"That the state of business is oftimes disguised to princes, for private ends. 46 6 That the truth of business is hardly to be expected from the relations of great men, whose friendships and dependencies extend far,—or from men factious, or from such servants as endeavour to build up their fortunes with their own hands, not leaving to their masters to do it upon their good deserving, or from parties. "That from misinformation, all errors, incongruities in matters of estate, and mistaking of the true means, whereby the just and gracious. purposes of princes come to be disappointed, do proceed. 646 That it is not easy to distinguish truth from falsehood, seconded by friends, and supported by reasons probable. 666 That it is impossible to do any thing conveniently or rightly, or to determine any thing de jure, if first it be not known how it is de facto. "That the justest and wisest princes must err in their directions given upon sinister information of the state of the business in hand. "That it is an easy matter to a just prince, by following only the bent of his own inclination, to give such directions and commands, upon matters perfectly known to him, as thereby he may reap honour, profit, the love of his subjects, and the reputation of wisdom and justice. "The truth of these foresaid propositions being so well known to your Majesty, it would be impertinent to me to go about to prove. But to be a means and instrument whereby the true state of business of Scotland, a place remote, may be conveyed to your sacred ears, is the best and most useful service can fall within the compass of my power, the highest of whose endeavour is to be a faithful servant, and not to make an unjust claim to eminent abilities. If, therefore, your Majesty may be pleased to prefer some honest and well-deserving servant to the place I hold of your Majesty, and to give me some place of access to your Majesty's person, (without which, services of that kind are nearly unuseful,) and a reasonable means that I be not forced to undo my estate, and instead of a useful servant become a troublesome suitor, (whereby there shall be more by many degrees brought in, and saved in your Majesty's coffers,) then I do humbly offer and undertake,— "To establish such correspondence in most parts of Scotland, and in all the courts and judicatures thereof, with men honest and judicious, not interested in affairs, and not knowing one of another, who shall give me sure intelligence of the state of every business which shall occur; and if any of them shall chance to be partially affected, the relation of the others shall controul what is amiss in his. Which relations shall be made known to your Majesty by me, without passion or affection, and without respect to any end of my own or of others, as I shall answer to God in conscience, to your Majesty upon my alledgeance, and under pain of your highest displeasure. Whereby your Majesty shall reap these commodities following, and many more. 1. As the clouds which obscure and darken the sun are dispersed by the heat of the same, so shall the cloud of factions, compacted to no other end but to misinform your Majesty for their private advantage, and to the prejudice of your Majesty's just and gracious designs, be dissolved by the knowledge of the true state of things, and your Majesty's resolutions and directions, proceeding from that knowledge, being constant and absolute, shall render their combinations vain and of no force, and your Majesty's affairs shall go more smoothly than hitherto they have gone." We do not copy any more of the commodities promised to his Majesty; nor do we think it necessary to dwell upon the modesty, the non-assurance, of this Napier document. Our readers may have heard of an imperium in imperio, and we leave it to them to judge how far the sagacious Scotchman wished to be removed from the custodiership of that dignity. Truly his lordship must have intensely felt about the ignorance and "mistakings," as to the affairs of Scotland, when he was ready to take upon his own shoulders the entire concern of removing them. No doubt he must have been prepared to employ spies and other reputable agents; but Charles was too blind or too wise to adopt the scheme. Our author is most indignant and rancorous against the spirit and language of the covenant which the great majority of the people of Scotland zealously subscribed. He says, that it came reeking from the hot-bed of faction." Montrose, all the world is aware, was one of its earliest and at first staunchest supporters, although he afterwards joined the King's standard, who had ordered the famous service book to be read in the church service, which was tantamount in the people's eyes to the establishment and preservation of episcopacy, so hateful to the Scotch nation. We quote some passages to show how Mr. Napier accounts for his hero's conversion to royalty. "The incident to which historians have generally referred the departure of Montrose from the path of rebellion, is, as Malcolm Laing expresses it, 'the returning favour of his Sovereign at Berwick,'-a vague and illformed assertion, that has been generally, though much too hastily, admitted. Let us consider the circumstances under which Montrose then met the King. "Had the revolt of Scotland ended with the treaty of Berwick, amply sufficient as the concessions upon that occasion were for the Religion and Liberties' of Scotland, the real objects of the