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and money, constructed during the winter a series of lines and field-works, exceeding anything yet seen in modern Europe in magnitude and strength, and to which the still more famous works of Torres Vedras have alone, in subsequent times, afforded a parallel. The fortifications extended from Namur on the Meuse, by a sort of irregular line, to the coast of Picardy. Running first along the marshy line of the Canche, they rested on the forts of Montreuil, Hesdin, and Trevant; while the great fortresses of Ypres, Calais, Gravelines, and St Omer, lying in their front, and still in the hands of the French, rendered any attempt to approach them both difficult and dangerous. From the Canche, the lines ran across the plain, by Montenencourt, to the Gy rivulet, down its banks to its junction with the Scarpe, along the Scarpe to Biache, from thence by a canal to the Sanzet, along the Sanzet to its junction with the Scheldt, down the latter stream to Valenciennes, and from thence by a series of intrenchments to the Sambre. Along the whole of this immense line, extending over so great a variety of ground, for above forty miles, every effort had been made, by joining the resources of art to the defences of nature, to render the position impregnable. The lines were not continuous, as in many places the ground was so rugged, or the obstacles of rocks, precipices, and ravines were so formidable, that it was evidently impossible to overcome them. But wherever a passage was practicable, the approaches to it were protected in the most imposing manner. If a streamlet ran along the line, it was carefully dammed up, so as to become impassable. Every morass was deepened, by stopping up its drains, or letting in the water of the larger rivers by artificial canals; redoubts

CHAP.

IX.

1711.

CHAP.

IX.

1711.

were placed on the heights, so as to enfilade the plains between them; while in the open country, where no advantage of ground was to be met with, field-works were erected, armed with abundance of heavy cannon. To man these formidable lines, Villars had under his command one hundred and fifty-six battalions, and two hundred and twenty-seven squadrons in the field, numbering seventy thousand infantry, and twenty thousand horse. He had ninety field-guns and twelve howitzers. There were, besides, thirty-five battalions 1 Ledyard, and eighty squadrons detached or in the forts; and, as Eugene soon took away twelve battalions and fifty squadrons from the Allied army, the forces on the 286, 287. opposite sides, when they came to blows, were very

ii. 426. Coxe, vi.

21, 22.

Hist. de

Marlb. iii.

16.

campaign.

nearly equal.1

Marlborough took the field on the 1st May, with eighty Plan of the thousand men and his whole force was soon grouped in and around Douai. The headquarters of Villars were at Cambray; but, seeing the forces of his adversary thus accumulated at one point, he made a corresponding concentration, and arranged his whole disposable forces between Bouchain on the right, and Monchy Le Preux on the left. The position of the French marshal, which extended in a concave semicircle, with the fortresses covering either flank, he considered, and with reason, as beyond the reach of attack. Several skirmishes took place between the two armies with various success. Two hundred men were lost to the confederates in an attack on Arleux. Villars took a convoy between Mortagne and St Amand, and killed and wounded four hundred more. Marlborough had his revenge in several attacks. on detached points along the line, among which was the redoubt of Aubigny. But this desultory warfare

did not suit the views of either commanders.

The

CHAP.

IX.

1711.

English general was meditating a great enterprise, which should at once deprive the enemy of all his defences, and reduce him to the necessity of fighting a decisive battle, or losing his last frontier fortresses. But he was overwhelmed with gloomy anticipations; he felt his strength sinking under his incessant and protracted fatigues, and knew well he was serving a party who, envious of his fame, were ever ready to decry his achievements. He lay, accordingly, for three weeks, waiting for his illustrious colleague, Prince Eugene, who 28. Hist. de arrived on the 23d May, in time to engage in a great 289,290. celebration of the anniversary of the victory at Ramilies, 289-291. which had taken place on that day.1*

1 Coxe, vi.

Marlb. iii.

Rousset, ii.

