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and Define the Corporate Limits of the Town poll-tax of not exceeding $2" on each tithable of Russellville, Authorize the Election of a Po- inhabitant of the town, for municipal purposes. lice Judge, and Provide a Sinking Fund for Subsequently another act was passed, entitled Said Town," approved March 12, 1869 (2 Sess. "An Act to Amend and Reduce into One the Acts 1869, p. 236). Previous to the passage of Acts Relating to the Town of Russellville, said act, the boundary of the town was in a very approved May 1. 1880 (2 Sess. Acts 1879, irregular and unsatisfactory shape, and while, p. 874), which was substantially a new charter, in 1869, it was a thrifty, though quiet, town, and under which the municipal affairs of the having a population of near 2,000 souls, with a town were conducted, until the passage of the reasonable prospect of growth and of steady act for the government of towns of the fifth improvement, having the advantage of one class, approved July 3, 1893, to which class the railroad, with the prospect of the early con- town of Russellville now belongs. By the act struction of another, the main object of the ex- of 1880 the boundary of the town was contintension of the limits seems to have been to cor- ued as fixed by the act of 1869, and the munirect the irregular shape of the lines defining the cipal authorities were empowered to assess and limits of the town, and at the same time to ex- collect taxes for municipal purposes annually tend the jurisdiction of the municipal govern- upon all of the real and other property in the ment over a considerable territory claimed to be town as of the 10th day of January, upon a list actually suburban, although not within the of the "taxable inhabitants and owners of lawful limits of the town. This the act ac- property in said town," and the marshal of the complished by describing a perfect square of town was invested with "all the powers and territory, each of the four sides extending 410 authority within the town of Russellville to poles, with the county court-house and public collect the town tax as sheriffs have in collect square in the center. By a previous act, enti-ing the state tax and county revenue." Nottled "An Act to Amend the Charter of the withstanding the ample power of taxation thus Town of Russellville,” approved March 5, 1868 | conferred on the municipal authorities to assess (2 Sess. Acts 1867-68, p. 219), the chairman and and collect taxes on their property within the board of trustees of the town were authorized corporate limits of the town, no effort was and empowered to assess and collect annually made by the said authorities to assess or levy or an ad valorem tax "of not exceeding 50 cents on collect from the appellant Briggs and the ap the $100 worth of real and personal estate pellee Beall taxes upon their land which was within the corporate limits of said town, and a brought into the limits of the town by the act of

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was not retroactive in its operation. Stilz v. Indianapolis, 81 Ind. 582.

Although the land is platted for the purpose of sale in parcels, each of which contains more than 5 acres, it is not within the provision of the Indiana statute taxing platted land if it is vacant and not used for town purposes. South Bend v. Cushing.

But under a new Constitution the Missouri court 123 Ind. 290. has changed its rulings.

A statutory provision permitting the assessment of land in a city not laid off into lots and blocks only by the acre as agricultural land is in conflict with a constitutional provision that all property subject to taxation shall be taxed in proportion to its value. State, Griswold, v. O'Brien, 89 Mo. 631. A statute providing that no tract of land in a city over 3 acres in extent shall be subject to taxation so long as it remains undivided and is used for agricultural purposes is in conflict with a constitutional provision requiring taxes to be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the same and forbidding exemptions other than those declared in the Constitution. Copeland v. St. Joseph, 126 Mo. 417.

In Henderson v. Lambert, 8 Bush, 607, it appeared that farm lands had been expressly exempted from city taxation by act of the legislature.

In St. Louis v. Allen, 13 Mo. 400, the power to tax the added land was made dependent on the making of certain suggested improvements in the vicinity of the added territory.

But when the improvement was made the land might be taxed at city rates for the remainder of the year. Benoist v. St. Louis, 19 Mo. 179.

A requirement that the land shall be assessed by the acre does not require the assessment to be made at the value of the land for farm purposes, but the taxing power may take into consideration the value of the land for any purpose. Benoist v. St. Louis, 15 Mo. 668.

In Serrill v. Philadelphia, 38 Pa. 355, the court construed certain tax exemptions which were given

II. Construction of statutory exemption or discrimi- by statute in favor of rural lands, holding that one

nation.

covering all rural lands was repealed by a subseex-quent one covering only marsh lands so as not to give a double exemption to the latter.

There are several cases in which statutory emptions or discriminations have been construed or enforced without any discussion as to their validity.

Under the Indiana act of 1852 a tract of land, less than 20 acres of which were used for farm purposes, was nor exempt from city taxation. Conklin v. Cambridge City, 58 Ind. 130.

