v. Page, 33 Conn. 61; Perkins v. Lawrence, | general proposition, that a reference to a 138 Mass. 361; McWhirter v. Newell, 200 Ill. | plan does not necessarily add to or enlarge 583, 66 N. E. 345. the easements conveyed by the deed. liams v. Boston Water Power Co., 134 Mass. 406, 416. Taking all these considerations into account, we should hesitate to decide that

Wil

ty to complain of alterations made in the ways in good faith, for the general improvement of the cemetery, and not impairing the value of his lot or his means of access to it."

In the Seymour Case the proprietor of a cemetery sought to change a grass walk to a gravel walk in one of the alleys of the cemetery. The complainant owned an adjoining | the plaintiff could have any standing in equilot which he claimed extended to the middle of the alley, and he relied upon the analogy of the interest of an adjoining lot owner in a platted city or village in an adjacent street to sustain his contention. The court said: In the McWhirter Case, on page 589 of 200 "But the cases are so unlike that the well- Ill., page 347 of 66 N. E., this court said: settled rules of law which govern one are not "The Troy Grove cemetery is a public cemeapplicable to the other. The controlling prin- tery, having been conveyed by the original ciple in both is the intention of the parties. trustees, who laid out and platted the land * But, as heretofore stated, there is embraced within it, to the village of Troy little or no resemblance between the condi- Grove, formerly known as the village of Hotions of a highway and a cemetery. In the mer. As it is a public cemetery, the sale of latter the presumption is of a reservation lots therein does not pass to the grantees the rather than of a grant. There is, perhaps, no title in fee to such lots, but thereby assures purpose to which wealth and art can be more to the grantee a license or easement therein properly appropriated than to embellishing for burial purposes so long as the cemetery the cities of the dead. Beautiful shall be used for cemetery purposes. This licreations of taste and genius relieve the ex- cense or easement becomes the property of ternal gloom and soften the repulsive asso- the family of the original grantee of the lot ciation of the grave. In the preparations of upon his or her decease. The fee of the lots a cemetery great skill and experience are in such case remains in the trustees of the required in preserving and adding to the cemetery, or their grantees, the trustees of natural advantages of localities, in grading, the village, in trust for the use and benefit of fencing, arranging walks, alleys, avenues and the association and of the lot owners. 'Gensquares, and in planting and protecting trees, erally the right in the lot is an easement, shrubbery, etc., and it is absolutely neces-only-the right to use it for burial and cemesary, in order to insure regularity, perma-tery purposes, but with no other interest in nence and progress, that these improvements the fee.' Perley's Mortuary Law, p. 178; should be under the control of one authority, Buffalo City Cemetery v. City of Buffalo, 46 acting in pursuance of matured and harmoni- N. Y. 503; Hancock v. McAvoy, 151 Pa. 464 ous design. The very nature of the case ex- [25 Atl. 48]." cludes the supposition that each of the hundreds of individuals owning any right of burying in a particular spot can go beyond his specified limitation and derange this system, substituting deformity for beauty, as his own bad taste or temper may suggest."

In the Perkins Case the purchaser of a lot in a public cemetery owned by the city of Lawrence sought to enjoin the city from building a wall and terrace in front of his lot, and to require the premises adjoining his lot to be restored to the condition they were in at the time he purchased his lot. The court denied the complainant relief; and Mr. Justice Holmes, in disposing of the case, said: "It has been said that rights of burial in public burial grounds are peculiar and are not very dissimilar to rights in pews; that they are so far public that private interests in them are subject to the control of the public authorities having charge of police regulations. Sohier v. Trinity Church, 109 Mass. 1, 21; see Pub. St. c. 82, § 15. It has been held in Connecticut, in the case of a sale by plan, that the fee of the ways remained in the owner of the cemetery, who retained general charge of the grounds. Seymour v. Page, 33 Conn. 61. Finally, apart from any peculiar principles applicable to

In this case the defendant corporation and its officers have no interest in the Mount Hope cemetery, its avenues or driveways or public grounds, nor do they in any sense represent the public or the lot owners. In attempting, therefore, to intrude upon the grounds of the Mount Hope Cemetery Association by breaking down and removing the fence upon the west side of said cemetery grounds and by attempting to level down the west boundary of said Cyprus street, which was wholly located within the grounds of the Mount Hope Cemetery Association, and by inviting funeral cortèges to pass through and over the grounds of the Mount Hope cemetery to and from the cemetery grounds of the defendant corporation adjoining the Mount Hope cemetery, and by representing that the avenues and driveways upon the defendant corporation's grounds were connected with the avenues and driveways on the complainant corporation's grounds, they were trespassers and wrongdoers.

