remarks, and, among other topics, on the following:-Ancient monarchies, Roman empire; empire of the Bishop of Rome; introduction of force; great revolution in France, Bonaparte; outburst in 1848; present state of Europe; English Court of Chancery. The above outline will convey to the reader a general idea of the book. It is, as we have said, a popular, not a scientific treatise; and it traces usefully to their sources in men's minds and passions many of the phenomena of the moral and political world. It is, or at least aims to be, always on the side of goodness and humanity; and we have often, in our perusal, been struck with the good sense which is generally manifested in the more practical parts of the volume. We must not be led into any ecclesiastical controversies, or we might perhaps find matter for them in some of the remarks on the free church. As to the author's general plan and division of his work, as we have just given it, we cannot say much. It certainly appears to us confused and complicated-in fact, it seems to want a general harmonizing principle of arrangement. We must, however, present a few details. The remark that the will has no control over the faculty of memory,' may be true so far as it means that we cannot directly deprive ourselves of its aptitude for remembering sensations;' but the statement appears to us far too general, for it is a familiar fact that attention, which is another name, or nearly so, for will, has the effect of indirectly aiding reminiscence; hence the two cases of actual memory, which may be severally termed simple remembrance and recollection, a distinction noticed by Aristotle.

In reference to the doctrine of causation, Dr. Carlile remarks as follows:- In regard to our necessarily inferring from every change that it must have a cause, we apprehend that such inference is derived from experience.' We have not space to go into the intricate question here involved; but should our author's work reach a second edition, we should like him to account for a fact which we suppose will not be denied, namely, that there are many events daily staring us in the face, and with which we are thoroughly familiar, which we fully expect will go on to happen as before we are morally certain that they will do so nevertheless, we feel that there is no absurdity in imagining them to cease occurring. Not so, however, with regard to the general principle of causation. Every body believes, no doubt, that the sun will rise to-morrow; every body would think a man mad who should predict that this is the last day it will ever shine on the earth: and yet no one who has for a moment reflected on the power of God, and on man's ignorance of the laws which regulate the great disturbances which we know from astronomy have taken place in certain parts of our solar

system, and which geology teaches us have occurred in our own planet, will venture to say that it is impossible that the sun should not rise to-morrow. But would any one be ready to admit that, under any circumstances, it is possible for any of the events of the universe to have happened without a cause? Now, we simply put the question, if both impressions are merely the result of experience, how it is that experience pronounces one impression to be of so different a character from the other?

In a subsequent part of the book our author discusses the question of parental affection-whether it is an innate or instinctive emotion, or 'is excited by anything in the children, or in the nature of their connexion with their parents?' He does not absolutely decide against some innate natural affection, especially in the mother, but thinks that there is much in the children themselves, and in the circumstances in which they come into connexion with their parents, that is calculated to draw forth the tenderest affections of the parents towards them.' The points enumerated are the helplessness of infants, their being the absolute property of the parents, their general resemblance to their parents, or other near relatives, the close connexion of the infant with the mother who nourishes it, and some other more remote supposed causes of affection.' We are not sure, notwithstanding the undoubted fact that circumstances do modify very greatly the parental affection, whether the author has assigned a sufficient weight to the instinctive tendency. It evidently exists largely in animals, so long as it is necessary and useful; and, independently of the circumstances which tend to prolong it in human parents, we apprehend that it is seen in great strength, though many of the adjuncts which the author has enumerated should not, in certain particular cases, be present. It may be more difficult to determine the question of a filial instinct, which respect for human nature has tended to enrol among the noblest of our propensities. Dr. Carlile decides against it :

The love of children to their parents has certainly nothing in it intuitive or instinctive, as is manifest from their readily attaching themselves to any one who cares for them tenderly and affectionately, and that often in preference to their own parents. One is rather disposed to be mortified to see how soon the most affectionate mother or father is forgotten by their children, even by children much advanced beyond the age of mere infancy. But it is a wise provision that when God may see fit to call away the parents the children are ready to cling to any others who may be employed and disposed to fulfil the duties of parents towards

them.'

Of self-love (as distinguished from selfishness), the author

seems to us to have given but a partial view when he says, 'It seems to be nothing more than the pleasure of pleasant sensations, exciting the desire of the continuance or repetition of them, and the pain of painful sensations, exciting the desire of being freed from them, or of avoiding their repetition,' as though the only objects which may give an impulse to self-love are our mere bodily appetites and passions, or, at all events, our senses generally. May not self-love, however, equally prompt us to many other desires? Selfishness is but the degeneration of a lawful self-love; and so our author appears justly to consider it. The range of selfishness may, however, indicate generally that of a lawful self-love; and surely neither the one nor the other principle is restricted in its objects to mere sensations.

