The facts are stated in the opinion. Assistant Attorney General Adams argued the cause and Assistant Attorney General Frierson filed a brief for petitioner: In running this train between one yard and another, defendant was using it on a railroad engaged in interstate .commerce, and the Safety Appliance Act applied. United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 759, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355; United States v. Brooklyn Eastern Dist. Terminal, 249 U. S. 296, 63 L. ed. 613, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283. Mr. D. F. Lyons argued the cause, and, with Mr. Charles W. Bunn, filed a brief for respondent: are used to make up and transfer inter-, state cars. Hurley v. Illinois C. R. Co. 133 Minn. 101, 157 N. W. 1005. There is no violation of the Safety Appliance Act of Congress in moving empty cars in trains by themselves to the shops for repairs. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. United States, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 690, 93 C. C. A. 450, 168 Fed. 236. The court stated that the object of the Safety Appliance Statute was manifestly to require interstate carriers to maintain their rolling stock in a certain condition of safety. It could not have been the intention of Congress to impose this duty upon carriers, and, at the same time, deprive them of the only practical method of meeting its requirements. Rolling stock must necessarily become defective within the terms of these stat The court below only did what this court did in the case of United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621, and in United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634. See also Louisville & J. Bridge Co. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 757, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court: The Northern Pacific Railway Company owns and uses in interstate commerce a terminal railroad along the water front of Duluth, extending from Rice's Point to Furnace, a distance of 4 miles. It was sued in the district court of the United States for the district of Minnesota for violating the Safety Appliance Act1 by operating over the whole of this road, in September, 1916, two transfer trains, without complying with the re quirement that 85 per cent of the train brakes be coupled so as to be under engine control. One train consisted of a locomotive and forty-eight cars, the other of a locomotive and forty cars. The comSafety Appliance Act did not control the contended that the provision of the pany operation because this terminal road was not part of a main line; that neither pasmoved on it; that on it trains are not senger nor freight trains, through or local, operated by time-tables, train [253] orders, or time cards, nor is the use of the track controlled by block signals; that on it no train has right of way over another; but that there the single operating rule applies which requires all trains to move at such speed that they can be stopped at vision, and utes, both by use and by accident. Repair shops cannot be kept on wheels. Such shops cannot be brought to the defective vehicle. The only practical method of railroading requires that such vehicles, when out of repair, shall be taken to the shops; and if they are wholly excluded from commercial use themselves, and from other vehicles which are commercially employed, they do not fall within any of the classes covered by the Safety Appliance Act. 27 Stat. at L. 531, Comp. Stat. § 8605, 8 1 Act of March 2, 1893, chap. 196, § 1, Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1155, as amended by Act of March 2, 1903, chap. 976, § 2, 32 Stat. at L. 943, Comp. Stat. § 8614, 8 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1188; and order of Interstate Commerce Commission dated June 6, 1910. that trains are under the yardmaster's orders. The company's contention was sustained by the district court, which directed a verdict for defendant; and the judgment entered thereon was affirmed by the circuit court of appeals for the eighth circuit. 167 C. C. A. 31, 255 Fed. 655. The case comes here on writ of certiorari. 249 U. S. 597, 63 L. ed. 795, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 388. operations on it be controlled by the Safety Appliance Act, the requirement would be satisfied in this case by the fact that two independent companies use the road for freight trains under air control, and that the passenger trains of another company cross it. "Not only were these [the defendant's] trains exposed to the hazards which that provision was intended to avoid or minimize, but, unless their engineers were able readily and quickly to check or control their movements, they were a serious menace to the safety of other trains which the statute was equally designed to protect." United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. supra. But there is nothing in the act which limits the application of the provision here in question to operations on main-line These additional facts are