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error.

Messrs. T. A. Pollock and F. D. Hutchings for defendants in error. [334] *Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a writ of error to the supreme court of the state of Kansas to review a judgment of that court overruling a demurrer of the nisi prius court to the petition of plaintiffs in error for an injunction to restrain the collection of taxes, levied by the city of Kansas City, on lands brought into that city under act of the legislature of Kansas authorizing cities of the first class having a population of 30,000 or more, which shall be subdivided into lots and blocks, or whenever any unplatted tract of land shall lie upon or mainly [335]within any such *city, or is so situated as to be bounded on three fourths of its boundary line by platted territory of or adjacent to such city, or by the boundary line of such city, or by both, the same may be added to and made part of the city by ordinance duly passed. There was a provision in the law as follows: "But nothing in this act shall be taken or held to apply to any tract or tracts of land used for agricultural purposes when the same is not owned by any railroad or other corporation.”

An ordinance was passed, pursuant to the statute, extending the city boundaries so as to include large tracts of land belonging to the Union Pacific Railway. A portion of the lands were used for right of way and other railroad purposes, and a large part of them were vacant and unoccupied, which were held by the company for its future uses.

Taxes were levied by the city upon the property, and the suit was brought to enjoin their collection. The petition presented the facts, and contained the following allegation:

"Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the laws." "And plaintiffs are advised, and so charge the fact to be, that in so far as said statute attempts to authorize the taking of said lands within the limits of Kansas City, Kansas, as attempted in said ordinance, Exhibit 'A,' it is unconstitutional, null, and void, in this, to wit:

"That by reason of that portion of the act

which excepts from its operation any tract or tracts of land used for agricultural purposes, when the same is not owned by any railroad or other corporation, it is in violament to the Constitution of the United tion of that part of the Fourteenth AmendStates, which reads as follows: 'Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." "

The defendants, other than the township of Wyandotte and school district No. 9, filed a general demurrer to the petition, which was overruled. The defendants, the township of Wyandotte and school district No. 9, did not plead in any way. The demurring[336] defendants electing to stand upon their demurrer, a perpetual injunction was granted as prayed for against them. They appealed to the supreme court, where the judgment of the lower court was reversed, and an order was made directing that court to sustain the demurrer.

The

the statute was presented to the supreme The question of the constitutionality of court of Kansas, and that court held that it violated neither the Federal nor state Constitutions. The same question is presented here in six assignments of errors. specific contention is that the Kansas statute Amendment which provides: "Nor shall violates that portion of the Fourteenth any state deprive any person of life, liberty, deny to any person within its jurisdiction or property without due process of law, nor the equal protection of the laws."

The defendants in error, however, object to the jurisdiction of this court, and urge that the judgment appealed from is not a final one, and is not therefore reviewable in

this court.

It is further urged that the record does not show that anything was done in the lower court after decision in the supreme court, but that error is prosecuted directly to the judgment of the supreme court,and that that determined only a question of pleading, and that its direction has not yet been acted on, and that no judgment of any kind has been entered against Wyandotte township or school district No. 9.

The law of Kansas prescribing action on demurrer is as follows: "If the demurrer be sustained, the adverse party may amend, if the defect can be remedied by way of amendment, with or without costs, as the court, in its discretion, shall direct."

In Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3 [27: 73], it was decided that "the rule is well settled and of long standing that a judgment or decree to be final, within the meaning of that term, as used in the acts of Congress giving this court jurisdiction on appeals and writs of error, must terminate the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, so that if there should be an affirmance here, the court below would have nothing to do but to execute the judgment or decree it had already rendered," for the[337] support of which many cases were cited; and further: "If the judgment is not one which

disposes of the whole case on its merits, it is not final. Consequently, it has been uniformly held that a judgment of reversal, with leave for further proceedings in the court below, cannot be brought here on writ of error;" also citing cases.

This case and those it cites have been applied many times, but we will confine our notice to instances of demurrer. DeArmas v. United States, 6 How. 103 [12: 361], was of this kind, but the grounds of demurrer urged there made the rule when applied to them not very disputable, and the case is not of much aid.

In Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Mfg. Co. 145 U. S. 608 [36: 834], the demurrer was overruled with leave to answer over. Upon appeal to the supreme court the order overruling the demurrer was affirmed with costs. The rule of the supreme court provided that "upon the reversal, affirmance, or modification of any order or judgment of the District court by this court, there will be a remittitur to the district court, unless otherwise ordered." Held, that the plaintiffs in error upon the return of the case to the court could plead over, and hence judgment was not final.

