1805. versus JOHNSON. perhaps not very doubtful, but they appear to be, upon the evidence at present before us, of the hand-writing The KING of the defendant; and, supposing them to be so, it is to be collected by the jury, and by them determined, whether with intention to be published or not? They are delivered in the county of Middlesex to Mr. Cobbett. I cannot entertain a doubt, that this is evidence to be sent to a jury; what conclusion they will draw is another question. In the case of the Seven Bishops, the publication was not proved; the fact was admitted by some of them, that they were the authors of the petition to the king, but proof of the publication was wanting." The counsel for the crown then gave further probable evidence, by re-examining Mr. Cobbett, of the probable destruction of the first letter and the covers. The libel was then read. Evidence was given on the part of the defendant to show that the hand-writing was not his, and not like his; and the verdict was GUILTY. SMITH against PAULL.-Nov. 26. After proceedings being delayed a year, a term's notice of exe- Practice cuting a writ of inquiry is sufficient, without giving a term's Term's Notice of Proceeding. notice of intending to proceed, and then a notice of executting the writ. It is therefore not necessary to give a term's notice of intending to proceed, but a term's notice of the next proceeding. ARULE being obtained to shew cause why the execu tion and proceedings thereon should not be set aside for irregularity, in having executed a writ of inquiry after a year's delay in the proceedings, without giving a term's notice of intending to proceed; HULLOCK shewed cause. He cited Barnes, 291, 1805. SMITH versus PAULL. Inferior Courts. and said that it had been held that notice of trial given between the essoign day and the first day of the term for trial after the term, was good. Here the notice was given on the 11th day of May, 1805, for executing the inquiry on the Sth day of July 1805; a term elapsed between the interval, and he contended that a term's notice of any step to be taken in the cause was sufficient; and that it was never necessary to give a term's notice of the intention to take any step in the proceedings. The general question in all the cases was only, whether a full term had elapsed or not, between the notice and the proceedings. On the other side, it was contended, that there should have been a term's notice of intending to proceed, and then the plaintiff should have given the usual notice of executing the inquiry. "There is no case Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J. that there should be a term's notice of intention of proceeding. If you were to give a term's notice of giving notice of inquiry or of trial, you might be out of time to give notice of trial after Trinity term, and so lose the whole vacation. RULE DISCHARGED on this ground, but afterwards granted upon terms. The KING against the BAILIFFS of IPSWICH. Nov. 26. The Lords' acts apply to inferior courts, but debtors in execution on processes issuing therefrom, must apply to be discharged, within the next term after being charged in execution, calculated by the terms in the superior courts as known in the calendar. POOLEY obtained a rule to shew cause why a man damus should not issue, directed to the bailiffs of the town and borough of Ipswich, requiring them to make a rule, or order, to cause Robert Arnold, a prisoner in execution in their gaol, to be brought up before 1805. The KING versus of Irswien, them at a court of Small Pleas for the said town and borough, and to grant to him the benefit of the several acts of parliament made for the relief of debtors with. respect to the imprisonment of their persons. The The BAILIPPS defendant, Arnold, being in custody for 181. 2s. 2d. gave hotice the 21st of September, 1805, of his intention, after fourteen days, to petition the court to be holden on the 7th of to grant him the benefit of the act 32 Geo. II. c. 28; 26 Geo. III. c. 44; 33 Geo. III. c. 5; and 37 Geo. III. with the usual affidavits and schedule. At a court held the 7th of October, 1805, the application was accordingly made, and the court was prayed to grant a rule for the plaintiff to shew cause why he should not be discharged. By the gaoler's certificate, it appeared that the prisoner was charged in execution upon a ca. sa, out of the said court, returnable the 8th of April, 1805. The prisoner, by affidavit, alleged before the said court that he had not applied before, because he had been informed that no prisoner in the said borough gaol could be entitled to the benefit of the said acts. The said court, upon hear ing the attornies, were of opinion that the statutes applied only to the superior courts, and refused the defendant the benefit of the acts. It appeared that the said court is not at all governed in its practice by any reference to the terms by which the process of the superior courts is regulated, and the court-days are every other Monday, and processes are inade returnable on those days. ALDERSON shewed cause, and contended that the acts did not apply to the case of à prisoner in an inferior court, and that if they did the prisoner was not entitled to his discharge, having delayed to apply to the court beyond the first term after being charged in ex ecution. WILSON and POOLEY, contrà, contended that the 1805. The KING versus of Ipswich. words of the acts applied generally to all prisoners in all courts, and that the defendunt Arnold was within the clause, which allows the debtor to be brought up The BAILIFFS at any time after, upon shewing to the court that his neglect arose from ignorance or mistake.* They contended also that the limitation, as to the next term, could not apply to a court where there were no terms.t Lord ELLEN BOROUGH, C. J. "If the prisoner appears by the acts to be otherwise entitled to his discharge, it is too much to say that by the use of the word term he is deprived of it. The statute of the 2 Geo. II. c. 22, s. 8, is without a limitation; and the 3 Geo. III. c. 27, relates especially to the courts at Westminster Hall and the assizes. The 8 Geo. II. c. 27, introduces for the first time the mention of the word term. This is an extraordinary limitation of time, and a very strange term used with respect to inferior courts. and their process; but, unless there is some absolute inconsistency, the limitation of the statute must be observed. Construing, however, all the acts together, we are willing to do what is most beneficial to the subject,and though I doubted at first as to the inferior court *33 Geo. III. c. 5, s. 5. The material words of the stat. 32 Geo. II. c. 28, upon which the question principally arose,were as follows, "If any person shall be charged in execution for any sum not exceed ing, &c. and shall be minded to deliver up, &c. it shall be Tawful for any such prisoner, before the end of the first term next after he shall be charged in execution, to petition any court of law from whence the process issued, upon which he was so taken and charged in execution, &c." "And if such court shall thereupon be satisfied of the regularity ofevery such notice, such petition shall be received; and such court shall thereupon, by order or rule of the same court, cause the prisoner so petitioning, to be brought into the same court, 1805. The KINO versus the BAILIF78 bringing the prisoner up, by order or rule of court;' yet it may do what is equivalent. It is indeed limited to the term after the being charged in execution; but as there is a discretionary power of enlarging that of IPSWICK. time, upon particular circumstances, vested in the court out of which the process issues, there is no impropriety in granting a mandamus to bring the prisoner up before the inferior court, for his case to be there examined and heard." GROSE, J. was of the same opinion. LAWRENCE, J. "The 8 Geo. II. c. 22, gives a general power to discharge, upon application to the courts out of which the process issued. And by the 8 of Geo. II. c. 22, the application is confined to the next term. It is impossible that the word term could apply to the practice of the inferior courts, but it is still as known a period of the year as if it were said within three months,' and it is clearly, therefore, only a denomination of the period in which the party must be brought up. The rule was therefore made absolute for a writ directed to them to have the prisoner brought before the said bailiffs, and to inquire into the cause of his delay, and grant relief if the prisoner should appear to them duly entitled. The KING against the COMMISSIONERS of SEWERS for the County of SOMERSET.-Nov. 25. The commissioners of sewers, under stat. 23 Hen. VIII. c. 5, must present the lands of levels, &c. to be benefited by Sewers. Jurissea-walls, &c. by juries summoned upon a precept directed diction. Presentment. Jury. to the sheriff, and by him summoned from the body of the county. And where such a jury was by custom summoned by a precept to the sheriff, who issued a precept to the clerk to the commissioners, to summon the foreman of a standing jury, summoned by the sheriff at the commencement of every new commission, and all of whom acted for |