material: The road for a distance of a mile at the beginning and for less at the end is single track. It crosses at grade two streets on one of which run street cars. It crosses at grade, at five places in all, lines of three independent railroad companies which run freight trains to piers situated between Rice's Point and Furnace. One of these companies also runs passenger trains tracks. The requirement that train across defendant's tracks. In addition, brakes shall be coupled so as to be under two other independent companies use, engine control is in terms (32 Stat. at under the usual traffic-right agreements, L. 943, chap. 976, Comp. Stat. § 8614, 8 about a mile of this railroad as a Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 1188) applipart of their freight lines to piers cable to "all trains used on any situated between Rice's Point and Fur- railroad engaged in interstate commerce." nace. These four miles of railroad It is admitted that this railroad is enowned by the Northern Pacific are not gaged in interstate commerce; and the used by it for switching or assem- cases cited show that transfer trains, like bling cars. The switching, assembling, those here involved, are "trains" within and classification of cars for its through the meaning of the act. A moving locoand local freight are done in the motive with cars attached is without the Rice's Point yard, where there are fifty- provision of the act only when it is not a five tracks, each 4,000 feet long, and at train; as where the operation is that of Furnace, where there are fifteen tracks, switching, classifying, and assembling cars are also switched and assembled. At cars within railroad yards for the purBerwind and Boston, two intermediate pose of making [255] up trains. Conpoints, where there are respectively nine gress has not imposed upon courts apand six tracks, cars are frequently set out plying the act any duty to weigh the or picked up by transfer trains. The dangers incident to particular operatransfer trains here in question appear to tions; and we have no occasion to conhave run solid between Rice's Point and sider the special dangers incident to Furnace. Trains are run by the North- operating trains under the conditions ern Pacific on this line at a speed varying here presented. from 3 to 18 miles an hour. [254] The company contends that the rule applied in the United States v. Erie R. Co. 237 U. S. 402, 59 L. ed. 1019, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 621; United States v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. 237 U. S. 410, 59 L. ed. 1023, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 634; and Louisville & J. Bridge Co. v. United States, 249 U. S. 534, 63 L. ed. 757, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 355,2 is not applicable, because here, unlike those cases, no part of the trains' journey was performed on a track used as part of the main line of the Northern Pacific system. If use of the road as part of a main line were essential in order that 2 That case was decided by this court, April 21, 1919. The decision of the circuit court of appeals in the case at bar was rendered January 15, 1919. The judgment of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals is reversed. unlawful combination carrier and coal company. 1. A railway company which, in combination with a subsidiary coal company controlled by it through stock ownership and common officers, deliberately enters upon a policy of making extensive purchases of anthracite land tributary to the railway company's lines, for the purpose of controlling the mining, transportation, and sale of coal to be obtained therefrom, of the Act of June 29, 1906, must be so and of preventing and suppressing compe- dissolved as to give each of such comtition, especially in the transportation and panies its entire independence, and all consale of such coal in interstate commerce, tract relations between the coal company and continues this policy after the passage and the sales company which would serve of the Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, with in any manner to prevent the sales comincreasing energy and tenacity of purpose, pany from extending its business of with the result that a practical monopoly buying and selling where and from and to is attained of the transportation and sale whom it chooses with entire freedom and of anthracite coal derived from such lands, independence must be enjoined, so that the violates the provisions of §§ 1 and 2 of sales company may in effect, as well as in such act, forbidding restraints of interstate form, become an independent dealer, free trade or commerce, and monopolization of to act in competition with the coal comor attempts to monopolize a part of such pany or railway company. trade or commerce. [For other cases, see Judgment, II.; Injunc tion, I. d, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] [For other cases, see Monopoly, II. in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Carriers association with commodity carried sale to carrier's agent monopolistic contract. 