In Werner v. Charleston, 151 U. S. 360 [38: 192], the announcement by the Chief Justice was: "The writ of error is dismissed. Meagher v. Minnesota Thresher Co. 145 U. S. 608 [36: 834]; Rice v. Sanger, 144 U. S. 197 [36: 403]; Hume v. Bowie, 148 U. S. 245 [37: 438]."

The statement of the case shows that it was analogous to the case at bar. The motion to dismiss stated that

"The judgment brought here by writ of error for review is a judgment of the supreme court of the state of South Carolina, which simply affirmed a decision of the lower court overruling a demurrer, and thereby remanded the case to the court below for a hearing on the merits. It is therefore an interlocutory judgment, and is in no sense a final decree.

cases of that kind, not because they are separable in principle from the other cases decided, but to observe and explain the rule in its special applia tion. That rule is in its utmost generality hat no judgment is final which does not terminate the litigation be tween the parties to the suit. If anything substantial remain to be done to this end, the judgment is not firal. The law of the case upon the pleadings, and hence as presented by the demurrer, may be settled, but if power remain to make a new case, either by the direction of the supreme court or in the absence of such direction by the statutes of the state, the judgment is not final. The statute of Kansas permitted such amendment, and the order of the supreme court did not take it away. Its order proceeds no further than a direction to sustain the demurrer to the petition. That done, the lower court had and has all of its power under the statute, and may exercise it at the invocation of plaintiffs in error. What they may be advised to do we cannot know. We can only consider their right and the power of the court. These existing, if we should affirm the judgment of the supreme court, that court, and maybe this court, may be called upon to determine other issues between the parties.

It follows from these views that the judgment of the supreme court is not final, and the writ of error must be dismissed, and it is so ordered.

UNITED STATES, Petitioner,

v.

BUFFALO NATURAL GAS FUEL COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 339-343.)

Natural gas free from duty under the tariff act of 1890.

Natural gas imported for use as fuel and for illuminating purposes is free from duty under ¶ 496 (p. 604) of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, as crude bitumen, or under ¶ 651 (p. 607) as crude mineral.

"To this the plaintiff in error replied: "The judgment brought here by writ of error for review is the judgment of the supreme court of the state of South Carolina, holding that a certain act of the general assembly of the state of South Carolina, entitled, "An Act [338]to Authorize the City Council of Charleston to Fill up Low Lots and Grounds in the Submitted December 2, 1898. Decided Janu City of Charleston in Certain Cases and for Other Purposes," approved on the 18th of

December, 1830, is not in violation of the Constitution of the United States, thereby affirming the judgment of the trial court and so ending the constitutional defense interposed by the plaintiff in error.'

"An examination of the record will show that the main ground of the demurrer, interposed in the court below by the plaintiff in error, was the unconstitutionality of the act of 1830. It was claimed both there and in the court above, as well as in this court, to be in violation of due process of law."

Rice v. Sanger and Hume v. Bowie, cited by the Chief Justice, were not rulings on demurrer, and we have confined our notice to

[No. 64.]

ary 3, 1899.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI to the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit to review a decision of that court affirming the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of New York which affirmed the decision of the Board of General Appraisers that natural gas was exempt from duty under the tariff act of 1890. Affirmed.

See same case below, 45 U. S. App. 345. The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. Henry M. Hoyt, Assistant Attorney General, for the United States, petitioner.

Mr. Herbert P. Bissell for the Buffalo Natural Gas Fuel Company, respondent.

[339]

[239] *Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opin-acterize and embrace natural gas, and they ion of the court:

The defendant gas company, doing business at Buffalo, in the state of New York, imports natural gas from the Dominion of Canada, for the purpose of supplying its customers with that article. The gas is brought in pipes under the Niagara river, and is used for consumption as fuel and for illuminating

purposes.

In 1893 the gas imported by the company was assessed for duty by the collector of the port of Buffalo as a nonenumerated unmanufactured article at ten per cent, under section 4 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890. 26 Stat. at L. 567, at page 613.

are in the free list, and are known as para-
graphs 496 and 651. *The language used in[341]
each, when taken in its popular and common-
ly received sense, or according to the sense
in which it is used commercially, would
cover and include the substance generally
spoken of and loosely described as natural
gas. The fact that it is not thus named in
the act compelled the collector to assess it
as a raw or unmanufactured article not enu-
merated, a description which does not fit
nearly so well as that which is contained in
each of the paragraphs mentioned above. We
think the evidence shows that natural gas
is included in the language of one or both
those paragraphs.

