ing for its object or effect the controlling of the price of any products of the soil or of any article of manufacture or commerce or the cost of exchange or transportation.

The constitution of Wyoming (Art. X, sec. 8) prohibits the consolidation or combination of corporations to control or influence production or prices.

The constitution of New Hampshire (art. 82) grants to the general court the power to enact laws "to prevent the operations within the State of all persons and associations, and all trusts and corporations, foreign or domestic, and the officers thereof, who endeavor to raise the price of any article of commerce."

STATUTORY PROVISIONS.-New Jersey prohibits combinations or agreements between corporations, firms, or persons—

(1) To increase the price of merchandise or of any commodity.1 (2) To fix at any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public or consumer shall in any manner be controlled, any article1 or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption in this State or elsewhere.

(3) To make any agreement by which they directly or indirectly preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves, or any purchaser or consumers, in the sale or transportation of any article or commodity, either by pooling, withholding from the market, or selling at a fixed price, or in any other manner by which the price might be affected.

(4) To make any secret oral agreement or arrive at any understanding, without express agreement, by which they directly or indirectly preclude a free and unrestricted competition among themselves or any purchaser or consumer, in the sale or transportation of any article, either by pooling, withholding from the market, or selling at a fixed price, or in any manner by which the price might be affected.?

Kansas prohibits, in substance, combinations of capital, skill, or acts by two or more persons, corporations, etc.

(1) To increase or reduce the price of merchandise, produce, or commodities, or to control the cost or rates of insurance.

(2) To fix any standard or figure, whereby its price to the public shall be, in any manner, controlled or established, any article or commodity of merchandise, produce, or commerce intended for sale, use, or consumption in this State.

(3) To make any contract, agreement, etc., by which they shall bind themselves (a) not to sell, manufacture, or transport any such article, etc., below a common standard figure, or (b) to keep the price

1The words "article" and "commodity" in this act are to be construed as synonymous with natural products, manufactured products, and goods, wares, and merchandise.

*New Jersey, Laws 1913, chap. 13.

of any such article, commodity, or transportation at a fixed or graded figure, or (c) to establish the price of any such article, transportation, etc., between them or themselves and others, so as to preclude free and unrestricted competition among themselves or others.

(4) To pool, combine, or unite any interests they may have in connection with the manufacture, sale, or transportation of any such article or commodity, that its price may in any manner be affected.' Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, North Dakota, and California have statutes substantially similar to the Kansas law. None of these, however, cover insurance. The other principal differences are: Louisiana, Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, North Dakota, and California omit the word "manufacture" after "sell" in clause (a), paragraph (3); use "graduated" instead of "graded" in clause (b), paragraph (3). Louisiana omits "commodity or transportation" in clause (b), paragraph (3). These six States also omit "manufacture" before "sale" in paragraph (4). Nebraska adds "production" after "sale" in paragraph (4). In the Michigan, Ohio, Louisiana, Nebraska, North Dakota, and California acts the word "at" follows "fix" in paragraph (2), making it read "to fix at any standard," etc. Michigan, Ohio, Nebraska, California, and North Dakota do not have "produce" after "merchandise" in paragraph (1). Nebraska inserts "card or list price" after "standard figure" in clause (a), paragraph (3), and North Dakota "or card price list" in the same clause. Michigan and Ohio insert "or fixed value" after "standard figure" in this clause. In the Michigan and Ohio statutes, "directly or indirectly" is inserted immediately before "unite" in paragraph (4). Louisiana omits "sale, use" before "consumption" in paragraph (2). Nebraska has "upon" after "controlled or established" in paragraph (2). North Dakota inserts "property" before "merchandise" in paragraph (1); and "manufacture" takes the place of "commerce" in paragraph (2). California omits "or reduce" in paragraph (1), and in California, Michigan, and Ohio the words "or consumer" follow "the public" in paragraph (2). In the Nebraska law the words "dispose of, traffic in" follow "sell" in clause (a), paragraph (3), and the phrase "with the intent to preclude, or the tendency of which is

