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this fashion, with this merit of equality? Did he not say, in so many words, that inequality was no great evil-meaning of course, comparatively no great one? And yet how could he well hold such language as this? In his own Report, from which I have read before, is not inequality of representation the very first evil enumerated? Was not the promise of a remedy for it the great persuasive everywhere to vote for the Convention? And now that we are in Convention to find the remedy-and two plans are presented to your choice, one of which accomplishes the object perfectly, and the other totally fails, and makes the matter a great deal worse than before-is it all at once recollected that the difference between equality and inequality, in this behalf, is quite trivial after all -merely a little matter of arithmetic or so-that "black's not so black, nor white so very white?" Is it all at once recollected that almost anything is better than for the people to be equally represented in the House; that that is very pretty talkgood words and commendable-a good enough topic for enthusiastic young dreamers, but that your solid man, who goes to the bottom of things, does not hold it important, any more than he holds it attainable? Is it all at once forgotten that equality of political right and power-among all the members of the State-unless an overruling necessity forbids it-is not a matter of mere convenience or caprice, but of justice, of humanity, a moral duty, a virtue—within the domain of conscience? Is it forgotten that justice is the one great concern of the State; its fairest ornament; its surest defence?

I may mistake, but I have always supposed that in a State perfectly homogeneous like Massachusetts, without ranks, orders, classes; without antagonisms of interests, institutions, pursuits, or moral sentiments; for it is of a Commonwealth thus absolutely kindred, and the same everywhere, that I speak; and it is the failure to discriminate between such an one and others, in these respects totally different, which has created some confusion and embarrassment to the chairman; in such a State, I have always supposed, that, according to our theories of liberty and justice, a system of representation in the popular branch was perfect, very much in proportion as it achieved an equal representation of every inhabitant, man, woman, or child; and that the nearest practicable approximation to this, was not merely a pretty good thing, a good enough thing in its way, a good thing to talk of, but that almost as much as all other things put together; it was the one characteristic and distinguishing mark and triumph of a republican polity. Observe, Sir, I repeat, that it is with sole reference to a State like Massachusetts that I say this. To others, differently constituted, it has no application. From the practice of others, differently constituted, you can derive no instruction whatever on what is practicable or what is right for us. And, therefore, the chairman only embarrasses himself and the argument, by the irrelevant analogies of the government of the United States. Sir, we all perfectly well understand, that in the construction of such a stupendous system as that, for a country so vast and so diverse, expanded now across a continent, broken up at the time the Union was formed into States, every one independent, every one equally a sovereignty with every other, distinguished by great diversity of productions and pursuits, and foreseeing already

essential differences of opinion as to the industrial and general policy of the future nation; every one separated from every other by the habits of a long colonial life, although attracted also to every other by the deep conviction of the necessity of uniting, and by a recent community of effort and glory; we all know that a representation of the whole American people as one mass, equally in both Houses of Congress, was neither possible nor desirable. The smallest States, equal exactly, in the eye of public law, to the largest, would not consent to such a thing. No man who has well studied our national system, and appreciated how indispensable is the existence and agency of State governments to save us from tyranny and corruption intolerable, could wish that they had. The result was a polity, elaborate, artificial, complex, heterogeneous in its structure, but in its working harmonized and glorious.

And so there are single States-such as Virginia, whose Blue Ridge, to some extent, divides her population, holding slaves, from that not holding them; and Kentucky, along whose margin on the Ohio, tendencies to emancipation have been said to be creeping, "with fear of change perplexing her," in which those interested in the local institution would scarcely choose to oppose it without artificial security to the general suffrage of a people represented equally, and in mass, by the head.

On the true policy of such States I say nothing, and I know nothing. But this I believe, and this I say, that in Massachusetts-the most homogeneous community that ever existed-certainly none more so-a family of persons all related, as you may say, by blood or marriage, to one another; not so much spread over as clustered closely on a little area of seven thousand square miles; every man within a day's ride of every other; all occupations and interests distributed with remarkable uniformity everywhere, and no one tending, in the least degree, to conflict with any other; town linked to country, and county to county, by "cords no man can break "-in such a state it should be our aim, our boast, to carry into practice the most genial and just politics; to bring civil rights and natural rights into the closest conformity; to raise this word or this thing equality, from an idea in the mind, a phrase in the Bill of Rights, into realized government; to clear the Constitution of whatever injustice it works; to found it on the granite, and to adorn it with the beauty of a morality that is eternal.

