1898.

provision denying to any state the right to pass any law impairing the obligation of a contract.

court jurisdiction, the state court must in words allude to the subsequent legislation and in terms give effect to it. It may be asIn all the litigation arising in the state sumed that if the real substance and necescourts, by reason of the subsequent legisla-sary effect of the judgment of the state court tion by Virginia upon the subject, the claim was the determination of a Federal question was made, on a review of the judgments in or the giving effect to subsequent legislation, this court, that the judgments of the state this court would have jurisdiction to review courts had given effect to statutes which that judgment, notwithstanding the particuwere passed subsequently to the original cou-lar language used in the opinion. But when pon statutes, and that the original contract the case before the state court could have made by those statutes had been impaired been decided upon two distinct grounds, one by reason of those subsequent statutes to only of which embraced a Federal question, rested which effect was given by the judgments the sole way of determining upon which of of the state courts. It was the giving ef- those grounds the judgment was If that fect by the judgment of the court to the would be to examine the language used in subsequent statutes, which it was alleged the opinion of the state court. impaired the contract, that gave jurisdiction language showed the judgment was founded to this court to decide for itself whether wholly upon a non-Federal question, this there was a contract, and, if so, what the court would be without power to review it. contract was, as a preliminary to the deci- Whether the state court has decided this sion of the question whether the subsequent case wholly without reference to subsequent statutes impaired the contract as construed legislation can only be learned from its opinby this court. The cases in which this court ion. To this extent it has always been decides for itself, without reference to the within the power of the state court to dedecision of the state court, what the contract termine the jurisdiction of this court. If[128] was, are cases where there has been, not only the former court chooses to decide a case upsubsequent legislation which is alleged to on a non-Federal question, when it might impair the contract, but also legislation have decided it upon one which was Federal which has been given some effect to by the in its nature, the effect of such choice is to judgment of the state court. Such is the deprive this court of jurisdiction, no matter case of Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 1 how erroneous we may regard the decision Black, 436, 443 [17:173, 177], and such are of the state tribunal. The power is with all the other cases decided in this court upon the state court in such cases to deprive us of jurisdiction to review its determination, that subject. If by the judgment of the state court in and we are wholly without any power to this case no effect has been given to any control its action in that respect. This is statute passed subsequently to either of the what has been done, and all that has been The opinion of the state coupon acts, this court is without jurisdic- done in this case. court shows that the judgment went upon tion to review that judgment. Water Company v. Easton, 121 U. S. 388 the original and inherent invalidity of the [30: 1059]; New Orleans Waterworks Com-coupon statutes and its judgment in that pany v. Louisiana Sugar Ref. Company, 125 U. Š. 18 [31: 607]; St. Paul, M. & M. Railway Co. v. Todd County, 142 U. S. 282 [35: 1014]; Central Land Company v. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 [40: 91]; Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. 207 [41: 132]. [127] *If there had never been any subsequent legislation regarding these coupon acts, and the highest court of the state had adjudged that they were void as being in violation of the Constitution of the state existing at the time of their passage, of course there would be no jurisdiction in this court to review that judgment. And the state court might have decided the case in different ways, at one time holding the acts valid and subsequently holding them void, and still this court would have no jurisdiction to re-examine the judgments of that court. This would be true even if millions of dollars had been invested in the bonds upon the strength of the judgment of the state court first giv. en holding the acts valid.

Lehigh

The cases above cited show that even if there has been subsequent legislation, if the judgment of the state court does not give that legislation any effect, and decides the case without reference thereto, this court is also without jurisdiction to review that judgment.

I do not say that in order to give this

respect, as I shall hereafter attempt to show,
gave no effect to any subsequent legislation.
That is the material question in this case
upon which the jurisdiction of this court
hangs. Prior decisions of this court in
other cases holding the contract valid, where
we had jurisdiction to determine such cases,
can have no effect upon the question of our
jurisdiction to review the judgment in the
case at bar. Prior decisions in such event
constitute no ground of jurisdiction.

But

I concede, plainly and fully, the power of this court to review a judgment of the state court when effect has been given by that judgment to subsequent legislation claimed to impair the validity of a contract. that vital fact must appear in order to support the jurisdiction, and without it the jurisdiction does not exist, no matter how important the question may be or how many times it may have been heretofore decided.

The

To say that the duty is cast upon this court to inquire whether a state has passed a law impairing the obligations of a prior contract is but to half state the case. inquiry must be further prosecuted to the extent of learning whether the state court has, by its judgment, given effect to such subsequent legislation, and, if it has not, then no duty or right rests upon this court to review the judgment.

