a breach of the contracts existing between them and their employees, notwithstanding the fact that the action of the federation was not taken with any malice or ill will toward the mine owners, but with the object of keeping up the price of coal, by which the wages of the miners were regulated. The doctrine of these cases appears to be followed in a subsequent decision of the court of appeal, which held that a mason's apprentice could recover damages from a society of laborers which had procured his employer, by threats of calling a strike, to refuse to continue him in his employ as an apprentice according to the terms of his apprenticeship contract. In another case an injunction was granted restraining the defendants from inducing subscribers to quotations from the London Stock Exchange to violate their contracts not to sell or disclose the information to others. And in a more recent case the same court decided that a company engaged in the sale of phonographs and records, which bound wholesale and retail dealers not to sell to anyone who was on its suspended list, could recover damages from a competing company which was on this list and which had procured machines from a dealer by having two of its employees falsely represent themselves as dealers and sign fictitious names to contracts presented to them. It was held, however, that where no misrepresentation was used, the competing company having secured machines from a dealer who merely assumed that it was not on the suspended list, damages could not be recovered.*

INDUCING BREACH ACTIONABLE THOUGH PROCURED BY LAWFUL MEANS. The early English cases appear to hold that inducing a breach of contract was not actionable unless some unlawful means were employed to procure the breach or unless it was done for the purpose of injuring one of the parties or of benefiting the person procuring the violation at the expense of the injured contracting party. When these opinions were reviewed by the House of Lords in a later case, some of the members of the tribunal declined to follow this reasoning and expressed the opinion that the basis of the action was the procuring of an unlawful act, namely, the violation of

1 South Wales Miners' Federation et al. v. Glamorgan Coal Co. et al., L. R. (1905), A. C., 239.

2 Read v. The Friendly Society of Operative Stone Masons of England et al., L. R. (1902), 2 K. B., 732 (Ct. of Appeal).

a Exchange Telegraph Co. r. Gregory, L. R. (1895), 1 Q. B., 147.

National Phonograph Co, r. Edison-Bell Consolidated Phonograph Co., L. R. (1908), 1 Ch., 335 (Ct. of Appeal). See also Smithies r. National Association of Plasterers, L. R. (1909), 1 K. B., 310; Denaby & Cadeby Collleries r. Yorkshire Miners' Association, L... R. (1906), A. C., 384, 389; New Kleinfontein Co. r. Superintendent of Laborers, (1906) Transvaal Law Reps., S. C., 241; Long v. Larkin et al. (1914), 2 Irish Reports, 285, 329 (Ct. of Appeal).

Lumley r. Gye, 2 El. & Bl., 216 (Q. B., 1853); Bowen r. Hall, L. R. (1881), 6 Q. B. Div., 333 (Ct. of Appeal); Temperton v. Russell, L. R. (1893), 1 Q. B., 715 (Ct. of Appeal).

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the contract, and that the ill will of the party inducing the breach, or the fact that it was done for the purpose of benefiting him at the expense of the injured party, was not material. This doctrine was expressly affirmed in a subsequent decision by the House of Lords,2 and in a still later case, where no fraud, misrepresentation, or other unlawful means were employed and where there was no ill will between the parties, it was nevertheless held by that court that the defendants, who had procured a breach of contract, must answer in damages to the injured party. Subsequently the court of appeal declined to hold a company liable for inducing a breach of contract where no unlawful means were employed and where the dealer violating the contract did so innocently and under mistake of fact; but awarded damages where fraud was employed in the inducement though the breach, so far as the party to the contract was concerned, was innocently made. The effect of these decisions appears to be that in England no fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, or other unlawful means need be present to render the procurement of a breach of contract unlawful if the breach is such as would give rise to an action on the contract against the party violating it.

NATURE OF CONTRACT.-In the earlier English cases the courts. appear to have been of the opinion that liability for procuring a breach of contract extended only to cases of enticing away or harboring another's servant, but in Lumley v. Gye the court held that a contract for the service of an opera singer was sufficiently within the rule of master and servant to sustain the action. In later cases it has been held unlawful to procure a breach of a contract to make bricks and tile exclusively for another," to purchase building materials, and to purchase meat. In a recent case, procuring a breach of a contract governing the sale of phonographs was also held unlawful. And in a case in the House of Lords in 1897 Lord Herschell stated that "the law laid down in Bowen v. Hall in terms applies to all contracts, and I quite agree that the nature of the contract can make no difference." 10 The distinction, therefore, in this class of actions between contracts of hiring or for personal services and ordinary commercial contracts seems to have disappeared from the English law.

