v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421 [42:
803].

Our attachment laws had their origin in (715)the custom of London. Drake, sec. 1. Under it a debt was regarded as being where the debtor was, and questions of jurisdiction were settled on that regard. In Andrews v. Clerke, Carth. 25, Lord Chief Justice Holt summarily decided such a question, and stated the practice under the custom of London. The report of the case is brief, and is as follows:

manual seizure, as they are, but no more than they can it be appropriated by attachment without process and the power to execute the process. A notice to the debtor must be given, and can only be given and enforced where he is. This, as we have already said, is a necessity, and it cannot be evaded by the insistence upon fictions or refinements about situs or the rights of the creditor. Of course, the debt is the property of the creditor, and because it is, the law seeks to subject it, as it does other property, to the pay. ment of his creditors. If it can be done in any other way than by process against and jurisdiction of his debtor, that way does not occur to us.

Besides the proposition which we have discussed there are involved in the decision of the Sharitt Case the propositions that a debt may have a situs where it is payable, and that it cannot be made migratory by the debtor. The latter was probably expressed as a consequence of the primary proposition, and does not require separate consideration. Besides, there is no fact of change of domi

"Andrews levied a plaint in the sheriff's courts in London and, upon the usual suggestion that one T. S. (the garnishee) was debtor to the defendant, a foreign attachment was awarded to attach that debt in the hands of T. S. Which was accordingly done; and then a diletur was entered, which is in the nature of an imparlance in that court. "Afterwards T. S. (the garnishee) pleaded to the jurisdiction setting forth that the cause of debt due from him to the defendant Sir Robert Clarke, and the contract on which it was founded, did arise, and was made at H. in the county of Middlesex, extra juris-cil in the case. The plaintiff in error was dictionem curiæ; and this plea being overruled, it was now moved (in behalf of T. S., the garnishee), for a prohibition to the sheriff's court aforesaid, suggesting the said matter (viz.), that the cause of action did arise extra jurisdictionem, etc., but the prohibition was denied because the debt always follows the person of the debtor, and it is not material where it was contracted, especially as to this purpose of foreign attach ments; for it was always the custom in London to attach debts upon bills of exchange, and goldsmith's notes, etc., if the goldsmith who gave the note on the person to whom the bill is directed, liveth within the city, without any respect had to the place where the debt was contracted."

The idea of locality of things which may be said to be intangible is somewhat confusing, but if it be kept up the right of the creditor and the obligation of the debtor cannot have the same, unless debtor and creditor live in the same place. But we do not think it is necessary to resort to the idea at all or to give it important distinction. The essential service of foreign attachment laws is to reach and arrest the payment of what is due and might be paid to a nonresident to the defeat of his creditors. To do [716]it you must go to the domicil of his debtor, and can only do it under the laws and procedure in force there. This is a legal necessity, and considerations of situs are somewhat artificial. If not artificial, whatever of substance there is must be with the debtor. He and he only has something in his hands. That something is the res, and gives character to the action as one in the nature of a proceeding in rem. Mooney v. Buford & George Mfg. Co. [34 U. S. App. 581] 72 Fed. Rep. 32; Conflict of Laws, sec. 549, and notes.

not temporarily in Iowa. It was an Iowa corporation and a resident of the state, and was such at the time the debt sued on was contracted, and we are not concerned to inquire whether the cases which decide that a debtor temporarily in a state cannot be garnisheed there, are or are not justified by principle.

