« ForrigeFortsett »
so as to be under engine control, is not limited to operations on main-line tracks. [For other cases, see Master and Servant, II. a, 2, b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Master and servant- safety appliances -coupling of train brakes.
3. A moving locomotive with cars at
a movement for a distance of of a mile, and necessitating crossing at grade three city streets once, two streets twice, one street three times, and a maintrack movement of at least 2,600 feet, with two stops and startings on the main track, is a train movement within the meaning of such act, and not a mere switching operation. Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 533, 63 L. ed. 757, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355. However, in Baker v. Grace, Tex. Civ. App.-, 213 S. W. 299, it was held, distinguishing United States v. Erie R. Co. and United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. supra, that an engine and two cars used solely for going to the relief of some wrecked or derailed car at some point in one of the company's yards, on some switch track, and never commerce in the hauling of any kind of commerce, was not a train within the meaning of such act, although, in going between the two yards, it used the main line, and crossed other railroads and street crossings.
United States v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co. 205 Fed. 428, which held that the hauling of a string of freight cars by a switch engine between two railroad yards, a part of the distance being over the main track and across switches and crossings, was not within the Federal Safety Appliance Act, relied upon Erie R. Co. v. United States, 116 C. C. A. 649, 197 Fed. 287, a later appeal in which (129 C. C. A. 307, 212 Fed. 853) rendering the same decision, was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621. In view of the later Supreme Court cases cited supra, United States v. New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. is of little or no value as authority.
Cars coupled together and hauled a distance of 2 miles, not in switching operations, but to be delivered to another crew, are a train although there is no caboose attached or marker displayed. United States v. Grand Trunk R. Co. 203 Fed. 775.
So, too, the hauling of a freight car by an electric motor is within the Federal Safety Appliance Act. International R. Co. v. United States, 151 C. C. A. 333, 238 Fed. 317.
tached is without the requirement of the Safety Appliance Acts of March 2, 1893, and March 2, 1903, as to the coupling of train brakes so as to be under engine control, only when it is not a train, as where the operation is that of switching, classify
And in Stearns v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. 166 Iowa, 566, 148 N. W. 128, the Feleral statute was held to be applicable to the case of a refrigerator car being pushed by an engine from the railroad yards to a freight house a mile away, since they were required to cross a number of railway and street crossings, and went for some distance along the main line. The court stated that the only exception to the statute that it would feel disposed to make would be a case of switching or spotting cars in the company's own yard.
That the Federal Safety Appliance Act does not apply to cases of switching operations in switch yards was held in Farrell v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 87 N. J. L. 78, 93 Atl. 682; Worley v. Southern R. Co. 169 N. C. 105, 85 S. E. 397; Whalley v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 248 Pa. 298, 93 Atl. 1016, writ of error dismissed in 241 U. S. 689, 60 L. ed. 1237, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 549. It should, perhaps, be satisfied that these cases follow as authority Erie R. Co. v. United States, 116 C. C. A. 649, 197 Fed. 287, the basis of the decision in which was that the movement of the cars under consideration in that case, although between yards treated as separate yards, in reality, owing to the peculiar conditions, amounted to a switching operation in one continuous yard, and so the act did not apply. The same decision was entered in a subsequent appeal (129 C. C. A. 307, 212 Fed. 853). This latter decision was reversed by the United States Supreme Court in 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, cited supra, on the ground that the movement of the cars was not a switching operation, but was a transfer train between independent yards, and so the Act did apply. As the Worley, Whalley, and Farrell Cases were purely switching operations, they are still authority for the view that switching operations in switch yards are not within the meaning of this act, since the Erie R. Co. Case, supra, is not opposed to such view.
It has, however, been held that the Federal Safety Appliance Act applies to a switching operation the object of which is to get together for transfer outside of the state cars which have been placed upon tracks that. in general,
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Assistant Attorney General Adams argued the cause and Assistant Attorney General Frierson filed a brief for petitioner:
In running this train between one yard and another, defendant was using it on a railroad engaged in interstate .commerce, and the Safety Appliance Act applied.
United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 759, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; United States v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 249 U. S. 296, 63 L. ed. 613, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283.