We quote the following valuable remarks on the Recognition of the Deity:'

The mind has not the same means, precisely, of recognising the presence and mental movements of the Deity, which it has of recognising the presence and mental movements of its fellow-men; but it possesses that kind of evidence of the being, the power, and will, of a mind or spirit pervading all nature, which it possesses of the existence, and power, and will of a fellow-man, when it examines any of his works in his absence; and it possesses that kind of evidence to an infinitely greater extent, and in infinitely greater perfection. Fenelon's reference to the marks of design in a watch, of which Paley has made so good use in his "Natural Theology," furnishes incontestable proof that no sane mind could see and examine such a work of art, and discover the use of it, without inferring that it was the work of a human mind contriving it, and acting on the members of a human body to execute the contrivance. Now we have evidence of the same kind everywhere around us of the existence, intentions, power, and will of an all-pervading, though invisible mind. We are in the midst of a vast workshop of machines, exhibiting every conceivable description of mechanical contrivance-a vast cabinet of the most glorious pictures, the source from which all pictures derive their beauty, and copies of pictures repeated ten thousand times over, with the utmost exactness; so that it seems to be scarcely possible that any rational creature, looking on these objects, should not see and feel that he is looking on the productions of an all-powerful and all-skilful mind, who has contrived all these wonderful things, and produced them in such amazing perfection.'-pp. 196, 197.

There are many practical remarks bearing on a variety of useful topics, which we should be glad to quote, if our space allowed. We restrict ourselves to the following passage, which occurs under the head entitled 'The means of influencing the minds of others.' Dr. Carlile justly deprecates the appeal to physical force for sustaining the authority of the law, excepting where it is absolutely necessary. He admits, however, that

there are always persons to be found whom no other motive than the dread of punishment will restrain from the violation of the law; but he maintains, very properly, that the first thing towards the stable support of any law is, that the people understand it, and understand the necessity of it, and the benefit which they derive from it. This is saying, in brief, that the 'true prop of good government is opinion.' As a sequel to his remarks on this subject, he introduces a comparison between the administration of some parts of the English and the Scottish civil law respectively. Bad as law is in England, vile and unjust as is its whole bearing on the purses of the unfortunates who fall, in self-defence, within its clutches, it would seem that matters are still worse in Scotland.

In Scotland, no civil case is decided by a jury. The pleadings of the advocates are addressed exclusively to the judges, in language utterly unintelligible to the public, and which is neither Scotch, nor English, nor Latin, but a barbarous mixture of all three, intelligible to no other class of human beings under the whole heaven but the legal corporation of Scotland. The tendency of the decisions of the Scotch judges is to give weight to minute distinctions, so as to render the whole law unintelligible to the people. Attorneys, or writers, as they are called, are accustomed to say that they can never conjecture how a case will be decided, however clear it may appear to them, because they never can foresee what insignificant point may be swelled into importance when it comes before the judges. One of the lords in ordinary of the Court of Session in Edinburgh, after hearing a cause, is said to have addressed the advocate for one of the parties to the effect, that he was sorry that their case was so plainly and palpably right in law, that he must decide in their favour; for he knew that his decision would be reversed in the Inner House (where a certain portion of the bench sit in judgment on causes which have been decided on in limine, after the lord in ordinary has sat on them.) This astounding charge, brought against the integrity of the supreme court of law in Scotland, by one of the judges of that court, sitting and acting in his official capacity, passed in Edinburgh for a mere sarcastic joke, and was scarcely heard of beyond the legal circle.'

We have another, and a large volume before us from the fertile pen of Professor Blakey. Such a work may be very useful, no doubt, provided it give a faithful and accurate description and criticism of the various theoretic modifications which have been propounded, especially of late years, on the subject of reasoning, the most important and elevated function of the human mind. The Preface informs us that this very consideration, or something approaching it, has occasioned the present work. The design is to give a history of theories of reasoning, and the general principles of the different logical systems. Mr. Blakey's introduction, like every part of all his works which we have seen, is popular and diffuse, rather than

showing anything of a decidedly scientific character, and closely grappling with the point in hand. We confess we hardly know, for instance, what is meant by the unsatisfactory state in which theories of mathematical evidence, of induction, of nominalism, and realism, are at the present moment placed.' At all events, we should have had illustrations, which are the grand test of the utility of a dissertation on almost any subject. Much of the introduction, though it is not destitute of talent, loses its value for want of such illustrations. We are told, for instance, of fundamentally different theories and principles; and that a thousand distinct treatises, and more, on logic, have appeared within the last three hundred years, while no two logicians can agree on any one principle of the science, nor be able to state to what particular or general uses it can be applied.' Now we hold statements such as these to be great exaggerations, and much calculated to mislead the multitude, who run away with a few notions out of a popular treatise, and then think themselves qualified to pronounce on any subject of human learning which may be discussed in it. Of the numerous logical treatises of which our author speaks, many have been mere compends or enlargements of others, some have been translations, and most of them by far have been based on the general principles of the Aristotelian dialectics. Even the most modern original treatises which we are acquainted with, are chiefly rather emendations, modifications, or augmentations of the received system, than attempts at its entire subversion; and to whatever extent any may have directly aimed at this, we believe that they have failed. The notion that no two logicians can be found, of any country, who can agree in any common principle' of logic, we hold to be just on a par with another statement often made on another subject, and by parties with whom we are glad to know that Mr. Blakey would be far enough from sympathizing. The statement we allude to relates to Christianity itself. How often does the infidel point to the divisions in the Christian world, and then tell you that he can find no two people, scarcely, who agree as to the principles of Christianity. But he has never taken the pains to find out how much of this ostensible disagreement leaves untouched certain fundamental principles. A philosopher ought hardly to have made so sweeping an assertion about logic, which must rest, however varied the form and the expression, on essentially the same basis. And with regard to the particular or general uses to which it can be applied,' everybody who knows that logic has something to do with reasoning, knows its use every day by experience.

As to the theory of mathematical evidence,' we believe that