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CHAP.

VII.

1709.

40.

of the field

soon to be the theatre of the great battle which was approaching, is an irregular plateau, interspersed by woods, intersected by streams, and elevated from a hundred and fifty to two hundred feet above the mea- Description dows of the Trouille. Mons and Bavay, the villages of of battle. Quevrain and Givry, formed the angular points of this broken surface. Extensive woods on all the principal eminences gave diversity and beauty to the landscape, and, in a military point of view, added much to the strength of the position as defensible ground against an enemy. Near MALPLAQUET, on the west of the ridge, is a small heath, and immediately to the south of it the ground descends by a rapid slope to the Hon, which finds its way to the Trouille, which it joins near Condé, by a circuitous route in the rear of the French position. The streams from Malplaquet to the northward all flow by a gentle slope through steep wooded banks to the Trouille, into which they fall near Mons. The woods on the plateau are the remains of a great natural forest which had formerly covered the whole of these uplands, and out of which the clearings round the villages and hamlets which now exist, have been cut by the hands of laborious industry. Two woods near the summit level of the ground are of a great extent, and deserve particular notice. The first, called the wood of Lanière, stretches from Longueville in a north-easterly direction to Cauchie; the second, named the wood Taisnière, of still larger size, extends from the Chaussée de Bois to the village of Bouson. Between these woods are two openings, or trouées, as they are called in the countrythe Trouée de la Louvière and the Trouée d'Aulnoit. Generally speaking, the ground occupied by the French, and which was to be the theatre of the battle, may be

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

1 Coxe, v. 29, 30.

41.

on both

sides.

described as a rough and woody natural barrier, stretching across the high plateau which separates the Haine and the Trouille, and pervious only by the two openings of Louvière and Aulnoit, both of which were in a very great degree susceptible of defence.1*

The Allied army consisted of 139 battalions and 252 Noble force squadrons, with 105 guns, mustering 93,000 combatants. It was divided into two corps, the one under the immediate direction of Marlborough, consisting of 104 battalions and 163 squadrons; the other, under that of Eugene, mustered 66 battalions and 108 squadrons. The detachments at the siege of Mons and at Tournay reduced the force in the field to the amount above stated. Eugene had the post of honour on the right, Marlborough on the left. The two armies, therefore, were as nearly as possible equal in point of military strength -a slight numerical superiority on the part of the French being compensated by a superiority of twenty-five guns on that of the Allies. Among the French nobles present at the battle were no less than twelve who were afterwards marshals of France.+ The son of James II., under the name of the Chevalier de St George, who combined the graces of youth with the Mém. de hereditary valour of his race, was there; St Hilaire 280. Coxe, and Folard, whose works afterwards threw such light on military science, were to be found in its ranks. The Garde-du-Corps, Mousquetaires Gris, Grenadiers-àCheval, French, Swiss, and Bavarian guards, as well

Villars, ii.

v. 32, 33. Hist. de

Marlb. iii. 49.

The author has passed over the ground, and can attest the accuracy of the description here given.

+ Viz., Artagnan, Maréchal de Montesquieu; De Guiche, Maréchal de Grammont; Puysegur, Montmorenci, Coigny, Broglie, Chaulnes, Nangis, Isenghien, Duras, Houdancourt, and Sanneterre. The monarchy never sent forth a nobler array.

The CHAP.

as the Irish Brigade, stood among the combatants. Montmorencies were there, and the De Guiches, the De Grammonts and De Coignys. The reverses of Louis had called forth the flower of the nobility, as well as the last reserves of the monarchy.

VII.

1709.

