to recognizing them as belligerent nations, and entitles each to all the sovereign rights of war against the other, p. 337.

Cited and applied in Prize Cases, 2 Black, 669, 17 L. 477, to action of Great Britain with reference to civil war in United States; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 613, 24 L. 1024, and it is not necessary that the independence of the revolting nation be recognized; Dole v. Insurance Co., 2 Cliff. 427, F. C. 3,966, in determining whether crews of ships of one belligerent nation should be considered pirates; Schooner Chapman, 4 Sawy. 512, F. C. 2,602, holding a vessel representing Confederate States government cannot be considered as fitted out for the commission of acts of piracy; Martin v. Hortin, 1 Bush, 632, and Smith v. Brazelton, 1 Heisk. 58, 64, 2 Am. Rep. 684, 688, where principle is applied in determining whether Confederates were entitled to right of belligerents. Cited, Miller v. United States, 11 Wall. 307, 20 L. 145, without particular application; Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U. S. 190, 24 L. 720, in discussion of rights of belligerents. Cited generally, The Hiawatha, Blatchf. Pr. 10, F. C. 6,451, as to rights, in regard to neutral powers, of government engaged in war to subdue insurrection of its own subjects. Cited in The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 429, as to necessity of recognition by some established government, before insurgents are entitled to rights of belligerents; dissenting opinion, Price v. Poynter, 1 Bush, 391, the majority holding the capture of horses for use of Confederate army by branch of army was a lawful exercise of belligerent rights; note, 91 Am. Dec. 280.

Evidence.-Where a witness falsifies a fact, in respect to which he cannot be presumed liable to mistake, courts are bound to apply maxim, falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, p. 339.

Cited with approval, American Telephone Co. v. Peoples' Co., 22 Blatchf. 552, 22 Fed. 324, where' witness testified falsely as to his pecuniary condition; Campbell v. State, 3 Kan. 498, holding refusal to instruct jury to this effect is error; Gillet v. Wimer, 23 Mo. 79, whenever testimony calls for such instruction, the court ought to give it; Paulette v. Brown, 40 Mo. 57, is to same effect; Dell v. Oppenheimer, 9 Neb. 457, 4 N. W. 53, where witness testified falsely as to rate of interest charged on loan made by him; Stoffer v. State, 15 Ohio St. 56, 86 Am. Dec. 477, holding, under such circumstances, court should instruct jury to reject entire testimony of witness so testifying. Approved generally, Skipper v. State, 59 Ga. 65; Callanan v. Shaw, 24 Iowa, 447, but maxim is applied only where witness willfully and knowingly gives false testimony; to same effect, Deering v. Metcalf, 74 N. Y. 506, where authorities are collected. Cited without particular application, People v. Chapleau, 121 N. Y. 276, 24 N. E. 472. See note, 81 Am. Dec. 270.

Modified, Moore v. Jones, 13 Ala. 304, application of rule should be made by jury; Lehman v. Marshall, 47 Ala. 377, province of determining credibility of a witness rests with jury; State v. Williams,

2 Jones (N. C.), 268, in common-law trial maxim is to be applied by jury, and is not rule by which judge may withdraw testimony from their consideration; to same effect, Mead v. McGraw, 19 Ohio St. 64. Cited, State v. Sexton, 10 S. Dak. 131, but held that maxim is inapplicable in absence of any motive or intent to deceive. Distinguished, Buffalo County v. Van Sickle, 16 Neb. 368, 20 N. W. 263, on ground that false statement of witness was not knowingly and willfully false; also in Pease v. Smith, 61 N. Y. 484, on same ground. International law. The sending of armed vessels, or of muni tions of war, from a neutral country to a belligerent port, is not contrary to the law of the United States, nor to the law of nations, p. 340.

Cited with approval, in The City of Mexico, 24 Fed. 41, the sending of munitions of war from neutral port to port of belligerent is a commercial enterprise and is not a violation of neutrality laws; The Carondelet, 37 Fed. 802, to same effect; dissenting opinion, Hart v. United States, 84 Fed. 805, 55 U. S. App. 498, the majority holding one who furnished transportation for military expedition against Spanish government in Cuba, violated neutrality laws. Approved, The Laurada, 85 Fed. 769, collecting authorities. Cited, without particular application, Briggs v. Light Boats, 11 Allen, 185.

Denied, The Meteor, 17 Fed. Cas. 198, where it is stated the above rule was mere dictum. See The Itata, 56 Fed. 509, 15 U. S. App. 1, construing revised statutes, section 5283, abrogating the rule of the principal case.

