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mobile used in the removal of the deposit, profits earned by a foreign manufacturing and concealment of distilled spirits upon and trading corporation within the state by which a tax was imposed by the United taking such proportion of the whole net States and has not been paid, notwithstand-income as the fair cash value of the corpoing the fact that the seller of such auto-ration's real and tangible personal property mobile, who had reserved title to it as within the state bears to the fair cash value security for unpaid purchase money, did not participate in or have knowledge of the illicit use by the purchaser, does not render such section invalid under U. S. Const., 14th Amend., as taking property without due

J. W. Goldsmith, Jr.,process of law. Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U. S. 505, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 189,

65: 376

47. Federal legislation conferring upon the Postmaster General power to revoke the second-class mail privilege enjoyed by a newspaper which that official finds, after a hearing fairly conducted, systematically to have contained false reports and false statements published with intent to interfere with the success of the military operations of the Federal government, to promote the success of its enemies, and to obstruct its recruiting and enlistment service, in violation of the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, is not unconstitutional, either as not affording the publisher a trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, or as infringing the constitutional freedom of speech and press, or as taking property without due process of law. United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. V.

Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.

65: 704

352,
Taxation and public improvements.
See also supra, 12, 14, 17.
License taxes, see infra, 56, 57.
48. Construing a state inheritance tax
law as operating when a trust deed for the
benefit of the grantor for life, with re-
mainder over at his death, was executed
after the statute was passed, but before
it was to take effect, infringes no rights
under Federal Constitution. Nickel v. Cole,
256 U. S. 222, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467,
65: 900
49. Defining invested capital according
to the original cost of the property, to the
exclusion of present higher values, as is
done by the Act of October 3, 1917, § 207a,
for the purpose of computing the war excess
profits tax imposed upon corporations by
that act, except that the tangible property
paid in prior to January 1, 1914, may be
taken at its actual cash value on that date,
but in no case exceeding the prior value
of the original stock or shares specifically
issued for it, and provided that intangible
property purchased bona fide prior to March
3. 1917, shall be included in invested capital
at a value not to exceed the actual cash
value at the time of purchase, does not
make the act productive of such baseless and
arbitrary discrimination as to render the
tax invalid under the due process of law
clause of the 5th Amendment to the Federal
Constitution. La Belle Iron Works V.
United States, 256 U. S. 377, 41 Sup. Ct.
65: 998
Rep. 528,
50. Measuring for tax purposes the net

of all the real and tangible personal prop-
erty of such corporation cannot be said to
be so inherently arbitrary, nor, as applied
to a corporation whose profits were largely
earned in a series of transactions, beginning
with manufacture in the state, and ending
with sale in other states, to produce so un-
reasonable a result, as to render invalid the
business outside the state, and hence deny-
state law prescribing such rule, as taxing
ing due process of law, where the only show-
ing made in support of his constitutional
objection is that but a very small part of
the corporation's net profits was received
method of apportionment, nearly one half
within the state, while, under the statutory
of the corporation's net income is attribu-
table to operations within the state, since
the percentage of net profits earned within
the state may, none the less, have been even
larger than the percentage arrived at by
Underwood Type-
the statutory method.
writer Co. v. Chamberlain, 254 U. S. 113,
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 45,

65: 165

51. In the absence of flagrant abuse or purely arbitrary action, a state may establish drainage districts and tax lands theresuch lands may escape liability solely bein for local improvements, and none of cause they will not receive direct benefits. Miller & Lux v. Sacramento & S. J. Drainage Dist. 256 U. S. 129, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 404, 65: 859

52. A railroad right of way and station grounds in Oklahoma are sufficiently identified in a proceeding for a special assessment for a street improvement to satisfy due process of law, where the premises not having been platted, the mayor and common council adopted a map of the city engineer on which the right of way and station grounds were set forth in proper quarterblock districts, and the premises assessed were those quarter blocks thereon designated as abutting on that portion of the street which was improved, and the designation was clear, although, some time after the passage of the ordinance providing for the assessment, this map was inadvertently removed from the city files, the railroad companies having full knowledge of the proceedings relating to the assessment, and of the commencement, progress, and completion of the improvement, and there being no suggestion that they were injured or misled by the temporary absence of the map from the Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. city files. Mackey, 256 U. S. 531, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65: 1076 582, Regulations of business; license; freedom to contract.

