HAVING got through the retrospec tive and accidental parts of the parliamentary debates, the party contests, and the discussions excited by factious, vexatious, or nugatory motions, we come to that far smaller portion which includes the real and essential business of state. May 12. The supplies voted for the year (exclusive of the proportion for Ireland) were 47,588,0241. for which ways and means were provided that would leave a surplus of 130,0001. These included a loan of eleven millions; besides, three millions had been borrowed for Ireland, and 600,000l. for the Prince of Brazil. For payment of the interest and sinking fund upon this latter sum, and for the liquidation of the principal, the revenues of the island of Madeira had been assigned, together with a consignment of such produce of Brazil as belonged to the prince, to his agents in this country. The whole loan was contracted for at an interest of 41. 12s, 1d., a rate at which the public had never before been able to borrow money, and at which it was hardly possible for any individual to procure it, however well secured or prompt his payment might be. "It was a proud consideration

for the country," Mr Perceval said, when he brought forward the budget, that under the increased and increasing expences of the war, and the unavoidable augmentation of the public expenditure, this should be the case. To meet the charge occasioned by the loan, an addition to the permanent taxes of about 105,0001. would be produced by a bill for the consolidation of the customs, and about as much more by a consolidation bill for the war-taxes; the wartaxes were to be applied to for the rest, amounting to little more than a million. A vote of credit had been taken for three millions. It would not be expected," he said, " that he should go at any length into an explanation of the manner in which this sum might be applied. There was, however, one circumstance which he felt it his duty to communicate: Austria, which, since the meeting of Parlia ment, had gone to war with France, on the commencement of that war drew bills upon this country, without having had any communication with his Majesty's government. When these bills arrived, it was the intention of ministers to advise his Majesty to recommend to Parliament to enable him to pay them; but before

any appropriation would be made for their payment, it was absolutely necessary to procure the consent and sanction of Parliament."

Lord Henry Petty inquired, "whe ther this most extraordinary step, as he must call it, was to be attributed to his Majesty's ministers, or to the Austrian government?" He was answered by Mr Canning, "that the Austrian government had no authority for it. The bills were drawn by the Austrian treasury, on the supposition that the person authorised to restore the former relations between the two governments would reach this country time enough to explain the necessity of that step, and the circumstances that induced it. It would not be expected," Mr Canning added, "that he should make any harsh comment on the conduct of the Austrian government; but he could assure the House, that measures had been taken to stop the recurrence of a practice so inconvenient in many respects. No time was lost in transmitting a friendly remonstrance to the court of Vienna, and informing it, that if such a thing were to be done at all, it must be done with the consent of Parliament. As for the charge of those politicians who clamour for peace when peace was impossible, that we had induced Austria to engage in a premature and hopeless struggle, the fact was directly otherwise. Austria had gone to war voluntarily, and strictly upon Austrian grounds. Our communications with her were few and precarious, and we had held out no specific promise of assistance. She was assured, indeed, that there would be a disposition to assist her, but that it would be greatly limited by the circumstances of the times; and this assurance was so restricted, that

he doubted whether it would not operate rather as a check than an encouragement. There were also physical obstacles in the way of making remittances, which might convince that power that she was not to place much reliance upon promises of assistance from England, even though less restricted. The preliminary, however, to any assistance, was the restoration of the former amicable relations between the two governments. This was considered as a just atonement to this country."

Mr Whitbread rose, as usual, to play the part of advocate for Buonaparte, and to revile the allies of England. "He should have been better pleased," he said, "if the money stated to have been granted as a loan to the Prince of Brazil had been at once presented as a gift, that the people might clearly have understood the transaction; for, considering the situation, the means, and the prospects of that prince, it was quite childish to suppose that a single shilling of it could ever be repaid. With regard to Austria, it was absolute madness to drive her into the contest. Austria was reduced to the very verge of ruin in the last war; she had actually been conquered then, and owed her escape and her existence solely to the generosity of that power, against which, in violation of treaties, she was now beginning operations. To those treaties she ought, beyond a doubt, faithfully to have adhered." The preposterous prejudice and folly of such opinions drew forth a reproof from Mr Ponsonby, though himself in opposition, and himself averse to granting any pecuniary assistance to the court of Vienna. "On what proof," he asked, "did Mr Whitbread rest this extraordinary assertion? His lecture on

