CHAP. VIII. 1710. ability, so as entirely to bar the approach to Arras; and at the same time it was in itself so strong, and so strengthened by the resources of art, as to render it extremely hazardous to attempt an attack. After reconnoitring this position, the Allied generals concurred in thinking that it was equally impossible to force it, and to undertake the siege of Arras while the enemy, in such strength and so strongly posted, lay on its flank.* Their first intention, on finding themselves. baffled in this project, was to seize Hesden on the Canchec, which would have left the enemy no strong place between them and the coast. But the skilful dispositions of Villars, who on this occasion displayed uncommon abilities and foresight, rendered this design abortive, and it was therefore determined to attack Bethune. This place, which was surrounded with very 1 Coxe, v. strong works, was garrisoned by nine thousand men, Rousset, ii. under the command of M. Puy Vauban, nephew of the sid. sur la celebrated marshal of the same name. But as an attack 1710, par on it had not been expected, the necessary supplies for Hist. de a protracted resistance had not been fully introduced when the investment was completed on the 15th July.1 * "Our project was to have attacked Arras as soon as the siege of Douai was over; but the French having drawn together many more troops than we could have imagined, which gives them certainly a great superiority as to their numbers, which will make another siege impossible till we have obliged them to send some of their troops into garrisons, or decided the fate of Europe by a battle. I thank God I have my health; but what I hear from your side of the water gives me so much uneasiness that I am not so fully pleased with those sanguine thoughts as formerly, that God would protect and bless us but with all my soul I pray He may, and shall very freely venture my life that we may have success, which is necessary not only for preventing the ruin of England, but of all Europe: for should the French get the better, you may depend upon it that Holland is so alarmed by our divisions in England that they would consent to whatever France should insist upon.”— Marlborough to Godolphin, June 2, 1710; Coxe, v. 196. 1 292-294. 296. Con Camp. de Villars, 172. Marlb. iii. 214, 215. CHAP. VIII. 1710. 41. with which averted the France on this occa sion. Fall Villars, upon seeing the point of attack now fully declared, moved in eight columns upon Hobarques, near Montenencourt. Eugene and Marlborough upon this Great skill assembled their covering army, and changed their front, Villars taking up a new line stretching from Mont St Eloi to invasion of Le Comte. Upon advancing to reconnoitre the enemy, Marlborough discovered that the French, instead of of Bethune, advancing to raise the siege, were busy constructing a August 28. new set of lines, which stretched across the plain from the rivulet Ugie, towards the Somme, and the centre of which, at Avesnes le Comte, was already strongly fortified. It now appeared how much Villars had gained by the skilful measures which had diverted the Allies from their projected attack upon Arras. It lay upon the direct road to Paris. Bethune, though of importance to the ultimate issue of the war, was not of the same present moment. It lay on the flank on the second line, while Arras was in front, and was the only remaining fortress in the last. By means of the new lines which he had constructed, the able French marshal had erected a fresh protection for his country, when its last defences were wellnigh broken through. By simply holding them, the interior of France was covered from incursion, time was gained not only for raising fresh armaments in the interior for its defence, but, what was of more importance to Louis, for waiting the issue of the intrigues in England, which were soon expected to overthrow the Whig cabinet. Villars, on this occasion, proved the Aug. 29 and salvation of his country, and justly raised himself to the Des. v. 116. very highest rank among its military commanders. His 294. Hist. measures were the more to be commended that they exposed him to the obloquy of leaving Bethune to its fate. In truth, Villars' men were so discouraged that 1 Villars' Mem. ii. 119-125. Marlbo rough to Godolphin, 30, 1710. Coxe, v. de Marlb. iii. 216. VIII. 1710. it was to the last degree hazardous to attempt anything CHAP. with them. Lacouture," said he, "called money the star of gaiety,' but unhappily that star does not shine very bright in our firmament. The bread of the soldiers, too, is execrable; the desertion is great one reason is, that in winter the soldiers die of famine, and in summer are killed it is not surprising that such a life is not very popular." 