any trust legislation from this party at that time. As a matter of fact the attention of the Republican party during President McKinley's first term was mainly directed toward tariff legislation, the war with Spain, and the currency situation.

Not until the closing years of the nineteenth century, however, did the trust problem reach a really acute stage. The organization of numerous trusts to cover fields formerly quite competitive created an entirely new situation. In the face of this situation President McKinley in December, 1899, in his annual message to Congress, took up the subject of trusts. He said in part: "Combinations of capital organized into trusts to control the conditions of trade among our citizens, to stifle competition, limit production, and determine the prices of products used and consumed by the people, are justly provoking public discussion, and should early claim the attention of Congress. . . . It is universally conceded that combinations which engross or control the market of any particular kind of merchandise or commodity necessary to the general community, by suppressing natural and ordinary competition, whereby prices are unduly enhanced to the general consumer, are obnoxious not only to the common law but also to the public welfare. Whatever power the Congress possesses over this most important subject should be promptly ascertained and asserted." 1

Early in 1900, also, the Industrial Commission, which had been appointed in 1898 to investigate trusts and monopolies, inter alia, made its preliminary report, recommending more detailed supervision over industrial corporations engaged in interstate operations. The testimony before this commission and the publication of its report focussed popular attention upon this subject. The state of the public mind at this time is indicated in the fact that the Republican party, which had hardly referred to trusts in its platform in 1896, inserted in its platform in 1900 this clause:

"We recognize the necessity and propriety of the honest cooperation of capital to meet new business conditions, and especially to extend our rapidly increasing foreign trade; but we condemn 1 Cong. Record, December 5, 1899, p. 25.

all conspiracies and combinations intended to restrict business, to create monopolies, to limit production, or to control prices, and favor such legislation as will effectively restrain and prevent all such abuses, protect and promote competition, and secure the rights of producers, laborers, and all who are engaged in industry and commerce.' 99 1

Much more vigorous denunciation of trusts was made in the platform of the Democratic party, as is shown by the following

extracts:

"Private monopolies are indefensible and intolerable. They destroy competition, control the price of all material and of the finished product, thus robbing both producer and consumer. They lessen the employment of labor and arbitrarily fix the terms and conditions thereof, and deprive individual energy and small capital of their opportunity for betterment. They are the most efficient means yet devised for appropriating the fruits of industry to the benefit of the few at the expense of the many, and unless their insatiate greed is checked, all wealth will be aggregated in a few hands and the republic destroyed.

We pledge the Democratic party to an unceasing warfare in nation, state and city against private monopoly in every form. "Tariff laws should be amended by putting the products of trusts upon the free list, to prevent monopoly under the plea of protection.

"We condemn the Dingley Tariff Law as a trust-breeding measure, skillfully devised to give the few favors which they do not deserve and to place upon the many burdens which they should not bear." 2

To satisfy the popular demand for trust legislation, a number of bills were introduced in Congress in 1900. One of the principal legislative proposals was a constitutional amendment to give Congress adequate power to deal with trusts and to maintain an open field for competition in industry. This measure received a comfortable majority in the House, but failed to secure the twothirds requisite for a constitutional amendment, and thus came 1 McKee, op. cit., pp. 342-343.

2 Ibid., pp. 334-336.

to naught.' Doubtless a partial explanation of the failure of this amendment is the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the Addyston Pipe case, rendered in December, 1899, had made it clear that the Sherman Act was more effective, and the power of the national government more extensive, than had theretofore been supposed.2

3

The constitutional amendment having failed of passage, the House immediately took up consideration of a bill to amend the Sherman Act. This bill was quite drastic, proposing among other things to deny the privilege of interstate transportation to manufacturing concerns organized for the purpose of monopolizing the manufacture or sale of articles of commerce, or of increasing or decreasing their price with the intent of preventing competition in their manufacture or sale. In the opinion of the committee that reported out the bill the measure fully exhausted the power of Congress to control combinations and trusts by penal legislation. The bill was debated in the House during only one day, and after being amended so as to exclude labor organizations from its prohibitions was passed by the House by a vote of 274-1. The sole dissenting vote was cast by Mr. James R. Mann, later the Republican leader of the House of Representatives. The Senate received the bill on June 4, referred it to the appropriate committee, and three days later adjourned sine die. In 1903 two laws dealing with trusts were passed. The first was an act to expedite the hearing and determination of cases arising under the anti-trust act and the act to regulate commerce.6