The proposition that the situs of a debt is where it is to be paid is indefinite. "All debts are payable everywhere, unless there[717} be some special limitation or provision in respect to the payment; the rule being that debts as such have no locus or situs, but accompany the creditor everywhere, and authorize a demand upon the debtor everywhere." 2 Parsons, Contracts, 8th ed. 702. The debt involved in the pending case had no "special limitation or provision in respect to payment." It was payable generally and could have been sued on in Iowa, and therefore was attachable in Iowa. This is the principle and effect of the best considered cases-the inevitable effect from the nature of transitory actions and the purpose of foreign attachment laws if we would enforce that purpose. Embree v. Hanna, 5 Johns. 101; Hull v. Blake, 13 Mass. 153; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. 286; Harwell v. Sharp Bros. 85 Ga. 124 [8 L. R. A. 514]; Harvey v. Great Northern R'y Co. 50 Minn. 405 [17 L. R. A. 84]; Mahaney v. Kephart, and the Bal timore & O. R'd Co. 15 W. Va. 609; Leiber v. Union P. Railroad Co. 49 Iowa, 688; National Fire Ins. Co. v. Chambers, 53 N. J. Eq. 468; Holland v. The Mobile & Ohio R'd Co. 16 Lea, 414; Pomeroy v. Rand, McNally, & Co. 157 Ill. 176; Berry Bros. v. Nelson Davis & Co. 77 Tex. 191; Wyeth Hardware & Mfg. Co. v. Lang, 127 Mo. 242 [27 L. R. A. 651]; Howland v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R'y Co. 134 Mo. 474.

To ignore this is to give immunity to debts Mr. Justice Valentine also expressed the owed to nonresident creditors from attach- view that "if a debt is exempt from a judiment by their creditors, and to deny neces-cial process in the state where it is created, sary remedies. A debt may be as valuable the exemption will follow the debt as an inas tangible things. It is not capable of cident thereto into any other state or juris

diction into which the debt may be supposed | Submitted April 5, 1899. Decided May 22, to be carried." For this he cites some cases.

considered that the doctrine affected the ju-State of Kansas. ERROR to the Supreme Court of the

W.

See same case below, 12 App. D. C. 51.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Franklin H. Mackey and
Mosby Williams for plaintiff's in error.
Messrs. J. J. Darlington and W. H.
Sholes for defendants in error.

720] *Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opin

ion of the court:

This is an action of ejectment brought by the plaintiffs in error and one Charles M. N. Latimer against the defendants in error for ninety-nine one-hundredths (%) undivided part of original lot ten (10), in square 1031, in the city of Washington, D. C.

the Supreme Court of that District in favor | terms of the sale said Childs & Sons were
of defendants, Louis Coblens et al., in an to be allowed until February, 1893, to re-
action of ejectment brought by Lucy T. Da- move from said square; that they continued
vis et al., plaintiffs, for lands in the city of in occupation and possession of the whole of
Washington, D. C. Affirmed.
said square under said defendants, paying
rent therefor down to the month of October,
1893, with the consent of said defendants,
and that they held said square for some
time after October without the consent of
the defendants, but not disputing their title,
being tenants holding over; that they re-
moved the greater part of their effects from
said square in the late fall or early winter of
1893-4, but did not remove entirely until
about the month of May, 1895; that the first
structure placed by them on the square when
they took possession in 1875 were two or
more brick kilns erected on lot 10, and that
these kilns were the last from which the
brick were removed when they left; that
these brick were in process of removal along
during the winter of 1893-'94, and that a
part of the machinery used by them in the
making of brick, namely, two large rollers,
with which the clay was crushed before being
made into brick, were not removed until
May, 1895; that these rollers and some ma-
chinery were hauled away in two four-horse
wagons as late as about May 20, 1895; that
the machine house was located on the north
part of lot 1, in said square, at or about a
point indicated by the witness Charles Childs
on a plat of the square exhibited to the jury,(722
and that the rollers and machinery were
north of the machine house; and on cross
examination in regard thereto the said
Charles Childs testified as follows:

The declaration was in the usual form, and defendants pleaded not guilty, on which issue was joined.

The plaintiffs derive title from Richard Young as heirs at law or grantees of heirs at law. The defendants claim by adverse possession under claim of title under an execution sale upon a judgment recovered against said Richard Young some time in the year 1826.

The case was tried by a jury. Before the case was submitted leave was granted to amend the declaration by striking out plaintiffs Charles M. N. Latimer and William W. Boarman. The verdict was for defendants. And after a motion for new trial was made and denied, judgment was entered in accordance therewith. The plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals, where the judgment was affirmed, and the case was brought here. There are eleven assignments of error in plaintiff's brief. All but three relate to instructions given or refused or modified concerning adverse possession. The plaintiffs contended for or objected to instructions which submitted the question of adverse possession to the jury. The other assignments of error will be noted hereafter.