The rule is familiar that in the interpreta-
tion of laws relating to the revenues the
words are to be taken in their commonly re-
ceived and popular sense, or according to
their commercial designation, if that differs
from the ordinary understanding of the
word. Two Hundred Chests of Tea, Smith,
Claimant, 9 Wheat. 430 [6: 128].

The importers claimed that the gas was entitled to free entry under section 2 of the above act, providing for a free list, either under paragraph 496 (page 604), as crude bitumen, or under paragraph 651 (page 607), as a crude mineral, not advanced in value or condition by refining or grinding, or by any other process of manufacture, not specially [840]provided for in the act. The importers made proper protest, and obtained a review of the Mr. Justice Story, in that case, in deliv decision of the collector by the board of gen-ering the opinion of the court, said: "The eral appraisers. That board, on a second hearing, after testimony had been given as to the character of the gas, decided that natural gas was a crude mineral, and the board on that ground sustained the claim that it was exempt from duty under paragraph 651 of the tariff act of 1890.

object of the duty laws is to raise revenue, and for this purpose to class substances according to the general usage and known denominations of trade. Whether a particular article were designated by one name or another in the country of its origin, or whether it were a simple or mixed substance, was of The circuit court affirmed that decision, no importance in the view of the legislature. and upon a review by the circuit court of ap-It did not suppose our merchants to be natpeals for the second circuit (45 U. S. App. uralists, or geologists, or botanists. It ap345), the decision was again affirmed. The plied its attention to the description of arlatter court, by Circuit Judge Lacombe, said: |ticles as they derived their appellations in "We do not undertake in this case to decide our own markets, in our domestic as well as whether or not natural gas is a 'crude bitu- our foreign traffic." See also Lutz v. Mamen.' If it be such, the provisions of para- gone, 153 U. S. 105 [38: 651], and cases graph 496 would control its classification, there cited. being more specific than those of paragraph 651. Both paragraphs are in the free list, and since natural gas comes fairly within the general provision for crude minerals, and is therefore free, it is unnecessary now to inquire whether it is also within the more specific description 'crude bitumen,' which is also free. The board of general appraisers properly reversed the collector's assessment of the article for duty; it is not a 'raw or unmanufactured article not enumerated.'" Circuit Judge Wallace, while concurring in the affirmance of the decision of the circuit court, was of the opinion that the importation in controversy ought to be classified under paragraph 496 as crude bitumen, and exempt from duty on that ground.

The decision having been duly entered, this court upon the petition or the government is sued a writ of certiorari, and the case has been brought here for review.

We are, of opinion that the circuit court of appeals was right in its disposition of the case. The substance that is taken from the bosom of the earth and which burns brightly without any further labor put upon it, is popularly designated as natural gas. This name is not contained in the tariff act, but there are two paragraphs thereof which it is claimed do properly and sufficiently char

Prior to 1890 natural gas had not been imported, although its existence in this country and in foreign countries was well known. After the passage of the tariff act of 1890, this corporation commenced its importation from Canada as stated. It appeared in the evidence that an analysis of the gas thus imported had been made by competent chemists, and it was found to contain methane, or marsh gas, to the extent of 95.6 per cent, the balance being made up principally of hydrocarbons other than methane.

In the opinion of some of the witnesses the natural gas thus examined was a crude bitu-[342] men. It was stated "that bitumens are mixtures of hydrocarbons of various kinds, mixed with other materials in varying proportions; a crude bitumen as found in nature is mixed with other materials." It was also testified that this natural gas contains 97.2 per cent of natural hydrocarbon, and the balance of 2.8 per cent is composed of substances usually found with the hydrocarbons in crude bitumen; that the term "bitumen" does not refer to any substance of definite chemical composition, but is distinctively a generic term applied to a large number of natural substances which consist largely or chiefly of hydrocarbons. These substances may be gaseous, as natural gas or marsh gas; fluid,

1898.

as petroleum or naphtha; viscous, as the semifluid asphaltum; elastic, as elaeterite, found in Utah, and elsewhere; solid, as some forms of asphaltum, bituminous or anthracite coal; that the common compositions of crude bitumen are naturally classified as above stated. The deposits of bitumen occur in various portions of the earth's crust; they differ naturally in appearance, in consistency, in various physical and chemical properties; but they are everywhere found to consist essentially of hydrocarbons, and they are correctly designated as crude bitumens. That natural gas should be designated as a crude bitumen was the opinion of some of the witnesses.