faction would yet have been unfulfilled. Their unchristian enmity against the Bishops, their irrational and sweeping projects against Episcopacy, were all unsatisfied. "But Montrose, though hitherto he had aided the Movement with thoughtless ardour, was not, as we have elsewhere observed, one of the faction. He had been brought in' as a great prize, but never almagamated with the Rothes' clique, and when in highest favour with the • Prime Covenanters,' was always considered by them apart from the initiated, and simply as a 'noble and true-hearted cavalier,'-' that noble valiant youth,'-' that generous and noble youth,' whose discretion was but too great in sparing the enemies' houses.' It was impossible that such a character, attached so loosely to the faction, should not have been awakened into loyal feelings by the conduct of the Covenanters, after the King's concessions at the treaty of Berwick. "Dr. Cook, in his History of the Church, has adopted, without sufficient examination, the popular theory of Montrose's loyalty. Speaking of the occasion, when Montrose was one of the three noblemen who dared to trust themselves with the King, he remarks, but what renders this conference peculiarly memorable is the impression which was made upon Montrose; hitherto he had been zealous for the Covenant, but he now changed, and resolved to employ his talents for promoting the royal cause; the other two remained firm to their party.' This, apparently, is recorded in no complimentary sense, and the contrast with his companions would seem to be unfavourable for Montrose, although there is no fact brought out inconsistent with his complete justification. If, however, by the impression alleged, no more is to be understood than some reaction in the generous mind of Montrose, occasioned by a gracious reception from the King, which he had never experienced before, or an explanation of the King's intentions with regard to Scotland, as to which Montrose had been deceived, his keenest eulogist might leave that accusation unrefuted. But that Montrose should have been suddenly gained over, and have now changed,' merely in consequence of some contingency that touched his avarice or ambition, (for it is certain that no immediate reward was held out, as when Rothes fell,) is, under all the circumstances, any thing but a probable theory. He appears indeed to have been proof against the mere prospect of admission to Court, or the first signal of his Sovereign's returning favour,' as we learn from Mr. Archibald Johnston himself, from whom we accept the anecdote as he gives it. That distinguished Covenanter is strenuously endeavouring, in a long and characteristic epistle, dated 2nd January 1639, a few months before this conference at Berwick, to seduce Lord Johnston, and persuade him not to go to Court; when he uses the argument, rather do nobly, as my Lord of Montrose has done, who having received a letter from the King himself to go up with diligence to his Court, convened some of the nobility, shewed unto them both his particular affairs, and the King's command, and that according to his covenant of following the common resolution, and eschewing all appearances of divisive motion, nobly has resolved to follow their counsel, and has gone home to his own house, and will not go to Court at all. It would, however, be a poor defence for Montrose to maintain that he was unmoved by the interview at Berwick with Charles, whose kingly presence and noble aspect were never so imposing as when he was beset by difficulties and danger. The monarch may indeed have particularly desired to reclaim Montrose. Struck by his stately and heroic bearing, contrasted with the irreverent levity of Rothes, and the repulsive democracy of Archibald Johnston, and, perhaps, favourably impressed by the humane forbearance which, contrary to the wish of the covenanting clergy, had characterized Montrose even in rebellion, it is not unlikely that Charles, in the words of his favourite poet, may have inwardly exclaimed at the sight of him, O, for a falconer's voice To lure this tassel gentle back again! and the accomplished King, who fascinated Presbyterianism itself, had indeed a falconer's voice for such a tassel gentle.' We believe, then, that Montrose had felt his heart yearn towards Charles the First, that some scales had fallen from his eyes, and that he departed from that inter view a wiser and a better man. But the popular calumny is certainly not history, and, indeed, we may distinctly trace its origin in circumstances that suggest a more adequate cause of Montrose's growing opposition to the convenanting faction." We observe in a note, that Mr. Napier regards the Bristol riot and burning which took place only a few years back, and "many other circumstances," as resembling the rise of the troubles in Scotland of which he treats, and of what is to be "the subsequent fate of the British Monarchy." We are not prophets, and but poor analogists we fear; otherwise, surely, we could not but see as our author sees. If, however, the war of opinion, which is the shape that hostilities take in the present day, is to enlist the sword and the scaffold for the arbitrement of disputed questions of policy in church and state, before those which agitate the country can be decided, it can hardly be expected that a more enthusiastic reformer will join the Movement than was Montrose when he attached himself and for a time belonged to the Covenanters, or