1. The evidence of adverse possession contained in the bill of exceptions is as fol

lows:

""I don't know but what the rollers might have been on lot 10. The machine house stood right in here (indicating), and the rollers might have been on lot 10.'

"The defendants further offered testimony tending to show that in November, 1893, the defendant caused four signs to be posted, each about four feet square, to the effect that the entire square was for sale or rent on application to them, one at each corner of the square, one of them being located on lot 10; that some of the old brick were left on the

ground, which the witness thought Childs & Sons abandoned, but they did not charge de"The defendants thereupon further offered fendants for them, which were suitable for evidence tending to prove that on March 8, use in building, and were still there; that [721]1875, Isaac P. Childs, and grantee of the defendants made no use of them, but that whole of square 1031 under a deed from Alex-witness thought they would have used them ander R. Shepherd, bearing date the 22d day of February, 1875, the same being one of the chain of conveyances offered in evidence by the plaintiff as tending to show a common source of title, took possession of the whole of said square, converted it into a brick yard, and continued to hold and use it as such, openly, notoriously, exclusively, continuously, and in a manner hostile to all the world, until January, 1892, when he and his immediate grantees sold and conveyed the said square as an entirety to the defendants for sixty-seven thousand dollars, of which thirty thousand was paid in cash and thirtyseven thousand dollars, deferred purchase money, was secured upon the ground by a deed of trust, upon which the defendants have ever since paid the interest; that by the

if they had gone into building operations; that either in the latter part of March or the first part of April, 1894, the defendants rented the entire square to one John A. Downing, who rented it for the purpose of converting it into a base ball park, but did not use it for that purpose; that he occupied the house which was on lot 7 for a dairy lunch and sublet a portion of said house for a barber shop; that the acts he did in reference to the occupation of the vacant ground in that square were as follows: That he prevented various parties from depositing tools, tool boxes, and railroad iron on the square, though none was attempted to be deposited on lot 10; that on the said square there were a couple of holes where the brick kilns had existed, and that there are the foundations of

As

some kilns built of brick still there, and that | elapsed before suit, and from the date of the the said Downing remained as such tenant in conveyance to Millard over eight years. Occupation of the said square, as aforesaid, un-suming that Tracenia Latimer and Elizabeth til June, 1895, when he sold his dairy lunch to McCormick were under disability when the a Mrs. Schulz, who took possession the same adverse possession commenced, did that posday; that after Isaac Childs & Sons left the session ever run against their interests, and square, which was in the winter of 1893-'4, if so, when did it commence to run? perhaps along in November, December, Janu- The statute of limitations in force in the ary, and February, they sold certain brick District is that of James I. chap. 16. Under kilns, some of which were on lot 10, to James that statute no suit for lands can be mainD. Childs, who in turn sold them to others, tained, except "within twenty years next aftby whom they were taken away; that said er the cause of action first descended or fall23]James D. Childs did not claim the land said en, and at no time after the said twenty bricks were on; that Mrs. Schultz continued years." Additional time is given to those in occupation of the property from June, under disability, as follows: "That if any 1895, down to the time of the trial; that person she rented the house with the privilege of using the entire square, provided she neither placed nor permitted others to place any thing unlawful upon it, and that she had stopped parties from dumping earth upon the square and from driving across it, though

she made no use of it herself.

shall at the time of said right or title of entry be or shall be at the time of the said right or title first descended, accrued, come or fallen within the age of twenty-one years, feme covert, non compos mentis, imprisoned, that then such person and persons, and his and their heir and heirs, shall or may, notwithstanding the said "The defendants thereupon produced as a twenty years be expired, bring his action, or witness in their behalf Goff A. Hall, assist- make his entry as he might have done before ant assessor of the District of Columbia, who this act; (2) so as such person and pergave testimony tending to prove that he had sons, or his or their heir and heirs, shall examined the tax books from 1875 down to within ten years next after his and their full the time of the trial, and that throughout age, discoverture, coming of sound mind, enthat period the taxes on said lot 10 had been largement out of prison, or death, take benassessed and paid in the name of the defend-efit of, and sue forth the same, and at no ants and those under whom they claimed. time after the said ten years.' Sec. 2, p. 359, Compiled Stat. Dist. Columbia.