the good faith of France, and the bad faith of Austria, must have an excellent effect when spread by our newspapers over the continent ! Austria was in hostility against France,

because France was bent on her destruction. This indeed, he thought, must be obvious to every man who looked fairly at the state of Europe. And was it possible, when Mr Whitbread accused Austria of perfidy, that he meant to ascribe good faith to Buonaparte? for this must be the inference."

This merited reproof did not sit easy upon Mr Whitbread; and when Mr Canning expressed an entire concurrence with the sentiments which Mr Ponsonby had delivered, he gave way to one of those rude and virulent sallies, in which his truculent disposition occasionally finds vent in Parliament." This," he said, “was the first time that the right honourable secretary had ever paid Mr Ponsonby a compliment; was it then to be understood that there was a treaty of subsidy going on between May 31. them" On a subsequent evening, when the vote of credit was taken into consideration, Mr Whitbread again repeated his pernicious opinions. "It was right," he said, "that ministers should be vested with a power to assist Spain and Portugal, though he doubted much that the contest would terminate in the subjugation of both countries. While, indeed, there was life there was hope the peninsula was engaged in a glorious cause, and after the share we had taken in it, he could not say that we ought, till the very last moment, to abandon men who were fighting for what is dear as life itself-liberty and independence." The recollection of his letter to Lord Holland probably occasioned this lan

guage; but it is not possible for the same person to be consistent in two opposite opinions at one time, and it soon appeared in which of his opinions Mr Whitbread was sincere. "He had been pompously told," he said, " of the enthusiasm of the people of Porto, yet they had received the French as willingly as the English! Similar accounts concerning Austria were now circulated to amuse us, and it was to be expected that they were equally deceitful: his unalterable opinion was, that as Austria, as well as Spain and Portugal, would shortly be crushed, and we should have to wage war alone with such fearful odds against the enemy, our business was carefully to husband our resources." He then proceeded to take a survey of the various coalitions against France, and mentioned the fate of Prussia as an instance of the preponderating power and genius of Buonaparte, when it ought to be instanced as an example of the effects of the husbanding system,-a system which, keeping armies for parade instead of service, renders them useless, and insures the ruin of the country which is cowardly enough, or foolish enough to follow it. "Whether Au stria or France was in the right," he continued, "he would not take upon himself to say; yet he would assert, that, from the period of the Revolu tion down to the rupture with Spain, France had never been the aggressor. He did not say France was in the right. He had never said so. Yet he was not persuaded that Austria was not to blame. Her territory, even her capital, had been restored to her; and he could not find himself prepared to say, that he was correct in forgetting these obligations, even supposing them to be only nominal, That France might have had it in

view, at some convenient season, to swallow up Austria, it was not in his power to deny, as ambition was a growing quality he could not think, however, that the present was exactly the time which would have been chosen for putting such a purpose into execution. It might be a moment convenient for Austria, but could hardly have been selected by Buonaparte: whatever his plans might have been, the present war could not be thought to be one of his seeking." In this awkward and embarrassed manner, advancing vile opinions and then qualifying them, and then again implying what he had before advanced, did Mr Whitbread struggle through the crude consistence of his discourse; common sense and notorious facts seeming to occasion as little scruples to him, as the breach of a treaty, the destruction of a friendly state, a private murder or a public massacre, to the Corsican who was the great object of his admiration.