17.

of the Pre

the French

The close vicinity of the two armies led to a sort of tacit armistice between them, which induced an occa- Appearance sional occurrence of a melancholy and interesting kind. tender in The Pretender was with the army of Villars; and his army. tall, graceful figure, the skill with which he managed his horse, and the elegance of his manners, rendered him an object of equal interest to the troops of both nations. Several of the English noblemen approached the hostile videttes when he was in sight, to get a nearer view of the heir of their royal house: the French sentries, in courtesy, and sympathising with the feeling, allowed them to remain near. Villars had more in view than mere courtesy in thus showing the royal prince of St Ger

"I see my Lord Rochester has gone where we all must follow. I believe my journey will be hastened by the many vexations I meet with, I am sure I wish well to my country, and if I could do good, I should think no pains too great; but I find myself decay so very fast, that from my heart and soul I wish the Queen and my country a peace, by which I might have the advanvantage of enjoying a little quiet, which is my greatest ambition."-Marlborough to the Duchess, 25th May 1711; COXE, vi. 28.

CHAP.

IX.

1711.

1 Hist. de Marlb. iii.

286-287.

18.

ration of Eugene with his

Marlbo

rough,

June 13.

mains to his lost subjects; he was not ignorant of the
secret negotiation which the new ministry were com-
mencing with Louis XIV., and hoped to awaken an
interest in his favour in the hearts of the English officers.
"The following day," says Marshal Villars, "my Lord
Marlborough sent to request me no longer to hazard
these promenades. In effect, I had no intentions of
repeating them, but I thought it might be serviceable to
the young prince to let himself be known."1

The plans of the Allied generals were soon formed; Fatal sepa- and, taking advantage of the enthusiasm excited by the commemoration of Ramilies, and the arrival of so illustroops from trious a warrior as Eugene, preparations were made for the immediate commencement of active operations. On the 28th, the two generals reviewed the whole army. Villars, on his part, had no intention of declining a conflict. He had chosen his field of battle in an open plain, covered on either flank, well adapted for the operations of cavalry, and had written to Louis for permission to fight. But their designs were soon interrupted by an event which changed the whole fortune of the campaign. Early in June, Eugene received positive orders to march to Germany, with a considerable part of his troops, to oppose a French force which was moving towards the Rhine, to influence the approaching election of the Emperor. He sent, accordingly, twelve battalions and Marlbo- fifty squadrons to man the lines of Ettingen, and St John, cover Frankfort, where the election was to take place; 1711. Des. and on his side, Villars detached first fifteen battalions, Coxe, vi. and as many squadrons, to reinforce the troops, and then ten battalions, and twenty-six squadrons after them, to Alsace. He was very reluctant to make this detachment.2 "The army of Flanders," says Villars,

rough to Sec.

June 14,

v. 428.

29, 30.

Hist. de

Marlb. iii. 292, 293.

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IX.

1711.

"was weakened, solely to have the credit of saying CHAP. that they had strengthened that of Germany." On the 13th June, Eugene and Marlborough separated, for the last time, with the deepest expressions of regret on both sides, and with gloomy forebodings of the future. The former marched towards the Rhine with his twelve battalions and fifty squadrons, Marlborough's whole remaining force moved to right, across the Scarpe into the plain of Lens, in divisions.1

1 Villars'

while Mem. ii.

the

174, 175.

Hist. de

Marlb. iii.

six 292, 293.

19.

avoids a

orders of

Though Villars was relieved, by the departure of Eugene, from a considerable part of the force opposed Villars to him, and naturally felt desirous of now measuring battle by his strength with his great antagonist in a decisive Louis. affair, yet he was restrained from hazarding a general engagement. Louis, trusting to the progress of the Tory intrigues in England, and daily expecting to see Marlborough and the war party overthrown, sent him positive orders not to fight; and soon after, the detachment of twenty-five battalions and forty squadrons, in two divisions, to the Upper Rhine, to watch the movements of Eugene, rendered it a matter of necessity for him to remain on the defensive. Marlborough, therefore, in vain offered battle, and drew up his army in the plain of Lens for that purpose. Though Villars threw eighteen bridges over the Scarpe, and made a show of intending to fight, he cautiously abstained from any steps which might bring on a general battle. It was not without good Villars' reason that Louis thus enjoined his lieutenant to avoid 174-177. compromising his army.2 The progress of the negotia- broke's Cortions with England gave him the fairest ground for resp. 172. believing that he would obtain nearly all he desired, 292, 293. from the favour with which he was regarded by the

2

Mem. ii.

Boling

Hist. de
Marlb. iii.

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