This opinion I brought with me into the Convention. And what is the opinion of the Convention itself on the general proposition? Has it not, under your lead, Mr. Chairman, with almost entire unanimity, divided the State into senatorial districts, each containing an equal population, and assigned a senator to each? What was the principle of that proceeding? On what reason was it that you have declared, that if here are two areas, side by side, each having on it the same number of human beings, every individual in one mass shall have the same amount of representation in the Senate-shall be equally near his representative in the Senate, with every individual in the other mass, although one area is larger, the other smaller; one rich, the other poor; one in the country, and the other on the sea? Sir, that reason was very clearly stated in debate. It was agreed to by all who took part in it. The discussion was general and able, and it is now of record.

[June 16th.

Shall I remind you what was, that day, the doctrine of this body? I understood it to be this: that every one is a human being equally with every other; and as such, has an equal right to be equally represented in government, with every other; that to be represented is a vast good, existing in the social state, and indispensable to the secure and full enjoyment of all which the social state can do for man; but that it is a good which every one may possess, equally with every other, without impairing the value of the good itself, or. in the least degree, abridging or displacing the possession of it by every other; that, therefore, representation-the being represented—the haring a right to be represented—is not in the nature of property in things-the essence of which is appropriation to an owner excluding all others from participating-but is rather in the nature of a right to life; to liberty; to happiness; to freedom of the soul; to freedom of the mind-whereof a state, a nation, a race, may share equally, and have, therefore, a right to share equally. It is a civil good; a social good; a political good; but it belongs to every human being alike; because his nature, the end of his existence, the will of his Maker, place him in the social, civil, and political state, and give him every good therein; the enjoyment of which by him invades no other man's right, and no other man's power of enjoy

ment.

Or to state your reasons less abstractly. You thought and held that every one, of all this mass, has needs and interests that require for him, and make it humane and just to give him, an equal quantity of representation, so to speak, with every other. Every one is a human being, whose person may be outraged by violence--and who, therefore, needs a law to protect him, and a representative to make the law. He is a person whose moral and spiritual nature may be improved by culture, and who, therefore, needs a wise and beneficent legislature to provide such culture, and a representative to promote such legislation. The infant in the mother's arms needs a law of infancy, and a representative to make it. The insane in a mad-house need a law, and an asylum of insanity, and a representative to make it. Every one is a human being, on whom the general doom attaches alike; to whom may come alike

"The oppressor's wrong, the proud man's contumely, the law's delay; The insolence of office, and the spurns

That patient merit of the unworthy takes; **

to whom alike may happen all things which government and laws can cause or cure, and therefore every one needs, alike and equally, representation in that government which makes that law. And this need you thought and held it humane, just, and morally right to supply. Is not this principle decisive of this question?

It is true, Sir,--and here is a distinction of some importance, in regard to which there is much confusion of ideas,--that when we come to determine who shall vote-that is, who shall act in bringing the particular representative into existence in the particular case,-then we have to look at something more, and other than the mere right or mere need of being represented. In such case, and for such objects, you have to require capacity also; intelligence, free will, physical, and other qualifications. These all do not possess. Childhood is too immature; the insane want discretion; the pauper, and the person under guardian

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ship, wants free will; woman is too delicate, and refined, and retiring, to "jostle and elbow, and win her way in a crowd." All do not possess the indispensable qualifications to vote; and therefore you select a portion, say one-fifth or one-sixth, who do possess them; and as my friend from Salem, (Mr. Lord,) speaking on another subject the other day, expressed it,-with exact propriety of constitutional and legal language,-you choose them into the office, and bestow on them the name and duties of legal voters. Theirs it is to bring the particular representative in the given case into being. But this right, this power, they hold in trust for themselves and for every-body. And so mark the distinction. The right to, the need of, an equal share of representation, an equal nearness, so to speak, to the representative, is one thing. The capacity to go to the polls, and vote intelligently and freely, is another thing. The right, the need, is found wherever a man, or woman, or child exists, inhabiting the State. The capacity demands specific faculties, and is lodged in fewer hands. Yet remember, that although these few compose ever the actual government, and no other participates or is consulted; yet that, according to a sound political morality, they hold it in trust; they hold it in trust for all; they hold it in trust for all equally; and therefore, if here is a civil or political thing called representation, the being represented,-which is a privilege, an enjoyment, a security, a good of priceless value; this also are they bound in conscience to apportion equally to all, unless a controlling necessity forbids.

