ditions; that she signed what purported to be a deed of the quarry lands, with the reservations and agreement mentioned, but never acknowledged it, as it was not intended to be recorded; that she resided at the "Quarry" during the summers, and at Detroit during the winters, and never knew or heard that her son Leonard claimed to have a deed of said lands other than the one intended as a life-lease until the winter of 1880, when she learned that her son Leonard had placed a deed upon record of all her lands; that she never signed or acknowledged such deed, but that it was signed and forged by her said son, without her knowledge or consent, and that, to conceal its existence as long as possible, it was kept from the record for nearly six months, and when it was recorded it was so indexed as to still further conceal its existence; that she charged her son Leonard with having a false and fraudulent deed from her on record of all her lands, and repeatedly tried to get him to restore said premises to her, but he, while he always promised to do so, continually delayed doing anything for her in that respect for the purpose of gaining time to sell or encumber the whole of said property, and put it, as he supposed, beyond her reach, and for this purpose he did, without her knowledge or consent, on the 15th of October, 1880, execute a deed to Herman Hoeft for four thousand dollars of an undivided one-half interest in section twentyfour, where the town site, the mill and dock property are located, and on the same day he exccuted to Edwin Hadley a mortgage for eight thousand dollars, covering the balance of her said lands, which mortgage was on October 27th, 1880, assigned to defendants Miller and Rowley for seven thousand five hundred dollars; that both the Hoeft deed and Hadley mortgage were taken with a knowledge of this claim; that in October, 1880, she went with counsel to the "Quarry " to compel her son to restore these lands, and after much effort, finally induced him to do so on the 16th of October, 1880, by deed, which was left with William A. Moore, of Detroit, in escrow, to be delivered to her on the death of her son, and on her paying one thousand dollars to his widow, but if she died first, the same was to be returned to her son and canceled;

that this deed was taken without knowledge of the Hoeft deed and Hadley mortgage, and was supposed to embrace all the lands, with the title in the same condition as on that 10th day of August, 1878, but when she learned that it did not so convey all these lands, and was to be received subject to these conditions and also said conveyances, she repudiated it as a fraud on her rights in the premises, and claimed all her lands free and clear of any encumbrances placed thereon by him. The prayer is for a decree setting aside this deed as a forgery, and also the Hoeft deed and Hadley mortgage, and for an accounting for the use and occupation of the premises and the timber cut therefrom.

Defendants Francis Crawford, the heir-at-law, Anna M. Crawford, the widow who took a life estate, and Edwin Hadley made no answer. Defendants Hoeft, Turnbull, adininistrator, and Miller and Rowley filed separate answers.

Hoeft's answer. Admits the deed and record, and denies the forgery; claims the complainant was in Presque Isle county since the date of the deed and allowed her son, down to his death in October, 1881, to have general control of the place and to sell and mortgage it as his own, and never abjected; denies any knowledge of the fraud, and charges he purchased in good faith for value, and without notice of ony claim made to the same; relied on this deed and its record, and, though it was well known that he was going to purchase this property long before he did, complainant never informed him of any claim to the property nor objected to his buying it, notwithstanding the fact that she was then at the "Quarry" and knew of his afterwards making large improvements on the property; demurs on the ground that the bill is defective for want of necessary parties; that complainant is estopped by her own laches by having put this property into the hands. of her son and allowing him to dispose of it as his own, and also in thus failing to notify him of her claim, though she knew of his purchase and being in possession of the property.

Turnbull's answer. Makes the same substantial defense as the Hoeft answer, but alleges the additional ground of

demurrer that, as complainant knew of the fraud in 1880, it is now too late to complain after her son's death, both as against his creditors as well as the bona fide purchasers of this property.

Miller and Rowley's answer. Says that they know nothing of the matters alleged except as to the mortgage; they admit its existence and record, but deny that Hadley had any knowledge of the fraud or that he was their agent in securing this loan, and aver that, relying upon his representations, they purchased this mortgage in good faith, and paid him therefor seven thousand five hundred dollars, without any notice or knowledge of the claim against this deed, and they allege that complainant is estopped by laches and by a deed of release executed to them January 26th, 1883, whereby she released to them all manner of right to question this mortgage and to further prosecute her suit against them.