A particular statute exempting farm lands within a certain city from municipal taxation is not repealed by a general statute subsequently passed without negative words, giving a general power of taxation but without necessary conflict between the two. Blain v. Bailey, 25 Ind. 165.

The mere fact that the land is held with the expectation of a rise in value will not make it taxable if it is used for farm purposes or is unoccupied, under a charter making farm lands or land vacant or unoccupied taxable at a lower rate than general city property. Gillette v. Hartford, 31 Conn, 351.

Under the Louisiana act of 1850 a distinction is made between rural and urban property. Munici pality No. 3 v. Michoud, 6 La. Ann. 605,

Under the Indiana statutes agricultural land within a city is subject to city school taxes and such special assessments as affect it in the same The Indiana act of 1877 providing for an exemp- manner as other property, but it is only subject to tion of agricultural lands from municipal taxation | general city taxes to an amount equal to the rate

1869, and afterwards by the act of 1880, until | ments were erected thereon in 1872. The the efforts made for that purpose which fur- track of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad nished the occasion for the present litigation. lies in front of this ground and is the south As we take it, the taxes now involved were as- boundary of it. We do not deem it necessary sessed in 1893; under the authority of acts in to go into lengthy detail of the facts material force previous to the passage of the said act of especially in the Briggs case. It is sufficient July 3, 1893. Action was instituted by each to say that the facts show that, although there of the parties seeking to enjoin the town and was no public street or alley or sidewalk the collector of the town tax from proceeding contiguous to his ground, he and his family had to collect these taxes, which had been assessed convenient access to the public streets of the by the municipal authorities on their said re- town by a driveway out of his lawn across the spective parcels of land within the limits of said railroad track, and thence across a meadow the town. The issues having been made up in in which Mrs. Briggs had an interest, to the each case, in the case of the appellant Briggs Hopkinsville pike, laid down on the map of the the court adjudged, in substance, that his land town as "Hopkinsville Street," which leads to was lawfully assessed, and that he was liable the public square and the principal business part for the tax, and his petition was dismissed; of the town, and which is a prolongation of the but in the case of the appellee Beall, the court main center street in the original boundary. adjudged, in brief, that his land was not law. His ground is 32 poles from the passenger defully assessed, or subject to the tax, and that pot of the said railroad, at which is the nearhe was not liable therefor, and the municipal est sidewalk. The same may be said concernauthorities were pepetually enjoined from pro- ing the land of appellee Beall. Brigg's resceeding to collect the tax that they were then idence is also something more than 1,000 seeking to collect from him on his said land. feet from the electric-light plant which supThese appeals are prosecuted to reverse the plied the town, and from which his residence judgment in each case. was supplied, over a line erected at his own In the case of Briggs, trustee, it appears expense, with light, which was the nearest that he was living with his family upon 12 point in the business part of the town to his acres of land that were included within the house. He had a number of tenement houses limits of the town by the acts of 1869 and situated south of the said railroad track, and 1880, which have been referred to, and that somewhat nearer to his ground than the electhe dwelling house and all other improve- | tric-light plant. The facts show further that assessed in the several townships for general town- | stitutional. Giboney v. Cape Girardeau, 58 Mo. 141; ship purposes. Leeper v. South Bend, 106 Ind. 375; | State, Patterson, v. McReynolds, 61 Mo. 203. Dickerson v. Franklin, 112 Ind. 178.

III. Right to repeal exemptions.

An exemption from municipal taxation may be repealed at any time. McCallie v. Chattanooga, 3 Head, 317.

The limitation of the rate of taxation to be placed on agricultural land may be repealed at any time. Washburn v. Oshkosh, 60 Wis. 453.

The legislature may repeal a provision for the exemption or lower taxation of agricultural property at any time. Powell v. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698; Probasco v. Moundsville, 11 W. Va. 501.

A statute fixing the size of the tract which is exempt from taxation lower than was the rule when certain property was annexed to the city will apply to that property if it is within its provisions. Winzer v. Burlington, 68 Iowa, 279.

IV. Validity of taxation of farm lands. Upon the question of the power to tax farm land there is also direct conflict.

One line of cases holds that

The charter may authorize taxation of all the property within the corporate limits. Barker v. State, 18 Ohio, 514.

Farm land enjoying no direct advantage from the municipal improvements is not exempt for that reason from payment of municipal taxes. Hummelstown v. Brunner, 17 Pa. Co. Ct. 140.