Conclusiveness of judgment in rate case, see Judgment, 5, 6. Sufficiency of averments in answer in rate cases, see Pleading, 5.

254, 255, 256 U. S.

Municipal regulation of street railway, services rendered by them, that power does

rates, see Street Railways, 4-7. See also supra, 18, 20-24, 26, 30. 53. An exercise of public policy cannot be resisted because of conduct or contracts done or made upon the faith of former exercises of it upon the ground that its later exercises deprive of property or invalidate those contracts. Thornton v. Duffy, 254 U. S. 361, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 137, 65: 304 54. The emergency growing out of the World War clothed the letting of buildings in the District of Columbia with a public interest so great as to justify, despite U. S. Const., 5th Amend., such temporary regulation as is made by the Act of October 22, 1919, tit. 2, § 109 (to remain in force two years unless sooner repealed), giving a tenant the privilege of holding over after the expiration of the lease, subject to regulation by the commission appointed by that act, so long as he pays the rent and performs the conditions as fixed by the lease, or as modified by the commission. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.

458,

65: 865 55. The suspension until November 1, 1922, in cities having a population of one million or more, and in cities in a county adjoining such city, of the right to recover possession of real property occupied for dwelling purposes, except where the person holding over is objectionable, or where the landlord seeks to occupy the premises as a dwelling for himself and his family, or intends to demolish the building and construct a new one (providing the tenant or occupant is ready, willing, and able to pay a reasonable rent), as was done by N. Y. Laws 1920, chaps. 942 and 947, was a valid exercise of the police power in the emergency growing out of the World War, and is not repugnant to the contract or due process of law clauses of the Federal Constitution, even as applied to a case where, before the passage of such statute, another lease of the premises had been made, to go into effect on the day following that when the existing lease by its terms expired, and when the lessees had contracted to surrender the premises. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465,

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56. Even though a license tax should destroy a business, it would not be invalid or require compensation upon that ground alone. Those who enter upon a business take that risk. Alaska Fish Salting & ByProducts Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219, 65: 489 57. There is no constitutional objection to exacting a discouraging rate of taxation as the alternative to giving up a business when the legislature has the full power of taxation. Alaska Fish Salting & ByProducts Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 219, 65: 489

65: 764

not include the right to fix rates which
are so low as to be confiscatory of the
Southern
property of such corporation.
Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U. S.
539, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400,
59. The right of a municipality to reg-
ulate street railway fares gives no power
whatever to violate U. S. Const., 14th
Amend., by enforcing a confiscatory rate.
San Antonio v. San Antonio Public Service
Co. 255 U. S. 547, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 428,

65: 777

60. If public service corporations and have power to contract as to rates, and exgovernmental agencies dealing with them ert that power by fixing by contract the rates to govern during a particular time,

the enforcement of such rates is controlled by the obligation resulting from the contract, and the question as to whether such rates are confiscatory becomes immaterial. Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U. S. 539, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400, 65:764

61. Confiscatory rates for services to be performed by public service corporations, fixed by governmental agencies, cannot be enforced unless they are secured by contract obligation. Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, 255 U. S. 539, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 400, 65: 764

62. A state may not segregate a class of traffic and compel a carrier to transport it in intrastate commerce at less than cost, or without a substantial compensation, although the return by the carrier from its entire intrastate operations may be adequate. Vandalia R. Co. v. Schnull, 255 U. S. 113, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 65: 539 Remedies and procedure.