391

In this class of cases the absolutely unbending and essential fact which must exist, in order to give jurisdiction to review a judgment of a state court, is subsequent legislation to which effect has been given by the judgment of the state court. This court is not the Mecca to which all dissatisfied suitors in the state courts may turn for the correction of all the errors said to have been committed by the state tribunals. Nor is it confided to this court to supervise the judgments of a state court in all cases where we may think that court has by its later decision invalidated a contract which it had once held to be lawful, and the judgment in which this court had upheld. The right of the state court in another case to reverse its former ruling is wholly unaffected by the fact that its former judgment had been affirmed here. Unless the Federal question exists in this case there is no ground of jurisdiction

However true it may be that in many prior | ers when reviewing a judgment of a state cases this court has held there was a valid court. contract created by the coupon statutes, so called, which could not be impaired by any [129]subsequent *legislation, the fact remains that unless such subsequent legislation has been given effect to by the judgment in this case, there is not the slightest shadow of a claim for jurisdiction in this court to review that judgment. Millions or hundreds of millions of dollars may have been invested in reliance upon a judgment of this court declaring the law to be that there was a valid contract, and yet a state court might in a subsequent action adjudge that there never was a valid contract, because the statute which it was claimed created it was in violation of the state Constitution. If that judgment did not, in effect, put in operation any subsequent legislation, the solemn adjudications of this court in some former cases that the contract was valid, could not affect the judgment in question nor furnish ground for the jurisdiction of this court to review that judg-founded upon any prior decisions. ment. This court is not intrusted with the Now, has this judgment of the state court duty of supervising all decisions of state given effect to any subsequent legislation? courts to the end that we may see to it that At the time of the passage of the coupon acts such decisions are never inconsistent, contra- there was no prior statute in Virginia perdictory, or conflicting. We supervise those mitting taxes to be paid in coupons of any decisions only when a Federal question aris- kind whatever. The sole authority for such es. It is said this court is not bound to fol- attempted payment of taxes rested in the low the last decision of a state court revers- coupon statutes under consideration. If they ing its prior rulings upon a question of the gave no such authority, then none existed, validity of a contract, when bonds have been and no payment of taxes by means of coupons issued and taken in reliance upon the deci- was valid. This is wholly irrespective of the sion of the state court adjudging the validity subsequent acts. The state court has held of the law under which the bonds were issued. the coupon *acts to be entirely void, because[131] I do not dispute the proposition, but it has in violation of the state Constitution in exnothing to do with this case. Where an ac- istence when they were passed. Under that tion has been brought under such circum- decision those acts are to all intents and stances in a Federal court, it has been fre- purposes as if they never had been passed. quently held that such court was not bound They therefore furnished not the slightest to follow the latest decision of the state form of legality to a payment of taxes in coucourt which invalidated the law under which pons. It was not a statute to forbid paying bonds had been issued, at a time when the taxes in coupons that was necessary in order state court had held the law valid. In such to deprive such payments of legality. A case the Federal court would follow the prior statute, a valid statute authorizing such paydecision of the state court and apply it to all ment, was necessary in the first instance, and the securities which had been issued prior to if there were no such statute there was no the time when the state court changed its de- authority existing to receive coupons in paycision. But such a case raises no question ment of taxes. The supreme court of apof jurisdiction in this court to review the peals of Virginia, in a case in which it had judgment of a state court. When that ques- jurisdiction, decided there was no such stattion of jurisdiction does arise, the right of ute, and consequently no such authority, bereview cannot rest upon the fact that the cause the statute purporting to confer that state court has refused to follow its former authority was void, as in violation of the decision, and, on the contrary, has directly Constitution of the state. This judgment [130]*overruled it. The jurisdiction of this court did not give the slightest effect to the legis to review the state court in this class of cases lation subsequent to the coupon statutes. It is confined in the first instance to an inquiry simply held there were no coupon statutes, as to the existence of subsequent legislation because those which purported to be such upon the subject, and if none has been en- were totally void. No subsequent statute acted to which any effect has been given by was necessary, and none such was given efthe state court, this court cannot review the fect to. Striking down the coupon statutes decision of the state tribunal, even though effectually destroyed any assumed right to that decision makes worthless a contract pay taxes in coupons, and the subsequent legwhich it had prior thereto held valid. islation was needless and ineffectual. Thus the whole groundwork upon which to base our jurisdiction in this case falls to the ground, and we are left to maintain it upon the insufficient claim of prior decisions of this

The cases of Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque,
1 Wall. 175 [17: 520], and Ohio & M. Rail-
road Company v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511 [19:
997] illustrate this difference between the
powers of this court when reviewing a judg-court.
ment of a lower Federal court and its pow- In truth, the particular question decided

affirmed, as to that point, by this court. In this decision now before us it has given no effect to subsequent legislation, and not having done so, but simply decided a question of local law regarding its own Constitution, the state court has given no decision which raises a Federal question, and therefore none that this court can review.