The question of the taxation of rural property within the limits of a municipality rests solely with the legislature, and such taxation is not unconstitutional because not equal and uniform for the reason that the rural property does not receive the same benefit that urban property does, nor because it is a taking of private property for public use without compensation. Norris v. Waco, 57 Tex. 635.

The taxation of a dairy farm included in the city limits for general municipal purposes is not an unconstitutional taking of private property without just'compensation,-at'least where the Constitution requires that taxes shall be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body levying the tax. Ferguson v. Snohomish, 8 Wash. 668, 24 L. R. A. 795.

If the legislature includes the new territory in The taxation of farm property within the limits the municipality without any direction as to its of a city for city purposes cannot be said to be a liability for taxation it will be liable to municipal taking of property without due process of law how-taxation for past debts as well as for current exever great the hardship or unequal the burden. penses. Madry v. Cox, 73 Tex. 538. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78, 26 L. ed. 658.

A statute giving a municipal corporation power to tax all land within its limits is not in violation of the Indiana Constitution, cannot be held void because it is unjust, and does not take private property for public use without compensation. Logansport v. Seybold, 59 Ind. 225.

The prohibition against taking private property for public use without compensation has no application to the taxation of property. Groff v. Frederick City, 44 Md. 67; Martin v. Dix, 52 Miss. 53, 24 Am. Rep. 661.

If the proceedings to incorporate the land into the city are valid the taxes will be valid. Lancaster County v. Rush, 35 Neb. 119.

If the legislature has power to annex the territory to the municipality, when it is annexed the municipality has the right to tax it. Weeks v. Milwaukee, 10 Wis. 242.

On the other side it is held that

Subjecting to municipal taxation farm property which cannot be benefited by municipal expenditures is a taking of private property for public purposes without just compensation. People v. Daniels, 6 Utah, 290, 5 L. R. A. 444; Ellison v. Linford, 7

The extension of city limits so as to include farm lands and subject them to taxation, is not uncon- | Utah, 166.

his ground was not divided up into lots, but that it constituted one lot, upon which, with ample means, he had erected a splendid urban residence, where he and his family were in a position to enjoy, and had the privilege of enjoying,if they chose to avail themselves of it, all of the advantages and conveniences which were to be afforded by or derived from the presence and energy of the municipal government, not only for comfort, but for protection as well. Appellee Beall was the owner of 180 acres of land situated on the western and northwestern boundary of the town as established by the act of 1869, but all of his land, up to the commencement of his action, had always been used as farming lands, and only 774 acres of it were included in the said town boundary, through which, as shown on the map of the town, the Owensboro & Nashville Railroad track runs from north to south. No part of this land had ever been divided into lots since the act of 1869. His residence was on that part of his farm that lay outside of the limits of the town, and the approach to it was from the Hopkinsville pike, and from a point thereon beyond the west line of the town boundary. That part of his land within the town boundary, as it appears from the map of the town is about equally divided by the track or line of the Owensboro & Nashville Railroad, but no streets or alleys had been laid out through any part of it, but that part of it east of said rail

road is situated on the Greenville pike, which is a prolongation northward of Main street, and is laid down on the map as "Greenville Street," which the municipal authorities in 1882 and since improved at considerable expense and for some distance out, and in front of Beall's land, but just how far, or to what point, the record does not show with certainty, but probably to a point nearly half way the length of his line fronting on said street or pike. Along this street, and on both sides of it, and adjoining Beall's land on the west side, there are several houses, which were occupied mostly by colored persons, erected on lots which were originally a part of the tract in question, but they were laid off, and sold prior to 1869. The occupants of said houses used the said street as the only way of ingress and egress from the premises, and appellee Beall used it also when going to and from that part of his land which he entered through a gate opening on the said street or pike. That part of this parcel of land lying between the line of the Owensboro & Nashville Railroad and Greenville street is wet, but good meadow land, and water rises on and flows from it under a culvert constructed across the said street at the expense of the town. There is an area of 34 acres of land between appellee Beall's land and the business part of the town, upon which there were not any improved lots, except that of appellant Briggs. Appellee Beall

W. 543.

The extension of the limits of a city over outly- | taxed as city property. Simms v. Paris (Ky.) 1 S. ing farm lands is in reality nothing more than an attempt to tax land'a certain distance outside the limits of the city, and is in effect the taking of private property without compensation. Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82; Langworthy v. Dubuque,13 Iowa, 86.

In Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330, it is intimated that the extension of the limits of a city over an adjoining farming land simply for the purpose of increasing the revenues of the city without any benefit to the farm would be an unconstitutional taking of private property for public use without compensation. And that intimation was adopted and applied as law in Covington v. Southgate, 15 B. Mon. 491.

An uninhabited tract of land nowhere adjoining an existing village, and in which the village has no special interest, cannot be made a part of the village for the mere purpose of increasing the corporate revenues by the exaction of taxes. Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210. This is put upon the ground that such action would be an abuse of the constitutional power that the legislature shall provide for the organization of cities, and incorporated villages.

If the city limits are extended to include agricultural property which is not benefited by the extension and cannot be, but is farming land simply, the attempt to tax is taking private property for public use without compensation contrary to the provisions of the Constitution. Parkland v. Gaines, 88 Ky. 562.

Local taxation authorized by law cannot be deemed a taking of private property without just compensation, unless it is palpable that persons or their property are subjected to such burden for benefit of others for purposes in which they have no interest and to which they are therefore not justly bound to contribute. Elkton Trustees v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138.

V. Power of courts.

Some of the courts assume that under the departmental system of government the question of municipal taxation, the same as that of the annexation of territory to the municipality (see note to State, Richards, v. Cincinnati, 27 L. R. A. 737), is purely one for the legislature, and that the courts will not interfere with legislative action.

If the limits of the municipal corporation have been constitutionally extended the courts are powerless to interfere with the taxation of agricultural lands within the extended limits. Santa Rosa v. Coulter, 58 Cal. 537; Dixon v. Mayes, 72 Cal. 166.

In a case involving validity of a tax on the property of a mining company the court said it would not enter upon an inquiry as to whether the owner of the property is benefited by the tax or not, for the purpose of determining its validity. Gold Hill v. Caledonia Silver Min. Co. 5 Sawy. 575.

When the lawmaking department of the government has exercised its judgment in relation to the assessment of taxes, the courts have no power to

has been violated. Linton v. Athens, 53 Ga. 588. Where agricultural land is not within the exemptions made by the Constitution and statutes of the state, it will not be exempt. Mendenhall v. Burton, 42 Kan. 570.

But a subjection of land to taxation by the ex-interfere unless the fundamental law of the land tension of town limits is not unlawful unless the legitimate object of improving the town shall have been palpably perverted to the unauthorized purpose only of lessening the burden of taxation on the inhabitants who would not be otherwise benefited by the extension. Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37. It is no invasion of constitutional rights to require land which enjoys the benefits of a town and is surrounded by buildings and has enjoyed the enhanced price because of the building of the town to be

If the property has been included within the limits of the city, the question of the right to tax it is precluded, and the rule is that all property situated within the city must bear its proper portion of taxes and must be assessed as city property. The

had never voted for town officers, or held any | On the other hand, it is contended by counsel office in said town, but was engaged in mer- for the town that the situation of the two cantile and other business in the town, and properties is such, with reference to the streets owned other property in the town. The lands of the town, and with reference to other houses of both Briggs and Beall, the taxes on which and lots within the limits that are subject to are involved in this litigation, are in the vicinity municipal burdens, as to make it proper and of the passenger and freight depots of the right that they should be subject to their fair Louisville & Nashville Railroad, and the shops proportion of these burdens, which are necesof the Owensboro & Nashville Railroad, as sary to the maintenance of municipal governshown by the map of the town, but they are ment for the benefit and convenience of situated on the side of the line or track of the the inhabitants of the town, and for the presformer road opposite to them, which has to be ervation of public order. Numerous cases of crossed in passing from their lands to the busi- a character similar to these cases, and in ness part of the town, the court-house and the which the same questions were raised, have public square. been decided by this court, and in no such case has it been held that the general assembly did not have the constitutional power to fix the territorial limits of municipal corporations, either by acts of original incorporation, or by subsequent acts extending their boundary lines. We do not understand counsel here to deny that the general assembly had the constitutional authority to pass the acts of 1869 and 1880 by which the limits of the town of Russellville were extended. Nor do we understand counsel to hold that the municipal power or authority within the limits of the town as defined by those acts is restricted, except in respect of the power to tax the added territory. There were other purposes for which the general assembly had the constitutional power to extend the jurisdiction of municipal govern

The foregoing statement contains the principal facts that are material to the questions raised in the two cases. It is contended by counsel for the appellant Briggs, and the appellee Beall that neither parcel of ground was subject to municipal taxation, briefly, because it is not urban property, and had never been used as such, or divided into lots; that the owners had never consented to the extension of the boundary of the town so as to include their land within the town limits; that they had never received any benefits from the municipal government, or consented to be taxed by it; and that to compel them to pay taxes on their said lands to the town for municipal purposes would be the taking of private property without any compensation.

court says: "It would breed unwarrantable con- | municipality is committed to county commissionfusion with our assessments, and produce endless strife in our taxation, to permit any body of land that has been declared a part of an incorporated city to be taxed as farming land, the same as if it was not embraced within the city limits." Hurla v. Kansas City, 46 Kan. 738.

