[No. 100.] Submitted November 15, 1920. Decided December 13, 1920. ON WRIT of Certiorari to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Eighth Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas to review a judgment which reversed a judgment of the District Court of El Paso County, in that state, enforcing a limitation of the liability of a carrier for the loss of baggage, and entered judgment for the full amount of the loss. Reversed. See same case below, App., 209 S. W. 432. Tex. Civ. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. T. J. Beall submitted the cause for petitioner: The shipment in question constituted interstate commerce. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 212,.40 L. ed. 945, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 666; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593; Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 57 L. ed. 442, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229; Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U. S. 557, 30 L. ed. 244, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 31, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 4; Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 29 L. ed. 715, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 475; Cutting v. Florida R. & Nav. Co. 46 Fed. 641; Houston Direct Nav. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. A. 89 Tex. 1, 30 L.R.A. 713, 59 Am. St. Rep. 17, 32 S. W. 889; State v. Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. Tex. Civ. App. 44 S. W. 542; State v. International & G. N. R. Co. Tex. Civ. App., 71 S. W. 994; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Fort Grain Co. Tex. Civ. App. 72 S. W. 419. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court: On March 14, 1917, Mrs. Woodbury Antonio Railway at San Antonio, [358] took the Galveston, Harrisburg, & San Texas, for El Paso, Texas, and checked her trunk, which she took with her. It was lost, and she sued the company in a state district court for the value of trunk and contents, which the jury found to be $500. Mrs. Woodbury was traveling on a coupon chased at Timmins, Ontario, from a ticket purCanadian railroad, entitling her to travel over it and connecting lines, from Timmins to El Paso and return, apparently with stop-over privileges. When the trunk was lost she was on her journey out. She was not told when she purchased her ticket or when she checked her trunk that there was any limitation upon the amount of the carrier's liability. It did not appear whether the ticket purchased contained notice of any such limitation, nor did it appear what was the law of Canada in this respect. The company insisted that Mrs. Woodbury was on an interstate journey, and that, under the Act to Regulate Commerce, February 4, 1887, chap. 104, 24 Stat. at L. 379, Comp. Stat. § 8563, 4 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 337, as amended, it was not liable for more than $100; since it had duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission and published a tariff limiting liability to that amount unless the passenger declared a higher value and paid excess charges, which Mrs. Woodbury had not done. She insisted that her transportation was Mr. Rufus B. Daniel submitted the not subject to the Act to Regulate Comcause for respondents: The transportation, by a common carrier or carriers, of a passenger from Timmins, Ontario, Canada, to El Paso, Texas, and return to Timmins, Ontario, Canada, upon a round-trip ticket purchased at Timmins, Ontario, Canada, is not such transportation as is included within the terms of § 1 of the Act to Regulate Commerce. United States v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 188 Fed. 484; Re Heated Car Service Regulations, 50 Inters. Com. Rep. 623; Canales v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 574; Seymour v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. merce, because it began in a foreign The only question before us is the amount of damages recoverable. portation by rail to an adjacent foreign country is, at least ordinarily, engaged in transportation also from that country to the United States. The test of the application of the act is not the direction of the movement, but [360] the nature of the transportation as determined by the field of the carrier's operation. This is the construction If Mrs. Woodbury's journey had started in New York [359] instead of across the border in Canada, the provision in the published tariff would clearly have limited the liability of the carrier to $100. For her journey would have been interstate, although the particular stage of it on which the trunk was lost lay placed upon the act by the Interstate wholly within the state of Texas. Com-Commerce Commission. International pare Texas & N. O. R. Co. v. Sabine Paper Co. v. Delaware & H. Co. 33 Tram Co. 227 U. S. 111, 