"Thereupon the plaintiff in rebuttal gave testimony tending to prove that the brick yard was established some time in the fall of the year 1875 and disappeared some time in 1893, leaving nothing remaining but the remnants of the old brick yard, and that the bricks were all removed from the kilns about March or April, 1894."

We think the evidence was sufficient to justify the action of the court in submitting the question to the jury, and the exceptions based on such action were not well taken.

2. Did the adverse possession apply to the title derived by the plaintiff Lucy T. Davis from her mother, Tracenia Latimer, and to the title of the plaintiff Millard P. McCormick, derived from his mother, Elizabeth McCormick?

of Gratz, 1 Wheat. 292 [4: 94]; Hogan v.
Kurtz, 94 U. S. 773 [24: 317]; Mercer's
Lessee v. Selden, 1 How. 37 [11:38]; Mc-
Donald v. Hovey, 110 U. S. 619 [28: 269].
The bar of the statute was therefore com-

More than twenty years elapsed after Tracenia's right accrued, as we have seen, before suit was commenced, and more than ten years of that time accrued after her death and that of her husband. She died under disability, but that made no difference. By the terms of the statute the time of limitation of suit commenced to run upon her death against her heir, Lucy T. Davis, and expired in ten years. No disability of[725] Lucy T. Davis, if she was under any, arrested the running of the statute. Cumulative disabilities cannot be used to that effect. Thorp v. Raymond, 16 How. 247 [14: 923]; Demarest v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 129 [8 Am. Dec. 467]; Smith v. Burtis, 9 Johns. 174; Jackson, Swartout, v. Johnson, 5 Cow. It is one of the contentions of the plain-74 [15 Am. Dec. 433]; Walden v. The Heirs tiffs that it did not apply to those titles, and error is based on a refusal of the court to so instruct the jury. The adverse possession began February 22, 1875; suit was brought May 17, 1895. There were therefore twenty years and a few months adverse pos-plete against her. But it was not complete session. Richard Young, the common source of title, died in 1860, testate. His will in effect devised the property in controversy to Matilda, his wife, for life; remainder to Tracenia and Elizabeth and other children. Both were then married. Their mother, the life tenant, died October 7, 1874. Tracenia [724]*died November 17, 1879, and her husband April 20, 1880. She left two children, one of whom is the plaintiff. Elizabeth died March 22, 1889. Her husband survived her, but died July 2, 1891. October 14, 1887, she and her husband conveyed their interests to their son, the plaintiff, Millard P. McCormick. From the death of Elizabeth and her husband, five and four years respectively

against Millard McCormick. Ten years of the period of adverse possession had not run after the death of his parents or after the conveyance to him and before suit was commenced; and we are brought to the contention that a verdict should have been rendered for him. Passing on and disposing of the contention adversely, Mr. Justice Shepard, speaking for the court of appeals, said:

"The rule is old and well established, that if one plaintiff in a joint action of ejectment cannot recover, his coplaintiffs cannot. Morris v. Wheat, 8 App. D. C. 379, 385. Hard as this rule may seem to be, it was followed in that case in obedience to the decision of the Supreme Court of the United

1149

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 728-739.)
Insufficient instruction to jury.

In answering a question of the jury in a prose
cution under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5208, for un-
lawful certification of a check, when they
come in after consultation, and ask for the
law as to certification when no money ap-
pears to the credit of the drawer, and the
court assumes to answer it by reference to
that section, its failure to explain the mean-
ing of "wilful violation" as used in § 13 of
the act of Congress of 1882, when defend-
ant's counsel requests it, is error which is
not cured by mere reference to the original
charge.
[No. 448.]

Walter was called as a witness by plain-
tiff; testified that such reconveyance was the
only one he had made of lot 10-the lot in
controversy. Thereupon defendant's counsel Argued March 13, 14, 1899.
cross-examined him at great length, against