in this case has never been before this court. In some of the former cases this court decided the general proposition that the coupon legislation was valid and created a contract. After it had thus decided, a case came before it where a subsequent statute provided that, in the case of the school tax, coupons should not be received in payment thereof. The state court had decided that the coupon stat- Under all the circumstances I can only see ute was invalid so far as it related to the a determination to take jurisdiction in this school tax, because the Constitution in exist-case simply because this court, as it is said, ence when the coupon acts were passed required in substance that such tax must be paid in lawful money, and consequently the coupon act was unconstitutional as to such [132]tax. This court affirmed that judgment. Vashon v. Greenhow, 135 U. S. 662, 713 [34: 304, 320]. Part of the coupon statute was thus held invalid by the state court and also by this court.

The state had also passed a subsequent statute providing that the tax for a license to retail liquor should be paid in lawful money. This court (affirming in that respect the court below) held that act valid, because it was in effect a regulation of the liquor traffic, and the state could at all times legislate upon that subject, notwithstanding the coupon acts and the alleged contract therein created. Hucless v. Childrey, 135 U. S. 662, 709 [34: 304, 319]. Both of these decisions were made subsequently to the time when this court had held the coupon statute valid, and that a valid contract was therein created.

The state court has now decided in this case that as the coupon acts were invalid as to the payment of the school tax in coupons (a proposition concurred in by this court), the result was that the whole acts were invalid, that they could not stand partly valid and partly void, and that the whole coupon scheme was unconstitutional. This phase of the controversy has never before reached this court, and the court has therefore never before decided this particular point. It has said, generally, that the legislation was valid, but it said SO only in cases where the general power of the legislature to enact the coupon statutes was in question, and it has never decided squarely the point that if the coupon acts be unconstitutional in some particulars they are nevertheless valid in all others. The fact is alluded to simply as matter of history.

But even if it had, that fact confers no jurisdiction upon this court to review this judgment, if it otherwise is without it. In other words, because this court has hereto

fore decided the question of the validity of

the contract, in cases where it had jurisdiction, that fact furnishes no foundation for its jurisdiction in this case, where the state court has given no effect to any subsequent legislation. Prior decision is not the foundation of jurisdiction. What I say is, that whether there have been two or more decisions, is wholly immaterial; jurisdiction cannot be taken because it is said that in a second or subsequent decision the state court [133]did not follow its first decision in regard to the contract, although that decision had been

has in cases in which it had jurisdiction decided the question differently from the decision in this case by the state court. That ground does not give jurisdiction, and that is the only ground that does exist.

The writ of error should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

UNITED STATES, Appt.,

v.

RANLETT & STONE.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 133-148.)

Appraiser of imported goods-when appraisement is valid-duty on American bags-foreign-made bags.

1.

2.

3.

4.

The judgment of an appraiser after actual examination, that imported goods are not as described, but fall within a different classification, must stand as against the importer, unless reversed on reappraisement, or by the board of general appraisers on protest filed.

An appraisement is not invalid as against the importer because the examination was not made in accordance with U. S. Rev. Stat. § 2901, which is intended for the benefit of the government.

The separation of American-made bags, which are free from duty, from foreign-made bags imported in the same bales, should be made by the importer if he wishes to obtain the exemptions on the former, and he cannot require the separation to be made by the goverument.

The prima facie showing that bags imported are of American manufacture is overturned when it appears that foreign bags in large numbers are included in the same bales with those of American make.

[No. 20.]

Argued and Submitted April 20, 1898. Restored to docket, and certiorari to bring up entire record ordered April 25, 1898. Submitted October 11, 1898. Decided December 5, 1898.

States Circuit Court of Appeals for the

N WRIT of certiorari to the United

Fifth Circuit, after certification of questions to this court, to review a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Fifth Circuit reversing the decision of the board of general appraisers and decreeing that certain duties paid by Ranlett & Stone on imported bags be refunded and that the liquidation of duties before made be set aside and the duties reliquidated. Reversed, with directions to enter a decree for the refunding of one fourth of the duties paid.

Statement by Mr. Chief Justice Fuller: [134] *Ranlett & Stone imported at the port of New Orleans, from Liverpool, England, 2,925 bales of grain bags, known as cental bags, each bale containing one thousand bags, or 2,925,000 in all, by several vessels, the entries running from August 14, 1893, to Jan-it has not been advanced in value or improved uary 15, 1894.