The question whether the benefits resulting from the extension of the limits authorized the burden of contributing to existing debts of the city is for the legislature to determine. Stoner v. Flournoy, 28 La. Ann. 850.

The question of the taxation of rural property within the city limits is for the legislature, and not for the courts, and the courts will not interfere although the tax is harsh and oppressive. New Orleans v. Michoud, 10 La. Ann. 763.

ers, the court cannot interfere with the exercise of such discretion on the ground that the resulting taxation will bear unjustly on individuals within the annexed territory. Powers v. Wood County Comrs. 8 Ohio St. 285; Blanchard v. Bissell, 11 Ohio St. 96.

The question of the taxation of rural land for municipal purposes is for the legislature, and not for the courts. Kelly v. Pittsburgh, 85 Pa. 170, 27 Am. Rep. 633.

The courts are powerless to afford relief if agricultural lands are taxed. Davis v. Point Pleasant, 32 W. Va. 289.

In Land, Log & L. Co. v. Brown, 73 Wis. 294. 3 L. R. A. 472, the court, in considering the power of the legislature to authorize a village to levy a tax on all the property in the town in which the village was situated, said it is for the legislature to fix the lim

In New Orleans v. Cazelar, 27 La. Ann. 156, where it appeared that complainant's property was sev-its of a taxing district, and not for the court. eral miles distant from the outskirts of the city and consisted in part of original forest, the court held that the power to extend the limits of the city was absolute, and that the Constitution required the taxes within the city limits to be equal and uniform, so that there was no relief to complainant from such taxation.

In St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507, it is held that the power of the legislature to extend the limits of a municipality are unlimited and it is assumed that the power of taxation accompanies the extension of the limits.

Under a constitutional provision that all property within the limits of a taxing power shall be equally taxed, a court will not [withdraw land from the taxing district after the incurring of indebtedness so that the result would be to throw greater burdens on the remaining land. Galesburg v. Hawkinson, 75 Ill. 152.

Conversely, some of the courts assume the power to supervise the action of the legislature, and some others, which have decided that the power rests absolutely in the legislature, have intimated that they would control any abuse of such power. The pomu-sition of the latter courts seems inconsistent because if the power is absolute in the legislature it would seem that the court would have nothing to say about it, and in the states in which the courts exercise the right to interfere it is because of alleged abuse of power by the legislature. So that the difference between the two rules rests rather upon the degree of abuse than upon the question of power.

Rural land which lies within the limits of a nicipal corporation, and which belongs to a class of property selected for taxation, cannot be relieved from a levy for municipal purposes on the ground that it receives no, or an inadequate, benefit from the expenditure of the money so raised. State, Bailey, v. Brown, 53 N. J. L. 162.

In Manly v. Raleigh, 4 Jones, Eq. 370, where a suit was brought to enjoin the collection of taxes on the added territory, the court says the power of the legislature to extend the limits of the town is absolute.

If the discretion as to annexation of land to a

The legislature cannot authorize a city to tax for its support land not reasonably considered to be city property. Bradshaw v. Omaba, 1 Neb. 16.

But in Turner v. Althaus, 6 Neb. 54, that case was

ment over territory contiguous to a town or city by extending its limits, besides that of taxation. This might be done in any case in anticipation of the future growth of the town or city, for the purposes of police protection, and the like. Such an exercise of legislative power was not violative of the constitutional guaranty of private property to the owners, because the land was still their own, and could not be taken or appropriated for any public use, such as for streets or alleys, without their consent, or without just compensation therefor. Cheaney v. Hooser, 9 B. Mon. 330; Swift v. Newport, 7 Bush, 37. It will be found on investigation, we think, that in most of the states the courts will not interfere in such cases to relieve property owners from taxation by the municipal authorities, because municipal government being an important part of the governmental machinery of the state, it is the peculiar province of the legislative department -the lawmaking power-to define or provide a method of defining the limits of municipal corporations, and to clothe them with the powers of local government, and that the propriety of legislative action in this regard may not be questioned. In this state, however, as well as in several other states, it has long been the established doctrine that the courts will relieve against the burden of municipal taxation, following the extension of the boundary

departed from, and the court held that except in cases where the sole object of the extension of the limits was to increase the revenue of the city, which was not passed upon, the question of the extension of the limits of the city was for the legislature, and that when the limits were extended the taxation upon all the property within the extended limits should be uniform according to its value.

