offense intended to be threatened by the criminal was. His sneaking, misera le suggestions were all designed to intimate to Wilson his knowledge, assumed as it was, that the latter had stolen his employer's property, and that unless he (Crimmins) was bought off, he would accuse him of it. The court will not in a case like this seek for technical errors or indulge in hypercritical construction to shield the wrong-doer. Judgment affirmed. Davis, P. J., and Daniels J., concurring. POWER OF ALIENATION UNDER WOMAN. MARRIED Bill to quiet title upon the following state of facts: On the 1st of June, 1867, John O. Evans conveyed to the defendant, Moses Kelly, three sub lots in square 247, in the city of Washington, in trust for Jane Thompson, wife of defendant, J. Harry Thompson. The trust is expressed in these words: "In trust, nevertheless, for the sole use and benefit of the said Jane Thompson, and for no other person whatsoever, and only to be conveyed by her, or her heirs joining in the deed with said trustees. Jane Thompson died on the 10th of February, 1872, seized of the equitable title to said lots, and by her last will and testament, bearing date January 24, 1871, and duly admitted to probate and recorded on the 26th of February, 1872, SUPREME COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF she gave and bequeathed the sum of COLUMBIA. $5,000, to be equally divided among her Louisa G. Smith v. J. Harry Thomp- four children, the defendants, J. Harry son et al. Decided September, 1875. Thompson, Jr., Perly, Jennie and Minnie A. Thompson, to take effect when said children shall have attained their majority, The rule may now be considered set:led wherever the chancery jurisdiction and constituted said bequest a charge exists, that a married woman is to upon said above described real estate, and be regarded as a femme sole in re-directed that the same should be sold and spect to her separate property; and c nveyed at the discretion of her executhat she may dispose of it as she tor to satisfy said bequest, and devised pleases, unless her power of dispo- said real property, subject to the foregoing sition is restricted or limited by the charge and any prior legal incumbrance, deed or will creating her interest. to her husband, the defendant, J. Where the beneficiary in a trust deed Harry Thompson, in fee simple, and conis a married woman, and there is no restriction upon the mode in which stituted and appointed her said husband she shall alienate the property, only executor of said last will and testament. Subsequently, on the 15th of April, that the trustee shall join in the deed; this limitation has no refer- 1873, the defendant, Kelly, trusted, as ence to a devise, and testamentary aforesaid, conveyed to the defendant, J. capacity in regard to said property Harry Thompson, said real property in is complete. fee simple. By virtue of the act of Congress regulating the rights of property of married women, passed April 10, 1869, a married woman may dispose of her entire property, constituting her separate estate, whether such prop erty was acquired before or after the passage of the act. The complainant purchased a portion of the property and received a deed executed by Thompson, and gave back a trust deed to secure the purchase money. She endeavored to raise money upon the property by giving a trust deed, and had concluded an arrangement, but her title was rejected upon the ground that Jane Thompson, at the time she executed her last will and testament had no legal capacity to devise the said real estate, and that in order to perfect complainant's title it is necessary that the testamentary capacity of Jane Thompson in respect to this property should be judicially ascertained and determined. The justice holding the Special Term dismissed the bill without prejudice, from which decree complainant appealed. Held, 1. The deed of trust made by Evans to Kelly, conveying the property for the sole use of Jane Thompson, and only to be conveyed by her or her heirs joining in the deed with trustee, was no restriction of the power to devise. It applies only to a conveyance, and must be construed as giving her the right to dispose of the property absolutely by will. of the act of Congress of March 3, 1875, but in which a new trial had been granted, and which was pending after the passage of the said act, may be removed from such State court to the Circuit Court of the United States. On the 25th of March, A. D, 1867, suit was brought by the plaintiffs against the defendants, in the Court of Common Pleas of Muskingum County, Ohio. Attachments were issued, and certain property was attached. On the 18th day of May, 1867, the defendants filed a motion to remove the cause into the Circuit. Court of the United States, on the ground that the defendants were citizens and residents of the State of Maryland, and that the plaint.ffs were citizens and residents of Ohio. Upon the hearing of the motion, it appeared that one of the plaintiffs was a citizen and resident of Ohio, 2. That although a married woman, one a citizen and resident of Illinois, and Jane Thompson had the same right to dis-one a citizen and resident of Minnesota. pose of her separate estate which belongs The motion was overruled. Thereupon to a femme sole, unless that right is lim- the parties proceeded to make up the ited or restricted by the deed or will cre- issues in said Court of Common Pleas, ating her interest. and at the April term, 1873, a jury was empanneled and the case submitted to the court, and judgment rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. 