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CHAP.

VII.

1709.

of his military command, and retained only at Lisbon in his character of ambassador at that Court. Minas was discarded as a general of too enterprising a character, and the direction of the army conferred on 1 Coxe, iv. the Marquis of Fronteira, who was regarded as more Hist. de likely to prove subservient to the narrow views petty jealousies of his Court.1

299-301.

Marlb. iii.

and 1,2.

At length Count Staremberg reached Barcelona; 3.

Tortosa and

and the German and Dutch reinforcements having Fall of arrived, an army of 22,000 men was formed, which in Denia. the end of June ventured to take the field, and advanced to endeavour to relieve Tortosa, which was besieged by the Bourbon forces. Although this fortress had always been regarded as the key of Catalonia, on the side of Valencia, yet its fortifications had been left in so dilapidated a state that it surrendered after a feeble defence of a month, before the Allied troops could advance to its relief; and although the garrison were to be conducted to the Allied headquarters in the camp at Constantine, yet great part of them deserted to the enemy before they reached that destination. After this Staremberg took post at Cervera-a position so well chosen that it prevented a design which the French commanders had formed of uniting their forces in Roussillon and Aragon, and shutting up the Allies within the walls of Barcelona. But this was only effected by such a concentration of forces as compelled him to abandon Denia to its fate, which was reduced by the Chevalier D'Asfeld in No-Coxe, iv. vember, and to witness with impotent grief the investment Hist. Mil. of Alicante, the last remnant of the Austrian conquests 549. in Valencia.2

In Italy the divisions of the Allies appeared with equally unfavourable effects on the military operations.

306, 307.

viii. 547

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

The convention concluded for the neutrality of Italy did not extend to the south of France; but the quarrels of Victor Amadeus and the Austrians were such that they rendered any joint operations hopeless. In the spring campaign of 1708, the former positively refused to allow his troops frontier. to march, unless the Emperor would confer on him the

4. Nugatory

the Italian

investiture of part of the Montferrat, which had been promised him by the treaty of 1703; and when, by the earnest entreaties of Marlborough, this point was conceded, he availed himself of the usual delays of the German princes in furnishing their contingents to postpone sending his troops into the field till the middle of July. The contingents, however, having at length arrived, General Daun, who commanded the combined forces, crossed the Little St Bernard and Mont Cenis; and having by a skilful feint drawn the attention of his opponent, Marshal Villars, to the side of Fort Barreaux, he suddenly invested the forts of Exilles and Perugia, which only held out a few days. Following up this advantage, he besieged the important fortress of Fenestrelles, commanding the great pass of Mont Cenis, which, after an obstinate defence, was reduced in the end of August. The fall of snow in the higher Alps, after this, caused both parties to return to their cantonments on either side of the Alps; and this terminated the campaign in Savoy, with no advantage to the Allies, Marib. iii.7. except that which, however, was by no means inconsiderable of having gained the command of the passes leading from Piedmont into Dauphiny.1

1 Hist. de

Coxe, iv. 305-307.

Although the success of this invasion was by no means considerable, and certainly nothing to what might have been expected from the magnitude of the forces employed, yet it led the Duke of Savoy to form the most

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

5.

the courts

and Berlin

campaign.

extravagant hopes from the project of an invasion of France on the side both of Lyons and Franche-Comté ; and for this purpose he demanded a large subsidy in money, and the aid of fifty thousand men under Prince Projects of Eugene, to operate on the Upper Rhine. Marlborough of Turin was well aware, from past experience, of the little re- for the next liance to be placed on any military operations in which the Emperor and the Italian powers were to be placed in co-operation. He was therefore far from sanguine of the success of their design; but as it was material to keep the court of Turin in good-humour, he gave the proposal the most respectful attention, and sent General Palmer on a special mission to the Duke of Savoy, to arrange the plan of the proposed irruption into the Lyonnois. With the cabinet of Berlin the case was just the reverse. The difficulties there were greater than ever, and, in fact, had become so urgent that nothing but the presence of the English general, or an immediate agent from him, could prevent Prussia from seceding altogether from the Alliance. General Grumbkow was sent there accordingly in March, and found the king in such ill-humour at the repeated disappointments he had experienced from the Emperor and the Dutch, that he declared he could only spare three battalions for rough, the approaching campaign.1* By great exertions, how- 1709. ever, and the aid of Marlborough's letters and influence, 346. the King was at length prevailed on to continue his

* "Can I do more than I do now?' said the king. I make treaties, but the Emperor breaks his word with me, as well as Holland, every moment. Besides, it is impossible, without great inconvenience, to give more than three battalions; and he is a wretch who would advise me otherwise.' I said he was a wretch who should advise him not to do it. He replied, 'You speak very boldly, and may perhaps repent it, if your arguments are not conclusive.""—General Grumbkow to Marlborough, March 9, 1709; Coxe, iv. 341.