It is said, however, that, conceding the defendants were trespassers, a court of equity, in a case like this, is powerless to prevent, by injunction, the repetition of these trespasses upon the grounds of the Mount Hope Cemetery Association. In the case of

The name the "Mount Hope Cemetery" had

ecessors in title from the time the Mount Hope cemetery was established, in 1856. The grounds designated as Mount Hope cemetery had been improved and beautified by the complainant and its predecessors in title at a large expense. The defendant corporation was holding out to the people who lived in the vicinity of Mount Hope cemetery that its lands were connected with the avenues and driveways of the Mount Hope cemetery, and it was endeavoring to sell lots in its cemetery by reason of its proximity to Mount Hope cemetery, and by the supposed advan tages which would accrue to the purchaser by reason of the fact that, in effect, the lot which he was purchasing formed a part of Mount Hope cemetery. Had the defendant corporation assumed the name "Mount Hope Cemetery" instead of "New Mount Hope Cemetery," we think all would agree that it would have no right to use that name as against the Mount Hope cemetery, and we think it equally clear that the defendant corporation cannot obtain the right to use said name by prefixing thereto the word “New," and thereby make its name "New Mount Hope Cemetery Association" instead of "Mount Hope Cemetery Association." The word "New" does not change the name.

this court held a court of equity may enjoin in a case like this, then a cemetery associaa repetition of trespasses by the defendant tion similarly situated to the complainant where the complainant's title is admitted may have its property, upon which it has or has been established in an action at law, expended large sums of money, together with and where the trespasses are such that the much time and labor, in beautifying and imamount recoverable as damages in an action proving, taken from it or its value greatly at law would be so small as to be dispro- lessened by every land owner who happens portionate to the vexation and expense of to own property adjoining it tearing down such action, thus rendering the remedy at and destroying the fences surrounding the law inadequate. There was no dispute as cemetery and making his land a part of the to the title of the Mount Hope Cemetery cemetery. Association and its grantors, and it would not be possible in an action at law to recov-been in use by the complainant and its pred er damages in an amount which would adequately compensate the complainant for the wrong done it by the acts of the defendant corporation and its officers. We think, therefore, this case falls clearly within the doctrine announced in the Cragg Case. This case differs, however, from the ordinary bill in equity filed by a person on his own behalf to enjoin repeated trespasses to his land. Here the complainant holds title to the land embraced within the confines of Mount Hope cemetery, in part at least, burdened with an easement in favor of the purchasers of lots within the limits of said cemetery, and we think the doctrine well settled in this state that injunction is a proper method by which to prevent a trespass-especially when such trespass is oft repeated-to protect grounds set apart and dedicated to cemetery purposes. Trustees of the First Evangelical Church v. Walsh, 57 Ill. 363, 11 Am. Rep. 21; Davidson v. Reed, 111 Ill. 167, 53 Am. Rep. 613; Wormley v. Wormley, 207 Ill. 411, 69 N. E. 865, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481. While the bills asking for protection of such grounds have generally been filed by a lot owner, we see no reason why the proprietor of a cemetery, who represents all persons to whom lots have been sold-resident as well as nonresident owners-cannot maintain a bill for the purpose of restraining repeated trespasses to real estate in which he retains an interest and which has been dedicated by him as a place for the burial of the dead. The complainant in this case has a twofold interest in the real estate comprised within the limits of Mount Hope cemetery. It is the owner of a large number of lots in said cemetery which it has not sold, and it is the owner of the fee in the lots which have been sold for burial purposes, and in the avenues, driveways, and public grounds which have been set aside for the use of the lot owners. An action of ejectment or a suit for damages, in a case like this, would afford the complainant no adequate remedy. We think, therefore, this bill was properly filed by the complainant to enjoin the defendant corporation and its officers from removing the fence which formed a barrier upon the west side of the Mount Hope cemetery grounds and from in any way interfering with the lands situated within the enclosure of said

In International Committee of Young Women's Christian Ass'n v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n of Chicago, 194 Ill. 194, 62 N. E. 551, 56 L. R. A. 888, it was held that there was such a similarity in names between the two associations that an injunetion should issue. In Hopkins Amusement Co. v. Frohman, 202 Ill. 541, 67 N. E. 391, it was held that the name "Sherlock Holmes" was infringed by the use of the name "Sherlock Holmes, Detective." And in Gamble v. Stephenson, 10 Mo. App. 581, that the words "What Cheer" (the name of a restaurant) were infringed by the use of the name "New and Original What Cheer Restaurant." And in Newman v. Alvord, 35 How. Prac. (N. Y.) 108, that the name "Akron Water Lime" was infringed by the use of the name "Onandaga Akron Cement and Water Lime." See, also, Koebel v. Chicago Landlords' Protective Bureau, 210 Ill. 176, 71 N. E. 362, 102 Am. St. Rep. 154. In Lee v. Halley, L. R. 5 Ch. App. Cas. 155, Lord Justice Giffard said: "The principle upon which the cases on this