But it was not enough for Mr Whitbread to apologize for the enemy, and calumniate the allies of England; he proceeded to accuse his country, and it almost seemed as if he were desirous of making Spain suspicious of so generous and sincere a friend. "At a time," he said, "when the people of England were every where talking of the injustice of Buonaparte towards Spain, he was surprised at the national blindness to. our own aggressions, recently manifested in the choice and approbation of our ambassador to that country. If there were a man in the universe who, in another part of the globe, had acted as Buonaparte had done with respect to Spain, it was the Marquis Wellesley. His conduct in the East Indies was perfectly similar to that of the French emperor, The

VOL. II. PART 1.

people of Spain, if they knew any thing of the affairs of this country, must know what that noble lord had done in India; but, then, all he did there proceeded from an ardent zeal for the public service, while Buonaparte, in acting the same part, was said to have been urged on by the instigation of the devil. They were doubtless the same acts, however dictated by different motives. Be that, however, as it might, the nomination of his lordship was certainly a bad omen, as the people of Spain must know that the Marquis Wellesley would, if the opportunity should of fer, take both Spain and Portugal as Buonaparte had done, through his ardent zeal for the service of his country." Mr Whitbread concluded this extraordinary speech with moving some resolutions, refusing to pay the bills drawn by the Austrian government, promising pecuniary assistance to Spain and Portugal as long as any hope could be entertained of a successful issue to their efforts; but earnestly recommending strict economy in managing the resources of the state, in order to be prepared for that last and most arduous strug gle, to which the present circumstances were but too likely to lead. These were negatived without a division.

The project of charging the loan for the year upon the war-taxes met with some opposition in the Upper House from Lord Sidmouth. "The amount of our expen- June 7. diture," he said, "exceeding that of the last year by about five millions, and that of 1807 by more than nine, far surpassed whatever the exaggerations of the timid or the fac tious had at any period foreboded; and the means of defraying it, by taking one million from the war-taxes for the purpose of supplying the in

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terest of the loan, were directly at variance with the system of financial policy adopted at the renewal of the war, and most injurious in their tendency to the future prospects of the country. We were now engaged in a contest which was evidently of indefinite duration, and to this view of it he had, at the recommencement of hostilities, endeavoured to adapt our expenditure. The object he had in view was, to arrive at the point where the sum borrowed would be balanced by the sum to be redeemed in the same year, after which, if there was no additional expenditure, the public service would be carried on with a diminishing, instead of an increasing, debt; it being his decided opinion, that if an addition to the expenditure became necessary, it ought to be provided for by an addition to the revenue; so that any permanent accumulation of debt might be prevented. But as a great increase of expenditure impeded our arrival at this splendid and impregnable situation of financial security, the noble lords who succeeded to the offices of First Lord of the Treasury and Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1806 had the wisdom and fortitude to propose an immediate addition of near six millions to the war-taxes: But after having laboured to reduce the public expences, they found the amount still so large, and the pressure of taxes recently imposed so burthensome, as to afford them no hopes of carrying into full effect the system adopted at the beginning of the war. The plan to which they had recourse appeared to be the best that circumstances would admit, and it was marked by the decided approbation of Parliament and the public. According to this plan, the expenditure of each year, exclusive of subsidies, being esti

mated at thirty-two millions beyond the surplus of the consolidated fund and the annual taxes, the war-taxes, which were computed at twenty-one millions, were to supply not only the interest, but a sinking fund for the loan of each year, the capital of which would, at any probable price of stocks, be thus redeemed within 14 years. Here were principles of redemption, renovation, and permanency, of which the project of the present year was wholly destitute. By the transfer of war-taxes which was now proposed, the people were deluded into a disregard of a proper expenditure, by the appearance of being spared the pressure of additional burthens ; whereas the effect of the transfer was to render those perpetual which would otherwise have ceased with the war, and to create the necessity of borrowing an additional million, the interest of which must be provided for by fresh taxes. The war-taxes had prevented, since the commencement of the war, an addition of more than two hundred millions of debt, and of near ten millions of permanent taxes; yet this was the system in which a breach was now improvidently made! To so rash a measure he must express his most decided and unqualified dissent; if persisted in, it had an obvious tendency to lay us at the feet of our enemy, though, humanly speaking, the means and resources which we possessed were, if wisely applied, fully sufficient to frustrate all his projects for our destruction, and to conduct us through the struggle, not only with security to our independence, but with increased glory and augmented power."

The Earl of Liverpool replied, that what was now proposed was not part of a system to be permanently acted upon: a sinking fund