3. The act of April 10, 1869, relating to the disposal of their property by married women, clearly authorized Jane Thompson to dispose of this land by will, even if she had no power so to do under the trust deed made in 1867; it makes no difference that the property was acquired previous to the passage of the act. Judgment reversed. At the same term the plaintiffs were awarded a second trial, under the statute. Amendments were made to the pleadings, and the cause was continued from term to term until the November term, 1874, when a trial was had before a jury, and a Opinion by McArthur, J.; Wylie, J., verdict was rendered for the defendants. dissenting. At the same term the verdict was set aside, and the cause was continued till the January term, 1875. On the 25th day of January, the cause was again continued. At the same term, to wit: April 25th, 1875, the order of continuance was set aside; and, on the same day, a petition was filed by the defendants in the State court, praying for a removal of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States, under the provisions of the act of Congress, of March 3d, A. D. 1875. Bond, with proper security, was filed. The grounds of removal were, that the defendants were citizens and residents of the State of Maryland, and that one of the plaintiffs was a resident of the State of Illinois, one a citizen and resident of Minnesota, and the other a citizen and resident of Ohio. This application was resisted upon the ground that the case did not come within the provisions of the act of March 3d, 1875, because not filed with the court at or before the first term at which the cause could be tried, and before the trial thereof. Upon the hearing of this petition the court, for the reason that the cause was triable and was actually tried in said court before the passage of the act of Congress, overruled said motion. The design of Constitutional provision, was to prevent the uniting of various objects having no necessary, or natural connection with each other in one bill. Geographical situs and various other circumstances, may be considered in determining the proper construction to be given to a statute. Appeal from an order at Special Term, granting an injunction against the defendants and respondents, pendente lite. The injunction restrained the defendants from establishing a line of steamships, or purchasing steamships to be used on 3 proposed line between the Port of New York and the Port of Aspinwall, in the Republic of New Granada, and between the Port of Panama, in said republic, and the Port of San Francisco, California. The plaintiff is a stockholder in the Afterwards, on the 12th day of May, Panama Railroad Company. And the 1875, the defendants filed in this court ground of the action as well as of the intranscripts of the record and proceedings junction, is that the defendant, The in said cause; and, afterwards, on the Panama Railroad Company, which is a 6th day of October, a motion was filed corporation, existing under the laws of in this court to strike the case from the the State of New York, has no power undocket on the ground of want of juris- der its charter to establish such proposed diction. steamship line. The defendant claimed that under the following provision of the charter of the Panama Railroad Company, such power was conferred, viz: “After constituting several gentlemen, a body corporate by the name of the Panama Railroad Company, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining a railroad with one or more tracks, &c., in the Republic of New Granada, it was further in said charter provided that said company should have the power "of purchasing and navigating such steam or sailing vessels as may be proper and convenient to Held, That the proceedings removed the cause to this court; that the cause came within the act of March 3d, 1875, which is applicable to all causes pending at the time of its passage, in which no final judgment had been entered, provided the petition, &c., are filed at or before the term at which said cause could be first tried after the passage of the act. Motion overruled. Opinion by Swing, J. INJUNCTION. N. Y. SUPREME COURT, GENERAL TERM, be used in connection with the said road, FIRST DEPARTMENT. Aaron Freeman, respt., v. The Panama Railroad Company et al., apples. Decided March 7, 1876. and for such purposes, all the necessary and incidental power is hereby granted to said corporation." Plaintiff claimed that the aforesaid It was not the intent with which the Con-provision was inserted in the act for the stitutional Provision (Sec. 16, Art. 3) was framed, that the Title of an Act of reason, that owing to the shallowness of the Legislature should contain all the the bay, at the termini of the road, ships details set forth in the act. were unable to come nearer than three and a half sea miles from such termini, It is no constitutional objection to a and to confer upon the Panama Ra Iroad Company the power to run lighters and small vessels, for the purpose of carrying freight and passengers from the large ships to the termini of the road, the aforesaid provision was incorporated in the charter and for no other purpose. It was further claimed by plaintiff, that if the construction claimed by the defendant was the proper construction, that the act was within the prohibition of Sec. 16, Art. 3 of the Constitution of the State of New York, which provides that "no private or local bill which may be passed by the Legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." Mr. Fullerton, for respt. statute that its title is vague and unmeaning as to its purpose, if it be sufficiently plain as to the matter to which it refers. That the title here sufficiently expresses the subject of the act of incorporation. That with reference to the act incorporating the Panama Railroad Company, we are unable to see any lack of power in the Legislature to give to said corporation power to construct and maintain a railroad, and also the power of purchasing and navigating such steam and sailing vessels from