HIGH COURT. SMITH V. CHEESE.-EDMUNDS, APPELLANT, v. Foster, Respondent. HIGH COURT. but on that I can give no opinion. At all events the ties, and the description is sufficient. The rule must be present application must be refused. discharged. QUAIN and FIELD, JJ., concurred. Order refused. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am of the same opinion. The object of the Act is to secure the identification of the witness; it says that he is to state his residence and occupation. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Williamson, Hill, & Co., If one of Mr. Browne's arguments is right, all persons of for R. P. & R. Philipson, Newcastle. Solicitors for the defendants, Wilkins, Blyth, & Marsland. no occupation are incapable of being witnesses under this Act. If the witness has a definite occupation it must be stated, and not so as to mislead, as in Larchin V. The North-Western Deposit Bank, where the term used would seem to point to a principal, not a clerk. Here the evidence was that the witness had, six years before, been a clerk, and though it is said he had prepared some bills of sale, there was nothing to show a definite occupation which could be properly de Bill of sale-Attesting witness-Description of occupa- scribed, Mr. Browne was in a difficulty to show any tion-Gentleman. Where the attesting witness to a bill of sale has no definite occupation, if he is of a class to which the term gentleman is usually applied, it is sufficient to describe him as "gentleman." 146 This was an interpleader issue tried before Brett, J., at the Hilary Sittings, 1875, in Middlesex. A verdict was entered for the plaintiff, a claimant under a bill of sale, leave being reserved to the defendants, the execution creditors, to move to enter a verdict for them on the ground that the description of the attesting witness as gentleman" was insufficient. It appeared from the evidence that the witness had six years before been clerk to a proctor, since which he had collected a few debts, written a few letters for others, and had drafted four bills of sale, had had money given him by his mother, and had no fixed occupation. A rule was obtained accordingly, which now came on for argument. Gaskell and C. Scott, showed cause, citing Sutton v. Bath, 3 H. & N. 382, 7 W. R. C. L. Dig. 13; Beales v. Tennant, 29 L. J. Q. B. 188, 8 W. R. C. L. Dig. 11; Tuton v. Saroni, 6 W. R. 545, 3 H. & N. 280; Morewood v. South Yorkshire, &c., Company, 3 H. & N. 798, 7 W. R. C. L. Dig. 14; Brodrick v. Scale, 19 W. R. -386, L. R. 6 C. P. 98. George Browne, in support of the rule, cited Trousdale v. Sheppard, 14 Ir. C. L. R. 370; Adams v. Graham, 12 W. R. 282; Allen v. Thompson, 4 W. R. 506, 1 H. & N. 15; Larchin v. North-Western, Deposit Bank, 23 W. R. 375, L. R. 8 Ex. 80, 21 W. R. Dig. 39, 40, L. R. 10 Ex. 64. GROVE, J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. I am not inclined to extend the use of the word "gentleman," which is no doubt vague; but Mr. Browne cannot suggest a better description. He does, on the authority of an Irish case, suggest that the description might have been "no occupation"; but that would give no more assistance than " gentleman." The latter term is used for almost any one at the present day. Here the person had no fixed occupation, though he occasionally collected debts, wrote letters, and drafted bills of sale; he was living on an allowance. I do not see how he could have been described otherwise in any way which would have told an inquirer more. Here he had no occupation which could have been described. The case of Sutton V. Bath is strongly in favour of my view. There the witness was a medical student, had been for a short time apprenticed to a surgeon, and had taken some steps to set up a lodginghouse, but had never practised as a surgeon, and had not done anything to get a living for six months before the attestation, and it was held that he was sufficiently described as 66 gentleman." Here there was no occupation properly and fairly included in the term which would make "gentleman" inappropriate. Morewood v. The South Yorkshire, &c., Company is also in point. I think the present case is within those authori better title. "Drawer of bills of sale" would be misleading, as he had drawn only four in his life. I think the cases all show that the description here was enough, and the rule must therefore be discharged. LINDLEY, J.-I am also of the same opinion. For the purpose of this Act, persons must be divided into those having some and those having no occupation. If a person is in the latter class, "gentleman" is not necessary applicable to him; but if he is in a class of life to which that term is usually applied, and if he has no occupation, it would be unjust to say the description is not enough, and to avoid the bill of sale because, having no occupation, he has added “gentleman" to his name. The rule must therefore be discharged. Rule discharged. Solicitor for the claimant, W. A. Brown. Solicitors for the execution creditors, Meredith, Roberts & Mills. EDMUNDS, Appellant, v. FOSTER, Respondent. Companies Act, 1862, 88. 