International law.-Augmentation of force by belligerent in port of United States is breach of our neutrality, p. 344.

Citizenship.- Quære, whether citizen of United States, independent of legislation, can throw off his allegiance, p. 347.

Cited generally, Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet. 267, 7 L. 675, merely stating question is not decided; Comitis v. Parkerson, 56 Fed. 558, 22 L. R. A. 150, 151, and n., in discussion of general subject; Beavers v. Smith, 11 Ala. 29, where the question is again left open.

Prize.-Augmentation of force or illegal outfit, in neutral country, infects captures subsequently made during same cruise with character of torts and requires restitution to parties interested, p. 348. Prize. Captures by public ships as well as privateers, if made in violation of our neutrality, are subject to restitution, p. 350.

International law. The exemption of the public property of one sovereign from local jurisdiction of another rests upon principles of public comity and convenience, and may be withdrawn on notice at any time, p. 353.

Cited, Walley v. Schooner Liberty, 12 La. 101, 32 Am. Dec. 115, application not clear.

Distinguished, Oyster Steamers, 31 Fed. 766, no considerations of comity between State and Federal governments shall prevent latter from enforcing laws of congress.

International law.- Exemption of foreign ships coming into our waters under license from local jurisdiction, does not extend to their prizes captured in violation of our neutrality, p. 354.

Miscellaneous.- Cited in The Siren, 7 Wall. 161, 19 L. 133, for what point is not clear; Ford v. Surget, 97 U. S. 611, 24 L. 1023, as to right of belligerent nation to establish blackade; The Florida, 101 U. S. 42, 25 L. 899, as involving a discussion of the rights of neutrals; In re Fassett, 142 U. S. 485, 35 L. 1089, 12 S. Ct. 298, and The Pizarro, 19 Fed. Cas. 788, as to jurisdiction of District Court in cases of marine tort. Cited, Amy Warwick, 2 Sprague, 133, F. C. 341, not in point; The S. L. Davis, 6 Blatchf. 139, F. C. 12,939, as containing discussion of principles of admiralty law; United States v. One Hundred Packages, 27 Fed. Cas. 286, not in point; Ingersoll v. Campbell, 46 Ala. 286, as to right of government to blockade its own ports. Erroneously cited, Hill v. Boyland, 40 Miss. 630.

7 Wheat. 356-452, 5 L. 472, EVANS v. EATON.

Evidence.-A person having an interest only in the question, and not in the event of the suit, is a competent witness, p. 425.

Principle applied in Bork v. Norton, 2 McLean, 425, F. C. 1,659, holding consignee of goods, who has delivered them over without payment of freight, is a competent witness in a suit by the master of the vessel against the owner of the goods; Fuller v. Rounceville, 31 N. H. 518, holding in action of trespass de bonis, the mortgagee is a competent witness for defendant; Runey v. Thompson, 1 Pinn. 507, in action of replevin if defendant pleads property in third person, such person is competent witness to sustain the plea.

Depositions, to be evidence in United States courts, must be taken according to laws of United States and rules of their courts, p. 426. Cited in discussion of use of depositions as evidence, Bowman v. Sanborn, 25 N. H. 103.

Appeal and error.- Where appeal is taken on ground of error in charge to jury, the appellate court will examine the substance of the charge only, p. 427.

Rule applied, Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Raddin, 120 U. S. 193, 30 L. 648, 7 S. Ct. 504, bill of exceptions should contain only matter of law excepted to; Oliver v. Phelps, 20 N. J. L. 184, 195, 199, where plaintiff spread whole charge on record, and then assigned seventeen errors on different causes, all this without having called attention of court below to supposed errors. Referred to in Carver v. Jackson, 4 Pet. 81, 7 L. 789, where court disapproves of practice of

spreading the charge in extenso on record; Bradstreet v. Bradstreet, 64 Me. 210, and Harriman v. Sanger, 67 Me. 445, condemning practice of reporting whole charge in bill of exceptions; Burt v. Insurance Co., 115 Mass. 16, bill of exceptions should set forth only the points of law raised at the trial; Nutting v. Herbert, 37 N. H. 355, application not clear. Approved generally, Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 S. & R. 202, 11 Am. Dec. 702; Stafford v. Walker, 12 S. & R. 196.

Patent law. If same combination existed before in machines of the same nature up to a certain point, and party's invention consists in adding some new machinery, or some improved mode of operation to the old, the patent should be limited to such improvement, p. 431.

