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CHAP.

VII.

1709.

strate condition. A crisis without example had taken place in its finances, and in its whole affairs. Credit was gone, specie had disappeared, commerce was at a stand, bankruptcy was universal, misery and insolvency were universal. To crown the whole, famine was making unheard-of ravages in the land. What an incredible and admirable change took place in the midst of the general ruin! They found the means of putting on foot in Flanders a numerous army, of finding subsistence in abundance, and providing funds to pay the troops, and retain them in the bonds of discipline. They regularly paid the soldier his dues -the officer alone was kept in arrear. It was presumed he would act from a spirit of patriotism and honour, and the expectation was not disappointed." 1 Dumont's There is no impartial mind which must not acquiesce in v. 172. the justice of this generous eulogium.]

Hist. Mil.

24.

both sides

Skilfully availing themselves of this burst of patriotic fervour, the ministers of Louis were enabled to open Forces on the campaign with greater forces than collected since the beginning of the war.

they had ever at the openThe principal campaign.

would have assailed us with new advantages drawn from the places into which I myself had introduced them, while at the same time I had demolished those which served as the rampart of my frontier provinces. As I put my protection into the hands of Almighty God, and as I hope that the purity of my intentions will induce the Divine blessing on my armies, I have written to the archbishops and bishops of my kingdom, to awaken the fervour of the prayers of the faithful in their dioceses; and I wish, at the same time, that my people throughout the whole extent of your government should know that they would now have been in the enjoyment of peace, if it had depended solely on my will to procure what they with reason desire, but which must be acquired by new efforts, since the immense sacrifices which I was prepared to have made have been vain to re-establish the public tranquillity. I leave it, therefore, to your prudence to make my intentions known in the manner which you deem most expedient to the people of your province.

"VERSAILLES, 12th June 1709."

"Louis.

ing of the

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

Marlb. iii.

46, 47.

effort was made in Flanders, where the chief danger
was to be apprehended, and the enemy's most powerful
army and greatest general were to be faced. Fifty-one
battalions and forty-nine squadrons were drawn from the
Rhine to Flanders; and this large reinforcement, joined
to the crowds of recruits which the public distress im-
pelled to his standards, enabled the renowned Marshal
Villars, who had received the command of the French,
to take the field at the head of 112,000 men. With
this imposing force he took a position, strong both by
nature and art, extending from Douai to the Lys; the
right resting on the canal of Douay, the centre covered
by the village of La Bassée, the left supported by
Bethune and its circumjacent marshes. The whole line
was strengthened by redoubts and partial inundations,
and traversed in front by a ditch fifteen feet wide,
covered by exterior works. The banks of the canal, as
far as Douai, were lined with troops.
Never at any

former period had France sent such an army into the
field; never had she one animated with so enthusiastic
and gallant a spirit. The soldiers, equally with the
nobles, were aware that this was the last effort for the

1 Hist. de independence of France. All felt, in the words afterwards used by Napoleon at Waterloo, "that the moment had arrived when it behoved every Frenchman to conquer or die."1

Rousset, ii.

274.

25. Marlborough's

efforts to obtain an

tion of force

Aware of the great augmentation of the enemy's army which was in progress in Flanders, seeing clearly that it was there that the vital point of the contest was to be,

augmenta and not less convinced of the necessity of reinforcements in the Low to stem the progress of disaster in Spain, Marlborough made the most vigorous efforts to obtain, both from the British government and the Allied powers, an increase

Countries.

of forces for carrying on the war.

He knew well that

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

the enemy was bringing forth his last reserve; that the ban and arrière ban of France were in the field; that this was their final effort; and that victory in this protracted struggle would remain with the party in war, as in a battle, which could throw in a reserve to which the enemy had nothing at the moment to oppose. By dint of vigorous representations, and by still having the majority of the cabinet and House of Commons on his side, though in a minority at Court, he succeeded in obtaining a reinforcement of 10,000 men to the English army; and the supplies voted for the ensuing year reached the unprecedented, and, as it was then thought, enormous amount of £7,000,000 sterling. But the other powers could not be prevailed on to make any similar additions to their contingents and so little was the British government aware of the necessity of augmenting the forces at the vital point, that, instead of making any addition to their troops in the Netherlands, they proposed to withdraw seven regiments from Antwerp, and send them to Spain. Marlborough expressed, as well he might, the utmost uneasiness at this extravagant pro- 350, 355, posal a proposal which shows what so many other borough to events in English history demonstrate, how ignorant Feb. 7, its government in general is of the first principles of iv. 372. military operations.1 *