26, 27-List of members— Default-Condition precedent. Every company is bound, under sections 26, 27, of the Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89) to send to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies once in each calendar year a list of its members and other details. And the fact that there is not a general meeting of the company held annually is no excuse for default in sending such list, &c., as the part of the section which says that the list is to be of those who are members on the fourteenth day after a general meeting is held is directory only. This was a case stated by justices, and was, in effect, an appeal against a conviction under section 27 of the Companies Act, 1862, for not sending in a list of shareholders to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies. Finlay, for the appellant, argued that there had been no default, as the list had to be made of persons who only general meeting in every year, and there was no were members on the fourteenth day after the first or evidence of such a meeting being held; and there was no evidence either that the appellant was a director, or made. He cited Cooper v. Gibbons, 3 Camp. 363, and that he knowingly and wilfully permitted a default to be Gibson v. Barton, 23 W. R. 858, L. R. 10 Q. B. 329. Kingdon, Q.C., for the respondent, contended that there was at least evidence enough to raise a presumption against the appellant. Finlay, in reply, cited Curlewis v. Corfield, 1 Q. B. 814, and urged that there could not in a criminal case be any presumption against the accused. EDMUNDS, Appellant, v. Foster, RespondentT.-MASPER AND WIFE v. BROWN. HIGH COURT. HIGH COURT. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.—This is an appeal from an order of justices. The appellant was convicted under the 26th and 27th sections of the Companies Act, 1862. The default for which he was convicted is mentioned in the 27th section. Section 26 enacts that, "Every company shall make, once at least in every year, a list of all persons who, on the fourteenth day succeeding the day on which the ordinary general meeting, or, if there is more than one ordinary meeting in each year, the first of such ordinary meetings, is held, are members of the company, &c., and a copy shall forthwith be forwarded to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies." I pause to observe that the words to which attention was directed by the Court of Queen's Bench are remarkable in their collocation; they say that the company shall once every year make a list. I am of opinion that the section is imperative as to making a list and forwarding it, and is, in substance, that it shall be done once in a year. True, it is to be a list of the persons who are shareholders on a particular day which implies a general meeting, but the company cannot evade the section by not making a day on which a list is to be made, i.e., by holding no meeting. I agree with the Court of Queen's Bench that calendar year is meant, and therefore on the 31st of December in each year the company would be in default. It is therefore enough to say that, where a person is summoned under section 27 for not sending a list, that default is complete on the 31st of any year. is a reasonable analogy to construe the section by the light of the cases in which the courts have ordered an act to be done, though the day fixed for it has passed, because the fixing of the day is only directory. Then comes the section which enacts that "if any company .... It makes default in complying with the provisions of this Act with respect to forwarding such list of members ... to the registrar, such company shall incur a penalty not exceeding five pounds for every day during which such default continues, and every director and manager of the company who shall knowingly and wilfully authorize or permit such default shall incur the like penalty." The default is in not forwarding the list, and for that the penalty is affixed. Then there is the second point as to whether, if the appellant was a director, he knowingly and wilfully authorized or permitted the default. It is admitted that no list was sent, and there is evidence from which I assume that he was a director. Is that evidence that he knowingly and wilfully permitted the default? I think that is prima facie evidence. [The learned judge then decided that in the particular case there was evidence to show that the appellant was a director, and knowingly and wilfully suffered the default to be made, and added : - This convicmust be affirmed. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am of the same opinion. The conviction is on an information charging the appellant with liability for default in not complying with the Companies Act, 1862, and there are two questions, first, whether there was a default, and secondly, whether the appellant is answerable for it. The first turns on the words of the section; by it certain benefits are given subject to conditions for the protection of the public. Certain returns are to be made to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies of a list of the members of the company, and of certain other details in the formation and position of the company. This is a matter of importance, because it is held that persons dealing with companies are taken to know the position of the company. Considering that, what is the meaning of the section as to the time fixed? Is it a substantial requirement, or is it directory only? I am of opinion that the substance is that a list is once a year to be sent, and that the part of the section as to time is merely directory. A company cannot by holding no meeting evade making a return. At the end of each year there is a default, and a penalty is incurred for every day after until the default is at an end. The next question is whether the appellant was answerable. [The learned judge then decided that there was evidence to support the finding upon this head, and concluded:-] I therefore agree with my lord. AMPHLETT, B.-I am of the same opinion. The quesmeeting be held, there is no default. If it were so, such tien of most general interest is whether, if no general disastrous consequences might follow that I must say something upon the question. It cannot be that a company can, by having no meeting, avoid the salutary provisions of the Act. If they could, the directorsmight relieve themselves from giving any intelligence to vincing that it was meant that a list was to be sent, and the public. I think the words of the section are conthat the time fixed is only directory, and the directors cannot evade the duty. Cn that view alone there was a default at the conclusion of each year. But even if not concurring in that view, I should say that, as against the duty was fulfilled of calling a meeting. I need not, then, company and the directors, it must be assumed that the discuss the question raised in the Court of Queen's Bench-i.e., whether, if there was directors, having neglected to fulfil a condition precedent, no meeting, the would be within the terms of section 27. On the other points I will say no more than that I concur. Solicitors for the respondent, Bevan & Whitting. Held, that these words included all proceedings against the defendant arising out of the same assault, whether taken by the prosecutor or by any other person consequentially aggrieved thereby. This was an action brought in the Court of Common Pleas at Lancaster, by a husband and his wife, for an assault upon the wife. In the second count the husband claimed damages for losing the society and services of his wife, and for expense incurred in nursing her, and for medical attendance. By his second plea, which went to the whole declaration, the defendant stated "That the alleged trespass was a common assault committed within the jurisdiction of the borough of Bolton police district, and that Richard Stockdale, Esq., and John Green, Esq.,. being justices of the peace, and then appointed for, and acting in and for, the borough of Bolton police district, and then siting at the police-court in the said borough,. upon the complaint and charge of the said Mary Masper, the female plaintiff, preferred by her in that behalf for the female plaintiff then being the party aggrieved by the assault, then caused the defendant to be arrested and held to bail to answer the complaint and charge, and to be further dealt with according to law; that the defendant afterwards, but before this action, duly appeared before the said magistrates, who, having in the presence of the defendant heard the complaint and charge of the female plaintiff, upon the merits adjudged and determined the complaint and charge and convicted the defendant, and then ordered the defendant to forfeit and pay the sum of 10s., to be paid and applied according to law, and also to pay to the said Mary Masper, the female plaintiff, the sum of 10s. 6d. for her costs as well of the said HIGH COURT. MASPER AND WIFE V. BROWN.-FURBER v. FINLAYSON. complaint and charge as of the hearing thereof; and that immediately after the making of the said order and conviction and before action the defendant did duly pay the said sums of 10s. and 10s. 6d., being the whole amount which he was so ordered and convicted to pay as aforesaid. Demurrer on the ground that such a plea was no answer to the second count in which the husband was suing for the damages occasioned to himself by the assault upon his wife. Joinder in demurrer. 66 HIGH COURT. children. There in section 1 it is enacted that, when the defendant has been convicted before two justices of an assault upon any female whatever-words wide enough to include a married woman-" such conviction shall be a bar to all future proceedings, civil or criminal, for or in respect of the same assault." Surely those words, and those in the section on which the plea is founded, are identical in meaning? If not, this anomaly will follow, that if a person is guilty only of a common assault, he may have five or six actions subsequently brought against him; whereas, if he only aggravated his assault, he would excape with a fine, and all further proceedings would be barred. DENMAN, J.