Cited generally, Whitney v. Emmett, 1 Bald. 312, 314, F. C. 17,585, as to distinction between patent on machine and patent on improvement. See note, 31 Am. Dec. 205.

Patent law. If patent include more than patentee's invention it cannot be supported, p. 431.

Cited and principle followed in Wyeth v. Stone, 1 Story, 286, F. C. 18,107, where patentee claimed exclusive title to art of cutting ice by means of any power other than human; Hovey v. Stevens, 3 Wood. & M. 23, F. C. 6,746, where specifications did not state clearly what part of machine was new invention; Stanley, etc., Co. v. Davis, 22 Fed. Cas. 1054, rejecting patent claim because too broad and not definitely distinguishable.

Patent law. An application for a patent must contain specifications of the invention in full, clear and distinct terms, so as to distinguish the same from all other things before known, p. 434.

Principle approved, Hogg v. Emerson, 6 How. 485, 12 L. 525, but where patent is sought for improvement to machine, applicant need not describe particularly and disclaim all the old parts; Brooks v. Jenkins, 3 McLean, 444, F. C. 1,953, where from specifications no one could tell what had been invented; Webster Loom Co. v. Higgins, 15 Blatchf. 455, F. C. 17,342, where patent was held invalid because of insufficiency of specifications; Cross v. Huntly, 13 Wend. 386, 387, holding, where patent does not describe improvement, so that it may be known in what improvement consists, the defect may be taken advantage of in action on note given for right to vend such improvement. Cited generally, Brooks v. Fiske, 15 How. 215, 14 L. 667, as to reason for rule. Approved without particular application, Sawyer v. Miller, 4 Woods, 474, 12 Fed. 727. Miscellaneous.- Referred to generally in Evans v. Hettich, 7 Wheat. 468, 469, 470, 5 L. 500, an action for infringement of same

patent. Cited erroneously, Garrard v. Reynolds, 4 How. 127, 11 L 905; also, Smith v. Kernochen, 7 How. 219, 12 L. 675, and Green v. Neal, 6 Pet. 297, 8 L. 405. Cited generally as bearing on questions in patent law, Whitney v. Emmett, 1 Bald. 315, 321, 322, F. C. 17,585. Cited, Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 171; S. C., 3 Sumn. 541, F. C. 1,518, as to constitutionality of grants of patents by congress. Cited erroneously, In re Josephine, 39 N. Y. 27.

7 Wheat. 453-470, 5 L. 496, EVANS v. HETTICH.

Evidence. It is no objection to the competency of a witness in a patent cause that he is sued in another action for infringement of same patent, p. 468.

Evidence. Where a deposition has once been read in evidence without opposition, it cannot be afterwards objected to as being irregularly taken, p. 470.

Cited and principle applied, Locke v. Farley, 41 Mich. 407, 1 N. W. 957, where irregular affidavit was introduced without objection; Williams v. Thomas, 3 N. Mex. 395, 9 Pac. 358, objection to evidence cannot be made for first time in appellate court. Approved, arguendo, Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Co., 65 Fed. 536.

Witnesses. Fact that witness is subject to fits of derangement is no objection either to his competency or credibility, if sane when giving the testimony, p. 470.

Cited and principle applied, Campbell v. State, 23 Ala. 74, where court excluded from jury such evidence; Bell v. Rinner, 16 Ohio St. 49, the credibility of a competent witness cannot be impeached by testimony of other witnesses that such witness is not possessed of ordinary intelligence; Coleman v. Commonwealth, 25 Gratt. 876, 18 Am. Rep. 713, fact that principal witness for State was deranged a few days prior and shortly subsequent to trial, is not suficient ground for granting new trial. Approved generally, State v. Hayward, 62 Minn. 493, 65 N. W. 68, where distinction between insanity as a direct issue and as a collateral issue noted. Note, 28 Am. St. Rep. 942, 943.

Distinguished, Holcomb v. Holcomb, 28 Conn. 180, where evidence was introduced to show witness was insane at time transaction occurred about which he testified; White v. State, 52 Miss. 223, where witness was examined to ascertain whether he was compos mentis.

Miscellaneous.- Cited generally, Whitney v. Emmett, 1 Bald. 315, F. C. 17,585, as to extent of description required of article for which patent is sought; Blanchard v. Sprague, 2 Story, 171; 3 Sumn. 541, F. C. 1,518, as to power of congress to grant a patent.