that a more meteorlike career is to await any one than attended the chivalric espousal of the royal cause by this proud and noble warrior. Equal romance will be looked for in vain, superior bravery and skill to his cannot find room in human nature. Mr. Napier's account and estimate of his hero's system of war affords a good sketch and a favourable specimen of the book. "Montrose's system of tactics, and military capacities in general, have been criticised by some modern historians, anxious to depreciate his character at all points, without, apparently, considering that the art of war was nearly in its rudest state in Britain at the period, and especially so among the too independent marauders from whom he was to derive the desultory and faithless following that constituted his army. Moreover, these critics seem not to have observed, or are pleased to forget, that throughout the whole of his brilliant campaigns, Montrose's resources were so limited and uncertain, that his success seemed to be the result of magic. That magic was his genius. Contemporary writers characterize his unexpected appearance in arms by the romantic simile of the sudden irruption of a speat, or mountain torrent. This says more for his military capacity than perhaps these descriptive chroniclers themselves were aware of. Montrose's policy, repeatedly pressed by him in vain, throughout the whole of the year 1643, upon Charles and his consort, was,-instant, determined, and rapid action. 'Strike a blow at once,' he said, ' in Scotland-and let it be a hard one-ere the armies of the Covenant are fairly on foot-and then Scotland is your own.' Such was Montrose's counsel in the Cabinet, and such was his system in the field. To his modern depreciators, who still call it no system, but the rash proposition of overweening vanity, we reply, that it is comprehended indeed in few words, and so is the tactic of Napoleon. It may be well doubted, if any one of the great military geniuses of modern times would have offered other counsel than Montrose did at York and Gloucester, or could have offered better under the circumstances. ་ sys Montrose himself has placed it beyond a question, that had his advice been instantly and fully adopted by the King and the loyal noblemen, the result must have been what he anticipated. But, as if royalty and loyalty had both combined to despite Montrose, at the expence of their own ruin, he was suddenly left alone, to the tardy and perilous experiment of the tem he recommended, when the tide, which it was that system to seize, had already been suffered to turn. Yet still he did all but redeem the golden moments lost, and afforded the most brilliant demonstration of his capacity for executing in the field what he had urged in council. Between the 18th and the 22nd of August, he achieved the no small adventure of passing from Carlisle to the Grampians in disguise. There he had not the prospect of raising ten men in arms. A few autumn nights he spent among the mountains, wrapped in his Highland plaid, seeking his destiny in the stars or communing with the unconscious shepherds.. A rumour and a letter sufficed to make him be up and doing. On the sixth day from his solitary arrival at Inchbrakie's, he was at the head of about three thousand ragged enthusiasts-ere the tenth was past he had fought a pitched battle of his own seeking-gained, over an army complete in all itsparts, a victory that shook the Covenant, and instantly he was master of Perth." The question of political and practical consistency on the part of the Marquis we must leave to the fancy, ingenuity and laboured construction of our author as found in his lengthened details; and pass on towards the close of the warrior's career, where we shall find many affecting circumstances which induce the heart to regard him, his followers, and friends as martyrs in the cause of royalty. Among these adherents and followers none was more conspicuous or constant than the second Lord Napier, Montrose's nephew, who was glad to betake himself to foreign parts for self-preservation. The only letter which Mr. Napier has found in the family chest from this young nobleman relating to the Marquis, conveys such a favourable picture of that great, and we doubt not, oft calumniated man, a picture so different too from what Mr. Brodie, Lord Nugent, and others have at no very distant period given, that it deserves to be liberally construed and fully weighed. It is addressed to the writer's lady, and part of it is as follows: "Montrose then (as you did hear) was in treaty with the French, who, in my opinion, did offer him very honourable conditions, which were these: First, that he should be General to the Scots in France, and LieutenantGeneral to the Royal Army, when he joined with them, commanding all Mareschals of the field. As likewise to be Captain of the Gens-d'armes, with twelve thousand crowns a year of pension, besides his pay; and assurance the next year to be Mareschal of France, and Captain of the King's own Guard, which is a place bought and sold at a hundred and fifty thousand crowns. But these two last places were not insert amongst his other conditions, only promised him by the Cardinal Mazarine; but the others were all articles of their capitulation, which I did see in writing, and used all the inducements and persuasion I could to make him embrace them. He seemed to hearken unto me, which caused me at that time to show you that |