All these, Mr. Chairman, I gather from its votes to be the opinions of this Convention. They express a higher and a wiser estimate of the merit of equality, and the vice of inequality, in representation, than the chairman advances in his speech, or exemplifies in his plan. They are American opinions; and they are sound opinions. I do not say that they can be acted on with safety elsewhere. I do not know that there is, or is not, a foreign state on earth that is ripe for them. Existing conditions of things, the product of an old time, still ruling the world from which it has passed away, may elsewhere, for centuries, resist their introduction. But their intrinsical beauty and justice, the teachers whom I best love, all liberal writers and thinkers under all systems, acknowledge and display. I find two ideas in such writers, which I commend to you; the first, that equality in representation, if attainable, is matter of right, of justice, of humanity, of the higher morals, and not of caprice or convenience only-and the second, that one great aim of true reform, and a real progress, is peaceably and gradually to remove the artificial inequalities which history has produced; to cause the law to tend ever towards the perfectly humane, and the perfectly just; and to bring civil and political rights nearer and nearer to the rights of nature. It is no place or time to verify this remark; but you will allow me to bring to your recollection a sentiment of Sir James Macintosh, concerning representation of places, as distinct from persons; and another of Dr. Whewell, the Master of Trinity College, and an eminent living writer-on the offices of reform and the nature of progress :—

"I must avow"-it is in his reply to Burke, on the French Revolution, that Mackintosh says this "with the same frankness, equal disapprobation of the admission of territory and contribution

as elements entering into the proportion of representation. The representation of land or money is a monstrous relic of ancient prejudice; men only can be represented; and population alone ought to regulate the number of representatives which any district delegates."

I read now from Dr. Whewell :—

"The events of history have at every step led to present inequalities. What then is the course which justice prescribes? We answer that justice requires us to aim constantly to remedy the inequalities which history produces. Such remedying of injustice is a part of the general duty of moral progress which belongs to states as well as to individuals. We have already said that the law must perpetually and slowly tend to the idea of justice." "Natural rights are the ideal conditions of moral society; they may be suspended in fact; the idea being imperfectly realized. When this is so, it is the business of all good men constantly to make the fact approach to the idea; to make law agree with humanity; to make civil rights coincide with natural rights."

I have answered the question, how great an evil is inequality of representation; and how much better is ours for being equal, than yours for being unequal. Ours cures the specific grievance which brought the Convention together; yours does not. Ours is just; yours is unjust. Ours makes political rights coincide with natural rights; yours does not try to do so. Ours aims to remove certain inequalities produced by history and accident, and substitute and vindicate an original justice; yours does not. Ours recognizes " right as the true sovereign of the world"; yours adheres to traditional forms. Ours recog

nizes "that inviolability of principles is the palladium of freedom and the palladium of virtue"; yours deserts principles.

And now, Mr. Chairman, I come to speak on the final, perhaps harder question; which is, whether, after all, there is difficulty insuperable— difficulty amounting to civil necessity that cannot be controlled-to prevent our putting into the Constitution the equality which our reason and our conscience approve. I agree that if all this inequality which disfigures the chairman's plan is necessary, there is an end to the matter. I know very well, and have keenly felt, and often said, before to-day, that when you come to apply a great principle to practice, you must be sometimes content to rest in a very distant approximation to the exactly true, and the exactly right. What, then, is the rule of morals for such a case? This precisely. If it is matter of necessity-if, under the responsibilities of this place, to duty, to the Commonwealth, you can say that it is matter of necessity, to come short of perfect justice in apportioning political right and power, you are excused. If it is necessary to put the government of Massachusetts into the hands of about one-third of its people or one-third of its voters, you are excused in doing it. If it is necessary to put it into the hands of one man, and his heirs male and female, you are excused for doing that. If it is necessary to say that a farmer in Franklin, being a legal voter, shall have three times, or twice, as much right or power as a farmer or fisherman, being also a legal voter, in Essex, in Bristol, in Barnstable-you are excused in giving it to him.

[June 16th.

though it may, and sometimes does, dictate a distasteful proceeding to an honest statesman-is "the tyrant's plea" also; and affords a pretty easy and tempting pretext to extenuate and gild the desertion of a great political principle. I appeal to your consciences, then, to know what is the necessity for unequal representation ?