*

Const. art. 4, § 13, providing that but one subject shall be embraced in an act, which shall be expressed in the title, although the title states "what shall be a defense." While the statute states that certain things shall not be a defense, the latter merely stating negatively what the title states affirmatively.

erty in the word, but that it is a fraud on a 1, 1908" (Laws 1907-08, p. 47), which is a person who has an established trade and sufficient reference for identification. carries it on under a given name, that some [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] other person should assume the same name with a slight alteration, in such a way as to 4. STATUTES (§ 118*)-SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE. Laws 1909, p. 180, providing for the preinduce persons to deal with him in the be-vention of pandering, is not in violation of lief that they are dealing with the person who has given a reputation to the name. ** I think this injunction has been properly granted upon the well-known principles of this court, which are applicable to all cases of this description, viz., that it is a fraud on the part of a defendant to set up business under such a designation as is calculated to lead, and does lead, other people to suppose that his business is the business of another person." This statement of the law was quoted with approval in the case reported in 194 Ill. at page 200, 62 N. E. 551, 56 L. R. A. 888.

There is evidence in this record that the mail of the two corporations has been confused in the post office, and it must be, we think, to the most casual observer apparent that the public would be likely to be confused and deceived into believing that purchasers of lots were dealing with the complainant when they were buying lots of the defendant corporation. We can conceive of no reason, under the conditions detailed in this record, why the defendant corporation should have adopted a name so similar to that of the complainant corporation's name unless it was done for the purpose of deriving profit from the sale of its lots, based upon the established name and business of the complainant corporation.

The decree of the circuit court will be reversed and the cause will be remanded to that court, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the prayer of the complainant's bill.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] 5. STATUTES (§ 118*)-SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE -PANDERING.

Laws 1909, p. 180, providing in its title for the prevention of pandering and for "the comtional because in the body of the statute it is petency of certain evidence," is not unconstituprovided that a wife may be a competent witness against her husband, since the latter provision is germane to the subject, and is reasonably embraced in the title.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] 6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 109*) - VESTED RIGHTS-RULES OF EVIDENCE.

Laws 1909, p. 180, providing for the prevention of pandering, and that the wife may testify against her husband, is not unconstitutional as revolutionizing the laws of evidence, since those laws pertain merely to the remedy, and are subject to the control of the Legislature, and there are no vested rights in them. al Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 260-263; Dec. Dig. § [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitution109.*]

7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 42*)-STATUTESVALIDITY-WHO MAY QUESTION.

A person found guilty of pandering within the state under Laws 1909, p. 180, providing for the prevention of pandering, cannot raise the question as to whether the act is unconstitutional in allowing prosecutions for acts committed without the state.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 39, 40; Dec. Dig. § 42.*]

Reversed and remanded, with directions. 8. STATUTES (§ 86*) - VALIDITY - SPECIAL

The Supreme Court will take judicial notice that the pandering act of 1908, making it a crime to induce a female to become an inmate of a house of ill fame, is in the statutes (Laws 1907-08, p. 47).

LAWS.

Laws 1909, p. 180, providing for the prevention of pandering, and the punishment therefor, is not unconstitutional as being special legislation.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. § 96; Dec. Dig. § 86.*]

Error to Municipal Court of Chicago; Henry C. Beitler, Judge.

Thomas C. Braun was convicted of pandering, and he brings error. Affirmed.

H. Stead, Atty. Gen., and John E. W. WayW. G. Anderson, for plaintiff in error. W. man, State's Atty. (Zach Hofheimer, of counsel), for the People.