HENRY W. SCOTT, Plff. in Err.,

v.

UNITED STATES.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 343–351.)

Testimony in criminal action—decoy letter.

1.

2.

Testimony of the persons named by the accused as his enemies, that they have no ill will against him, is not collateral to the main issue, or a contradiction of what the prosecution has brought out, where the accused on his direct examination said that enemies had placed in his pocket stolen money that was found there, and their names were brought out on cross-examination.

The fact that a letter stolen from the mails was a decoy addressed to a fictitious person is not a defense to an indictment under U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5467, when the letter had been delivered into the jurisdiction of the postoffice department by dropping it into a letter box.

[No. 80.]

uary 3, 1899.

Evidence on the part of the government was given by witnesses who were connected with the Government Geological Survey, and their evidence would tend to show that the word "minerals" in the mineralogical sense of the word almost invariably refers to solids; that in the mineralogical definition gases would not be included, but that there was a wider definition, which, according to some authorities, includes all the constituents Submitted December 5, 1898. Decided Janof the earth's crust, and that would include gases. It was also stated that if a scientific man wants to be precise he confines his use of the term "mineral" to a certain homogeneous substance, a chemical entity, having a definite composition, just as the mineralogist does. But nevertheless minerals are both solids and liquid, according to most definitions, and that some authorities include gases among minerals and others exclude them.

IN

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Southern District
of New York to review a judgment of that
court convicting Henry W. Scott of stealing
a letter and its contents from the mail, under
U. S. Rev. Stat. § 5467. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. T. C. Campbell for plaintiff in er-

ror.

Mr. James E. Boyd, Assistant Attorney

[343] *One witness for the government said if you General, for defendant in error.

exclude from the mineral kingdom the gases included in the atmosphere, you must set up some fourth class of substances; the division being, generally, the vegetable kingdom, the animal kingdom, and the mineral kingdom; but no such fourth division is ordinarily designated, and the constituents of the atmosphere are not vegetable and they are not animal, and ordinarily they are included in the mineral kingdom.

*Mr. Justice Peckham delivered the opin-[344] ion of the court:

Henry W. Scott, the plaintiff in error, was indicted under section 5467, Revised Statutes, for stealing a letter and its contents from the mail, and the indictment alleged that he unlawfully and wilfully secreted and embezzled a certain letter intended to be conWe think the evidence in this case shows veyed by mail and directed to Miss Mary that, within the language of paragraph 651 Campbell, Cottonwood, Yavapai county, of the act of Congress, interpreting that lan- Arizona, he being a letter carrier in the city guage in accordance with the rule above of New York and the letter having been intrusted to him and having come into his posmentioned, natural gas would fairly come under the head of a crude mineral, if there session in his capacity as such carrier. The were no more limited classification in the letter contained $3.50 in two silver certifiact; but that the classification as crude bi- cates of the United States, each of the detumen is more limited, and we are of opinion nomination of one dollar, and a United that, upon the evidence, natural gas is prop-States Treasury note of the denomination of one dollar, and a fifty-cent piece of the silver The evidence erly thus described. If it be within the more specific classification, it would be controlled coinage of the United States. thereby. It is not important in this case to showed that the letter was what is termed a conclusively decide which classification cov- decoy letter; that the money was placed As therein by one of the inspectors of the Postwas sealed, ers it, because both are on the free list. the gas is described in one or both of the office Department; that it paragraphs, it cannot come under section 4 stamped, and addressed as above mentioned, of the act, which provides for the levy, col- and deposited about 2:30 o'clock P. M. in lection, and payment on the importation of one of the street letter boxes in the city of all raw or unmanufactured articles, not New York, in the district from which the deenumerated or provided for in the act, a duty fendant collected such letters. Within a few moments after it was deposited in the letter of ten per centum ad valorem. box by the inspector, he saw the defendant come to the box, unlock *it, take out its con-[345] tents, put them in his bag and continue on

The judgment of the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Northern District of
New York was right, and should be affirmed.