Who may attack validity of taxing statute for lack of hearing, see Statutes, 3.

Increasing tax valuation without notice

or hearing, see Taxes, 10.

63. The Delaware statutes which afford a nonresident individual defendant in a suit begun by foreign attachment an opportunity to appear and defend only in case he gives bail or security for the discharge of the property seized to the value of such property and costs do not deny due process of law, even though defendant may have no resources or credit aside from the property attached. Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 Ü. S. 94, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 433,

65: 837

64. The purchase of a railroad under a decree of foreclosure is not deprived of property without due process of law by a writ of prohibition which excludes from such decree words which purport to an thorize the purchaser to dismantle the road, since the purchaser, whatever the words of the decree, acquires all the rights that the mortgagor had to stop operations when unprofitable, and the prohibition, not compelling further operation at a loss, did not cut down the purchaser's rights any more 58. Although governmental agencies than did the presence of the excluded words having authority to deal with the subject enlarge them. Bullock v. Florida ex rel. may fix and enforce reasonable rates to be Railroad Commission, 254 U. S. 513, 41 paid public utility corporations for the | Sup. Ct. Rep. 193,

65: 380

65. Indians were not deprived of their property without due process of law by the provisions of the Acts of April 26, 1906, $ 9, and May 29, 1908, § 27, authorizing the court of claims to hear, consider, and adjudicate the claims against the Mississippi Choctaws of certain persons for services rendered and expenses incurred in the matter of the claims of the Mississippi Choctaws to citizenship in the Choctaw Nation, and to render judgment thereon on the principle of quantum meruit in such amounts as may appear equitable or justly due therefor, which judgment, if any, shall be paid from any funds now or hereafter due such Choctaws by the United States, and declaring that the lands allotted to the Mississippi Choctaws are subject to a lien to the extent of any judgment so rendered, and constituting the governor of the Choctaw Nation the representative of the defendants, upon whom notice of the suit was to be served in their behalf, and designating the Attorney General of the United States as their attorney to appear and de

fend the suit. Winton v. Amos, 255 U. S.
373, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342,
65: 684

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70. A limit in time to tide over a passing trouble may justify a law that could not be upheld as a permanent change. Block v. Hirsh, 256 U. S. 135, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 458, 65: 865

71. A state may, when exercising its and accommodate their coexistence, and, in police power, consider the relation of rights, the interest of the community, limit one right that others may be enjoyed. Walls v. Midland Carbon Co. 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 118, 65: 276

such gas is burned or consumed without the use of natural gas for products where fully and actually applying and utilizing the heat therein contained for other manuMidland Carbon Co. 254 U. S. 300, 41 Sup. facturing or domestic purposes. Walls v. Ct. Rep. 118,

72. The fact that carbon black is more 66. Due process of law is not afforded a valuable than the gas from which it is extaxpayer where the county board of assess-tracted does not preclude a state from prosors, conformably to the state tax law, inhibiting, in the exercise of its police power, creased the valuation of his property as returned for taxation without notice or hearing, other than notice given after the assessment was made and a hearing in the arbitration provided for in case of the taxpayer's dissatisfaction, and such arbitration failed because the arbitrators could not agree within the ten-day period fixed by law, and hence no majority award could be made, though all believed the assessment was too high. Turner v. Wade, 254 U. S. See also supra, 47. 64, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27,

65: 134

65: 276

VI. Freedom of speech or press.

73. The constitutional freedom of the 67. A newspaper publisher whose secondclass mail privileges have been revoked for press may protect criticism and agitation the publication of articles that offended for modification or repeal of laws, but it against the Espionage Act of June 15, 1917, does not extend to the protection of him was accorded a hearing which, if fairly who counsels and encourages the violation conducted, satisfies the requirements of due of the law as it exists. United States ex process of law, where due notice was given rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. of the time and character of the hearing, V. Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. 65: 704 the publisher was represented thereon by Rep. 352, 74. Freedom of speech or press is not its president, and, so far as appears, all that it desired to say or offer was heard denied by state statute making it unlawand received. United States ex rel. Milful to advocate or teach that men should waukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. not enlist in the military or naval forces Burleson, 255 U. S. 407, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.