1 Kansas, Laws 1897, chap. 265, sec. 1; G. S., sec. 5142.

State v. Phipps et al., 60 Kans., 609 (1893). -Alleged that defendants were agents of foreign insurance companies doing business in the State, that the companies had combined to control the price and rate of insurance in Oswego, Kans., that they increa, ed such rates, and that accused were compelling local agents to observe rates so established. Urged that the law of 1889 so far as it affected foreign insurance companies or their agents was in conflict with the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce, the court having recently held that insurance was "trade." Held, that “trade," so used, was not synonymous with intertate commerce, that insurance was not interstate commerce, and that the State has power to regulate the usiness of foreign insurance companies. Conviction affirmed under the antitrust law of 1889. (Some what similar but less comprehensive than the statute of 1897 above cited.)

2 Louisiana, Laws 1892, act 90, sec. 1; Michigan, P. A. 1899, No. 255, sec. 1; Ohio, G. C., sec. 6391; Nebraska, R. S. (1913), sec. 4017; North Dakota, Laws 1907, chap. 259, sec. 1; California, Laws 1907, chap. 530, sec 1, as amended by Laws 1909, chap. 362.

to prevent or preclude," is used instead of "so as to preclude" in clause (c), paragraph (3). Michigan adopts the word "arts" instead of "acts" in the opening clause.

The law of Texas is substantially similar to that of Kansas, the principal difference being that in addition the former prohibits (a) the fixing or maintenance of prices, etc., as well as increasing or reducing prices, and (b) affecting, by any of the means set forth in the law, the price of preparing any product for market or transportation.'

Arizona has a law similar to the Kansas statute, as has also Colorado, except that the latter does not apply to insurance.2

While, as already pointed out, certain provisions of the California law are very similar to those of the Kansas statute, the former act provides also that no agreement, combination, etc., shall be deemed to be unlawful or within the provisions of the act whose object is to conduct its operations at a reasonable profit or to market at a reasonable profit those products which can not otherwise be so marketed; nor shall it be deemed unlawful for persons or corporations engaged in the business of selling or manufacturing commodities of a liko character to employ, organize, or own any interest in any

1 G. L. 1903, Chap. XCIV, sec. 1.

Queen Insurance Co. v. State, 83 Ter., 250 (1893).-Action under act of 1889 (somewhat similar to act cited) against Texas Insurance Club, an association of insurance agents, and 57 foreign insurance corporations. Alleged that the club was organized, with the consent and procurement of defendant companies, for the purpose of fixing rates and commissions. Held, that the act did not apply, as insurance was neither "trade" nor a "commodity" within the meaning of the act.

Wiggins v. Bisso, 92 Tex., 219 (1898).—In a suit by a partner for an accounting, defendant pleaded that the profits, if any, were accumulated under an unlawful agreement with the St. Louis Brewing Associa tion whereby said partnership and brewing association combined their skill, capital, labor, and acts to create and carry out restrictions in trade, to increase the price of beer, and to prevent competition in transportation, sale, and purchase of beer, etc., and set up a contract providing for the sale of beer to the dealer at stipulated prices, the manufacturer obligating himself not to sell beer to any other person in the town and the dealer obligating himself not to buy from any other except said manufacturer. On demurrer, held a good defense. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Teras, 19 Teras Civil Appeals, 1 (1898), 177 U.S., 28 (1900).—The Waters-Pierce Oil Co., a foreign corporation doing business in Texas, was alleged to have made contracts with dealers in oil, through its agents in the State, which bound the dealers to buy only of the Waters-Pierce Co., to sell at a price fixed by the company, not to sell to competing dealers, and to pay certain penalties to the company if they bought from a competitor. The court of civil appeals sustained a decree forfeiting the right of the company to do business in the State, holding that the statutes involved were a valid exercise of the police power of the State. On writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States the judgment was affirmed, the court holding that the courts of Texas had the right to interpret their statutes to apply to intrastate commerce only; that the statute of March 30, 1889, imposed conditions which it was within the power of the State to impose, and that this statute was not repealed by the act of April 30, 1895.

Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. State, 106 S. W., 918 (Tex. 1907); 212 U. S., 86 (1909).—Alleged that the WatersPierce Oil Co. was a party to an agreement or understanding with the Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, one object of which was to create a monopoly and control the price of petroleum oil and prevent competition in its sale in a large territory, including Texas, and to a large extent such object was accomplished. Held, that the performance of such agreement within the State constituted a violation of the antitrust laws of 1899 and 1903, although the agreement may not have been made therein. Penalty assessed and permit to do business in State, except as to interstate commerce, ordered canceled. Affirmed by Supreme Court of United States, which held that laws prohibiting acts which "tend" or are "reasonably calculated" to restrain trade and prevent competition are not so vague and indefinite as to deprive any one of due process of law; and declined to hold a fine of over $1,600,000 so excessive as to amount to deprivation of property without due process of law where it appeared that the business was extensive and profitable during the period of violation, and that the corporation had over $40,000,000 of assets, and had declared dividends amounting to several hundred per cent.

* Arizona, Laws 1912, chap. 73, sec. 1; Colorado, Laws 1913, chap. 161, sec. 1.

association, etc., having as its object the transportation, marketing, or delivery of such commodities.' Colorado also has a similar provision.2

A section of the Ohio law imposes a much heavier penalty in case of combinations to control the price or supply, or to prevent competition in the sale of bread, butter, eggs, flour, meat, or vegetables.3

Arkansas prohibits any person, corporation, firm, etc., from entering into any pool, agreement, etc., whether the same is made in the State or elsewhere, to regulate or fix either in the State or elsewhere the price of any article of manufacture, commodity, or any article or thing whatsoever, or the price or premium to be paid for insuring property, or to maintain said price when so fixed.

Mississippi has a statute similar to that of Arkansas, except that the provision against fixing prices is limited to the State instead of "in this State or elsewhere." 5

South Carolina and Tennessee prohibit arrangements, contracts, trusts, etc., designed or which tend to advance, reduce, or control the price or the cost to the producer or consumer of articles imported into the State, or in the manufacture or sale of articles of domestic growth or domestic raw material. Kansas has a similar

1 California, Laws 1907, chap. 530, sec. 1, as amended by Laws 1909, chap. 362.

Grogan v. Chaffee, 156 Cal., 611 (1909).—A manufacturer of olive oil, in a quantity relatively small in comparison with the amount manufactured and sold in the market supplied by him, sought an injunction, alleging that the defendant bought oil under an express agreement that he would not sell it at less than a given price and that he had sold and threatened to sell it at less than such price. Held, that there was nothing unreasonable or unlawful in the effort of a manufacturer to maintain a standard price for his goods; that it was simply a means of securing the legitimate benefits of the reputation which his product may have attained; that the condition was valid as between the original seller and buyer; that, as between them, its breach may be enjoined by the manufacturer, and that section 1673, Civil Code, declaring void contracts restraining the exercise of a lawful business, did not apply. (Antitrust Law referred to but not involved in decision.)

D. Ghirardelli Co. v. Hunsicker et al., 164 Cal., 355 (1912).-This case is similar to Grogan v. Chaffe except that defendants did not purchase from plaintiff, but from a jobber who purchased from plaintiff upon the same general conditions on which Chaffee bought from Grogan. Held, that such a condition was enforceable, not only against the jobber, but also against a purchaser who bought to sell again at retail under an agreement with the jobber, which in terms was made for the express benefit of the manufacturer, whereby he undertook to maintain the fixed retail price; that the contract of the second purchaser was one of the class referred to in section 1559, Civil Code, providing that a contract made expressly for the benefit of a third person may be enforced by him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it; and, further, that the agreement was not in violation of the State Antitrust Act as amended in 1909, nor unenforceable as being in restraint of trade under the common law.

* Colorado, Laws 1913, chap. 161, sec. 1.

* Ohio, G. C., sec. 6396, as amended by the act of May 3, 1913. Arkansas, Act 1, 1905, as amended Laws 1913, Act 161.

