Page ཨ;Ë 356 33. Instance of the same political infatuation in our times, 34. Results which have followed from it in the last instance, 35. Strange insensibility to national sins which often prevails, 37. Extraordinary coincidence in the crises of the two contests, 38. Real causes of this identity of conduct of the opposite parties on these 41. What course the Tories should have pursued at the Treaty of Utrecht, 42. But no excuse can be found for our violation of the Treaty of Utrecht by 43. Answer to the common argument used in behalf of the Quadruple Alliance, 369 44. Our active interference to put down Don Carlos and the male line was still 48. Great change which the substitution of the female line for the male in Spain made in this respect on the interests of other powers, 49. The danger of the Spanish alliance is unchanged by the Revolution of 1848, ib. 12. Dangers of the opposite system, 13. Reasons why Marlborough's genius was underrated in his life, 20. Circumstances which palliate these faults in him, 21. His private character and elevated ideas in the disposal of money, 22. His magnanimity and humanity, 23. His character as drawn by Adam Smith and Bolingbroke, 24. The five great generals of modern times, 27. His astonishing successes over the Turks, 28. Narrow escape from ruin, and wonderful victory at Belgrade, 29. His character as a general, and parallel to Napoleon, 30. Daring and skill with which he extricated himself from dangers, 37. His great services to his kingdom during the next ten years of peace, 38. Coalition of Austria, Russia, France, Saxony, and Sweden against Prussia, 65. Marlborough was more successful than Wellington in sieges, 66. Causes of this circumstance, 67. Great and remarkable land triumphs of England over France, 68. Long series of land disasters sustained by France from England, LIFE OF MARLBOROUGH CHAPTER VII. PROGRESS OF THE WAR IN OTHER QUARTERS IN 1708.-CONFERENCE OF THE HAGUE.SIEGE FALL OF MONS. VII. 1709. 1. Progress of of the Medi the war in terranean Rhine. ALTHOUGH the campaign in Flanders was the principal CHAP. one in 1708, and from its vast importance and thrilling interest absorbed the greater part of the forces of the contending parties, and nearly the whole interest of the struggle, yet it was by no means the only theatre important operations. In other quarters considerable and on the successes had been gained, which contributed to enhance the difficulties, and augment the dangers of the French monarch. In the Mediterranean, Admiral Drake had conquered Sardinia, almost without striking a blow. Minorca, with its noble harbour and powerful fortress of Port Mahon, had yielded to a combined naval and military force under the able direction of General Stanhope, and, with Gibraltar, promised to secure to the English the command of that inland sea. On the VOL. II. Α VII. CHAP. Upper Rhine, the Electors of Bavaria and Hanover, at the head of their respective armies, had cautiously abstained from serious hostilities, and spent the cam 1709. viii. 225 272. Hist. 1 Hist. Mil. paign in mutual observation, without achieving anything Worthy of being recorded. Everything had been drawn. to the campaign in Flanders: nothing had occurred elsewhere to counterbalance its advantages.1 de Marlb. iii. 1, 2. 2. Ruinous divisions which pre vailed in Spain. The war in Spain, at the outset, promised more important operations, but they had not terminated in any considerable results. The effects of the disaster of Almanza were still deeply felt. The same jealousies between Lord Galway and the Spanish generals and Government, prevented any considerable operation either from being undertaken or being brought to a successful issue. Although the cabinet of Vienna, at the urgent entreaty of Marlborough, at length sent 7300 men to reinforce the army in Catalonia; yet, even with the aid of this considerable reinforcement, it was weak aud disjointed, without either money, magazines, or clothing-alike incompetent to commence offensive operations, or to defend its own frontier from the invasion of the enemy. The jealousy shown of the Portuguese troops, who had been despatched to succour Catalonia, after the disaster of Almanza exposed it to the danger of immediate conquest, was such that a British squadron was despatched to bring them round to their own country. Even after this source of irritation was removed, the jealousy of foreigners, which seems so inherent in the Spaniards that not even the greatest disasters can eradicate it, produced such continued disputes, that so far from gaining the Allies lost ground in every part of the Peninsula. Lord Galway, who had been removed to Portugal after his ill success at Almanza, was deprived |