The courts will interfere to restrain municipal taxation where the owner of the property cannot be benefited in a municipal point of view. Langworthy v. Dubuque, 16 Iowa, 271.

The courts will limit the line of municipal taxation to the line where it ceases to be for purposes beneficial to the proprietor in a municipal point of view. Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404.

In order to justify interference by the court there must be such a flagrant case as authorizes the conclusion at first blush that the taxation is a mere taking of private property for public use. Sharp v. Dunavan, 17 B. Mon. 223.

In Re Little Meadows, 35 Pa. 335, where an attempt was made to incorporate a village with a great deal of farm land within its limits, the court says it is quite unjust to give a village such an extension, for this puts all the farm lands around it in the power of the real villagers to tax them as they please and expend all the tax for themselves. But the question in the case was the interpretation of the power given by the legislature, and not the question of the power of the legislature.

lines of a town or city, in cases where "the legitimate object of improving the town" has been "palpably perverted to the unauthorized purpose only of lessening the burden of taxation on the inhabitants, who will not be otherwise benefited by the extension." Swift v. Newport, supra. In the case of Elkton Trus tees v. Gill, 94 Ky. 138, following Cheaney v. Hooser, supra, and Maltus v. Shields, 2 Met. (Ky.) 553, the doctrine is stated in the following language: "The protection afforded to, and advantages received by, the citizen from a municipal government are, in the meaning of the Constitution, just compensation for taxation imposed in order to maintain it. And local taxation authorized by law cannot be deemed taking private property without just compensation, unless it is palpable that persons, or their property, are subjected to such burden for benefit of others for purposes in which they have no interest and to which they are therefore not justly bound to contribute." In that case a parcel of 6 acres of land, embracing the residence and lawn of the owner, which was within the limits of the town, the the land being a part of a tract containing 46 acres, which was used for agricultural purposes, the part including the residence being adjacent to two streets of the town, was held to be subject to taxation by the town. In Mal'tus v. Shields it was held that a lot of about 9

the public indicate that such is necessary, there is constitutional power to so enact and tax for such purposes the real estate of the people whether the lands are large or small. There is no power in the courts to control the action of the legislature when the power to tax is conferred in good faith to uphold local government and give police regulations to the people, and not merely to impress taxable property for revenue purposes in order to lighten the burdens of others. Arbegust v. Louisville, 2 Bush, 271.

The Federal courts are bound by the decisions of the state upon the question as to restraining collection of taxes upon farm lands within the city limits for city purposes. Oliver v. Omaha, 3 Dill. 368; Kountze v. Omaha, 5 Dill. 443.

VI. What property is taxable.

Each case must be determined upon its own peculiar facts. Brooks v. Polk County, 52 Iowa, 460. If the land is so situated that the city cannot grade and improve streets, erect its public works, or extend public protection to its citizens proper without at the same time giving the owner of the land the full benefit and greatly enhancing the value of his property, the power to tax arises. Fulton v. Davenport, 17 Iowa, 404; Davis v. Dubuque, 20 Iowa, 458.

A lot which is benefited by the improvements and current expenditures, as well as permanently enhanced in value, is liable to taxation for municipal purposes; but it is not liable to taxation if it is not accessible by any street leading to the busiHew-ness part of the city and has no additions or improvements near it, while it is surrounded on all sides by land used exclusively for agricultural purposes. O'Hare v. Dubuque, 22 Iowa, 144.

The wisdom or discretion of the exercise of the power of taxation cannot be interfered with by the courts unless it has been so grossly perverted as to be a manifest violation of the Constitution. itt's Appeal, 88 Pa. 55.

If the statute provides that the city council shall discriminate between agricultural lands and city lands the discretion is committed to them to determine which shall be taxed as city lands, and the court will not interfere with that discretion unless it is abused. Erie v. Reed, 113 Pa. 468.

When in the judgment of the legislature the interest of a suburban population demands local regulations, and the peace, tranquillity, and order of

In determining whether lands of a rural character situated within the limits of a city are benefited by the municipal government, the purpose for which they are held is a controlling fact to be considered. If held as city property to be put upon the market whenever they reach a value corresponding to the view of the owner, they ought to

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