Mr. D. F. Lyons argued the cause, and, with Mr. Charles W. Bunn, filed a brief for respondent:
are used to make up and transfer inter-, state cars. Hurley v. Illinois C. R. Co. 133 Minn. 101, 157 N. W. 1005.
The court below only did what this court did in the case of United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, and in United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634.
See also Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 757, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355.
Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court:
The Northern Pacific Railway Company owns and uses in interstate commerce a terminal railroad along the water front of Duluth, extending from Rice's Point to Furnace, a distance of 4 miles.
It was sued in the district court of the United States for the district of Minnesota for violating the Safety Appliance Act 1 by operating over the whole of this road, in September, 1916, two transfer trains, without complying with the re quirement that 85 per cent of the train brakes be coupled so as to be under engine control. One train consisted of a locomotive and forty-eight cars, the other of a locomotive and forty cars. The company contended that the provision of the Safety Appliance Act did not control the operation because this terminal road was not part of a main line; that neither passenger nor freight trains, through or local, moved on it; that on it trains are not operated by time-tables, train  orders, or time cards, nor is the use of the track controlled by block signals; that on it no train has right of way over another; but that there the single operating rule applies which requires all trains to move at such speed that they can be stopped at vision, and utes, both by use and by accident. Repair shops cannot be kept on wheels. Such shops cannot be brought to the defective vehicle. The only practical method of railroading requires that such vehicles, when out of repair, shall be taken to the shops; and if they are wholly excluded from commercial use themselves, and from other vehicles which are commercially employed, they do not fall within any of the classes covered by the Safety Appliance Act.
There is no violation of the Safety Appliance Act of Congress in moving empty cars in trains by themselves to the shops for repairs. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. United States, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 690, 93 C. C. A. 450, 168 Fed. 236. The court stated that the object of the Safety Appliance Statute was manifestly to require interstate carriers to maintain their rolling stock in a certain condition of safety. It could not have been the 27 Stat. at L. 531, Comp. Stat. § 8605, § 1 Act of March 2, 1893, chap. 196, § 1, intention of Congress to impose this duty Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1155, as amended upon carriers, and, at the same time, by Act of March 2, 1903, chap. 976, § 2, deprive them of the only practical 32 Stat. at L. 943, Comp. Stat. § 8614, 8 method of meeting its requirements. Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1188; and order Rolling stock must necessarily become de- of Interstate Commerce Commission dated fective within the terms of these stat- June 6, 1910.
that trains are under the yardmaster's orders. The company's contention was sustained by the district court, which directed a verdict for defendant; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. 167 C. C. A. 31, 255 Fed. 655. The case comes here on writ of certiorari. 249 U. S. 597, 63 L. ed. 795, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388.
operations on it be controlled by the Safety Appliance Act, the requirement would be satisfied in this case by the fact that two independent companies use the road for freight trains under air control, and that the passenger trains of another company cross it. "Not only were these [the defendant's] trains exposed to the hazards which that provision was intended to avoid or minimize, but, unless These additional facts are material: their engineers were able readily and The road for a distance of a mile at the quickly to check or control their movebeginning and for less at the end is single ments, they were a serious menace to the track. It crosses at grade two streets on safety of other trains which the statute one of which run street cars. It crosses was equally designed to protect." United at grade, at five places in all, lines of three States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. supra. independent railroad companies which run But there is nothing in the act which limfreight trains to piers situated between its the application of the provision here Rice's Point and Furnace. One of these in question to operations on main-line companies also runs passenger trains tracks. The requirement that train across defendant's tracks. In addition, brakes shall be coupled so as to be under two other independent companies use, engine control is in terms (32 Stat. at under the usual traffic-right agreements, L. 943, chap. 976, Comp. Stat. § 8614, 8 about a mile of this railroad as a Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1188) applipart of their freight lines to piers cable to "all trains used on any situated between Rice's Point and Fur- railroad engaged in interstate commerce." nace. These four miles of railroad It is admitted that this railroad is enowned by the Northern Pacific are not gaged in interstate commerce; and the used by it for switching or assem- cases cited show that transfer trains, like bling cars. The switching, assembling, those here involved, are "trains" within and classification of cars for its through the meaning of the act. A moving locoand local freight are done in the motive with cars attached is without the Rice's Point yard, where there are fifty- provision of the act only when it is not a five tracks, each 4,000 feet long, and at train; as where the operation is that of Furnace, where there are fifteen tracks, switching, classifying, and assembling cars are also switched and assembled. At cars within railroad yards for the purBerwind and Boston, two intermediate pose of making  up trains. Conpoints, where there are respectively nine gress has not imposed upon courts apand six tracks, cars are frequently set out plying the act any duty to weigh the or picked up by transfer trains. The dangers incident to particular operatransfer trains here in question appear to tions; and we have no occasion to conhave run solid between Rice's Point and sider the special dangers incident to Furnace. Trains are run by the North- operating trains under the conditions ern Pacific on this line at a speed varying here presented. from 3 to 18 miles an hour.