57 L. ed. Inters. Com. Rep. 270, 273, citing Texas 442, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 229. And the & P. R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Carmack Amendment [June 29, 1906, Commission, 162 U. S. 197, 40 L. ed. 34 Stat. at L. 595, chap. 3591, § 7, 940, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 405, 16 Sup. Comp. Stat. §§ 8604, 8604aa, 4 Fed. Ct. Rep. 666. It is in harmony with Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 499] under which that placed upon the words of § 1 carriers may limit liability by published of the Harter Act, February 13, 1893, tariff applies to the baggage of a pas- chap. 105, 27 Stat. 445, Comp. Stat. § senger carried in interstate commerce 8029, 6 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. 371: (Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 "Any vessel transporting merchandise or U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450, property from or between ports of the 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, Ann. Cas. 1915D, United States and foreign ports," which, 593), although it does not deal with lia- in Knott v. Botany Worsted Mills, 179 bility for personal injuries suffered by U. S. 69, 75, 45 L. ed. 90, 94, 21 Sup. the passenger (Chicago, R. I. & P. Ct. Rep. 30, were construed to include R. Co. v. Maucher, 248 U. S. 359, vessels bringing cargoes from foreign 63 L. ed. 294, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 108). ports to the United States. There is a The subsequent legislation, the Cummins later clause in § 1 which deals specificalAmendment, Act of March 4, 1915, chap. ly with the transportation of property 176, 38 Stat. at L. 1196, as amended by to or from foreign countries; but cases the Act of August 9, 1916, chap. 301, arising under that clause are not applica39 Stat. at L. 441, Comp. Stat. § 8592, ble here. That clause applies where the Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1918, p. 387, foreign country is not adjacent to the has not altered the rule regarding liabil- United States. The cases which hold ity for baggage. that the act does not govern shipments from a foreign country in bond through the United States to another place in a foreign country, whether adjacent or not, are also not in point. Compare United States v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 188 Fed. 484; Re Bills of Lading, 52 Inters. Com. Rep. 671, 726-729; Canales v. Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. 37 Inters. Com. Rep. 573. But counsel for Mrs. Woodbury insists that, solely because her journey originated in Canada, the provisions of the Act to Regulate Commerce do not apply. The contention is that § 1 of the Act of 1887 does not apply to the transportation of passengers from a foreign country to a point in the United States. To this there are two answers. The first is that the transportation here in question is not that of a passenger, but of property. Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, supra. The second is that the act does apply to the transportation of both passengers and property from an adjacent foreign country, such as Canada. Section 1 declares that the act applies to "any common carrier in the transportation of passengers or property from any place in the United States to an adjacent foreign country." A carrier engaged in trans65 L. ed. Since the transportation here in question was subject to the Act to Regulate Commerce, both carrier and passenger were bound by the provisions of the published tariffs. As these limited the recovery for baggage carried to $100, in the absence of a declaration of higher value and the payment of an engaged charge, and as no such declaration was made and excess charge paid, that sum only was recoverable. Reversed. excess 303 [361] FRANK C. THORNTON and the, stitutionally impair the obligations of inCleveland Stamping & Tool Company, surance contracts entered into upon the Plffs. in Err., faith of the previous ruling of the commission, nor does such ruling amount to a denial of due process of law or of the equal protection of the laws. V. THOMAS J. DUFFY and Herbert L. Eliot, (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 361-370.) [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. a, 5; IV. b, 7; IV. g, 4, e, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law - due process of law impairing contract obligationschange in public policy. following de 1. The Federal Supreme Court must accept on writ of error the decision of the highest court of a state as to the meaning of state legislation and the state Constitution, as though such meaning was expressed in both legislation and Constitution. [For other cases, see Appeal and Error, 21242151, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Constitutional law impairing contract obligations due process of law equal protection of the laws workmen's compensation forbidding insurance against liability. 