IX. 1710. CHAP. they retired in three columns through the mountainous. region which separates Old Castile from the adjoining province of Valencia. But Vendôme was too able and active a general to allow them to make their retreat without molestation. He pursued them with all his forces; and being greatly superior to the enemy in cavalry, in consequence of the detachment of so large a part of that arm as an escort to the king towards Barcelona, and the non-arrival of any succour from the side of Portugal, he soon obtained decisive advantages. The Allies were dreadfully harassed also in their retreat by the peasantry, who, as in every national war from the days of Sertorius to those of Wellington, formed themselves into guerilla bands, which assailed the flanks and rear of the retiring columns without intermission. Thus assailed and exhausted, the third column, composed of six thousand British troops under Stanhope in person, arrived, on the i. 315-317. evening of the 6th December, at Brihuerga, where they sought a few hours' rest within its ruined walls.1 1 St Philip. ii. 401, 402. Coxe, v. 383. Coxe's House of 10. Attack on Stanhope's division at Brihuerga, which is forced to A dreadful disaster here awaited this division of the British troops, which in its ultimate effects proved decisive of the fate of the war in the Peninsula. The Allies retreated not only in three columns, but with a capitulate. day's march between each-the British, as those on whom most reliance could be placed, being the last one. Upon this state of matters Vendôme formed, and with great ability executed, a plan for cutting off entirely this detached rearguard. Carefully concealing his movements from the enemy, which the favourable disposition of the peasantry gave him every means of doing, he, unknown to them, followed closely the British column; and no sooner had they taken post at Brihuerga, than he appeared on the heights which environ it with twenty thousand IX. 1710. ii. 402-409. to Marlbo men, and not only entirely surrounded the town, but CHAP. cut off all communication between it and the other Allied divisions in advance. So completely was Stanhope taken by surprise that there were no guards put on the look-out, to give notice of the approach of an enemy; and so active were the movements of Vendôme that with twenty thousand men he had marched forty-five 1St Philip. leagues in eight days, being on an average of five leagues Gen. Pippes and a half, or fourteen miles a-day -an astonishing rough, effort in a mountainous country, and over very bad roads. 1711. The result was what might have been expected from House of such remissness on the one side and such energy on the i. 317-319. other. Stanhope was assailed on all sides by a force Marib. v. triple his own; and after defending himself bravely for Gen. Stantwo days he was forced to surrender with all his troops, Lord Dartnow reduced by sickness and the sword to four thousand 17,1710. five hundred men !1 March 29, Coxe's Bourbon, Coxe's 383, 384. hope to mouth, Dec. 11. Battle of Villa Vici which Ven pulsed, and disasters of Dec. 8. This was a mortal blow to the Allied cause in the Peninsula. Stahremberg, who received on the second day only intelligence of the danger of his lieutenant, osa, in made all imaginable haste back with the German and dome is reDutch troops; but he arrived on the heights near Bri- subsequent huerga only to find the whole French and Spanish the Allies, army, now twenty-two thousand strong, drawn up in battle array, on strong ground between him and that town, while the melancholy silence which prevailed within its walls told but too clearly the sad fate of his companions in arms. Nothing remained but to make the best of his way with his army, now diminished by a full third of its numbers, towards Barcelona. But Vendôme was not a general to halt midway in the career of success. Stahremberg retreated leisurely, taking up, wherever he halted, as strong a position CHAP. IX. 1710. 12. asters in the retreat. as possible, to impose upon the enemy, and afford time for his artillery and baggage to defile in the rear. With this view he took up a strong position at VILLA VICIOSA, where he offered battle, hoping that he would be able to keep his ground till nightfall, when he might resume his retreat. Vendôme, however, having all his forces in hand, immediately commenced a vigorous assault upon the Allies. The latter fought with great resolution, being old German troops, and not only succeeded in maintaining their ground, but even in repulsing the enemy at all points—a result which clearly proved what might have been expected if the disaster at Brihuerga had not deprived them of a third, and that the best part, of their troops. But being inferior, by fully ten thousand men, to the Great dis- enemy, and still more so in horse, Stahremberg