 The company contends that the rule applied in the United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; and Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 757, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355,2 is not applicable, because here, unlike those cases, no part of the trains' journey was performed on a track used as part of the main line of the Northern Pacific system. If use of the road as part of a main line were essential in order that
2 That case was decided by this court, April 21, 1919. The decision of the circuit court of appeals in the case at bar was rendered January 15, 1919.
The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed.
and sale of coal to be obtained therefrom, of the Act of June 29, 1906, must be so
trade or commerce.
[For other cases, see Monopoly, II. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]
Carriers association with commodity carried -sale to carrier's agent monopolistic contract.
2. A contract which an anthracite coal company, controlled by an interstate railway carrier through stock ownership and common officers, made with a sales company, the stockholders in which were practically identical with those in the railway company, whereby the coal company is to sell the coal mined by it to the sales company, the latter to pay therefor at 65 per
cent of the New York prices, and to sell
no other coal than that purchased from the coal company, there being further provisions that the coal company shall lease all its facilities, structures, and trestles to the sales company; that either party shall have the right to abrogate and cancel the contract upon giving six months' notice, and that the sales company shall not buy coal except from the coal company,-violates both the commodities clause of the Act of June 29, 1906, making it unlawful for any railway company to transport in interstate commerce any article which it may own or in which it may have any interest, and the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade. For other cases, see Carriers, III.; Monopoly, monopoly
II. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Judgment dissolution
3. A combination effected through intercorporate relations between an interstate railway carrier, an anthracite coal company, and a sales company, which is found to violate both the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, and the commodities clause
Note. On illegal trusts under modern anti-trust laws-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689. On relation of contract or combination to interstate commerce which will bring it within the scope of the Federal Anti-trust Act-see notes to Loewe v. Lawlor, 52 L. ed. U. S. 488, and Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268.
As to monopolies, generally-see notes to Fowle v. Park, 33 L. ed. U. S. 67, and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 41 L. ed. U. S. 1008.
Argued October 12 and 13, 1916. Restored to docket for reargument May 21, 1917. Reargued November 7, 1917. Restored to docket for reargument June 10, 1918. Submitted October 7, 1919. Restored to docket for oral argument May 17, 1920. Reargued October 5, 1920. Decided December 6, 1920.
APPEAL from the District Court of
the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a decree which dismissed the bill in a suit by the United States to dissolve intercorporate relations between corporations alleged to violate the Sherman Anti-trust Act and the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act. Reversed and remanded for the entry of a decree in conformity with the opinion.
See same case below, 225 Fed. 399.
Assistant to the Attorney General Todd and Solicitor General Davis argued the cause, and, with Attorney General Gregory and Mr. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., filed a brief for appellant on original argument:
The Lehigh Railroad's control of the trade and commerce in anthracite coal produced along and transported over its lines was acquired by other than normal methods of industrial development, and by means wrongful and unlawful in themselves.