1 Cong. Record, June 1, 1900, p. 6426; and House Report no. 1501, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.

2 See p. 395.

3 House Report no. 1506, 56th Cong., 1st Sess.

4 Cong. Record, June 2, 1900, p. 6502.

A proviso in the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Appropriation Act of February 25, 1903, granted immunity to persons testifying in suits brought under the anti-trust or interstate commerce acts. 32 Statutes at Large, part I, p. 904. Because of the "immunity bath" decision (see p. 485) this immunity was limited in 1906 to natural persons only. 34 Statutes at Large, part I, p. 798.

632 Statutes at Large, part I, p. 823.

The purpose of this bill was to reduce the delay of the courts in settling important cases arising under the anti-trust and inter-V state commerce_acts, and to that end it provided in substance that the circuit courts of the United States must give precedence to suits in equity arising under these acts, when the United States was a complainant, and when the Attorney General certified that the suits were of general public importance; and it further provided that appeals must be taken direct to the Supreme Court, and within sixty days from the entry of the decree of the lower court.

The second act established an agency to secure greater publicity of the affairs of industrial corporations. The organization of numerous trusts concerning which the public knew little had naturally created a popular demand for publicity. President Roosevelt in his first annual message to Congress had said "the first essential in determining how to deal with the great industrial combinations is knowledge of the facts-publicity." 1 In his second annual message he had repeated this recommendation, saying that "publicity can do no harm to the honest corporation; and we need not be overtender about sparing the dishonest corporation."2 Congress yielded to his wishes in this matter (his wishes were those of the country), and in February, 1903, established, in the newly created Department of Commerce and Labor, a Bureau of Corporations, which, under the direction of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, was to investigate the affairs of industrial corporations engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, the President of the United State to determine what part of the information thus obtained should be made public. At the head of the Bureau there was to be a Commissioner of Corporations, appointed by the President, with a salary of $5,000. He was empowered to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses, and the production of documentary evidence.

By the

passage in 1903 of the act creating the Bureau of Cor

1 Cong. Record, December 3, 1901, p. 83.

2 Ibid., December 2, 1902, p. 7.

8 32 Statutes at Large, part I, pp. 827-828.

porations, the Expedition Act, and the Elkins Act dealing with railroad rebates, the Republican party during President Roosevelt's first term made distinct progress in anti-trust legislation. But during President Roosevelt's second term, though he regularly referred to trusts in his messages to Congress, nothing whatever was accomplished.1 Mention should be made, however, of one of his main recommendations. In his message of 1907 President Roosevelt had suggested that agreements among, or combinations of, corporations be submitted to a government body for its approval. In a special message presented to Congress on March 25, 1908, he took up this matter in more detail. He pointed out that in the modern industrial world combinations among business men and laboring men were absolutely necessary, and they were coming more and more to be necessary among farmers. The Sherman Anti-trust Law, though only partially effective against vicious combinations, had been construed so as to prohibit every combination for the transaction of modern business. He therefore recommended that some governmental authority, presumably the Commissioner of Corporations, be authorized to pass on the validity of contracts filed with it, and if within a definite time (say sixty days) the Commissioner had not prohibited such contract, it would not be deemed to be illegal unless in unreasonable restraint of trade.2

A bill embodying this suggestion was introduced in the Senate on April 1, 1908, only a week after the reading of the President's message. On January 26, 1969, the Committee on the Judiciary (to which the bill had been referred) brought out the measure, but with an adverse report. The committee in an unanimous report pointed out that the effect of the bill would be to confer a dispensing power, a power of granting immunity, on a mere bureau head (the Commissioner of Corporations for industrial corporations) or on an administrative body (the Interstate Commerce Commission for railroads), and in both instances without notice or hearing, a course of procedure that

1 Except for an amendment of the immunity provisions. See footnote to p. 326.

2 Cong. Record, March 25, 1908, p. 3854.