CARTER, J. An information was filed by [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal one Lena Martin in the municipal court of Law, Cent. Dig. § 706; Dec. Dig. § 304.*] Chicago against the plaintiff in error, Thom3. STATUTES (§ 118*)-SUFFICIENCY OF TITLE. as C. Braun, charging him with willfully inLaws 1909, p. 180, for the prevention of ducing, persuading, and encouraging her to pandering, is not defective as being without a title, since it states that it is "an act to amend leave her home in St. Louis, Mo., and come an act in relation to pandering, approved June to Chicago to be an inmate of a house of ill

fame for the purpose of prostitution. On | 82; Ritchie v. People, 155 Ill. 98, 40 N. E. September 18, 1909, plaintiff in error was 454, 29 L. R. A. 79, 46 Am. St. Rep. 315; Bobe! found guilty of "pandering," as charged in said information, and sentenced by said court to six months' imprisonment in the House of Correction and to pay a fine of $300. No bill of exceptions is found in the record, and this writ of error is to review the law and pleadings only.

v. People, 173 Ill. 19, 50 N. E. 322, 64 Am. St. Rep. 64. The title states that the act provides "what shall be a defense," while the body of the act states that certain things shall not be a defense. It is insisted, therefore, that what is embraced in the body of the act is not expressed in the title. The title refers affirmatively to what is stated

It is further urged that the act is unconstitutional because it provides that a wife may be a competent witness against her husband, whereas the title only refers to "the competency of certain evidence." There is no merit in this contention. The provisions of the act are germane to the general subject expressed in the title, and are reasonably embraced therein. The act is not in violation of the Constitution in the manner contended.

Plaintiff in error contends that the pandering act, approved June 12, 1909 (Laws 1909, | negatively in the body. There is nothing inp. 180), is unconstitutional and void. It is consistent in so doing and the objection seems first urged that the act purports to amend hypercritical. an act of June 1, 1908, and that the latter act was never passed by the Legislature; that it could not be amended as it was never in existence. To sustain this point, counsel asks the court to take judicial notice of the proceedings of the Senate and House of Representatives as found in their journals. Whatever may be the rulings in other jurisdictions, it is the settled law of this state that it is not the province of this court, at the suggestion or request of counsel, to undertake to explore the journals of the Legislature for the purpose of ascertaining the manner in which a law went through the Legislature. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Wren, 43 Ill. 77; Grob v. Cushman, 45 Ill. 119; Cantrell v. Seaverns, 168 Ill. 165, 48 N. E. 186. The pandering act of June 1, 1908, is found in our statutes (Laws 1907-08, p. 47). We will take judicial notice of that fact, and, no evidence having been offered to impeach it, we will not hunt for such information in the journals of the Legislature. Bedard v. Hall, 44 Ill. 91.

It is further contended that said law of 1909 is without a title, because, after quoting the title of the law of 1908, no independent title is afterwards incorporated as a part of the 1909 act. If the reference to the act to be amended, in the title and body of the amendatory act, is sufficient for identification, it is all that the law requires. 1 Lewis' Sutherland on Stat. Const. (2d Ed.) § 231. The act is not subject to the criticism urged against it on this point.

It is further contended that the act in question violates section 13 of article 4 of the Constitution, which provides that only one subject shall be embraced in the act, and that such subject shall be expressed in the title. It is not required that the title shall specifically and exactly express the subject of the act or be an index of its details. The Constitution is obeyed if all the provisions relate to one subject indicated in the title, and are parts of it, incident to it or reasonably connected with it. People v. McBride, 234 Ill. 146, 84 N. E. 865, 123 Am. St. Rep.

As we understand his argument, counsel further urges that the provision in this act allowing the wife to testify against her husband is a revolution in the law of evidence and therefore unconstitutional. No one has a vested right in the rules of evidence. They pertain to the remedy and are subject to modification and control by the Legislature. Meadowcroft v. People, 163 Ill. 56, 45 N. E. 303, 35 L. R. A. 176, 54 Am. St. Rep. 447. The wife can testify against the husband if the Legislature so provides. Miner v. People, 58 Ill. 59. This statute does so provide.

It was further contended on oral argument that the statute is unconstitutional because under certain of its provisions a person could be prosecuted in this state for an act committed entirely within the boundaries of another state or jurisdiction. Without considering or deciding whether the statute is open to this criticism, it is a sufficient answer in this case that plaintiff in error is in no position to raise the question. The crime with which he is charged was consummated in Illinois. He was convicted and tried here. If that particular provision of the act could be regarded as unconstitutional, we would not hold the entire act void for that reason; hence on the facts in this case the plaintiff in error cannot invoke that point as a defense. Kettles v. People, 221 III. 221, 77 N. E. 472; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 11 N. E. 881. Neither do we find any basis for plaintiff in error's contention that the act in question is special legislation.

The judgment of the municipal court will be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; Al- serve any question for review upon appeal or bert C. Barnes, Judge.

Ira Campbell was convicted of robbery, and providing that if, during trial, either party alhe brings error. Affirmed.