Well, the answer is, first, and broadly, this-that we must continue to elect our representatives by separate and single towns, and for separate and single towns. We must continue to attach power, right and privilege, to place-not to men, not to inhabitants, not to ratable polls, not to legal voters; but to place. This will, of course, work inequality, for that is inseparable from strict town representation; but strict town representation, inequality or no inequality, we must keep up whether we will or not. This is the necessity.

Well, Sir, if we must, we must. But is it quite clear that we must do any such thing? Who will take upon him to say that he knows that we live too late or too early in the lifetime of Massachusetts to be able to be just? Who has shown, or may show, that our existing practice of representation, however ancient, puts it out of our power to establish reason and the right, in an amended Constitution? The chairman deprecates our laying the towns upon the "Procrustean bed of an idea of equality." I thought it had been the aim, the boast, of a true reform, quietly to adapt the contrivances which we inherit to the times in which we act, and to correct the inequalities and injustice which history has transmitted. Gentlemen are becoming strangely distrustful of our ability all at once. Called together, as they have said, to apply relief to great vices in the government, to celebrate a supposed progress, to accomplish large and various reforms, representing the primary and absolute sovereignty of the people, uncontrolled by anything but the law under which we assemble, and our obligations to duty, are certain old usages—once more just, now unjust-too strong for us? Is it all at once found out that accident; that the past-and not reason, conscience, and free will-can alone determine the form of the Constitution? Why, if the Chairman will give me leave, it almost warrants the adaptation of an appeal of Mr. Grattan to the Irish House of Commons!

"Shall the historian, after tracing the earlier stages of your proceedings, stop at equality of representation, and observe, here the principal men among the reformers were found wanting-and when justice was within their grasp, and her temple opened its folding doors, fell down and were prostituted at the threshold !”

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tion and give it to the schools of Massachusetts ? You know you cannot. But can you not totally change the existing practice of electing representatives by towns, and for towns, and perform the the same office by districts? You know that you can, as easily, and as innocently, if the public good requires it, as you can mend your pens. This settles the question of property. "Property exists for the benefit of the proprietor. Political power exists only for the service of the State." It is for the service of the State that towns exercise this power, and the State may resume the trust whenever justice, equality, the best interests of the State require it. It is in its nature exactly such a right-if right you choose to call it-as law and a usage of six hundred years had given Gatton and Old Sarum in England-good while the law stood-good for nothing to prevent a change, or after a change of the law. It is just such a right as belongs to all old traditional political privileges and things-to all things which

are "

dragged down in the net of time "—and it is to be dealt with accordingly. If useful, they are to be retained; if indifferent, retained or not, as sentiment or taste may prescribe; if useless, or certainly, if mischievous or unjust, to be abolished. It is precisely such a right (I agree perfectly in this with my colleague, Mr. Schouler,) as our counties have had heretofore to elect senators by a general county ticket, by the county and for the county. This practice was ancient too. This too, was authorized by the Constitution. The counties were attached to it. They were accustomed to it. It was a strict corporate function. Old associations gave its exercise interest and value. Yet I heard no pathetic eloquence the other day when you cut those counties up into senatorial single districts, as coolly as the Judge of Probate cuts up the old homestead, and parcels it among the boys and girls, when the father is dead.

But it is said that although it is not a right, the towns are attached to it, and will not give it up. Sir, will you allow the people a chance to speak for themselves? How do you know they will not? They will give it up if they ought to do so, will they not? They ought to if it works injustice. But it works inequality-gross-offensivesectional, putting man over man-country over town-and inequality is injustic-if you can prevent it and do not. Try them. Perhaps they may prove to be more equal to the appreciation of a sound and large idea, than you imagine; more attached to things and less to forms; more mindful of substance, and less mindful of shams; more anxious for realities and rights, than for artificial regulations; more careful of living and present interests, than of the traditions of a buried past. How do you know it will not turn out to be popular to have done the right and the just thing, to all, and for all-even to the stranger within your gates?

Besides. Does not every-body see that there has been a constant progress in our system of government towards a more complete and equal representation of the people-and that we have arrived at the moment when the last relics of a representation of place are just ready to disappear naturally and in the fullness of time?