General replications to the answers were filed, and the case is before us upon pleadings and proofs. It was first argued before us at the October term of 1884, and was held under advisement until the 9th of April, 1885, when an opinion was filed by the Chief Justice affirming the decree of the court below dismissing the bill of complaint.

It was there stated that the case contained a great deal of conflicting evidence which had given us no little trouble, but in considering the evidence, the majority of the Court did not feel fully assured that the forgery alleged in the bill had been established, but we felt quite well satisfied, as stated by the Chief Justice, "that the deed in question was made by complainant, who weakly suffered herself to be misled and defrauded by her worthless son." Mr. Justice Campbell did not agree with us in the conclusion which we had reached, and expressed the opinion that the deed complained of was not a genuine instrument. A rehearing was granted, and the case was at our last term ably and exhaustively argued by counsel for both parties. We have again read the printed record with care, and in addition have critically examined the original depositions and exhibits returned to this Court, and as we have come to a different conclusion from what we

before announced, I shall proceed to state the reasons therefor.

The main ground upon which relief is asked is the forgery alleged to have been committed by Leonard C. Crawford of the deed bearing date August 10th, 1878. In weighing the testimony bearing upon this point, it is proper to consider the relation which these parties bore to each other, their age, mental condition and the surrounding circumstances. The complainant is the mother of Leonard C. Crawford, and he is said by some of the witnesses to have been her favorite She was a lady over seventy years of age at the time. the forgery is alleged to have been committed, and judging from her testimony her mind and memory must have been weakened by age, for it bears inherent evidence of intellectual decay and of the presence of infirmities incident to advanced years. She frequently contradicts herself and falls into errors without apparent cause. She was inquired of and testified to many things, such as admissions, conversations and transactions which were incompetent as evidence, being within the prohibition of the statute allowing parties to testify as witnesses in their own behalf. All such testimony we have excluded from our consideration. But the fact remains that she was a weak old woman, dependent upon the son for the management of her business and for the maintenance and support of herself, and that she placed great confidence in his integrity and disposition to do right in his transactions. with her. In short, she had a mother's weakness for a favorite child. Her trust in him is illustrated by the testimony of Mr. Dowling, who was engaged by her to get a reconveyance of the property. She had accused her son of forging the deed, and Dowling had obtained the consent of the son to reconvey the property upon certain conditions more particularly referred to hereafter. Dowling says that he was not acquainted with the descriptions, and he read the deed which her son proposed to execute to her to ascertain if it contained all, and he says she did not seem to know, and she said: "I guess they are all there; if my son says so, it must be so."

Such being the relation of the parties to the deed claimed to have been forged, a transaction whereby, as it is claimed, the mother voluntarily made a conveyance of all her property, variously estimated to be worth from twelve thousand to fifty thousand dollars, to her son, must be characterized by the utmost good faith, and the burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction is upon those who claim under the conveyFarmer's ex'r v. Farmer 39 N. J. Eq. 211; Condit v. Blackwell 22 N. J. Eq. 481; Porter v. Woodruff 36 N. J. Eq. 174; Tate v. Williamson L. R. 1 Eq. 528; Rhodes v. Bate L. R. 1 Ch. App. 252; Billage v. Southee 9 Hare 534; Cowce v. Cornell 75 N. Y. 91. In the case last cited Mr. Justice IIand said: "It may be stated as universally true. that fraud vitiates all contracts, but as a general thing it is not presumed but must be proved. Whenever, however, the relations between the contracting parties appear to be of such a character as to render it certain that they do not deal on terms of equality but that either on the one side from superior knowledge of the matter derived from a fiduciary relation, or from overmastering influence, or on the other from weakness, dependence, or trust justifiably reposed, unfair advantage in a transaction is rendered probable, there the burden is shifted, the transaction is presumed void, and it is incumbent upon the stronger party to show affirmatively that no deception was practiced, no undue influence was used, and that all was fair, open, voluntary and well understood."

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It is entirely clear that up to August 10th, 1878, Mrs. Crawford was the owner in fee of the valuable property in ques tion. It is not claimed or pretended that Leonard C. Crawford ever purchased this property from his mother or paid her any consideration therefor, and yet a deed bearing date the 10th day of August, 1878, is produced, which, if genuine, vests the title of the whole of this property in the son for the nominal consideration of two thousand dollars. He suddenly becomes the ostensible owner, and his mother at the same instant becomes ostensibly a beggar. The proposition is startling, and calls for an explanation of the transaction from