471

asked him: "Have you any enemies among the employees at that station?" and the defendant answered that he had one by the name of Augustus Weisner and another named John D. Silsbee, his former superintendent; that he was an enemy of his and so was Weisner, and that those two were all that he regarded as enemies in that office, both being employed in the same branch office as the defendant, and he said that for a month before he was arrested he was not on speaking terms with Weisner.

his route. The carrier returned to the
branch postoffice, station E, where he was
employed, a little after three o'clock, turned
the contents of his bag upon the proper table
for distribution, and hung the bag and also
his coat on a peg, and left the room and was
gone about half an hour. One of the clerks
of the department had been told before the
defendant's arrival with his letter bag to
look out for a letter addressed as above de-
scribed, and withdraw it from the mail, and
in obedience to such instructions and during
the defendant's absence he looked through
the letters thus taken from his bag, and the
letter was not to be found. Upon the de-
fendant's return to the distributing room,
he took his coat and bag and started on his
route for another collection of letters, and
while on the street he was met by the officers
of the government about five minutes after
four o'clock P. M., and was then arrested and
brought to the station. He was charged with
having the letter, and was asked to show
what he had in his pockets. The letter was
not found, but the defendant took from his
right-hand trousers pocket, among other
things, the three bills which had been placed
in the letter. The fifty-cent piece was found When the defendant rested the government
loose among other coins in another pocket. called as witnesses John D. Silsbee and Au-
The officers identified the bills by marksgustus Weisner, the two men named by the
which had been placed on them, and also by
reason of the numbers of the bills, a mem-
orandum of which had been taken. The coin
had been marked and was identified by the
officers.

In relation to the letter, it appears that it was prepared by the inspector of the department, who addressed the same to Miss Mary Campbell. The inspector wrote the body of the original letter. He did not know Mary Campbell, and never saw her; it was addressed to her at Cottonwood, Arizona, at which place there is a postoffice, but there was no one of the name of Miss Mary Campbell residing at Cottonwood, Arizona, to his knowledge. The address on the letter was to a fictitious person; the money placed in the letter was the money of Mr. Morris, one of the inspectors.

The court asked the defendant: "What is the trick that you mean to suggest to the jury that was played upon you?" and the defendant answered: "The only solution that I can give of it is that that two dollars had been abstracted from my pocket and these marked three dollars put in the place of it. Three dollars and a half placed there; fifty cents in with this change." The witness had just previously stated that he left two onedollar bills belonging to himself in his coat pocket at the time he hung his coat upon the peg in the sorting room and left it there to go down stairs, and from which room he was absent about twenty-five minutes.

defendant as his enemies, both of whom tes-
tified under the objection and exception of[347]
defendant's counsel, that they had no ill-will
whatever towards the defendant, and that
they had never had any quarrels with him,
and Weisner said, on the contrary, that he
had liked the man. The counsel for the de-
fendant objected to this testimony on the
ground that the evidence of defendant upon
this subject was collateral, brought out by
the government on his cross-examination,
and that the government was bound by his
answers.

After the evidence was all in the counsel
for the defendant requested the court to
charge, "that a letter intended to be con-
veyed by mail, under the statute, must be
addressed to an existing person, at an exist-
ing place, or to a real and genuine address."
The court refused so to charge, and the de-
fendant excepted.

Upon the trial the defendant was sworn in his own behalf, and upon his direct exam[346]ination testified that when he was arrested The defendant's counsel further requested and the money found upon him, he said to the court to charge, "that a letter with an the inspectors, "Somebody has done me a impossible address, which can never be dedirty trick;" to which one of the inspectors livered and which the sender, acting conreplied. "Do you think I am concerned in jointly with postoffice officials, deterthat?" The defendant says that he answered mined should be intercepted in the mail, is him, "I did not think or did not know not such a letter as was, in the meaning of whether he was; but if he was not, some the statute, 'intended to be conveyed by enemy of mine in that office was." He de- mail.'" This was also refused, and an exnied on the witness stand, that he ab-ception to such refusal taken by defendant's stracted, or took from the collection table, counsel. or at all, any letter such as is described in the indictment, or any money belonging to any other person in the world.

Upon cross-examination the district attorney endeavored to obtain a fuller statement from the defendant as to what he meant when he said on his direct examination that somebody had done him a dirty trick, and that some enemy of his in the office was concerned in it, and to that end the district attorney

The jury having convicted the defendant, he has brought the case here by writ of er

ror.

Regarding the objections taken by the defendant to the evidence of Silsbee and Weisner, above alluded to, we think they were properly overruled. The evidence objected to was not irrelevant, and the government was not bound by the answers of the defendant as to Silsbee and Weisner being his en

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