3. An exercise of public policy cannot be resisted because of conduct or contracts done or made upon the faith of former exercises of it, upon the ground that its later exercises deprive of property or in validate those contracts. [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 582- Argued November 8, 1920. Decided Decem- IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of 2. A ruling of a state industrial comthe State of Ohio to review a judgmission, justified or demanded by a change in the state law, by which the commission, ment which affirmed a judgment of the revoking its previous discretionary action, Court of Appeals of Franklin County, declares that no employers shall be per- in that state, which, on appeal from the mitted to pay or furnish directly to injured Court of Common Pleas, sustained deemployees or to the dependents of killed murrers to the petition and answer and employees the compensation and benefits cross petition in a suit to enjoin the provided for in the state Workmen's Com State Industrial Commission from enpensation Law if such employers, by contract or otherwise, shall provide for the forcing its ruling prohibiting employers insurance of the payment by them of such from making direct compensation under compensation and benefits, or shall indem- the state Workmen's Compensation Act nify themselves against loss sustained by if such employers, by contract or otherthe direct payment thereof, does not uncon-wise, have provided for the insurance Note. On the general subject of Generally, as to what laws are void writs of error from the United States as impairing obligation of contractsSupreme Court to state courts-see see notes to Franklin County Grammar notes to Martin v. Hunter, 4 L. ed. U. School v. Bailey, 10 L.R.A. 405; Bullard S. 97; Hamblin v. Western Land Co. v. Northern P. R. Co. 11 L.R.A. 246; 37 L. ed. U. S. 267; Re Buchanan, 39 Henderson v. Soldiers & S. Monument L. ed. U. S. 884; and Kipley v. Illinois, Comrs. 13 L.R.A. 169; and Fletcher v. 42 L. ed. U. S. 998. Peck, 3 L. ed. U. S. 162. On what adjudications of state courts can be brought up for review in the Supreme Court of the United States by writ of error to those courts-see note to Apex Transp. Co. v. Garbade, 62 L.R.A. 513. On error to state courts in cases presenting questions of impairment of contract obligations-see note to Osborne v. Clark, 51 L. ed. U. S. 619. On error to state courts in cases involving questions of due process of law -see note to Burt v. Smith, 51 L. ed. U. S. 121. On right of Federal Supreme Court to review questions not involved in the record-see note to Missouri ex rel. Hill v. Dockery, 63 L.R.A. 571. Change of remedy generally as impairing the obligation of contract-see notes to Best v. Baumgardner, 1 L.R.A. 356; Phinney v. Phinney, 4 L.R.A. 348, and Louisiana ex rel. Ranger v. New Orleans, 26 L. ed. U. S. 132. As to constitutionality of workmen's statutes-see notes to Hunter v. Colfax compensation and industrial insurance Consol. Co. L.R.A.1917D, 51, and Jensen v. Southern P. Co. L.R.A.1916A, 40. As to constitutionality of compulsory industrial insurance-see note to State ex rel. Davis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 466. As to the validity of class legislation, generally-see notes to State v. Goodwill, 6 L.R.A. 621, and State v. Loomis, 21 L.R.A. 789. of the payment of such compensation, or have indemnified themselves against loss sustained by direct payment. Affirmed. See same case below, 99 Ohio St. 120, 124 N. E. 54. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Judson Harmon and Arthur I. Vorys argued the cause and filed a brief for plaintiffs in error: (2) Liability insurance is not inimical to public policy. American Casualty Ins. Co's Case (Boston & A. R. Co. v. Mercantile Trust & D. Co.) 82 Md. 535, 38 L.R.A. 97, 34 Atl. 778; Kansas City, M. & B. R. Co. v. Southern R. News Co. 151 Mo. 373, 45 L.R.A. 380, 74 Am. St. Rep. 545, 52 S. W. 205; Breeden v. Frankford M. Acci. & Plate Glass Ins. Co. 220 Mo. 327, 119 N. E. 576; Stone v. Old Colony Street R. Co. 212 Mass. 459, 99 N. E. 218; Rumford Falls Co. v. Fidelity & C. Co. 92 Me. 574, 43 Atl. 503; Hoadley v. Purifoy, 107 Ala. 276, 30 L.R.A. 351, 18 So. 220. (3) Contracts indemnifying employers are not inimical to public welfare, and the legislature cannot prohibit such contracts. The legislature has the power to compel all employers to contribute to the state workmen's compensation fund, or it may provide the conditions upon which employers may pay into the state fund, and the conditions upon which they may pay compensation directly to employees; but the desire of an employer who elects to pay compensation directly, to indemnify himself, cannot Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 be made the sole basis of a legislative L. ed. 1336, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. classification of employers, distinguish- Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; ing them as ineligible to pay compensa- Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, tion directly. Such basis of classification is not related to the purpose of the constitutional amendment and the Workmen's Compensation Law. Adams v. Tanner, 244 U. S. 590, 61 L. ed. 1336, L.R.A.1917F, 1163, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 662, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 973; State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. 