the several termini of said railroad, to and from the cities of New York and San Francisco, as may be proper and convenient to be used in connec tion with such railroad. The title of the act incorporating the Panama Railroad Co. (Laws 1849, Ch. Held further, That as to the remain284) is as follows, viz.: "An Act to incor- ing question depending upon the conporate the Panama Railroad Company."struction of the act as to whether by the From the order of the Court below language used in the act of incorporation, the power is conferred to establish granting the injunction sought for this the proposed line of steamships, we are appeal was taken. inclined to think that, taking into consideration the geographical situs of the contemplated railroad which the LegisHeld, That it was clearly not the in- lature must be presumed to have contemtent with which the constit itional provi-plated, and that it was proposed to build sion was formed (Sec. 16, Art. 3) that the the road across a narrow isthmus, and title of an act of the Legislature should that the success of the undertaking decontain all the details, and set forth every pended altogether upon whether the corpower, duty and obligation of the body poration, by the powers and facilities corporate. The omission of such details in the title of an act, was not the mischief sought to be prevented. In the first case that arose under Sec. 16 of Art. 3 of the Constitution, the Court of Appeals held that "The design of the Constitutional provision was to prevent the uniting of various objects, having no necessary, or natural, connection with each other, in one bill, for the purpose of combining various pecuniary interests in support of the whole, which could not be combined in favor of either by itself." Connor v. The Mayor 1 Seld (5 N. Y.,) 203. This, in substance, has been held to be the design of the Constitutional provision ever since. granted, could make itself the carrier of a remunerative inter-ocean commerce and travel, and also the language used, the to run such steamship line in connection with the road was conferred by the act of incorporation. power Order appealed from reversed, and injunction dissolved. Opinion by Davis, P. J.; Daniels, J., concurring in opinion; Brady, J., in re sult. ERRATA. On page 90, vol. 2, line 24, for "assign ment" read "re-assignment." RAILROAD. [No. 7. N. Y. SUPREME COURT, GENERAL TERM. Alfred Nelson, respt. v. The Long Island Decided March 7, 1876. and also "Good for One Day Only," and on the back of the same was stamped "Aug. 5th." From the evidence on the trial it appeared that, shortly after the plaintiff took the train to Southampton, the conductor came into the car where the plaintiff was sitting and requested the fare from plaintiff, and the ticket aforesaid on being The ticket issued by a Railroad Com- shown to the conductor, he said, "That pany is not conclusive evidence of has run out." Plaintiff said, "I guess not; the right of the holder, but only a to- I bought it on Saturday, and I told the ken or voucher, adopted for conven- man I bought it from I was coming back ience, to show that the passenger has on Wednesday." The conductor said, paid his fare from and to the point « Yes-but the rules are different." The named. The representation of a ticket agent who receives the money and hands out the ticket, as to the time the ticket has to run, are admissible, and bind ing on the Company. conductor then went to the front of the car and came back with a book, and opened it and took out the rules and said that he must do so-and-so. Plaintiff refused to pay his fare, and at the next sta That a passenger, having been ejected tion (Westhampton) he was put off, the from a train for wrongfully refus-conductor using no force, the plaintiff ing to pay his fare, has no right, walking with him to and off on to the upon an offer to pay his fare after platform. The plaintiff immediately got such expulsion, to be again admitted into the car again, and when called upon as a passenger on the train. paid his fare, $1.15, to Manor, that being Appeal from a judgment entered on the the terminus of the Sag Harbor branch of verdict of a jury. the road. This action was brought to recover of At Manor, the intersecting point of the the defendant the sum of $5,000 damages, main and branch road, the car in which for wrongfully ejecting plaintiff from a plaintiff was, was hooked on to another car upon one of the trains run by the de- train with another conductor. But the fendant. The plaintiff was expelled from second conductor had been informed of one of the defendant's cars on refusing to the action of the plaintiff in refusing to pay the fare. The answer set up that the pay his fare, and of his being put off and plaintiff, on the 3d of August, 1872, had paying to Manor. Plaintiff did not get off purchased an excursion ticket from Hun- the car at Manor, and after the train left ter's Point to Southampton, and return that station for Hunter's Point, the second at any time between the 3d and 6th of conductor came into the car where plainAugust, 1872, on which last mentioned tiff was and asked for tickets. Plaintiff day it should expire, and that on the 7th handed the same excursion ticket he had day of August, 1872, the day of the oc- shown to the former conductor. The concurrence set forth in the complaint. the ductor said it was not good; it had run plaintiff, learning the contract had ex-out-and requested his fare. Plaintiff pired, voluntarily left the train of defend- said, "I tender this ticket as my fare;" ant. The ticket of the plaintiff, shown by him on the 7th of August, was printed "Excursion Ticket" on the face of it, plaintiff said, "I shall not pay, you can put me off." The car was stopped, and plaintiff was put off. Action was brought for the last expulsion. On the trial evi |