Causes

beyond our reach-tendencies which we could not control if we would, and ought not to if we could, have they not long been conducting to this consummation, and will they not inevitably, and speedily effect it? Gentlemen have instruct

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. — CHOATE.

ed us in this debate in the history of our representation. Without engaging in any detail in that research, I see one long and steady progress from the day when the first Constitution was written in the cabin of the Mayflower to this. Under the colonial and provincial governments our representation may be admitted to have been somewhat after the English type; and that was very much a representation of place. It was more popular; but it was somewhat English; it was framed on a mixed idea; of a right in place, and also in man. "We tried to reflect, with a true filial resemblance, the beauteous countenance of British liberty," and we reflected some of its deformities also. That was, in one sense, the day of small things in freedom. "First the blade, then the ear, after that the full corn in the ear." I honor and love the strong, stern, much enduring men of that time; I bless Almighty God for what they were, and what they did, and what they left us; yet saw they not all things, nor counted themselves to have apprehended all things. That season was infancy; the infancy of a giant certainly; but yet infancy. A mighty future was before them, but it was all future. Sir, we must remember that those days were days of privilege somewhat; church members only voted; orthodox believers only-freeholders also as well as orthodox-could be elected to office. But time rolled on; the popular tendencies of our system developed themselves more and more; our mission of republican liberty became more and more pronounced; the great questions of the Revolution were moved and discussed; blood flowed; and by 1776 or certainly 1780 we grasped completely the American idea that the people were the source of sovereignty; that they are equal; that they alone are to be represented in the popular branch of government, and that they are to be represented equally there. This idea was embodied in its broadest and most intense expression in our own Constitution. The gentleman from Cambridge, (Mr. Sargent,) read it yesterday. "There shall be in the legislature of this Commonwealth, a representation of the people, annually elected, and founded upon the principle of equality." There was the principle. But it was then thought that the great end, the great principle itself might be wrought out by the existing instrumental means, that is, a representation of towns, and by towns; and those means therefore were retained, not to defeat equality of representation of the people, but to execute it. The people were accustomed to those means. They were attached to them. Population was so distributed that, at that time, the incompatibility of town representation with that equality and that justice, which formed the essential constitutional principle, was not offensively apparent.

But time still passed on; and that incompatibility did become apparent; and the moment this was so you may begin to remark an effort, a progress towards dispensing with the means, and insuring the end, towards substituting for a representation of towns-intended to accomplish, but not accomplishing an equal representation of the people-substituting for this a direct representation of the people, on the principle of equality, by means which shall certainly accomplish the object, that is, by representative districts.

Of this tendency of opinion, a brief extract from a speech of Mr. Justice Story in the Convention of 1820 may afford some illustration.

[June 16th.

That great Jurist although he advocated a property basis of the Senate, comprehended the whole spirit of the Constitution of 1780; appreciated perfectly that it meant to have the people equally represented in the other branch; saw that, in the changes of circumstances, the means used defeated the end aimed at; that place, not man, was coming to engross the representation; and that there was just one remedy. I read his words :—

"In the select committee I was in favor of a plan of representation in the House founded on population, as the most just and equal in its operation. I still retain that opinion. There were serious objections against this system, and it was believed by others that the towns could not be brought to consent to yield up the corporate privileges of representation, which had been enjoyed so long, and were so intimately connected with their pride and their interests. I felt constrained therefore, with great reluctance, to yield up a favorite plan."

Of the same tendency you find more evidence in the period from 1835 to 1810. The basis even of the Senate became changed from property to inhabitants—and the counties were made districts, to elect, each a number of senators according to the number of its inhabitants-every district, however, to have one, and none to have over six. And for the House, by the proceedings of two successive legislatures, sitting as conventions, and by the people acting on their amendments-the idea that every town, as such, is to elect a representative, by itself, and for itself, every year, was dropped forever from the Constitution--and the original principle that equal representation of people—by whatever means-is the grand end to be kept in view—was vindicated, and reasserted; and more completely than before, though still partially,

carried into execution.

So, Sir, it has been all a progress from the beginning, hitherto. Every quarter of a century the stream has been working itself clearer, and clearer; the one great complaint at this moment is that place yet confers privilege; the remedy is clear to every man's apprehension; with you, or without you, time will certainly compel its adoption; and yet you are sure the people are not ready for it!