352,

Criminal matters.

V.

65: 704

Indefiniteness of criminal statute, see
Criminal Law, 2, 3.

68. To subject military prisoners, con-
fined in a military prison under previous
court-martial sentences which involved their
discharge as soldiers, to trial by court-
martial for offenses committed during such
imprisonment, does not involve a violation
of the guaranty of U. S. Const. 5th Amend.,
against the deprivation of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law. Kahn
v. Anderson, 255 U. S. 1, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep.
224,
65: 469

of the United States or of the state, or

that citizens of the state should not aid or
assist the United States in prosecuting or
the United States.
carrying on war with the public enemies of
Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U. S. 325, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 125,

VII. Vested rights.

65: 287

75. Children of Omaha Indians born during the trust period acquired no vested right to an allotment by virtue of the Treaties of March 16, 1854, and March 6. 1865, with the Omaha Tribe, or the Acts of August 7, 1882, and March 3, 1893, en

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1. Services not gratuitous, and neither mala in se nor mala prohibita, rendered under a contract that is invalid or unen

76. A state statute exempting from lia-forceable, may furnish a basis for an imbility for debts of the assured the avails of insurance upon his life, when payable plied or constructive contract to pay their

den v. Clement, 256 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 408.

reasonable value. Winton v. Amos, 255 U.

65: 684

to his estate, violates the contract clause of the Federal Constitution in so far as it S. 373, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, undertakes to exempt the proceeds of polly affixed to real property belonging to an 2. Whenever a structure is permanenticies taken out prior to the passage of that individual without the latter's consent or act from antecedent debts. Bank of Minrequest, he cannot be held responsible because of its subsequent use. It becomes his by being annexed to the soil, and he is not is not deemed to have accepted it, so as obliged to remove it to escape liability. He to incur an obligation to pay for it, merely because he has not chosen to tear it down, but has seen fit to use it. Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563

65: 857 77. Contract obligations of a bridge company, specially incorporated by N. Y. Laws 1857, chap. 753, to build a railroad bridge over the Niagara river, and later consolidated with a similar Canadian corporation, pursuant to New York and Canada statutes, subject to all the duties of each of the consolidated companies, cannot be said to have been impaired unconstitutionally, by N. Y. Laws 1915, chap. 666, amending the original charter, in the exercise of the states' reserved power to amend, by requiring the construction of a roadway for vehicles and a pathway for pedestrians on that part of the bridge within the jurisdiction of the state, where the Canadian charter, unlike the New York one, made the arrangements for foot passengers and carriages a duty. International Bridge Co. v. New York, 254 U. S. 126, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 56, 65: 176

IX. Involuntary servitude.

78. An involuntary servitude forbidden by U. S. Const., 13th Amend., is not created by the provisions of N. Y. Laws 1920, chaps. 131 and 951, which make it a misdemeanor for a lessor, or any agent or janitor, intentionally to fail to furnish such water, heat, light, elevator, telephone, or other service as may be required by the terms of the lease, and necessary to the proper and customary use of the building. Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 465,

CONTRACTS.

65: 877

Contracts limiting liability of carrier, see Carriers, 12-14.

Impairing contract obligation, see Constitutional Law, VIII. Consideration for sale of entire property of corporation, see Corporations, 5, 6.

Liability of Indian nation on quantum meruit, see Indians, 4, 4a.

Performance; breach.