State v. Frank et al., 169 S. W., 333 (Ark., 1914).—Defendants, proprietors of laundries in Little Rock, were alleged to have agreed with each other to fix prices to be charged their customers and to have conducted business under this agreement. It was further alleged that for the purpose of driving out competition in the city of Malvern they entered into a combination to do the laundering of that place at a less price than was charged at Little Rock and other places. The complaint alleged a violation of the antitrust statute (acts 1905, p. 1, sec. 1). The State supreme court in sustaining a demurrer to the complaint held that the subject matter of the agreement was not a "commodity," "convenience," or "repair," nor was it within the phrase any article or thing whatsoever, "as used in the statute: that the business of laundering was a mere service done, and an agreement to regulate the price to be charged therefor was, in its last analysis, merely an agreement to fix the price of labor, or services, which had not been made unlawful. • Mississippi, Code 1906, sec. 5002, as amended by Laws 1908, chap. 119, sec. 1. South Carolina, Civil Code, sec. 2437; Tennessee, Laws 1903, chap. 140, sec. 1.

statute, differing principally in that it extends to agreements affecting attorneys' or doctors' fees, the rate of insurance, and the rate of interest on loans, or any other services.1

South Carolina also has a statute prohibiting pools, agreements, etc., to regulate or fix the price of any article or thing whatsoever, or to maintain said price when so regulated or fixed, or to fix or limit the price of property insurance.2

Idaho prohibits corporations, associations of persons, etc., directly or indirectly to combine or contract in any manner whatsoever to fix the price of any article of commerce, or of produce of the soil, or of consumption by the people.3 Illinois, Utah, and Iowa have similar provisions in their laws, except that they also prohibit combinations, etc., of "individuals," and prohibit combinations "to regulate or fix the price of any article of merchandise or commodity." The Utah laws also prohibit any combination by persons having for its object or effect the control of prices for professional services, any products of the soil, any article of manufacture or commerce, or the cost of exchange or transportation.5

Wisconsin prohibits any agreement, contract, etc., to restrain or prevent competition in the price of any article or commodity in general use in the State or constituting a subject of trade or commerce, or which shall in any manner control or fix the price of any such article or fix any standard or figure by which the price to the public of any such article shall be in any manner controlled or established."

Indiana prohibits every scheme, design, understanding, contract, etc., to increase or reduce the price of merchandise or any commodity, natural or artificial, and all arrangements, etc., between

1 Kansas, Laws 1889, chap. 257, sec. 1; G. S., sec. 5185.

2 South Carolina, Laws 1902, No. 574, sec. 1,

Idaho, Laws 1909, p. 297.

Illinois, Laws 1891, p. 206, as amended by Laws 1893 and 1907; Utah, Stats., sec. 1753; Iowa, Stats., sec. 5060.

Ford et al. v. Chicago Milk Shippers' Association, 155 Ill., 166 (1895).—The milk producers, shippers, and wholesale dealers in and around Chicago formed an association to regulate the sale and price of milk to the retail dealers. The boards of management of the association in pursuance of this purpose fixed the price to be paid for milk during certain periods, notified the members and city dealers, and required all parties buying milk from said association to give bonds to secure compliance with this and other orders. The association was given control of all milk consigned by any of its members to any stand in Chicago. In an action by the association against Ford et al. to recover for milk delivered, the defendants pleaded that the acts of the association were unlawful under laws of 1891, page 206, and on appeal to the State supreme court the plea was sustained.

5 Utah, Stats., sec. 1752.

Wisconsin, Laws 1907, p. 432; Stats., sec. 1791j.

Butterick Publishing Co., respondent, v. Rose, appellant, 141 Wis., 533 (1910).—Plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant in which the latter agreed to purchase a specified amount of plaintiff's patterns (patented), to sell them at retail prices fixed by plaintiff, and not to sell any other make of patterns during the continuance of the contract. Subsequently defendant refused to receive any more patterns and advertised and sold patterns of a rival concern. Defendant contended, among other things, that the contract was in restraint of trade and in violation of section 1770g, Wisconsin Statutes (similar to sec. 1791), but applies to foreign corporations). Held, that this section was not intended to restrict the rights of a patentee, acquired under the laws of the United States, and that to hold that it did apply would make it unconstitutional.

* Indiana, Laws 1907, chap. 243, sec. 1.