extent of their application to nontechnical marks, labels, etc., appears to be somewhat doubtful. For this reason nothing more than the references to them are given.1

The same comment applies to statutes affording similar protection to labels, marks, and brands which have been registered with the various State authorities. Such statutes are to be found in 14 States and in Porto Rico.

FRAUDULENT USE OF GENUINE LABELS, MARKS, AND BRANDS.-This is prohibited in general terms by the following Kentucky statute:

SEC. 1. That no dealer or merchant shall make or apply or cause to be made or applied to any parcel or package any printed, written, stamped, engraved or other kind or character of label bearing the brand or name or both such brand and name of any manufacturer without the written authority of said manufacturer.

SEC. 2. Any person, firm or corporation violating the provisions of this act shall be fined in any sum not less than ten nor more than fifty dollars for each ‚offense,3

In addition, there are statutes in 38 States, Porto Rico and the District of Columbia which prohibit the refilling and reselling of labeled, marked, or branded containers by persons other than those who originally filled and sold them. Whether the protection of these statutes is limited to containers bearing technical trade-marks is also doubtful, and hence their citations only are given.*

1 Arizona Penal Code (1913), sees. 350-353; District of Columbia Code, sec. 879; Georgia Penal Code (1911), secs. 254, 255; Idaho Rev. Codes, secs, 6862-6865; Illinois J. & A. Ann. Stats. (1913), secs. 3696, 3697; Iowa Code (1897), see. 5047; Maine Rev. Stats. (1903), ch. 40, sec. 26; Massachusetts Rev. Stats. (1902), ch. 72, sees. 2, 3, 6; Michigan, Howell's Stats. (1913), secs. 14713-14716; Minnesota Gen. Stats. (1913), secs. 8852-8857; Mississippi Code (1906), secs. 1380-1382; Missouri Rev. Stats. (1909), sees. 11789-11796; Nebraska Rev. Stats. (1913), sees. 8701, 8705; Nevada Rev. Laws (1912), secs. 6689-6690; New Jersey Comp. Stats, (1910), p. 1802, sec. 196; New York Penal Law, sees. 2350-2351; North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913), secs. 9711-9718, Ohio Gen. Code (1910), secs. 13089, 13091; Oregon, Bellinger and Cotton's Code, sec. 1840; South Dakota Penal Code, secs. 423-427; Wisconsin Stats. (1913), sec. 4463; Wyoming Comp. Stats. (1910), sec. 3060.

2 California Penal Code (Kerr), secs. 350–353; Colorado, Mills' Ann. Stats. (1912), sees, 7557-7561; Connecticut Gen. Stats. (1902), secs, 4904-4906; Indiana, Burns' Ann. Stats. (1914), secs. 10441-10452; Massachusetts Rev. Stats. (1902), ch. 72, secs. 7-14; Montana Rev. Codes (1907), secs. 8447-8450; Nevada Rev. Laws (1912), secs. 6691€394; New Jersey Comp. Stats. (1910), pp. 5643-5648; New Mexico Stats. (1915), sec. 5559; North Carolina, Pell's Rev. of 1908, sees. 3019-3022; Oregon Laws (1911), ch. 97; Pennsylvania, P. & L. Digest, cols, 7315-7318; Porto Rico Rev. Stats. (1911), sees. 5759, 5760; Utah Comp. Laws (1907), secs. 4482-4485; Vermont Pub. Stats. (1906), secs. 4962-4967, as amended by Pub. Acts, 1908, No. 121.

Kentucky, Acts 1912, ch. 51, p. 205,

Alabama Code (1997), secs. 7318-7321; Arizona Penal Code (1913), sec. 354; Arkansas, Kirby's Digest (1904), secs. 7969-7973; California Penal Code (Kerr), secs. 3541-3541, Laws of 1911, ch. 230; Colorado, Mills' Ann. Stats. (1912), secs. 7570-7576, inc.; Connecticut Pub. Acts (1911), ch. 208; District of Columbia Code, sec. 878; Florida Comp. Laws (1914), sees, 3345, 3346; Indiana, Burns' Ann. Stats. (1914), sec. 10439; Idaho Laws (1911), ch. 212; Iowa Code Supp. (1907), sec. 5052; Kansas Stats. (1909), secs. 9670-9671; Maine Rev. Stats. (1903), ch. 40, secs. 37-39; Maryland Code, art. 27, secs. 331-335; Massachusetts Rev. Stats. (1902), ch. 72, secs. 15-18; Michigan, Howell's Stats. (1913), secs. 4341–1343; Minnesota Gen. Stats. (1913), secs. 6951, 6952; Missouri Rev. Stats. (1909), sec. 4831; Montana Rev. Stats. (1907), sec. 8451; Nebraska Rev. Stats. (1913), secs. 8869–8895; New Hampshire Laws (1903), ch. 120; New Jersey Comp.