96 Ohio St. 250, 117 N. E. 232; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 55 L. ed. 328, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 259; Chicago v Netcher, 183 Ill. 104, 48 L.R.A. 261, 75 Am. St. Rep. 93, 55 N. E. 707; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 131, L.R.A.1916D, 545, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283; Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co. 201 N. Y. 271, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 162, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 156; Chenoweth v. State Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 958, 141 Pac. 132, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1188; Byers v. Merdian Printing Co. 84 Ohio St. 408, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 913, 95 N. E. 917; Dunahoo v. Huber, 185 Iowa, 753, 171 N. W. 123. The legislature has no power to prohibit employers from insuring or indem nifying themselves against their liability to employees. (1) Insurance has no power inimical to public policy. Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Erie & W. Transp. Co. 117 U. S. 312, 29 L. ed. 873, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 759, 1176; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427; Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 195 U. S. 223, 47 L. ed. 169, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18; Yee Gee v. San Francisco, 235 Fed. 757; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, L.R.A.1915C, 1189, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612; Chenoweth v. State Medical Examiners, 57 Colo. 74, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 958, 141 Pac. 132, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 1188; Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 347, 61 L. ed. 773, L.R.A.1917E, 938, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 298, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 1024. Assuming, for the purpose of this branch of the argument only, that the state fund "insures" the compensation due to employees from employers, and that the law may give the state fund a monopoly of such insurance, and deny the right to issue such insurance to all others, still the state cannot abrogate existing insurance, valid when it was issued. Bedford v. Eastern Bldg. & L. Asso. 181 U. S. 227, 45 L. ed. 834, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 597; American Bldg. & L. Asso. V. Rainbolt, 48 Neb. 434, 67 N. W. 493; McNamara v. Keene, 49 Misc. 452, 98 Asso. v. Meyers-Abel Co. 12 Ariz. 48, N. Y. Supp. 860; Industrial Bldg. & L. 95 Pac. 115. And the state cannot take away the right of the employer to procure other insurance by making contracts of insurance in the other states, or by any other means over which the state has no control. Stone v. Old Colony Street R. Co. 212 Mass. 459, 99 N. E. 218; New York L. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U. S. 357, 62 L. ed. 772, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1918E, 593; Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427. Neither Ohio Gen. Code, § 1465-69, nor § 1465-101, as amended in 1917, was intended to apply, and neither does apply, to contracts theretofore made by employers. lature to require all employers to con- Sturges v. Carter, 114 U. S. 511, 29 L. Granting, for the sake of argument, 45; German Ins. Co. v. Com. 141 Ky. 206; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 389, 58 L. ed. 1011, L.R.A. 1915C, 1189, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 612; State ex rel. Turner v. United States Fidelity & G. Co. 96 Ohio St. 250, 117 N. E. 232; Hunter v. Colfax Consol. Coal Co. 175 Iowa, 245, L.R.A.1917D, 15, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803, 11 N. C. C. A. 886; New York, C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Williams, 199 N. Y. 108, 35 L.R.A.(N.S.) 549, 139 Am. St. Rep. 850, 92 N. E. 404; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1,56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co. 187 Mich. 8, 153 N. W. 49. The contracts referred to in the petition and cross petition herein were made subject to the right of the legis E. 643, 20 Ann. Cas. 607; Sherman v. Mr. Timothy S. Hogan also argued the |