employer had violated the collective bargaining contract by deducting from the pay of some 4,000 employees their wages for April 3 on account of their absence, that absence not being a "furlough" or "leave of absence" within the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. The union requested a declaration of rights under the collective bargaining agreement. Though the employees affected were not parties to the suit, the complaint prayed for an accounting of the amount owed each employee and a judgment in favor of the individual employees for the unpaid wages.

We make mountains out of molehills in not allowing the union to be the suing as well as the bargaining agency for its members as respects matters involving the con

DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

348 U.S.

struction and enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. Individual contracts of employment result from each collective bargaining agreement. But those contracts are the resultant of the collective bargaining system, a system that continues to function and operate after the contracts are made. The concept of collective bargaining contained in the statute (29 U. S. C. § 159 (a)) includes, of course, the negotiation of the collective agreement and the settling of the terms of the individual contracts. But the collective bargaining relationship does not end there. To be sure, the TaftHartley Act provides that there shall be no changes in the provisions of the agreement during its term, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d). But that does not mean that the collective bargaining agent drops out of the picture once the agreement is made. We know enough of trade-union practices to know that the advent of collective bargaining has produced a permanent, organized relationship between the union and the employer, involving a day-to-day administration of the collective agreement. The Act indeed extends the right of collective bargaining that far. For it specifically provides that ". . . to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder. . .," 61 Stat. 142, 29 U. S. C. § 158 (d) (italics added).

The processing of grievances is recognized by the Act as a function which the labor organization performs or may perform. For 29 U. S. C. § 152 (5) defines "labor organization" as an agency which deals with employers, inter alia, "concerning grievances." As the National Labor Relations Board stated in Hughes Tool Co., 104 N. L. R. B. 318, 326, "The adjustment of grievances,

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DOUGLAS, J., dissenting.

viewed in the larger aspect, constitutes, to a great degree, the actual administration of a collective-bargaining contract."

The administration of the collective agreement is its life and meaning. The adjustment and settlement of grievances, the development of an administrative practice concerning the collective agreement give it force and authority.

The right of individual employees to present their own grievances is recognized by the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). But even when they desire to speak for themselves, rather than through the union, Congress attached two important conditions. First, any adjustment of the individual grievance must not be "inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect." Second, the union must be given "opportunity to be present at such adjustment." Id.

It is plain, I think, that the grievance procedure is a part of the collective bargaining process. And a lawsuit is one of the ultimates of a grievance. A lawsuit, like negotiation or arbitration, resolves the dispute and settles it.

In short, the union represents the interests of the community of employees in the collective bargaining agreement. The wide range of its interests are envisaged by the Act, which gives the collective bargaining agency exclusive authority to bargain "in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." 29 U. S. C. § 159 (a). The range of its authority is the range of its interests. What the union obtains in the collective agreement it should be entitled to enforce or defend in the forums which have been provided. When we disallow it that standing, we fail to keep the law abreast of the industrial developments of this age.

WEBER ET AL. v. ANHEUSER-BUSCH, INC.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI.

No. 97. Argued February 2-3, 1955.-Decided March 28, 1955.

In a dispute between two unions over work being performed for respondent, each claiming the work for its own members, one union went on strike. Respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Board a charge of an unfair labor practice under §8 (b) (4) (D) of the Taft-Hartley Act against the striking union; but the Board held that no "dispute" existed within the meaning of that subsection and quashed the notice of a hearing. Respondent filed a complaint in a Missouri state court, alleging violations of other subsections of § 8 (b)(4) of the Taft-Hartley Act and also a violation of the State's restraint of trade statute. The state court enjoined the strike as a restraint of trade. Held: The state court was without jurisdiction to enjoin the conduct of the union, since its jurisdiction had been pre-empted by the authority vested in the National Labor Relations Board. Pp. 469-482.

(a) Whether the Board's finding that no violation of §8 (b) (4) (D) was involved necessarily encompassed a ruling on the other subsections was a question for the Board to pass upon in the first instance. Pp. 477-478.

(b) Congress has sufficiently expressed its purpose to bring the conduct here in controversy within federal control and to exclude state prohibition, even though that with which the federal law is concerned as a matter of labor relations be related by the State to the more inclusive area of restraint of trade. Pp. 480-481.

(c) Where the moving party itself alleges unfair labor practices, where the facts reasonably bring the controversy within the sections prohibiting these practices, and where the conduct, if not prohibited by the federal Act, may reasonably be deemed to come within the protection afforded by that Act, a state court must decline jurisdiction in deference to the tribunal which Congress has selected for determining such issues in the first instance. P. 481. (d) Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U. S. 740, distinguished. Pp. 481-482.

364 Mo. 573, 265 S. W. 2d 325, reversed.