Section & Pamig of the goods if the person or corporation as those of

any article of merchandise, and A women or printed thereon or "vert setuent, or otherwise, set tatuut as to the person by addi pof was made, or was in

whom such article of 1phonis whole or in part prodzoed, ratufactured, fr s el, proossed, treated, marketed, packed, bottled or boxed, or falsely represents that such article of merchandise or the material or any part thereof hus or Lay properly have any trade-mark attached to it or used in contes tion with it, or is or Lay properly be indicated or identified by any trade-mark,

Is guilty of a misdemeanor

Section 7. Enticement of employees.

Twelve States, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and the United States, have laws prohibiting the enticing away of employees, that of the United States being applicable only to employees in arsenals or armories. With the exception of the Tennessee statute, which forbids the enticement of any person under contract or in the employ of another, and of the Maine law, which prohibits employment agencies from inducing any employee to leave his employment, these laws are limited in their application to certain classes of employment. Considered in the aggregate, they apply to the following employees:

Stats. (1910), pp. 293-299; New Mexico Stats. (1915), sec. 5558; New York Penal Law, secs. 2355 2357, general business law, secs. 360-367; Louisiana Acts (1896), No. 120, as amended by Acts 1904, No. 74; North Carolina, Revisal of 1908 (Pell's), secs. 3027a30274; North Dakota Comp. Laws (1913), sees, 9719-9721; Ohio Gen. Code (1910), sec. 13111; Oklahoma Comp. Laws, sees. 8207-8209; Pennsylvania, Pepper and Lewis s Diz, 2d ed., pp. 7819 7324; Porto Rico Rev, Stats, (1911), secs. 5763-5765; Rhode Island Gen. Laws (1909), ch. 198; South Dakota Penal Code, secs. 428-430, Laws 1903, ch. 83, sec, 1; Texas, White's Penal Code, arts, 918a to 918e; Utah Comp. Stats. (19071, secs 4475x, 4486; Vermont Pub, Stats, (1906), secs, 4968-4972; Virginia Code (1904), sec. 1906a; West Virginia Code (1913), sees, 3598-3600; Washington, Remington and Bal linger's Code (1910), secs, 9501-9503; Wisconsin Stats, (1913), secs. 1747a-1-1747dd. 1 New York Laws (1914), vol. 2, eh, 332.

Alabama Code (1907), sccs, 6849, 6850; Arkansas Laws (1905), Act. No, 298; Florida Comp. Laws (1914), sec. 3232; Georgia Penal Code, sec 123; Kentucky, Carroll's Stats. (1915), sec. 1349; Louisiana Acts (1906), No, 54; Maine Laws (1911), ch. 87, sec. 4; Mississippi Code (1906), sec. 1146; New Jersey Comp Stats (1910), p 2205; North Carolina Pell's Rev of 1908, secs, 3365, 3567; South Carolina Crim. Code (1912), sec, 004, as amended by Acts 1913, No. 28; Tennessee Acts (1967), ch. 154; U. S. Stats, L., vol 44, p. 308 (D) CD); Hawaii Rey, Laws (1915), sec. 4201; U. 8. Stats, L., vol. 35, p.

8

Apprentices, servants, domestics, laborers, tenants, share croppers, and artificers. The laws of the District of Columbia, Maine, and New Jersey apply only to enticement by employment agencies. A violation of these statutes is punishable criminally in all jurisdictions save one, where a civil liability alone is prescribed, while in five jurisdictions, there is imposed both a criminal and a civil liability, the measure of damages under the latter usually being the losses incurred by reason of the enticement. In Alabama a sum in no case less than double the damages may be recovered in a civil action, onehalf of which goes to the injured employer and the other half to the county in which the offense occurs; and in Louisiana the injured employer is allowed double the amount of any debt owed him by the enticed employee.

10

Also in several States, early statutes enacted to prevent the enticement of lawfully bound apprentices are still in force. The violation of these statutes was usually punished by either fine or imprisonment, or both.

Section 8. Use of trading stamps.

GENERAL STATEMENT.-The trading stamp has been very generally employed by merchants in recent years as a device to induce patrons to confine their trade to them and to attract new customers. The value of the stamps represents a small percentage of the purchase price of goods and they are usually given only to cash purchasers. The stamps are redeemable in goods, or sometimes in money or goods, either by the establishment giving them or by the company which sold the stamps to the dealer. Very generally the stamps are sold to merchants by companies organized for the purpose of engaging in this business, and are redeemed by the trading-stamp company after being issued by the merchant to his customers. Some merchants, however, have adopted the policy of issuing and redeeming their own stamps. It is common, also, for manufacturers to issue coupons with their products redeemable by the consumer in “premiums."

1 Alabama.

* Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, North Carolina, and South Carolina.

3 District of Columbia and New Jersey.

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Mississippi, South Carolina, and United States.

lina.

Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, and South Caro

Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and North Carolina.

7 United States.

* Tennessee.

Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, and Mississippi.

