had intended. When I arose, it was my design | only to say a few words by way of explanation; but if, in the course of my remarks, I have said anything I ought not to have said, it is too late to recall it now, and I can only repeat what I have said before, that personally, I have no feeling of unkindness against any person or persons to whom I have alluded.

I state these matters, that the members of the Convention may know what the feelings of the inhabitants of the town of Williamstown are, and that they regard this simple provision as of more importance to them, than all the other changes which may be made in the Constitution. I do not suppose that gentlemen of this Convention can feel so much interest in this matter as we do. There are but few towns in the Commonwealth where such institutions exist, and in those a different state of things may exist than with us, and greater harmony of feeling may prevail between the inhabitants of such towns, and the students of those institutions. But, unfortunately that is not our case. We have been differently situated, and, as I remarked in the outset, I brought forward this matter by the express instructions of my constituents, whose wishes I am bound to respect, and, as far as may be in my power, to carry out. I hope, therefore, that the resolve will be adopted, and that the amendment will be rejected.

Mr. WALKER, of North Brookfield. It will be well, perhaps, to look to the history of the resolves now before the Convention. The first of these two resolves is the same as was the third resolve in the original Report of the Committee to whom this matter was referred. While those original resolves were pending, a member moved the amendment which is contained in the second resolve now before us. Under these circumstances, as the two matters were not at all necessarily connected, it was thought best to refer the whole subject again to the Committee. It was so referred, and the Committee have reported back the two matters in separate resolves.

As regards the first resolve, as has been stated, the provisions of it are contained in the Constitutions of many of the States. Nineteen of them have the general provisions of the first resolution, and some contain the precise language which we have used. I think the gentleman from Williamstown, (Mr. Duncan,) has entirely satisfied us, as he did the Committee who reported this subject, that these are desirable provisions, that no harm can result from them, and that they ought to be adopted. I think the facts he has narrated, in relation to the action of the students at Williamstown, is sufficient to satisfy us that it

is not for the good of the people of that place, and especially that it is not good for the students themselves, that their relations should be such as would tend to bring them into conflict with the officers of the town, or involve them in acts of riot and disorder. It is a great detriment to the interests of the students, to allow them to mix up with the politics of the town, as it withdraws their attention from the immediate objects they have in view, in connecting themselves with institutions of learning. It is, to my mind, very clear, that it ought not to be said that this provision deprives many of them of their right to vote, for that is not true; for, if they are inhabitants of other towns, they retain their right to vote where they rightfully belong. It only prevents those persons who connect themselves with such institutions as students, from taking part in the municipal affairs of the places in which they have no real interest. As a general thing, they have only been brought out at times when party spirit has run high, and when parties have been nearly balanced. At such times politicians are able, by going to the colleges, to get aid enough to carry their schemes, and I submit, whether such a course is for the interests, either of the people of the towns, or of the students themselves? I believe it is not. I believe that this resolve ought to be adopted as it stands, and that the amendment should be rejected.

Mr. SARGENT, of Cambridge. It seems to me, Sir, that the whole of the first resolution is unnecessary, certainly all except that part which it is proposed to strike out. I think I am correct in saying that all the other cases, except that, are already fully provided for, and in that I think I am borne out by the decisions of the court which have heretofore been made upon questions arising on those cases.

In regard to the part which is proposed to be stricken out, I think it should go with the other part of the resolve, and that all of it should be stricken out; first, because I believe that all the rest of the resolution is entirely unnecessary, and second, because I believe the part proposed to be stricken out, to be unjust. Now, Sir, we provide in the Constitution that any male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have resided in the Commonwealth one year, and in the town where he claims a right to vote, six months last past, and shall have paid a tax, shall be entitled to vote. Now, Sir, that refers to no particular class of individuals. It is a broad, general provision. It says, "any male citizen over twentyone years of age," &c. Now what is proposed by this resolve? You propose to say to one class of

Tuesday,]

[July 5th.