"I received last night the favour of yours of the 7th January, in which you continue of opinion that the seven regiments at Antwerp should be sent to England. I can say no more on that subject. You will see what the enclosed letter says as to the designs of France. As they draw their troops from all parts to strengthen their army in this country, if we, at the same time, are to be obliged to leave our troops where they cannot be of much use, there can be no doubt but at length my Lord Faversham will be gratified by our being beaten, for so great a superiority will undo us. I am of your opinion, that one reason for the enemy marching their troops from all parts so early

1 Coxe, iv.

372. Marl

Godolphin,

1709. Coxe,

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

26. Which at length are partially

But all that he could obtain from the British government was a promise that the seven battalions should be retained in Flanders, and should not be removed at the

commencement of the campaign in the Low Countries. At the same time, he made such vigorous representations The forces to the Dutch ministry, of the danger of taking the field

successful.

at his dis

posal.

1 Coxe, iv.

371-373; and v. 1-5. Hist. de Marlb. iii. 45, 47. Rousset, ii. 274,275.

with an inferior force, that he succeeded in obtaining a reinforcement of 4000 Würtembergers, in their pay, who were to be drawn from the Rhine. Yet, with all this, he was still inferior to the enemy when the campaign commenced; and but for the reinforcements thus tardily yielded to his urgent representations, he would have been so much so that the campaign, so far from leading to a prosperous result, would in all probability have terminated in nothing but disaster. At length, however, Marlborough took the field at the head of 110,000 men; and although his force was composed of a heterogeneous mixture of the troops of different nations, yet, like the colluvies omnium gentium which followed the standards of Hannibal, it was held together by the firm bond of military success, and inspired with that unbounded confidence which is founded on experience of the resources and capacity of its chief. Events of the greatest and most interesting kind could not but be anticipated, from the contest of two armies of such magnitude, headed by such leaders, and when the patriotic ardour of the French nation,1 now roused to the into this country, is in hope they may incline the Dutch to hearken to peace." -Marlborough to Godolphin, Brussels, Feb. 7, 1710; CoXE, iv. 372. Again,— "I know not what you may reason in England, but I am fully persuaded that it is of the last consequence to have the troops of Würtemberg and the seven regiments serve in this country in the next campaign; for, with those, all the troops that we may be able to get for the sum of money voted by Parliament, for the troops of augmentation, will fall very much short of the number of men the enemy will have in this country. Is it possible that men

uttermost, was matched against the military strength of the confederates, matured by a series of victories so long and brilliant.

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

27.

of Villars'

Though relying with confidence on the skill and intrepidity of his troops, Marlborough, according to his Description usual system, resolved if possible to circumvent the position. enemy by manoeuvring, so as to reserve his hard blows for the time when success was to be won in no other way. His design was to begin the campaign either with a general battle or by the reduction of Tournay, lying on the direct road from Brussels to Lille, which would break through, in the most important part, the barrier fortresses. To prepare for either event, and divert the enemy's attention, strong demonstrations were made against Villars' intrenched position. If it had been practicable, he would have been attacked; but, after a close reconnoitre, both generals deemed it too hazardous an enterprise, and it was resolved to besiege the fortress. In truth, the position which Villars had taken up, and strengthened with all imaginable skill and diligence, was, literally speaking, impregnable. His left rested on Roubaix, to cover St Venant, and his right at Tinques, to protect Bethune. From thence it extended towards the Scarpe, his left being covered by the streams of the Roubaix and two heights, his centre by the Marsh of Cambrin, and his right by the canal between Douai and Lille. Along this line intrenchments were thrown

of good sense, and that mean sincerely well to the common cause, can be in the least doubt that, if the enemy make their greatest, indeed their only effort in this country, we must do the same, or expect to be beaten? which I pray Almighty God to avert, for it would be a fatal blow. If any orders have been sent for the march of these seven regiments, I do most earnestly beg you will lay before her Majesty and the lords of the cabinet my apprehensions."-Marlborough to the Lord-Treasurer, Brussels, Feb. 11, 1710; Coxe,

iv. 372.

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