1 Opinions of Lords Watson and Herschell in Allen . Flood, L. R. (1898), A. C., 1, 108, 119.

2 Quinn v. Leathem, L. R. (1901), A. C., 495.

a South Wales Miners' Federation et al. v. Glamorgan Coal Co. et al., L. R. (1905), A. C., 239.

National Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Phonograph Co., L. R. (1908), 1 Ch., 335. 2 El. & Bl., 216 (Q. B., 1853).

Bowen v. Hall, L. R. (1881) 6 Q. B., 333 (Ct. of Appeal).

Temperton v. Russell, L. R. (1893) 1 Q. B., 715.

Quinn v. Leathem, L. R. (1901), A. C., 495.

"National Phonograph Co. v. Edison-Bell Phonograph Co., L. R. (1908) 1 Ch., 335. 10 Allen v. Flood, L. R (1898), A. C., 1, 126.

Section 3. Enticing employees from the service of competitors.

So far as appears from the reported cases, enticing a competitor's employees to leave his service in violation of their contracts and to enter the employment of rivals has been little resorted to as a competitive method. A few cases have arisen, however, both in this country and in England, where in an effort to cripple a rival, his employees have been induced to leave him for service with a competitor, or the agents of a competitor have been induced to secretly represent its rivals in violation of a contract for exclusive services. The legal ground of liability in such cases is ordinarily that the employees have been induced or procured to violate their contracts of employment; but in some cases it is apparently made to depend in part on a conspiracy to injure a competitor's business or on a willful and malicious interference with it.

AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In a leading case in Massachusetts the supreme judicial court held that to obstruct and hinder the business of a shoe manufacturer by persuading and inducing a large number of persons in his employ to leave, and by inducing one of his employees to violate his contract of service, was unlawful and a cause of action for damages for the injury inflicted. And where the salesman and local manager of a map

1 The record in United States v. American Tobacco Co. et al. discloses considerable evidence showing that the defendant, in its efforts to drive an independent manufacturer out of business, had enticed its employees to leave it and enter the service of the defendant and had attempted also to cause strikes in its factories. United States r. American Tobacco Co. (Circuit Court, Southern District of New York), vol. II, record, p. 631; same case, Government's brief in the Supreme Court (1910), p. 254. See also People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 170 Fed., 396, 400 (C. C. A., 1909).

In Hamilton Manufacturing Co. v. Tubbs Manufacturing Co. et al., 216 Fed., 401, 412 (1908), the inciting of strikes was charged among other things, but the evidence was conflicting and not sufficiently clear to justify granting the relief prayed for.

In Rice v. Standard Oil Co., 134 Fed., 464, 470 (C. C., 1905), it was alleged among other things that the defendant and its associates “bribed and bought out the plaintiff's sales agents, and caused the plaintiff's agents and employes to betray the trust confided to them by the plaintiff in his said business, and to wrongfully abandon the plaintiff's service and disregard their duty to the plaintiff in the course of his business." The court sus tained a motion to dismiss the declaration on the ground that the averments were too vague, and observed that "none of the plaintiff's agents thus alleged to have been bribed or to have betrayed their trust is named."

Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass., 551 (1871). But see Boston Glass Manufactory v. Binney, 4 Pick., 428 (1827), where it was held lawful to induce a servant to leave his master when his term of employment should expire, although he might not previously have had any Intention of quitting.

See also Tunstall et al. r. Stearns Coal Co., 192 Fed., 808, 810 (C. C. A., 1911), where it was alleged, among other things, that the defendants, former employees of the plaintiff and representatives of a labor organization known as the United Mine Workers, were, by the use of money, "hiring to discontinue work the company's employes who were remaining at work, and hiring to remain away or go elsewhere others who were intending to go to work in the company's mines." It was not alleged that any time contract relation existed between the company and the men so hired. The defendants were enjoined from "hiring or employing any of the employes of the plaintiff to quit the service of the plaintiff, and enjoined and restrained from hiring and paying any persons who are

company, on entering the service of a competitor, induced another employee also to leave and to enter the service of the new employer in violation of his contract, and was also attempting to entice others away, it was held that his former employer was entitled to an injunction restraining him from procuring its employees to leave in violation of their contracts. Similarly where a company employed a traveling salesman under contract to sell for it exclusively, it was held that the company could recover damages from a rival which secretly induced the salesman to sell its goods as well. In a recent New York case, however, it was held that damages could not be recovered for enticing away a competitor's employees in violation of their contracts of employment, unless fraudulent or otherwise unlawful means were employed. In an earlier case the New York Supreme Court apparently held it actionable for a corporation engaged in refining oil, maliciously and with the intention of injuring a rival's business, to entice from the latter's service its superintendent, who had planned, located, and constructed its works, at the time when the company's refinery had been so far completed that it could commence distilling oil.*