King of Prussia to

Marlbo

March 9,

Coxe, iv.

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

6.

His cold reception from the court of England, and mission

to the Hague.

present troops in the Low Countries, and to increase them by fourteen squadrons of horse.

But it was not on the Continent only that open enemies or lukewarm and treacherous friends were striving to arrest the course of Marlborough's victories. His difficulties at home, both with his own party and his opponents, were hourly increasing; and it was already foreseen that they had become so formidable, that, at no very remote period, they would cause his fall. Though he was publicly thanked, as well he might, by both Houses of Parliament, when he came to London on 1st March 1709, loaded with the honours of Oudenarde and Lille, yet he received no mark of favour from the Queen, and was treated with studied coldness at Court.* Envy, the inseparable attendant on exalted merit-ingratitude, the usual result of irrequitable services, had completely altered the Queen's sentiments in regard to him. Mrs Masham omitted nothing which could alienate her royal mistress from so formidable a rival; and it was hard to say whether she was most cordially aided in her efforts by the open Opposition, or the half Tory-Whigs who formed the administration. Both Godolphin and the Duke speedily found that they were merely tolerated in 352, 366, office; while, in order to weaken their influence with borough to the people, every effort was made to depreciate even the Nov. 28, glorious victories which had shed such imperishable lustre over the British arms.1 Deeply mortified by this ingratitude, Marlborough gladly embraced an offer which

1 Coxe, iv.

377. Marl

the Duchess,

1708. Coxe, iv. 361.

* In communicating the thanks of the House of Lords, the Chancellor said, "I shall not be thought to exceed my present commission if, being thus led to contemplate the mighty things which your Grace has done for us, I cannot but conclude with acknowledging, with all gratitude, the providence of God in raising you up to be an instrument of so much good, in so critical a juncture, when it was so much wanted."-Coxe, iv. 375.

VII.

was made to him by the Government, in order to remove CHAP. him from Court, to conduct the negotiation now pending at the Hague with Louis XIV., for the conclusion of a general peace.

1709.

7.

difficulties

So painful had the situation of Godolphin become that he himself said, the life of a slave in the galleys was Increasing a paradise compared to his. * All his measures were of Godolphin in the thwarted by the secret influence at Court, which rendered ministry. almost nugatory the command he had of the cabinet; while, at the same time, the altered state of the public opinion in regard to the Whig cabinet, and the policy of continuing the war, rendered it impossible to think of a dissolution. Marlborough had his full share of these vexations; for, in addition to all the crosses and disappointments which weighed so heavily on his friend at home, he was oppressed by the cares and anxieties of the war, and the extreme difficulty of keeping together the heterogeneous materials, and stilling the ceaseless jealousies of the coalition. + Nor were affairs at home in a more propitious state. Even among the leaders of his own party, Halifax, who had never forgiven the slight, as he deemed it, cast upon him by the refusal of the situation of Plenipotentiary at the Hague, had

* "I don't use to trouble you with complaints of my own circumstances; but so much advantage is taken of your absence, and I suffer so much, that I must give myself the vent of saying, the life of a slave in the galleys is paradise in comparison of mine: but at first, the length of the campaign would not let you come, afterwards the States would not let you come, and now God Almighty won't let you. So I must yield to fate."-Godolphin to Marlborough, January 10, 1709; Coxe, iv. 356.

+"If Lord Sunderland's news letter be true, I should hope the King of France were in earnest; and then there would be a peace, which, upon all accounts, I long for, being extremely weary of the life I am obliged to live; for my spirit is so broke that I am fit for nothing but a lazy quiet life, which I prefer before all the pleasures of this life."-Marlborough to Godolphin, Feb. 21, 1709; Coxe, iv. 357.

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