42. fall of Be 28. The trenches were opened before Bethune on the night of the 23d July. Fagel conducted the attack Siege and on the bastion of St Ignatius, where there was only thune, Aug. one covered way; Schulemberg on the gate of Aire, where there were two. The confederates sustained a severe loss the next night from a sortie of the garrison, which cost them eight hundred men, besides having all their works levelled with the ground. Schulemberg, however, pushed his approaches with vigour and success. On the 12th August, a reinforcement of six, on the 20th of twelve battalions, strengthened the besiegers; and although the besieged made two vigorous sallies, which were only repelled with a loss of a thousand men, their progress was very perceptible. Fagel, on his side, had pushed the sap up to the palisades of the outworks; Schulemberg had made himself master of the counterscarp, and battered in breach the rampart. The besiegers were preparing to fill up the ditch. The garrison, weakened by its long and gallant defence, had nearly exhausted its ammunition and provisions; balls even were awanting for the guns. In these circumstances, M. de Vauban, after thirty-five days of open trenches, beat the chamade-" the sad signal," says the French annalist, “which terminated all the sieges undertaken by Marlborough;" and the garrison, now reduced to CHAP. VIII. 1710. fifteen hundred men and nine hundred wounded, was conducted, with the honours of war, to St Omer. When the white flag was hoisted, and the firing ceased, the 1 Rousset, French governor appeared on the ramparts; Marlborough hastened to the counterscarp, and from thence the two commanders saluted each other with mutual marks of respect and admiration.1 ii. 296, 297. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 218-221. 43. animosity to Marlborough in England. He intends to besiege Calais. Notwithstanding the loss of so many fortresses on Increasing the endangered frontier of his territory, Louis XIV. was so much encouraged by what he knew of the great change which was going on in the councils of Queen Anne, that, expecting daily an entire revolution in the ministry, and the overthrow of the war party in the cabinet, he resolved on the most vigorous prosecution of the contest. He made clandestine overtures to the secret advisers of the Queen, in the hope of establishing that separate negotiation which at no distant period proved so successful. Torcy, the Duke's enemy, triumphantly declared, "what we lose in Flanders, we shall gain in England." To frustrate these machinations, and, if possible, rouse the national feeling more strongly in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war, Marlborough determined to lay siege to Aire and St Venant, which, though off the line of direct attack on France, laid open the way to Calais, which, if supported at home, he hoped to reduce before the conclusion of the campaign.* He entertained the most sanguine "I am of opinion that, after the siege of Aire, I shall have it in my power to attack Calais. This is a conquest which would very much prejudice France, and ought to have a good effect for the Queen's service in England; but I see so much malice levelled at me that I am afraid it is not safe for me to make any proposition, lest, if it should not succeed, my enemies should turn it to my disadvantage."-Marlborough to Godolphin, 11th August 1710; COXE, v. 343. CHAP. VIII. 1710. hopes of success from this design, which was warmly approved of by Godolphin; but he received at this time. such discouraging accounts of the precarious condition of his influence at court, that he justly concluded he would not receive adequate support from England, out of which the main supplies for the enterprise must be drawn. He, in concert with Eugene, therefore, wisely resolved to forego this dazzling but perilous project ii. 298. for the present, and to content himself with the solid 343. Hist. advantages, unattended with risk, of reducing Aire and iii. 223, 224. St Venant.1 1 Rousset, Coxe, v. de Marlb. capture of Sept. 29. Having taken their resolution, the confederate gene- 44. rals began their march in the beginning of September, Siege and and on the 6th of that month both places were invested. St Venant, Aire, which is comparatively of small extent, was garrisoned by only two thousand seven hundred men ; but St Venant was a place of great size and strength, and had a garrison of fourteen battalions of foot and three regiments of dragoons, mustering eight thousand combatants. They were under the command of the Count de Guebriant, a brave and skilful commander. Both were at this time protected by inundations, which retarded extremely the operations of the besiegers, the more especially as the autumnal rains had set in early this year, and with more than usual severity. While anxiously awaiting the cessation of this obstacle, and the arrival of a great convoy of heavy cannon and ammunition which was coming up from Ghent, the Allied generals received the disheartening intelligence of the total defeat of this important convoy, which, though guarded by sixteen hundred men, was attacked and destroyed by a French corps on the 19th Sep- Sept. 19. tember. This loss affected Marlborough the more |