But it is said they are so much attached to the existing system, that nothing can be done. Attached to what? To representation? Certainly. Their history has shown that. To unjust and unequal representation? Sir, I would not hear their enemy say so. I think that in

the chairman's discussion of this branch of the subject, with a good deal of ability, there was some exaggeration, and much fallacy. If he means to say that the people are attached, deeply and reasonably attached, to our general town system; to the preservation of the towns; and to the administration of public business therein, as a general system, I agree with him--I agree with them in that attachment. In our history, in our public life, nothing is more beautiful, or more useful, than the existence, administration, and influences of these municipalitics; and I agree, and maintain, at the outset, that if to district the State for representatives is to abolish towns; or kill the town life of the State; or impair its utility, you ought not to do it. I would not have equality of representation at that cost. I agree with the chairman's estimate of our general municipal system; with what he read from

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De Tocqueville; with what he read from Mr. Jefferson; with what he read from somebody's correspondent, anonymous to us-with what he read, most eloquent of all, from my colleague, (Mr. Hillard). Long ago, long before a word of all this was written or thought of, John Adams, in a letter to the Abbe de Mably, preserved in French, the original English being lost, anticipated, and tersely and strongly exhibited the same general view. I concede every word of it. But I must say that when I find all this admiration of towns, terminating in the illogical and revolting conclusion that they must be made-without the least particle of necessity, and for no good it does them or their great objects of utility-the instruments of injustice-I start back from it. Almost, I incredulously begin to hate such praise. It seems insidious-although doubtless sincere. "Nothing is beautiful, that is not true"-is a canon of criticism. I mean no offence; and I would indulge in no extravagance-but it brought to mind that eloquence, the like of which-written or spoken-it may be centuries before man shall hear or read again; in which Burke lamented the passing away of the age of chivalry; the overthrow of splendid and venerable establishments; the Queen of France, fallen as a star, from her place on high-to repair her beam no more. It took "the prisoned soul of Europe, and lapped it in Elysium." But when men began to discern that all this eloquence, and music, conducted to the conclusion that church, and throne, and kindred aristocracy, were to be established over again upon the prostrated rights of man; that it turned back the golden wheels of the car of reform, and shut the gates of mercy on the masses of mankind; when they found in the happy phrase of Paine, that "he pitied the plumage and forgot the dying bird,"-the spell was broken forever. So I turn from all the argument, and all the rhetoric, that would puzzle, or charm me to the conclusion, that it is necessary in order to preserve these little democracies which have rocked the cradle of independence, and trained the people to the practice of public affairs-that, to their existence and uses it is necessary to allow them to become agencies of inequality, and injustice. Why how transparent is the sophism here! The chairman aggregates, skilfully and justly, all the good, which towns, and the town life and administration have ever done; he then just assumes that all of it is attributable to the way in which they vote for representatives; and then asks how you can cut down a wood that has yielded such shade, and borne such fruit! To hear him you would that suppose every town in the State was to be abolished; every town-meeting shut up; every town deliberation, and debate, and vote, and election, to be put an end to; and every power and function and duty of towns to be clutched and held and wielded by some central body, sitting here or somewhere! Is such extravagance likely to be useful? Why, Sir, consider exactly what our town system is; and how it does the good we all ascribe to it; and then say if districting for representatives impairs it a particle. The system is this. The inhabitants of these towns, as such, are charged with certain public affairs; by the care of which they become trained to business; instructed; elevated. What are these affairs? Education; pauperism; the care of public ways; the police of the towns; its finances; the election of its officers; the giving

of votes for officers to represent the people in the government. To administer these affairs; they meet in town-meetings; they think, they exchange opinions; they discuss and decide. And thus they become accustomed to business; to the formation and expression of thoughts; to know, and feel, and act out, what is meant by public life, as distinct from the selfishness, and insulation of mere personal toil, for personal gain. Besides all this, they have ever been accustomed occasionally to meet, and to consider of those subjects of extraordinary interest, by which the nation or the State, is, from time to time, agitated; and such meetings have formed part also of the same general discipline.