65: 1099

Effect of impossibility of performance upon charter party, see Shipping,

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State jurisdiction over foreign corpo- | which it was incorporated, and the only
ration, see Courts, 6.
Jurisdiction of suit against corporation
incorporated under Federal law,
See Courts, 9, 10.
Matters as to insurance, see Insurance.
Income tax on stock dividends, see In-
ternal Revenue, 7.

way in which the stockholders could realize
anything from their investment was by a
sale of its property. Geddes v. Anaconda
Copper Min. Co. 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup.
Ct. Rep. 209,
65: 425

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5. The rule that while a sale for an adequate consideration of all the property of a corporation which, its business having proved unprofitable, has suspended operations without prospect of revival, may be authorized by the owners of a majority of the stock, such sale must be for money only, is subject to the exception that when stock which has an established market value and a wide and general market is taken in exchange for the corporate property, it should be treated as the equivalent of money, so as to sustain a sale otherwise valid. Geddes v. Acaconda Copper Min. Co. 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, 65: 425

a

1. Generally, agents of a corporation are not agents of the stockholders and can not contract for the latter. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165, 65: 368 2. The relation of directors to corpora- 6. The highest cash offer for the proptions is of such a fiduciary nature that erty of a corporation at a public sale is transactions between boards of directors not such a measure of its value that the having common members are regarded as failure to obtain a bid at such sale for jealously by the law as are personal deal- more than the consideration fixed in ings between a director and his corpora- private sale of such property, authorized tion, and where the fairness of such trans-by the owners of a majority of the capital actions is challenged the burden is upon stock, should be accepted by the courts as those who would maintain them to show a sufficient reason for confirming such sale their entire fairness, and where a sale is when attacked by the minority stockholders, involved, the full adequacy of the considera- where the courts found such consideration tion, and this is especially true where a on other evidence to be inadequate. Geddes common director is dominating in influence v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 254 U. S. or in character. Geddes v. Anaconda Cop-590, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209, per Min. Co. 254 U. S. 590, 41 Sup. Ct. Distribution of assets. Rep. 209, 65: 425

3. Authority in the executive officers of railway companies to assent to changes in the charter of a terminal company which materially affect the property interest of the companies in a matter so vital as the ownership and control of an important terminal is not to be implied as coming within the general scope of their duties, especially where their action was taken under the mistaken impression that it was merely making the charter conform to the situation already actually existing, while, in fact, such amendments, if given effect according to their terms, materially change the situation, to the disadvantage of the proprietary companies, by putting an end to an important trust, contrary to their actual intent as parties beneficially interested. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. Des Moines Union R. Co. 254 U. S. 196, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 81, 65: 219

Corporate powers.

65: 425

7. The right to follow the distributed assets of a corporation in the hands of the stockholders applies not only to those who are creditors in the commercial sense, but to all who hold unsatisfied claims. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365, 65: 697

8. A corporation cannot disable itself from responding to liability for its acts by distributing its property among its stockholders and leaving remediless those having valid claims. In such a case the claims, after being reduced to judgment, may be satisfied out of the assets in the hands of the stockholders. Pierce v. United States, 255 U. S. 398, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365,

CORRUPT PRACTICES.
See Elections, 2, 3.

COSTS AND FEES.

65: 697

In moot case, see Appeal and Error, 75. COUNTERFEITING.

4. The sale of all the property of a mining company, authorized in good faith and for an adequate monetary consideration 1. A possession which is not conscious by the owners of a majority of the stock, and willing is not included and made crimis a valid sale which may not be defeated inal by the provisions of U. S. Crim. Code, or set aside by the minority stockholders, § 169, for the punishment of anyone who, although the corporate property had a large without lawful authority, shall have in his speculative value, and the corporation, possession any die in the likeness or similitherefore, could not be said to have been tude of a die designated for making genuine insolvent, where such corporation had sus- coin of the United States. Baender v. Barpended operations, and there was no reason-nett, 255 U. S. 224, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 271, able prospect that it might be able profitably to resume the mining business for

65: 597

2. Making the conscious and wilful

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