2. A contract which an anthracite coal company, controlled by an interstate railway carrier through stock ownership and common officers, made with a sales company, the stockholders in which were practically identical with those in the railway company, whereby the coal company is to sell the coal mined by it to the sales com [No. 1.] Argued October 12 and 13, 1916. Restored to docket for reargument May 21, 1917. Reargued November 7, 1917. Restored to docket for reargument June 10, 1918. Submitted October 7, 1919. Restored to docket for oral argument May 17, 1920. Reargued October 5, 1920. Decided December 6, 1920. pany, the latter to pay therefor at 65 per APPEAL from the District Court of cent of the New York prices, and to sell no other coal than that purchased from the coal company, there being further provisions that the coal company shall lease all its facilities, structures, and trestles to the sales company; that either party shall have the right to abrogate and cancel the contract upon giving six months' notice, and that the sales company shall not buy coal except from the coal company,-violates both the commodities clause of the Act of June 29, 1906, making it unlawful for any railway company to transport in interstate commerce any article which it may own or in which it may have any interest, and the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, prohibiting contracts in restraint of trade. For other cases, see Carriers. III.; Monopoly, monopoly II. b, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Judgment dissolution relief injunction. 3. A combination effected through intercorporate relations between an interstate railway carrier, an anthracite coal company, and a sales company, which is found to violate both the Sherman Anti-trust Act of July 2, 1890, and the commodities clause Note. On illegal trusts under modern anti-trust laws-see note to Whitwell v. Continental Tobacco Co. 64 L.R.A. 689. On relation of contract or combination to interstate commerce which will bring it within the scope of the Federal Anti-trust Act-see notes to Loewe v. Lawlor, 52 L. ed. U. S. 488, and Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 10 L.R.A. (N.S.) 268. As to monopolies, generally-see notes to Fowle v. Park, 33 L. ed. Ü. S. 67, and United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 41 L. ed. U. S. 1008. the United States for the Southern District of New York to review a decree which dismissed the bill in a suit by the United States to dissolve intercorporate relations between corporations alleged to violate the Sherman Anti-trust Act and the commodities clause of the Hepburn Act. Reversed and remanded for the entry of a decree in conformity with the opinion. See same case below, 225 Fed. 399. Assistant to the Attorney General Todd and Solicitor General Davis argued the cause, and, with Attorney General Gregory and Mr. Arthur W. Machen, Jr., filed a brief for appellant on original argument: The Lehigh Railroad's control of the trade and commerce in anthracite coal produced along and transported over its lines was acquired by other than normal methods of industrial development, and by means wrongful and unlawful in themselves. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 76, 55 L. ed. 619, 651, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; Anthracite Rate Case, 35 Inters. Com. Rep. 220; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 367, 57 L. ed. 243, 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; Interstate Commerce Commission Baird, 194 U. S. 25, 43, 44, 48 L. ed. 860, 867, 869, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 402, 49 L. ed. 518, 527, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Coxe Bros. v. Lehigh Valley V. The control acquired and maintained by the Lehigh Railroad in combination with the Lehigh Coal Company through the means aforesaid, over the trade and commerce in anthracite coal produced along and transported over the lines of the Lehigh Railroad, constitutes a restraint and monopolization of trade, in violation of the Anti-trust Act. R. Co. 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 460, 4 I. C. C. | U. S. 516, 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Rep. 873; United States v. Milwaukee Co. 21 Inters. Com. Rep. 129, 23 Inters. Refrigerator_Transit Co. 142 Fed. 247; Com. Rep. 480; Lehigh Valley R. Co. v. Re Lumber Rates, 28 Inters. Com. Rep. United States, 204 Fed. 986; Marian 471; Star Grain & Lumber Co. v. AtCoal Co. v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. chison, T. & S. F. R. Co. 14 Inters. Com. 24 Inters. Com. Rep. 140, 25 Inters. Com. Rep. 364; United States v. Lake Shore Rep. 14; reaffirmed by later decisions & M. S. R. Co. 203 Fed. 295; Hughes in Red Ash Coal Co. v. Central R. Co. 37 Creek Coal Co. v. Kanawha & M. R. Co. Inters. Com. Rep. 460; Plymouth Coal 29 Inters. Com. Rep. 671; United States Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. 