ad objectum quod per eam representatur, prout est cogitatio intel lectus hanc vel illam rem representans,-quo modo forma seu essentia ideæ consistit in representatione rei, sive in eo quod sit representamen vel imago ejus rei quam concipimus.' (Phosph. Philos. & 5.)

CHAPTER III.

VARIOUS THEORIES OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION.'

§1.-SYSTEMATIC SCHEMES, FROM DIFFERENT POINTS OF VIEW, OF THE VARIOUS THEORIES OF THE RELATION OF EXTERNAL PERCEPTION TO ITS OBJECT, AND OF THE VARIOUS SYSTEMS OF PHILOSOPHY FOUNDED THEREON.*

SCHEME I.-Table of distribution, General and Special.-In the perception of the external world, the object of which we are conscious may be considered either, (I.) as absolute and total— or, (II.) as relative and partial, i. e., vicarious or representative of another and principal object, beyond the sphere of consciousness. Those who hold the former of these doctrines may be called Presentationists or Intuitionists: those who hold the latter, Representationists. Of these in their order.

I-The Presentationists or Intuitionists constitute the object, of which we are conscious, in perception, into a sole, absolute, or total, object; in other words, reduce perception to an act of immediate or intuitive cognition; and this-either (A) by abolishing any immediate, ideal, subjective object, representing;-or, (B) by abolishing any mediate, real, objective object, represented.

A. The former of these, viewing the one total object of perceptive consciousness as real, as existing, and therefore, in this case, as material, extended, external, are Realists, and may dis

This chapter is Hamilton's third Supplementary Dissertation on Reid. -W.

Compare the more comprehensive evolution of Philosophical Systems from the total fact of Consciousness in perception, given above, p. 28 a, sq. An acquaintance with that distribution is here supposed.

On the terms Intuition and Representation, and on the distinction of immediate and mediate, of ideal and real, object, see previous chapter, § 1.

tinctively be called Intuitional or Presentative Realists, and Rea. Presentationists or Intuitionists; while, as founding their doctrine on the datum of the natural consciousness, or common sense, of mankind, they deserve the names of Natural Realists or Natural Dualists. Of this scheme there are no subordinate varieties except in so far as a difference of opinion may arise, in regard to what qualities are to be referred to the object perceived, or non-ego,-what qualities to the percipient subject, or ego. Presentative Realism is thus divided (i.) into a philosophical or developed form-that, to wit, in which the Primary Qualities of body, the Common Sensibles,' constitute the objective object of perception; and (ii.) into a vulgar or undeveloped form -that, to wit, in which not only the primary qualities (as Extension and Figure), but also the secondary (as Color, Savor, &c.), are, as known to us, regarded equally to appertain to the non-ego.

B.-The latter of these, viewing the object of consciousness in perception as ideal (as a phenomenon in or of mind), are Idealists; and as denying that this ideal object has any external prototype, they may be styled Absolute Idealists, or Idealist Unitarians. They are to be again divided into two subaltern classes, as the Idea—(i.) is,—or (ii.) is not, considered a modification of the percipient mind.

i.—If the Idea be regarded as a mode of the human mind itself, we have a scheme of Egoistical Idealism; and this again admits of a twofold distinction, according as the idea is viewed(a) as having no existence out of the momentary act of presentative consciousness, with which it is, in fact, identical;—or (b) as having an (unknown) existence, independent of the present act of consciousness by which it is called up, contemplated, but not created. Finally, as in each of these the mind may be determined to present the object either-(1.) by its own natural laws, or (2.) by supernatural agencies, each may be subdivided into a Natural and Supernatural variety.

ii.-If, on the other hand, the Idea be viewed not as a mode of the human mind, there is given the scheme of Non-Egoistical Idealism, which, in all its forms, is necessarily hyperphysical. It admits, in the first place, of a twofold distinction, according as the ideal object is supposed-(a) to be,—or (b) not to be, in the perceiving mind itself.

a. Of these the former may again be subdivided according as the ideas are supposed-(1.) to be connate with the mind and existent in it out of consciousness;—or (2.) infused into it at the moment of consciousness,-(a) immediately by God,-(6) by some lower supernatural agency.

b.-The latter supposes that the human mind is conscious of the idea, in some higher intelligence, to which it is intimately present; and this higher mind may either be-(1.) that of the Deity, or (2.) that of some inferior supernatural existence.

All these modifications of Non-Egoistical Idealism admit, however, in common, of certain subordinate divisions, according as the qualities (primary and secondary) and the phenomena of the several senses may be variously considered either as objective and ideal or as subjective and sensational.*

IL-The Representationists, as denying to consciousness the cognizance of aught beyond a merely subjective phenomenon,

* The general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thoroughgoing Idealism, here given, may, at first sight, be startling. On reflection, however, their radical affinity will prove well grounded. Both build upon the same fundamental fact that the extended object immediately perceived is identical with the extended object actually existing;-for the truth of this fact, both can appeal to the common sense of mankind;-and to the common sense of mankind Berkeley did appeal not less confidently, and perhaps more logically, than Reid. Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only systems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any foundation in consciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves. The scheme of Hypothetical Realism or Cosmothetic Idealism, which supposes that behind the non-existent world perceived, there lurks a correspondent but unknown world existing, is not only repugnant to our natural beliefs, but in manifold contradiction with itself. The scheme of Natural Realism may be ultimately difficult-for, like all other truths, it ends in the inconceivable; but Hypothetical Realism-in its origin-in its development—in its result, although the favorite scheme of philosophers, is philosophically absurd.

are likewise Idealists; yet as positing the reality of an external world, they must be distinguished as Cosmothetic Idealists. But, as affirming an external world, they are also Realists, or Dualists. Since, however, they do not, like the Natural Realists, accept the existence of an external world directly on the natural testimony of consciousness, as something known, but endeavor to establish its unknown existence by a principal and sundry subsidiary hypotheses; they must, under that character, be discriminated as Hypothetical Realists or Hypothetical Dualists. This Hypothesis of a Representative perception has been maintained under one or other of two principal forms, a finer and a cruder,―according as the representation-either (A) is, or (B) is not, supposed to be a mode of the percipient subject itself. (And, be it observed, this distinction, in reference to Reid's philosophy, ought to be carefully borne in mind.)

A. If the immediate, known, or representative, object be regarded as a modification of the mind or self, we have one variety of representationism (the simpler and more refined), which may be characterized as the Egoistical Representationism. This finer form is, however, itself again subdivided into a finer and a cruder; according as the subjective object-(i.) is—or (ii.) is not, identified with the percipient act.

i. In the former case, the immediate or ideal object is regarded as only logically distinguished from the perceptive act; being simply the perceptive act itself, considered in one of its relations, its relation, to wit (not to the subject perceiving, in which case it is properly called a perception, but) to the mediate object, the reality represented, and which, in and through that representation alone, is objectified to consciousness and perceived.

ii. In the latter case, the immediate object is regarded, as a mode of mind, existent out of the act of perceptive consciousness, and, though contemplated in, not really identical with, that act. This cruder form of egoistical representationism substantially coincides with that finer form of the non-egoistical, which