Where an association of job printers procured a typographical union, by threats of declaring an open shop, to call out the union men in a competing establishment, with the object of compelling the latter to observe the rule of the association respecting the maintenance of prices for printing, it was held by the Supreme Court of Georgia that an injunction should issue restraining the association from "interfering with the plaintiff's business as a printer engaged in competitive trade, and from unlawfully influencing the labor organization from obstructing its business." While conspiracy was alleged in this case, the court expressly stated that liability for maliciously interfering with the plaintiff's contracts with its employees was independent of the conspiracy. Similarly, the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that an insurance company could recover damages from other companies which, it was alleged, had conspired to injure it by maliciously and unlawfully persuading and intimidating its agent to leave its service by threats to drive him out of business as an insurance agent if he remained with the company."

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seeking employment of the plaintiff from engaging in the employment of the plaintiff. In other words, from bribing the employes of the plaintiff to cease work for the plaintiff, or from bribing persons who are willing and desirous and about to enter its employ from so doing." An order for this preliminary injunction was affirmed.

1 Kinney v. Scarbrough Map Co., 74 S. E., 772 (Ga. Sup. Ct., 1912).

J. S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stove Works, 96 Tex., 453 (1903).

* De Jong v. B. G. Behrman Co. et al., 131 N. Y. Supp., 1083 (Sup. Ct., App. Div., 1911). Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Everest, 3 How. Prac. Rep. (N. S.), 179 (N. Y. Sup. Ct.. 1886).

Employing Printers' Club v. Dr. Blosser Co., 122 Ga., 509 (1995).

* Globe & Rutgers Fire Insurance Co. v. Firemen's Fund Insurance Co. et al., 97 Miss., 148 (1910).

And in a recent case in the Federal courts relief was denied a complainant who sought to restrain a ball player from playing with a rival organization in violation of his contract with the complainant, where the latter had induced the player, previous to signing the contract, to break his then existing agreement to play with the rival organization, the ground of the decision being that the conduct of both complainant and defendant had been unconscionable, and the former not coming into court with clean hands would not be afforded relief.1

ENGLISH DECISIONS.

The legality of enticing away a rival's employees was before the English courts at least as early as 1774, when it was held that an employer could recover damages from a rival who induced his journeymen shoemakers to leave his service, though they were not hired for a determinate period. Similarly, where a piano manufacturer invited a rival's workmen to dinner and after causing them to become intoxicated induced them to sign contracts of employment with him, it was held that the original employer could recover damages, and a verdict of £1,600 was held not excessive. In another case, however, the court expressed the opinion that it was not unlawful to induce a servant to leave his master where there was no contract by which the master could require his services.*

In a leading case in the English court of appeal it has been held that it is unlawful to induce an artisan under contract to work exclusively for another to break his contract, and the same principle was applied in a comparatively recent case where it was held that it is actionable to continue to employ ballet girls after notice that they were under contract to perform for a competitor."

Section 4. Betrayal of trade secrets.

The right of business men to protection from the betrayal or unauthorized use of secret processes, machinery, formulas, or other secrets of their business has been frequently before the courts, especially in recent years. The profits resulting from the use of such secrets

1 Weeghan r. Killifer et al., 215 Fed., 168 (D. C., 1914). For cases involving the legality of inducing violations of contracts of employment by others than competitors see Bixby r. Dunlap, 56 N. H., 456 (1876); Haskins r. Royster. 70 N. C., 601 (1874); Daniel r. Swearengen, 6 8. C.. 297 (1875); Huff r. Watkins, 15 8. C., 82 (1880); Perkins r. Pendleton, 90 Me.. 166 (1897); Thacker Coal & Coke Co. v. Burke, 59 W. Va.. 253 (1906); Jackson r. Morgan, 94 N. W., 1021 (Ind. App. Ct., 1911).

2 Hart . Aldridge, 1 Cowper's Reps., 54 (1774). But that to induce a breach of a contract for an indeterminate period is not unlawful unless illegal means be employed, see Allen r. Flood, L. R. (1898), A. C., 1.

Gunter r. Astor et al., 4 Moore C. P., 12 (1819).

Nichol r. Martyn, 1-2 Espinasse, 732 (1799).

Bowen r. Hall, L. R. (1881), 6 Q. B. Div., 333.

De Francesco r. Barnum, 63 Law Times, 514 (Q. B., 1891). See also Fred. Wilkins & Bros. (Ltd.) r. Weaver, L. R. (1915), 2 Ch., 322.