-If the words had been "for the same cause of action," I should have had more doubt. But looking at the words as they stand, I think they mean "for the same act, the same offence." The analogous statute quoted by my lord shows at least that it is not improbable that the Legislature meant to bar all proceedings, whether arising directly or indirectly from the assault. The only decision on the section seems to be Vaughton v. Bradshaw, 9 W. R. 120, 9 C. B. N. S. 107, and that is not much in point. But it has served to direct me to the very statute which is, no doubt, the foundation of this section, the 9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 27. LINDLEY, J.-I am of the same opinion. I have no doubt that "for the same cause "" here means "for the same assault." The only question that I asked myself was, By whom are the further and other proceedings to be brought? By the person assaulted only, or by others as well? I think by any one. The words here, "by or on behalf of," show that a husband or master might prosecute instead of the person assaulted, and the 18 & 19 Vict. uses the comprehensive term, "a bar to all proceedings." I agree, therefore, that this section precludes all proceedings, civil or criminal, by whomsoever taken. R. Henn Collins, for the plaintiff.-The subject-matter of the prosecution before the justices was the assault on the wife, which, no doubt, is also the subject-matter of the first count in this action. But in the second count the husband is suing, not for the injury to his wife, but for the consequential damage to himself. This is quite a distinct cause of action. In Brockbank v. Whitehaven Railway Company, 7 H. & N. 834, it was held that the husband and wife might first sue for the injuries done to the wife, and that then the husband might bring a separate action for the damages that had accrued to himin consequence of the same injuries; although, since section 40 of the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, the two causes of action may be joined in one declaration, and usually are so joined for the sake of convenience. [LINDLEY, J.-But does not " for the same cause" mean in this section "for the same assault"?] No; the word "cause" means here what it usually means: cause of action." [Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-But the words are that, by conviction and payment of the fine imposed, the defendant" shall be released from all further or other prodeedings, civil or criminal, for the same cause." You cannot have a cause of action in criminal preceedings; but the assault is the cause of all the proceedings, civil or criminal.] The words "for the same cause are here used exactly in the same sense as in the maxim Nemo bis vexari debet pro eâdem causâ, which means that you may not bring two actions for the same cause of action, nor prosecute twice for the same ground of criminal proceeding. But at common law one is bound to prosecute first, and then one may bring a civil action for the same assault. Such a course is now prevented by this statute so far as the prosecutrix is concerned; she cannot sue for damages arising out of the assault, but her husband can sue for the injuries he has sustained, since his is quite a different cause of action. The words for that cause are used precisely in that sense in Bill of sale-Possession taken-Execution creditor. Hyde v. Scyssor, Cro. Jac. 538. Sufficient effect can be given to the statute without construing it to bar actions The holder of a bill of sale, which was not registered, by persons other than the prosecutor. And the plaintiff's sent a man to take possession of the goods and prevent the construction is a reasonable one. A servant may prose-grantor retaining them. This man entered the premises cute for a battery and yet his master sue for consequential damage thereby caused to himself. This is a statute barring a common law right, and must therefore be construed strictly. No one appeared for the defendant. Lord COLERIDGE, C.J.-I think this a good plea There is no question but that the second count discloses a different ground of action from the first; but I am of opinion that the plea is an equally good answer to both. The section says that, "if any person against whom any such complaint shall have been preferred by, or on behalf of, any such person aggrieved, have obtained such certificate or, having been convicted, shall have paid the whole amount adjudged to be paid, in every such case he shall be released from all further and other pro-ceedings, civil or criminal, for the same cause." I think this is a civil proceeding for the same cause, and therefore barred by the statute. It arises from the same cause as the criminal proceedings, viz., the assault. am confirmed in this view by the words of a statute in pari materia, the 16 & 17 Vict. c. 30, an Act for the prevention of aggravated assaults upon women and I | Judgment for the defendant. Solicitors for the plaintiff, Chester, Urquhart, Mayhew, & Holden, for H. M. Richardson, Bolton. C. P. Div. Sed vich 5 Ch D809 FURBER V. FINLAYSON. бад