42.

movements

sides, and

of the

puties,

Early on the morning of the 9th, Marlborough and Eugene were on the look-out at the Mill of Sart, with Preparatory a strong escort, consisting of thirty squadrons of horse. on both From the reports brought in, it was soon ascertained interference that the whole forces of the French were marching Dutch detowards the plain of Malplaquet, on the west of the Sept. 9. plateau, and that Villars himself was occupying the woods of Lanière and Taisnière. His headquarters were at Blaugnies, in the rear of the centre. The two armies were now only a league and a half separate, and Marlborough and Eugene were clear for immediately attacking the enemy, before they could add to the natural strength of their position by intrenchments. But the Dutch deputies, Hooft and Goslinga, interfered, as they had done on a similar occasion between Wavre and Waterloo, and strongly insisted on the risk which would be run if a general battle were hazarded with an enemy so strongly posted. "How many men," said they, "shall we sacrifice before we can force an enemy so strongly intrenched, who will fight from one post to another, and if he is worsted can retire without difficulty or design? whereas we, in case of defeat, shall be cut up Marlb. iii. by the garrisons of Maubeuge, Condé, Mons, and Valen- Rousset, ii. ciennes."1

Aware, from long experience, that the Dutch deputies would oppose whatever he appeared eagerly to insist for, Marlborough gave his opinion with moderation in favour of an immediate attack, without waiting for the

1 Hist. de

98, 99.

CHAP.

VII.

1709.

43.

Opinions

of Marlborough and Eugene in

of war,

Sept. 9.

troops, consisting of twenty-six battalions, which would arrive the day following from the lines before Tournay. Eugene spoke with more warmth, but still counselled a delay in the attack till the troops came up from Tournay. "Your prudence," said he, addressing the Dutch the council deputies, "is excessive. The enemy before you is not so strong as he whom you have often defeated. His best soldiers have perished at Hochstedt, at Cassano, at Ramilies, at Turin, at Oudenarde; there are not twenty thousand men in his army who are not new levies. The multitude of his intrenchments is a proof of his weakness, and of the little confidence which the generals have in their troops. That army is the last effort of exhausted France; let us dare to attack it; we shall disperse it, and the enemy of Europe will find himself constrained to take the law from our hands. Our soldiers, who are animated by the recollection of a long series of successes, await with impatience the result of this council; they will regard it as an insult if the result is not conformable to their wishes. Our true wisdom is to reckon confidently on their valour, which during seven years has never disappointed us. I may perhaps add that they are led by the same chief, who will know how to guide them on the path of victory, which is not altogether unknown to them."1

1 Rousset, ii. 286. Hist. de Marlb.iii. 99, 100.

44.

Result of these deliberations.

The result of these deliberations was a middle course, which, as usual in such cases, proved in the end the most perilous which could have been adopted. It was resolved to fight rather than abandon the siege of Mons, and attack the enemy if he did not himself become the assailant, but to delay the conflict till the reinforcement of twenty-six battalions came up from Tournay, and till St Ghislain, which commanded a passage over the Haine,

VII.

1709.

was taken. This was done next day, the fort being CHAP. carried by escalade, and its garrison of two hundred men made prisoners; and on the day following all the reserves from Tournay came up. But these advantages, which in themselves were not inconsiderable, were dearly purchased by the time which Villars gained for strengthening his position. Instead of pushing on to attack the Allies, as Marlborough and Eugene had expected, in order to raise the siege of Mons, that able commander employed himself with the utmost skill and vigour in throwing up intrenchments in every part of his position. He did this with such judgment and energy, and took such skilful advantage of all the defences which the ground afforded, that by the morning of the 11th the position was wellnigh impregnable, and unquestionably would have proved so to any other troops but those of Eugene and Marlborough.1

Hist. de

Marlb. iii.

100, 101.

Coxe, v.

34, 35.

tifies his

The nature of the ground singularly favoured his 45. efforts. The heights he occupied, plentifully inter- Villars forspersed with woods and eminences, formed a concave position. semicircle, the artillery from which enfiladed on all sides the little plain of Malplaquet, so as to render it, in Dumont's words, "une trouée d'enfer," which could not be approached without destruction. Around this semicircle, redoubts, palisades, abattis, and stockades, were disposed with such skill and judgment, that, literally speaking, there was not a single inequality of ground (and there were many) which was not turned to good account. The two trouées or openings, in particular, already mentioned, by which it was foreseen the Allies would endeavour to force an entrance, were so enfiladed by cross batteries as to be wellnigh unassailable. Twenty pieces of artillery were placed on

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