did not deem it advisable to await a renewed attack on the following day from an enemy now double his numbers, and flushed with success. He therefore spiked all his artillery on the field of battle, as there was no possibility of drawing them off through the execrable roads by which alone his retreat could be conducted, and continued to retire, on the following day, by roads scarcely passable for a victorious army, encumbered with artillery. But, as usual in Spain, the effects of this forced retreat equalled the losses of the most disastrous battle. Stahremberg reached Barcelona on the 6th January with only seven thousand men, without guns, and in the most 1 St Philip. deplorable condition-the poor remains of twenty-five thousand, which set out from thence in the beginning of summer, to achieve the conquest of the Peninsula.1 i. 317-319. The immediate consequence of these disasters was the loss of all the Austrian conquests in Spain, whose ii. 405-407. Coxe, v. House of possessions, by the end of February, were limited to the fortresses of Barcelona, Tarragona, and Balaguer. These calamities, which seemed to extinguish all hope CHAP. IX. 1711. 13. these dis Marlbo lands in March 4, of a successful issue of a war in the Peninsula, at least Effects of for a very long period, at once demonstrated how entirely asters on the success of the war had come to depend on the single rough, who arm, and be chained to the standards, of Marlborough, Holland, and proved to him that it was only by a vigorous 1711. effort in the Netherlands, where the Allies were superior, and the defences of France were so nearly broken through, that the objects of the war could be attained. He left England, accordingly, deeply impressed with the necessity of making the most of the brief period allotted to him, from the change of ministry, to bring the war to a successful conclusion. He landed at the Hague on the 4th March; and, although no longer possessing the confidence of Government, or intrusted with any control over diplomatic measures, he immediately set himself with the utmost vigour to prepare for military operations. Great efforts had been made by both parties, during the winter, for the resumption of hostilities, on even a more extended scale than in any preceding campaign. Marlborough found the army in the Low Countries extremely efficient and powerful; diversions were promised on the side both of Spain and Piedmont; and a treaty had been concluded with the Spanish government, in consequence of which a large part of the Imperial forces was rendered disposable, and Prince Eugene was preparing to lead them into the Low Countries. But, in the midst of these flattering prospects, an event occurred which suddenly deranged them all, postponed for above a month the opening of the campaign, vi. 4-10. and, in its final result, changed the fate of Europe.1 1 Hist. de Marlb. iii. 285. Coxe, CHAP. IX. 1711. 14. On the 16th April the Emperor Joseph died of small-pox at Vienna-an event which was immediately followed by Charles, King of Spain, declaring himself a candidate for the Imperial throne. As his ror Joseph, pretensions required to be supported by a powerful of Charles demonstration of troops, the march of a large part of peror, April Eugene's men to the Netherlands was immediately. Death of the Empe and election VI. as Em 16. stopped; and that prince himself was hastily recalled from Mentz, to take the command at Ratisbon, as marshal of the forces of the Empire. Charles was soon after elected Emperor. Thus Marlborough was left to commence the campaign alone, which was the more to be regretted, as the preparations of Louis, during the winter, for the defence of his dominions, had been made on the most extensive scale, and Marshal Villars' lines had come to be regarded as the ne plus ultra of field fortification. Yet were Marlborough's forces most formidable; for, when reviewed at Orchies on the 30th April, between Lille and Douai, they were 1 Eugene to found, including Eugene's troops, which had come up, rough, April to amount to one hundred and eighty-four battalions, and three hundred and sixty-four squadrons, mustering above one hundred thousand combatants. But forty-one 1711. Coxe, battalions and forty squadrons were in garrison, which Des. v. 319. reduced the effective force in the field to eighty thousand men.1 Maribo 23, 1711. Marlbo rough to St John, April 29, vi. 16; and 15. The great object of Louis and his generals had been Great lines to construct such a line of defences as might prevent by Villars. the irruption of the enemy into the French territory, now that the interior and last line of fortresses was so constructed nearly broken through. In pursuance of this design, Villars had, with the aid of all the most experienced engineers in France, and at a vast expense of labour |