Feb. 8. in which the goods were, but could not get into the room in which they were, but kept watch outside the door of such room, the grantor being absent. The jury having found that the man intended bonâ fide to take possession, Held, that there was evidence to justify such finding, and that a verdict found for the holder of the bill of sale against an execution creditor whose execution was put in after such taking of possession was rightly found. The bill of sale This was an interpleader issue brought to try the plaintiff's right, as holder of a bill of sale, granted to him by one Hartmont, as against the defendant, for whom the sheriff had seized under an execution. was not registered. The further facts sufficiently ap pear from the judgments. The issue was tried before and a rule was afterwards granted for a new trial, on the Lindley, J., when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, ground that there was no evidence to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's case, and that the verdict was The attention of the court was not called to Reg. v. Morris, 15 W. R. 999, L. R. 1 C. C. R. 90, where a somewhat different construction was put upon this section by the majority of the court. HIGH COURT. against the weight of evidence. argument. FURBER V. FINLAYSON.-NEWTON V. SHERRY. This now came on for Day, Q.C., and Holl, showed cause, but were stopped by the court. Cohen, Q.C., and Warr, supported the rule, citing Ex parte Jay, Re Blenkhorn, 22 W. R. 175, L. R. 9 Ch. 133; Ex parte Lewis, 19 W. R. 835, L. R. 6 Ch. 626. BRETT, J.-I am of opinion that this rule must be discharged. The goods in question had passed to the plaintiff by the bill of sale. But they were not his property as against the execution creditor unless, at the time named in the issue, the plaintiff had taken actual possession of them, and not left them in the apparent possession of the grantor. A clerk was sent by the plaintiff to take them and to keep every one else away; he went, intending bona fide to fulfil the orders, and succeeded in getting into a room which, so far as sight went, commanded the rooms in which the furniture was; those rooms were locked, and the man did not know where the key was; but he could see the rooms. Hartmont, the grantor, was away, and there was only a housekeeper there, who would probably be hostile to the plaintiff. The sheriff's officer knew the plaintiff's man was there and found him there, and got from the plaintiff an order for admission to the premises. Are those, then, facts from which a jury might say that the plaintiff was in actual possession of the goods. It is true that his man neither touched, nor saw, nor could at all get at the furniture; but he was in a position to show that he claimed to be in possession, and to keep out all others, the grantor included. I think that is sufficient evidence to go to the jury to show that the statute was satisfied. We have been pressed by two cases. Ex parte Jay is one; there the pupils of the grantor were allowed to remain in the premises and use the goods, and the persons sent to seize were kept out of sight. Then there is Ex parte Lewis; but there the men supposed to be in possession were out of the way. There, too, there was the fact that placards were up on the house announcing the furniture to be sold, but not saying that the sale was against the grantor, who was still in possession of the premises. Here the man was in a position to show that he was in actual possession, and the owner was away, and the man in possession was there to keep him away. I think there was ample evidence, and the rule must be discharged. ARCHIBALD, J.-I am of the same opinion. I not only think there was evidence to go to the jury, but that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. The Bills of Sale Act says that the instrument, if unregistered, shall in certain cases be void if the goods are in the apparent possession of the grantor, which they may be, by the interpretation clause, "notwithstanding formal possession thereof may have been taken by or given to any other person." The question is whether these goods were in the apparent possession of the grantor when they were seized by the sheriff. In interpreting the clause it must be remembered that formal possession by the grantee is not, under some circumstances, enough to prevent the grantor from being in apparent possession. No definition is given of formal possession, but it is said not to be enough. Now, was this a mere formal possession? That question turns upon whether the plaintiff did all he could, and with a bona fide intention of taking possession. My Brother Brett has stated all the facts, and from them it is clear that Hartmont was not in possession, and that no one could be so without the consent of the man sent by the plaintiff to take possession. What ought to be done by a sheriff's officer is no guide to what the holder of a bill of sale must do. I think the evidence is enough to show such possession as the latter must take, and the jury when asked to say if the possession taken was only a sham have answered in the negative. therefore agree that the rule must be discharged. I HIGH COURT. LINDLEY, J.