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 76, 55 L. ed. 619, 651, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; Anthracite Rate Case, 35 Inters. Com. Rep. 220; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 367, 57 L. ed. 243, 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Interstate Commerce Commission Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 43, 44, 48 L. ed. 860, 867, 869, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 402, 49 L. ed. 518, 527, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Coxe Bros. v. Lehigh Valley
Rep. 873; United States v. Milwaukee Refrigerator Transit Co. 142 Fed. 247; Re Lumber Rates, 28 Inters. Com. Rep. 471; Star Grain & Lumber Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 14 Inters. Com. Rep. 364; United States v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 203 Fed. 295; Hughes Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. R. Co. 29 Inters. Com. Rep. 671; United States v. Pacific & A. R. & Nav. Co. 228 U. S. 87, 57 L. ed. 742, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; Atty. Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. 29 L. J. Ch. N. S. 794, 6 Jur. N. S. 1006, 8 Week. Rep. 556; Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363, 370, 58 L. ed. 269, 273, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65.
The control acquired and maintained by the Lehigh Railroad in combination with the Lehigh Coal Company through the means aforesaid, over the trade and commerce in anthracite coal produced along and transported over the lines of the Lehigh Railroad, constitutes a restraint and monopolization of trade, in violation of the Anti-trust Act.
R. Co. 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 460, 4 I. C. C. | U. S. 516, 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 21 Inters. Com. Rep. 129, 23 Inters. Com. Rep. 480; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. United States, 204 Fed. 986; Marian Coal Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 24 Inters. Com. Rep. 140, 25 Inters. Com. Rep. 14; reaffirmed by later decisions in Red Ash Coal Co. v. Central R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 460; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 36 Inters. Com. Rep. 143; G. B. Markle Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 441; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 457; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 L. ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. R. Co. 222 U. S. 541, 56 L. ed. 308, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108; Vandalia R. Co. v. United States, 141 C. C. A. 469, 226 Fed. 713; United States v. Hocking Valley R. Co. 194 Fed. 234, 127 C. C. A. 285, 210 Fed. 735, 234 U. S. 757, 58 L. ed. 1579, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675; Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S. 498, 524, 525, 55 L. ed. 310, 319, 320, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; Fourche River Lumber Co. v. Bryant Lumber Co. 230 U. S. 316, 323, 57 L. ed. 1498, 1501, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887; United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit Co. 226 U. S. 286, 287, 308, 57 L. ed. 226, | 234, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 396, 50 L. ed. 515, 523, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; United States v. Great Lakes Towing Co. 208 Fed. 733; Gwynn v. Citizens' Teleph. Co. 69 S. C. 435, 67 L.R.A. 111, 104 Am. St. | Rep. 819, 48 S. E. 460; United States Teleph. Co. v. Central U. Teleph. Co. 122 C. C. A. 86, 202 Fed. 66; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hirsch, 123 C. C. A. 145, 204 Fed. 849; United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co. 218 Fed. 502; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. 226 Fed. 62; United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. 225 Fed. 800; United States v. Corn Products Ref. Co. 234 Fed. 964; Merchants Legal Stamp Co. v. Murphy, 220 Mass. 281, L.R.A.1915C, 520, 107 N. E. 968; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 46, 47, 57 L. ed. 107, 116, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 L. ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co. 212 U. S. 227, 53 L. ed. 486, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Ellis v. Inman, P. & Co. 65 C. C. A. 488, 131 Fed. 182; United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 238
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 57 L. ed. 1232, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 392, 393, 50 L. ed. 515, 521, 522, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Atty. Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. 29 L. J. Ch. N. S. 794, 6 Jur. N. S. 1006, 8 Week. Rep. 556; United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 238 U. S. 516, 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; United States v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 203 Fed. 295; Chesapeake & O. Fuel Co. v. United States, 53 C. C. A. 256, 115 Fed. 610; Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 60 W. Va. 519, 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268, 116 Am. St. Rep. 901, 56 S. E. 264, 9 Ann. Cas. 667; Northern Securities Co. v. United States. 193 U. S. 197, 363, 48 L. ed. 679, 711, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 226 U. S. 61, 83, 57 L. ed. 124, 132, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 346, 355, 57 L. ed. 243, 250, 253, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90.
The arrangements with the Lehigh Coal Sales Company do not have the effect of dissociating the Lehigh Railroad from coal mined and purchased by the Lehigh Coal Company and Coxe Brothers & Company, as required by the commodity clause.