36 Inters. v. Pacific & A. R. & Nav. Co. 228 U. S. Com. Rep. 143; G. B. Markle Co. v. Le- 87, 57 L. ed. 742, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 443; high Valley R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. Atty. Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. 441; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Delaware, L. 29 L. J. Ch. N. S. 794, 6 Jur. N. S. 1006, & W. R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 457; 8 Week. Rep. 556; Delaware, L. & W. R. Interstate Commerce Commission v. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 363, 370, Louisville & N. R. Co. 227 U. S. 88, 57 58 L. ed. 269, 273, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 65. L. ed. 431, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 185; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union P. R. Co. 222 U. S. 541, 56 L. ed. 308, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108; Vandalia R. Co. v. United States, 141 C. C. A. 469, 226 Fed. 713; United States v. Hocking Valley R. Co. 194 Fed. 234, 127 C. C. A. 285, 210 Fed. 735, 234 U. S. 757, 58 L. ed. 1579, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 675; Southern P. Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Com- Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 mission, 219 U. S. 498, 524, 525, 55 L. U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 619, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) ed. 310, 319, 320, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 279; 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. Fourche River Lumber Co. v. Bryant 1912D, 734; United States v. American Lumber Co. 230 U. S. 316, 323, 57 L. ed. Tobacco Co. 221 U. S. 106, 55 L. ed. 663, 1498, 1501, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 887; United 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; Nash v. United States v. Union Stock Yard & Transit States, 229 U. S. 373, 57 L. ed. 1232, 33 Co. 226 U. S. 286, 287, 308, 57 L. ed. 226, Sup. Ct. Rep. 780; New York, N. H. & 234, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 83; New York, N. H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce ComH. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce mission, 200 U. S. 361, 392, 393, 50 L. ed. Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 396, 50 L. ed. 515, 521, 522, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; 515, 523, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; United Atty. Gen. v. Great Northern R. Co. States v. Great Lakes Towing Co. 208 29 L. J. Ch. N. S. 794, 6 Jur. N. S. 1006, Fed. 733; Gwynn v. Citizens' Teleph. Co. 8 Week. Rep. 556; United States v. 69 S. C. 435, 67 L.R.A. 111, 104 Am. St. | Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 238 U. S. 516, Rep. 819, 48 S. E. 460; United States Teleph. Co. v. Central U. Teleph. Co. 122 C. C. A. 86, 202 Fed. 66; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Hirsch, 123 C. C. A. 145, 204 Fed. 849; United States v. Keystone Watch Case Co. 218 Fed. 502; United States v. Eastman Kodak Co. 226 Fed. 62; United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. 225 Fed. 800; United States v. Corn Products Ref. Co. 234 Fed. 964; Merchants Legal Stamp Co. v. Murphy, 220 Mass. 281, L.R.A.1915C, 520, 107 N. E. 968; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 46, 47, 57 L. ed. 107, 116, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 L. ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Continental Wall Paper Co. v. Louis Voight & Sons Co. 212 U. S. 227, 53 L. ed. 486, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 280; Ellis v. Inman, P. & Co. 65 C. C. A. 488, 131 Fed. 182; United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 238 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873; United States v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 203 Fed. 295; Chesapeake & O. Fuel Co. v. United States, 53 C. C. A. 256, 115 Fed. 610; Pocahontas Coke Co. v. Powhatan Coal & Coke Co. 60 W. Va. 519, 10 L.R.A.(N.S.) 268, 116 Am. St. Rep. 901, 56 S. E. 264, 9 Ann. Cas. 667; Northern Securities Co. v. United States. 193 U. S. 197, 363, 48 L. ed. 679, 711, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 226 U. S. 61, 83, 57 L. ed. 124, 132, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 346, 355, 57 L. ed. 243, 250, 253, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90. The arrangements with the Lehigh Coal Sales Company do not have the effect of dissociating the Lehigh Railroad from coal mined and purchased by the Lehigh Coal Company and Coxe Brothers & Company, as required by the commodity clause. United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R., Anti-trust Act has been held to be, it is Co. 213 Fed. 240, 238 U. S. 516, 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873. Interstate commerce would none the less be affected, and the monopoly in question none the less in force, even if the Lehigh Railroad had dissociated itself at the mouth of the mines from the coal produced and purchased by the Lehigh Coal Company by transferring the title to the Lehigh Coal Sales Com pany. Rearick v. Pennsylvania, 203 U. S. 507, 512, 51 L. ed. 295, 298, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 159; Dozier v. Alabama, 218 U. S. 124, 128, 54 L. ed. 965, 967, 28 L.R.A. (N.S.) 264, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 649; Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U. S. 274, 52 L. ed. 488, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 301, 13 Ann. Cas. 815; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 367, 57 L. ed. 243, 258, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; United States v. Coombs, 12 Pet. 72, 9 L. ed. 1004; W. W. Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U. S. 38, 48 L. ed. 608, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 307; Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U. S. 375, 398, 399, 49 L. ed. 518, 525, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 276; Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463, 52 L. ed. 297, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 221 Ú. S. 229, 55 L. ed. 716, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 564; Gibbs v. McNeeley, 60 L.R.A. 152, 55 C. C. A. 170, 118 Fed. 120. The contract of March 1, 1912, between the Lehigh Coal Company and the Lehigh Coal Sales Company, is, in and of itself, a contract in restraint of trade, because of the provisions for exclusive dealing prohibiting the Lehigh Coal Company from selling to any other buyer, and prohibiting the Lehigh Coal Sales Company from buying from any other seller. United States v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 238 U. S. 516, 59 L. ed. 1438, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 873. The fact that the controlling stockholders of the Lehigh Coal Sales Company are the same persons as the controlling stockholders of the Lehigh Railroad (even though, standing alone, it might not bring the transportation by the Lehigh Railroad of a commodity belonging to the Lehigh Coal Sales Company within the prohibition of the commodity clause) in itself negatives any dissolution of the monopoly. United States v. Union P. R. Co. 226 U. S. 470, 57 L. ed. 306, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 162. If a transaction violates constitutional enactments of Congress such as the immaterial whether or not the transaction has the sanction of state law. Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. 197, 346, 48 L. ed. 679, 705, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 436; United States v. Union P. R. Co. 226 U. S. 61, 86, 57 L. ed. 124, 133, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 53. Nor would it make any difference if the combination denounced as illegal by the Anti-trust Act had existed prior to the passage of that act under the authority of valid state laws. United States V. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso. 166 U. S. 290, 342, 41 L. ed. 1007, 1028, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 540; Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. ed. 617, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 834, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 502, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 734; United States v. American Tobacco Co. 164 Fed. 700, 221 U. S. 106, 176, 55 L. ed. 663, 692, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632; Boyd v. New York & H. R. Co. 220 Fed. 174. The law of Pennsylvania, even as construed by defendants, has never done more than permit a railroad company to acquire an interest in the stocks of coal mining companies, and in some instances an interest in coal mines. The law of Pennsylvania, construe it as broadly as we may, has never authorized a railroad company to monopolize the business of shipping coal or any other commodity over its line, as the Lehigh Railroad has done. It has never authorized a railroad company, by all manner of rebates and preferences, to build up the business of one mining company, in which it had an interest, at the expense of all others shipping over its road, as the Lehigh Railroad has done. United States Teleph. Co. v. Central U. Teleph. Co. 122 C. C. A. 86, 202 Fed. 66; Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U. S. 20, 49, 57 L. ed. 107, 117, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Com. 3 Sadler (Pa.) 83, 7 Atl. 368; United States v. Delaware & H. Co. 164 Fed. 215; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Duncan, 111 Pa. 352, 5 Atl. 742; Philadelphia & R. R. Co. v. Patent, 1 Sadler (Pa.) 467, 17 W. N. C. 198, 5 Atl. 747; United States v. Reading Co. 226 U. S. 324, 57 L. ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 90; New York, N. H. & H. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 200 U. S. 361, 50 L. ed. 515, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; Chincleclamouche Lumber & Boom Co. v. Com. 100 Pa. 445. The engrossing by a railroad of virtually the entire trade in coal trans |