-I am of the same opinion. I think the verdict was right, and take the same view now that I did the man in possession could not get the key, and a few at the trial. The sole thing to be said against it is that days after Hartmont came back. I cannot say that the finding was wrong. Rule discharged. Solicitor for the claimant, R. Furber. C. P. Div. Administration Feb. 11. NEWTON V. SHERRY. A notice under 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 29, advertised by an administrator and calling upon "creditors and others" to send in their claims is sufficient to protect the administrator against claims by next of kin of the intestate. This was an action on an administration bond brought by one of the next of kin of the intestate against a surety on the bond. There were nine pleas, of which the eighth and ninth alone were material to the present report. The eighth alleged a distribution of the estate after due notice given pursuant to 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 29. The ninth was one on equitable grounds, alleging that the plaintiff wilfully concealed her existence after knowing of the death of the intestate. These pleas were demurred to. At the trial a verdict was found for the plaintiff, with leave for the defendant to move to set it aside and enter it for him if the court should be of opinion that any of the pleas were proved. A rule was obtained accordingly and now came on for argument. The demurrers were argued with the rule. R. T. Reid, for the plaintiff, contended that the 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 29, did not protect against claims by next of kin, and if it did the notices given were insufficient, as they only called on "creditors and others" to send in their claims, and the words "and others" must be read as ejusdem generis with "creditors." He cited Williams on Executors, ed. 1873, p. 1340; Woods v., Weightman, 20 W. R. 459, L. R. 13 Eq. 434; and also Sandrey v. Michell, 11 W. R. 363, 3 B. & S. 405. He also contended that the advertisements ought to have been inserted in American newspapers as there was some evidence that the administratrix suspected the plaintiff to be in that country. Lumley Smith, for the defendant, was not called on. BRETT, J.-In this case we are not called upon to say whether the ninth plea is good, because it is admitted. that there was no evidence to support it. As to the eighth plea, the first question is whether the case of administrators in regard to claims of next of kin is within the protection of the statute referred to. It is an Act for the relief of trustees, and executors and administrators are within its purview. Are they protected against next of kin if the requirements of the 29th section have been followed? That section says, "Where an executor or administrator shall have given such or the like notices as, in the opinion of the court in which such executor or administrator is sought to be charged, would have been given by the Court of Chancery in an administration suit, for creditors and others to send in to the executor or administrator their claims against the estate," &c., then they shall be protected against claims not notified before the expiry of the notices. It has been suggested by Mr. Reid that the case is not within the words "and others," and that the expression must be read as referring only to persons in con HIGH COURT. simili casu with creditors. The words seem large enough to include next of kin, "for creditors and others to send in their claims," and later " any creditor or claimant." It seems to me that as this Act was passed to protect administrators, and as the damage would be equally great from the next of kin as from creditors, and as the words are large enough, I think we ought to say that administrators are protected against next of kin as well as against creditors. HIGH COURT. NEWTON V. SHERRY.-VANCE v. LOWTHER. ministration to proceed without a suit in chancery; that if the administrators, &c., have given due notice, and then distributed the estate, they should not be harassed afterwards. I think, therefore, that this administratrix is protected, and that the words" and others" include next of kin. Then it is said that that is not so as against a surety. But if the surety is defeated he will proceed against the administratrix, who will be protected, and therefore she would then be indirectly deprived of her protection. I therefore entirely agree on the question of law. As to the facts, these are to be further inquired into, and I will only add that I think the advertisement was sufficient, and that whether the locality of the newspapers was enough, must depend on the further investigation. That investigation I will undertake, and report the result to the court. The next question is whether there is evidence that the administratrix followed the directions of the section. It is said that she did not, because the advertisement did not directly call on the nex tof kin. But the