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CHAP.

VIII.

1709.

16.

His errors, and delu

ing him.

But time, the great dispeller of illusions, whose mighty arm no individual greatness, how great soever, can long withstand, has begun to abate much of this colossal reputation. His temper was violent in the sion regard- extreme; frequent acts of hideous cruelty, and occasional oppression, signalised his reign he was often impelled, by ill-directed zeal for the advancement of his people, into measures which in reality and in the end retarded their improvement. At one time he could subject, on mere suspicion, his most faithful servants to the most cruel tortures; at another, destroy a splendid mirror in an ungovernable fit of passion. He was thoroughly despotic, and could tolerate no opposition, on any grounds, to his will. The destruction of the Strelitzes, or Prætorian Guards of the capital, was a frightful act of severity; but it was unavoidable, and was attended with as much good in the end as it was executed with courage in the beginning. But many of his other acts of gigantic despotism had not a similar excuse. More than any other man, he did evil that good might come of it. He impelled his people, as he thought, to civilisation, though, while launching into the stream, hundreds of thousands perished in the waves. "Peter the Great," says Mackintosh, “did not civilise Russia: that undertaking was beyond his genius, great as it was; he only gave the Russians the art of civilised war." The truth was, he attempted what was altogether impracticable. No one man can at once civilise a nation: he can only put it in the way of civilisation. To complete the fabric must be the work of continued effort and sustained industry during many successive generations. That Peter failed in raising his people to a level with the other nations of

Europe, in refinement and industry, is no reproach to him. It was impossible to do so in less than several centuries. The real particular in which he erred was, that he departed from the national spirit, that he tore up the national institutions, and violated in numerous instances the strongest national feelings. He clothed his court and capital in European dresses; but men do not put off old feelings with the costume of their fathers.

CHAP.

VIII.

1709.

17.

acter of his

Peter's civilisation extended no further than the surface. He succeeded in inducing an extraordinary degree Real char of discipline in his army, and the appearance of con- changes. siderable refinement among his courtiers. He effected no material ameliorations in the condition of his subjects; and by endeavouring to force them at once up to a level with the states of Western Europe, he not only rendered his government unpopular with the rural population, but also prevented his improvements from penetrating the great body of the people. In his efforts to construct a European capital in the marshes of Livonia, he was in the end successful; but it was at the expense of the lives of a hundred thousand of his subjects, who perished in the attempt. His genius was vast, but it was after the manner of the Orientals rather than the Europeans. Cheops raising the pyramids from the toil and sweat of generations of captives was the emblem and prototype of his government. It could not be otherwise. It is casier to remodel an army than change a nation; and the celebrated bon-mot of Diderot, that the Russians were "rotten before they were ripe," is too happy an expression, indicating how much easier it is to introduce the vices than the virtues of civilisation among an unlettered people. To this day the civilisation of Russia has never descended below the higher ranks;

VIII.

1709.

CHAP. and the efforts of the really patriotic Czars who have since wielded the Muscovite sceptre-Alexander and Nicholas--have been mainly in abandoning the fictitious career into which Peter turned the people, and the reviving with the old institutions the true spirit and inherent aspirations of the nation. The immense though less obtrusive success with which their efforts have been attended, and the gradual though still slow descent of civilisation and improvement through the great body of the people, prove the wisdom of the principles on which they have proceeded. Possibly Russia is yet destined to afford another illustration of the truth of Montesquieu's maxim, that no nation ever yet rose to durable greatness but through institutions in harmony with its spirit. Yet was Peter's attempt, though in many respects a mistaken, a great and glorious one it was the effort of a rude but lofty and magnanimous mind, which attributes to mankind in general that vigour and ambition of which it is itself conscious. And without shutting our eyes to his many and serious errors, in charity let us hope that the words of Peter on his deathbed have been realised: "I trust that, in respect of the good I have striven to do my people, God will pardon my sins.' The great concentration of the forces on both sides in Flanders, during the campaign of 1709, rendered the Rhine, and operations on both sides feeble in other quarters. Great plans had been formed by Marlborough and Eugene for a simultaneous irruption into France from the side of Alsace and Piedmont, with the view of the two invading armies uniting at Lyons at the same time that the grand army moved direct from Flanders on Paris; but the vigorous efforts of the French king, and still more the jealousies and tardiness of the Allies, wherever Marlbo

18.

Campaign

on the

its disasters,

July 29.

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CHAP.

VIII.

1709.

rough was not in person to allay them, rendered them abortive. So slow were the movements of the German princes on the Upper Rhine, that, before any considerable force could be collected to threaten Alsace, a strong body of men had been assembled under Marshal d'Harcourt to defend the lines of Lauterburg, and cover that province. Want of money, and the usual jealousies of the northern states of Germany, long delayed the march of the contingents of Hanover and other powers. But at length they arrived in the end of July, and sanguine hopes were entertained of success; for while the Elector of Hanover occupied the attention of Marshal d'Harcourt by a feigned attack on his lines of Lauterburg, Count Merci led a chosen body of six thousand men, by forced and secret marches, by Basle into Alsace, where he intrenched himself near Neuburg, on the Rhine, directly in their rear. But, the latter officer having detached seven thousand to watch them, Count Merci imprudently left his intrenchments, and met his antagonist in the open plain. The result was, that, after a sharp action, he was totally defeated, and driven across the Rhine with the loss of half his army. This disaster put an end to all thoughts of the invasion of FrancheComté, and rendered abortive the operations in Piedmont by the discord it produced between the cabinet 83, 84. of Vienna and that of Turin.1

1 Hist. Mil.

ix. 227-235.

Coxe, v.

19.

in Pied

their abor

In conformity with the concerted plan of operations, Victor Amadeus made active preparations for commencing Operations hostilities on the side of the Maritime Alps, and a con- mont, and siderable Austrian force, under Marshal Daun, was tive result. assembled to co-operate with it. But here again the discord between the two courts intervened effect to mar the operations of the armies.

with fatal

The Duke

CHAP.

VIII.

1709.

of Savoy refused to move his troops till he had received the investiture of the Vigenavaisin, stipulated for him. by the treaty of 1703; which the Emperor declined granting, on the plea that he included in it nine villages which did not belong to it, but were fiefs of the Empire ! On such miserable disputes did events hinge in the south of Europe, on which the issue of the war was in a great degree dependent. Louis XIV. took advantage of this schism to make overtures to the Duke of Savoy through his daughter, the Queen of Spain, offering him the most advantageous terms if he would consent to a separate accommodation, and representing the impolicy of his continuing in an alliance the object of which was to expel his own daughter from her throne. These representations produced a considerable effect: the Duke of Savoy remained at Turin in a state of such anxiety and discontent that it preyed upon his health, and brought on an alarming fever. In consequence of these causes the campaign was not opened till the middle of August; and Marshal Daun, who commanded the invaders, then found the Duke of Berwick so strongly posted, in a position covering Briançon, that he could not force the passage into Dauphiné; and soon after, having heard of the defeat of Count Merci, he retired into Piedmont, having obtained no other advantage, in a campaign from Mem. 156- which such mighty results were expected, but the capture of the trifling post of Anneci, garrisoned by sixty men, in the entrance of the Alps!1

1 Coxe, V. 86, 87.

Berwick's

159-edit.

Petitot.

The war in Spain assumed a new and much more alarming aspect this year, in consequence of the contest having become a national one, and of the ardour displayed by the Castilians in behalf of the Bourbon dynasty. A great change had occurred in the feelings

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