Such is now our town system. Do we propose to abolish it? Why, Sir, we leave to every town, every subject of deliberation and action, which now belongs to it; we leave it every power; every duty; every function; we leave it every meeting, stated or occasional; we leave it to give every vote on every question, which it now does : schools, the poor, the ways, the police, its financies; we leave it to choose every officer it now does; we leave all, with all its influences, exactly as now, with this single exception; that whereas now-if it has any right to vote at all for representative-as above a hundred have not-its vote, counted alone chooses a representative; it is hereafter to be counted with the votes of some one or two other towns, exactly as now its vote for governor and senators is to be counted. That single difference is all the difference. And, now in all reason and decency, tell me what harm, or what change, good or bad, you see here? There will be representatives enough chosen, will there not? Yes. Those who are chosen will by service in the legislature become educated and informed as now they are-and go home, as now they do, to communicate freely, will they not? Yes. Whether the single vote of a town chooses a representative, or its vote counted with other towns does it, still will not each town meet to vote for him just at it does now; will it not give up a day from business to ideas as now it does; the nature of the office to be filled; the fitness of the candidate to fill it will these topics not be handled, in the preliminary consultations and at the meeting, just as now? Nobody can conceive why they will not. A wider area of selection is opened -consultations with more minds are made necessary; more opinions are to be reconciled; and all this at once increases the interest in the business; improves the chances of a better choice: enlarges and liberalizes the views; and constitutes a more enlarged discipline to public affairs. Yes, Sir, and you give equality of representation to the whole people, into the bargain. And yet, we hear that it is matter of necessity that we endure this inequality.

I must not forget, however, that the chairman here and there brought to view another aspect of the necessity, which we are said to be under, to submit to unequal representation. He suggested -if I understood him-that a system of perfect equality among men, or voters, would lead to centralization, or concentration, somewhere; and to the swallowing up of somebody by somebody. Sir, I submit that he who advances such a suggestion, as a reason why we cannot make the political rights of the people of such a State as this coincide with their natural rights, is bound to be pretty precise in his statements, and pretty clear

[June 16th.

in his proofs; and I protest, that with all the attention I gave him, I am not at all sure that I even comprehend his difficulty. "Concentration" is a word of good emphasis and command; "centralization," the readers of De Tocqueville at least, have to be reasonably familiar with; and to be "swallowed up" is an intelligible, though unattractive idea; but who is to be concentrated, or centralized; who is to be eat, or be eaten-or when, or where, or how-is not quite so clear.

I suppose that all these figures of speech were aimed at Boston. To any other locality in the State they are utterly, not to say ludicrously, inapplicable. But if so; if it is necessary, in your judgment, thus to disfranchise the tradesmen and mechanics; and middle men, and all men, of Boston, because there are a great many of them in one place, will you let me ask, first how that excuses or explains such a plan as this? Is the fact that Boston tends to centralize or concentrate or swallow up anything, a very exquisite reason, why one-third of the people of Massachusetts should elect a majority of fifty in a House of four hundred? Is it a reason why Worcester with 126,000 inhabitants, should have some twentyseven more representatives than Essex with 127,000 inhabitants? Is it a reason why you should bereave the entire sea-coast of its equal measure of right to bestow it on the centre and West? Is it a reason why Bristol, and Barnstable, should have somewhere about one-third, man for man, of the power of Franklin, Hampshire, or Berkshire? What are Barnstable, and Bristol and Essex likely to swallow? Sir, there is a harder question. What season, of centralization, or concentration, or anything else, is there, that within the same locality, the same county, you discriminate between people in a fashion so incomprehensible? The presence of my most esteemed and reverend friend from Danvers, (Mr. Braman,) suggests a single example of what I mean, of which there are scores just as extraordinary. In the county of Essex are two contiguous towns -Danvers and Middleton. They adjoin-parted by an invisible line, running through green fields. Middleton has a representative for eight hundred inhabitants. Danvers one for about four thousand.

The man of Middleton will have about five times as much political power and right as his next door neighbor, in whose employment he works by the month. Why? Is it in order to protect the country from Boston centralization? Not obviously. Is it to protect Middleton from Danvers? Is it to protect such towns as Middleton from such towns as Danvers? What diversity of interest, have they? One is larger; and the other smaller; but what is the conflict of interest? Both are farming towns mainly; each having some mechanical and manufacturing employmentsDanvers especially-but both chiefly farming towns; both industrious; law abiding; moral; kindred, each to each. Nobody can see how in a hundred years one of these towns should demand general legislation adverse to the other-and yet to protect this poor little Swiss Canton of a Middleton, from being swallowed up by this Austria, this Prussia, this France of a Danvers, the inhabitant of Middleton has fives times as much power, and right, as his next neighbor who works on his bench, or holds his plough! Sir, that which is unintelligible or absurd in that case, is equally so in a hundred others throughout this plan.