advertisement follows the section, and would to any reasonable person be sufficient. Then it is said that it was not inserted in newspapers in all necessary places. It is no doubt important that estates should not be distributed without every proper means being taken to give notice to interested persons abroad; and I think it would not be enough to advertise in English papers only if the administratrix had some knowledge or suspicion that a person interested was in another country. But from the circumstances of this case, that the plaintiff had surreptitiously left her family and did not communicate with them, there can hardly be said to be reasonable ground for the administratrix to suspect that she was in America. Had she, then, notice that the plaintiff was alive? I think there was evidence for the jury that she had no notice, but that is not proof; and thinking it important that a person should not be shut out of her property, it ought, I think, to have been left to a jury, and if both sides had not expressed a wish not to have it sent back, I should have thought there ought to be a new trial. However, my Brother Lindley will have the administratrix examined before him, and if he reports that she had no notice, then the verdict for the defendant must stand; if otherwise, it must be entered for the plaintiff. not ARCHIBALD, J.—I am of the same opinion as to the eighth plea. And I think that the true construction of the statute cannot be limited to the sense attempted to be given to it by Mr. Reid. The latter part of the section is this," Such executor or administrator shall be liable for the assets, or any part thereof, so distributed to any person of whose claim such executor or administrator shall not have had notice at the time of the distribution of the assets or a part thereof, as the case may be." The earlier part shows that it is clearly intended for the protection of executors and administrators. I was at one time inclined to think that there was some weight in the distinction between claims in the distribution of the estate and claims of creditors; but I think now that the section intended to provide for such claims as well as those of creditors, for that taking the whole section you cannot confine "claims" to those in the nature of debts, for the section says 66 any person of whose claim, &c."; and again, “nothing in the present Act contained shall prejudice the right of any creditor or claimant," so that the word" claimant" is added. I agree as to the form of the advertisement, and as to the importance of the notice, being so advertised as to give fair notice to all parties. But the question whether the notice is properly advertised is one of degree, and depends on the circumstances. Here the intestate was English and of English family, and there was only one member of the family away, and she was one who had gone years before. I think in such a case it was not necessary to advertise further than was done. LINDLEY, J.-I am of the same opinion. As to the application of the 29th section to claims by next of kin, I think that it is putting an unnecessarily narrow meaning on the section if it is to be confined to claims in the nature of those by creditors. The real object was to protect, not administrators and executors only, but all those beneficially interested in estates, and to enable the ad Held, that the alteration of the date was a material alteration, and invalidated the cheque. This was an appeal from the county court of Lancashire. The action was on a cheque drawn by the defendant on the Manchester and County Bank in favour of S. Bagnall or bearer. The cheque was dated the 2nd of March, 1875, and on the same day was paid by the defendant to S. Bagnall. On the following day S. Bagnall gave it to his clerk with instructions to pay it to his credit at his bank. The clerk absconded with the cheque, and retained it in his possession until the 5th of April, and whilst it so remained in his possession, and before he paid it to the plaintiff, he altered the date thereof from the 2nd of March, 1875, to the 26th of March, 1875. He then passed it to the plaintiff, who took it for value. On the 4th of March, 1875, notice was given to the bank not to pay the cheque if presented, and on the 6th of April, 1875,, the cheque was so presented by the plaintiff, and payment thereof refused. The learned judge found, as a fact, that the plaintiff had not been guilty of negligence in taking the cheque from the clerk, and he held that under the circumstances the alteration of the date was not material, and thereupon a verdict was entered for the plaintiff. The question for the opinion of the court was whether the judgment so given was right. Crompton, for the defendant, cited Hirschman v. Budd, 21 W. R. 502, L. R. 8 Ex. 171. (He was stopped by the court.) Baylis (Julian Robins with him), for the plaintiff.—The alteration here was not material. First, under the Stamp Laws the date of a cheque payable to order or demand is not material: Bull v. O'Sullivan, L. R. 6 Q. B. 209, 19 W. R. C. L. Dig. 17; and 33 & 34 Vict. c. 96, ss. 54, |