“Art. 332. To guard against fraud, and to dise, insert filled with and a description of the insure identity, the collector shall require, in addition to proof of clearance, the production of a statement, certified by the

"Third. An affidavit by the importer, at- | did not come under the provisions of section tached to the entry, that the articles men- 2910 of the Revised Statutes. tioned therein are to the best of his knowledge and belief truly and bona fide manufactures of the United States, or were bags exported therefrom filled with grain."

"Fifth. Verification after examination, by the appraiser, with an indorsement stating whether the articles are of domestic or of foreign manufacture.

"Such bags and other coverings exported to be returned should, when practicable, be marked or numbered, in order that they may be identified on their return; and the marks or numbers should appear on the shipper's manifest upon which they are exported. When the respective shipments arrived in this country free entry was made by the importer and evidence furnished regarding the right to free entry and the character of the goods. Samples of the respective invoices were then sent to the appraiser's office and

examined as follows:

From one entry of 600 bales, 70 were ordered to the appraiser's store and 18 of that number were opened by him;

Of another entry of 650 bales, 43 were ordered to the store and 19 were opened;

Of a third entry of 325 bales, 38 were ordered to the store and 13 were opened; Of a fourth entry of 850 bales, 85 were ordered to the store and 16 were opened;

The Board of General Appraisers sustained the action of the collector. General Appraisers' Decisions, No. 2623.

The importers applied for a review of this
decision to the circuit court of the United

States for the fifth circuit, which, without
taking any additional testimony, reversed
the decision of the board, and entered a de-
cree that the duties paid by Ranlett &
Stone, namely, two cents per pound on the
several consignments of bags, enumerating
them, be refunded; "that the examination
heretofore made of said bales of bags is void
and not in conformity to law or the regula-
tions of the Treasury Department, and any
liquidation of duties based on said examina-
tion is illegal and void, and the liquidation
of duties heretofore made be set aside, and
the money *received from Ranlett & Stone[139]
as duties be refunded as aforesaid; and the
court doth further order and decree that the
collector direct a re-examination of said
bales of bags to be made according to law,
and on such re-examination to reliquidate
the duties which may be lawfully due there-
on."

The United States appealed from the de-
cree to the circuit court of appeals, which
certified certain questions to this court,
whereupon a writ of certiorari was issued
and the entire record brought up.

Messrs. Henry M. Hoyt, Assistant Attorney General, and W. J. Hughes for appellant on first and second argument and submission.

Mr. William A. Maury for appellees on first argument and submission.

Messrs. Thomas J. Semmes and Will

iam A. Maury for appellees on second sub-
mission.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the

opinion of the court:

Of a fifth entry of 300 bales, 21 were ordered to the store and 14 were opened; Of a sixth entry of 100 bales, 100 were ordered to the store and 10 were opened; And of a seventh entry of 100 bales, 100 were ordered to the store and 10 were opened. [138]*The examination of the bales was made by the appraiser, assisted by an examiner. The appraiser reported as to each importation that the bales contained bags of foreign manufacture, subject to duty, and thereupon the collector, by direction of the Treasury Department, at the request of the importers, in order to obtain possession of the goods, made impost entries, assessing duties at the rate of two cents per pound on the entire consignment, under paragraph 365 of the act The opinion of the General Appraisers of 1890, 26 Stat. at L. 593, as "bags for grain stated that "it was admitted that there were made of burlaps." The importers protested bags of foreign manufacture and of Ameriagainst the "decision, liquidation, and rate can manufacture, all indiscriminately minand amount of duties assessed," on the gled together, no attempt being made on engrounds: That the bags were entitled to try or afterwards to separate from these free entry under paragraph 493 of the free enormous totals of goods of the same class list as bags of American manufacture, ex- those claimed to be relieved from duty acported filled with American products; that, companied by the proof establishing such inif not free under that paragraph, they were "in some cases examined every bale of the dulgence." The examiner testified that he entitled to free entry under the provisions whole entire invoice;" that he used his judg of section seven of the act of February 8, ment "to try to open sufficient to get at the 1875, and the regulations for the free entry classification of the goods;" and that where of bags other than of American manufacture, he opened the bales and examined them he prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury found of foreign make in general "from sev thereunder; and that the goods were not enty-five to eighty per cent." Indeed we do fairly and faithfully examined by the ap- not understand the importers to deny that praisers; that the assessment of two cents these importations contained foreign-made per pound because the bales contained a mix-bags. ture of foreign and American bags was in- Under title 33 of the Revised Statutes a correct, and that the goods being all of one duty was imposed on grain bags, value, whether of foreign or American make, those manufactured in the United

*In respect of these importations, it must[139] be assumed that the bags were not in fact all of American manufacture or substantially so.

except
States [140]