10 Connecticut Gen Stats., sec. 1250; Florida Comp. Laws (1911), sec. 3231; Georgia Penal Code, sec. 121; Illinois, J. and A. Ann. Stats., sec. 455; Kentucky, Carroll's Stats (1915), sec. 2601; Missouri Stats. (1909), sec. 4817; Nevada Rev. Laws (1912), sec. 495; New Hampshire Pub. Stats. (1901), ch. 180, sec. 12; North Carolina, Pell's Rev. of 1908, sec. 193; and Ohio Gen. Code, sec. 8018.

When the stamps are sold to merchants by trading-stamp companies the latter usually agree to distribute to the public books containing the names of merchants giving the stamps and explaining the method of issuing and redeeming them, and in other ways to advertise the merchants. By agreement between the stamp company and merchants, the right to distribute the stamps is usually limited to one merchant within a specified area.

There has been considerable legislation enacted in recent years for the purpose of abolishing the use of trading stamps. The advocates of legislation of this class urge that the use of the stamps tends to monopoly, fosters combinations, and restrains trade by restricting open competition; and that in so far as the business is conducted by stamp companies it is a mere intervention between the buyer and seller of a third party preying upon both. They further assert that it adds to the cost of living by imposing a useless tax on the community, leads to the sale of inferior goods, and encourages indiscriminate buying. The opponents of legislation prohibiting the use of stamps urge, however, that their use is merely a method or scheme of advertising and that they afford a ready means of giving a small discount to cash purchasers. They further characterize the efforts to prohibit their use as attempts to protect one class from the fair, free, and full competition of another class.

Legislation affecting the use or distribution of trading stamps may be broadly divided into two classes, (1) That which is apparently designed to abolish their use entirely or to tax them out of existence, and (2) that which is intended to regulate the issuance and redemption of such stamps.

LEGISLATION PROHIBITING THE USE OF TRADING STAMPS.-Antitrading stamp legislation proper did not begin in the United States until 1898. Unsuccessful attempts, however, were previously made in Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Maryland to prevent gifts or premiums by merchants to their customers under existing statutes against (1) any offer with the sale of any article, or any article of food, of anything except what was stated to be the subject of the sale, (2) "lottery gifts by storekeepers and others," and (3) gift enterprises.4

The New York act was held to invade constitutional rights under the guise of the police power, and was characterized by the Court of Appeals as belonging to a type of legislation intended to protect one class against the free, fair, and full competition of another class."

1 Massachusetts Laws (1884), ch. 277.

New York Laws (1887), ch. 691; South Carolina Laws (1887), No. 397.
Pennsylvania Laws (1885), No. 36.

4 Maryland Laws (1886), ch. 480,

People v. Gillson, 109 N. Y., 389 (1888).

A similar statute in South Carolina appears not to have been construed. In passing upon the Massachusetts statute the court said that it did not forbid the sale of two things at once, even though one was the particular object desired and the other an additional inducement. Although the body of the Pennsylvania act forbade the gift or sale of any ticket, check, token, or memorandum entitling the holder to money or any article of value, it was held void on the technical ground that its title, mentioning lottery gifts merely, did not sufficiently indicate its purpose." In Maryland, a statute prohibiting gift enterprises not involving chance was held to be an unwarrantable exercise of the police power.3

The first attempt to prevent the use of stamps issued by tradingstamp companies by invoking a gift enterprise statute was in the District of Columbia, where the statute declares that every person who in any manner holds out the promise of gift or bestowal of any article or thing for and in consideration of the purchase of any other article or thing shall be regarded as engaged in a gift enterprise, and prohibits gift enterprises as thus defined and in general terms. The statute thus construed was upheld on the ground that the tradingstamp company is a device for getting something for nothing, and hence may be controlled under the police power, no matter whether its operation involves chance or not. In emphasizing the fact that the application of the statute to merchants was not being passed upon, the court said:

That it was not intended to apply to ordinary discounts for cash, or in proportion to amounts of purchases when made by the merchant himself to his customers, may be regarded as certain and the exercise of such power would doubtless be denied if expressly attempted.

Provisions substantially identical with the above, however, have since been held invalid in Colorado and Nebraska if designed to prohibit the trading-stamp business. They were there regarded, when thus applied, as attempts to prohibit legitimate business that was not obnoxious to public morals or detrimental to the public welfare, and thus to invade constitutional rights under the guise of the police power. And in 1911 when the Massachusetts Legislature was considering the adoption of the District of Columbia statute the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court gave it as their opinion that the

1 Commonwealth v. Emerson, 165 Mass., 146 (1896).

2 Com. v. Moorhead, 7 Pa. Co. Ct., 513 (1890).

a Long v. State, 74 Md., 565 (1891).

District of Columbia Laws. 1871-1872, p. 96, and R. S. D. C., secs. 1176-1177. Lansburgh v. District of Columbia, 11 Apps. D. C., 512 (1897). Followed in D. C. v. Kraft, 35 Apps. D. C., 253 (1910), and D. C. v. Gregory, 35 Apps. D. C., 271 (1910). Denver Ordinance No. 62, 1904; Nebraska Laws, 1911, ch. 179.

Denver v. Frueauff, 39 Colo., 20 (1906).

State v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 94 Nebr., 785 (1913).

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