may have resided in this or that place one, two, three, or four years, yet if you reside there for the purpose of obtaining an education you shall be deprived of the privilege of exercising that civil right. Let us see how such a provision will operate. Suppose a man comes into the town of Williamstown, which feels so much aggrieved in this matter, to enter himself as a student in Williams' College. He is twenty-one years of age. Another man comes into the same town and lets himself out as a hired man, with no idea of remaining any definite time, and it is wholly accidental whether he remains there a year, or less, or more. He remains there one year and perhaps another. You give him a right to vote, while you deprive the other of that right. No provision is made here to put them upon an equal footing. It is the home of the hired man for the time being, and so it is the home of the student for the time being. When the Constitution provides that a man shall decide where his home is, it does not provide that he shall decide that he intends to continue it as his home for one day longer. It is enough for him, if it is his home on the day when he claims a right to vote, and he is not called upon to say whether he intends to leave to-morrow or not. If I recollect aright, a case of this kind which arose in Amherst College, came in question before congress, upon a contested seat in the House of Representatives. It was referred to a Committee, and the Committee being of the political party of the contestant, decided at once that the man casting the vote, having resided in the State one year, having resided in Amherst six months, and paid a tax assessed within two years, had complied with the requirements of the Constitution, and it was not necessary for him to contemplate remaining another day in that place of residence, in order to entitle him to a right to vote. Now I cannot see how we can, with justice, say to one class of citizens, you shall have the right to exercise the elective franchise, and to another similarly situated, that you shall not. There are thousands who vote in this State every year, who have not the remotest idea of remaining here any particular length of time. Our brickyards in Cambridge are every year full of that class of men, who spend their summers there, and disperse in the fall. Yet, having no other domicile and having resided there the time required by the Constitution, they were always permitted to vote, and they alone are the ones to determine whether that be their domicile or not. I undertake to say that no man, except the man who claims the right to vote, can decide that question. When the question is put to him, "is this your place of resi

should like to know the power that can dispute it. Who else can decide whether that be his home or not.

Now it is said that there is a great deal of difficulty with the students at Williamstown. I happen to reside in a city where we have a large college, and more students, I presume, than they have in Williamstown, and we have not the least difficulty with them in the world. And why? We do not try, and never have tried to deprive them of their civil rights. We award to them all the privileges given to them by the Constitution, and we have no difficulty with them whatever. I think if my friend from Williamstown, (Mr. Duncan,) and his constituents will pursue the same course, he will find those young gentlemen mild, amiable, and among the best citizens, and find them no longer burning their town officers in effigy.

Mr. DUNCAN. I would ask the gentleman if those mild and amiable young men did not attempt to blow up one of their college buildings with a bomb shell?

Mr. SARGENT. I was speaking of them as citizens, and in regard to the exercise of their public rights, and their action in our public meetings. I have no doubt boys are boys, and if Williamstown is so bad as they say it is, it might be well to blow it up. I speak of them when they come to the polls, and to other public places. When they mingle with the citizens on those occasions, they are as gentlemanly, peaceable, and as good citizens as we have. I think this class ought not to be deprived of their rights. I believe when a student at a seminary decides that to be his home for the time being, having no other domicile, he is as much entitled to vote, as the laboring man who decides the place where he labors is his home while he labors there. I cannot vote for any resolution which proposes to deprive any citizen of the elective franchise. I therefore move to strike out all of the first resolve.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair would state that the motion is not strictly in order at this time, but will be after the disposition of the pending motion.

Mr. MORTON, of Taunton. I would ask the Chair what the precise motion now before the Committee is.

The CHAIRMAN. It is the motion to strike out from the first resolve the words "or while a student of any seminary of learning."

Mr. MORTON. I understood that to be the motion before the Committee, but as all parts are somewhat connected, I desire to make a few

remarks in relation the whole proposition. When this proposition was first presented to my mind I entertained great doubt whether it ought to be adopted or not. I was rather inclined to suppose that it ought not to be adopted, but some reflection upon the subject, and especially the discussion of the matter in opposition to the resolution, has brought me to the conclusion that it is expedient to retain the whole. I think there is not the slightest question but what precisely the same rule of law now prevails, that will prevail if this resolution is adopted. I will neither add to, nor take from the law as it now stands, and the question which presented itself to my mind was, whether it was expedient to substitute a constitutional law for a statute law.

But, before I say anything upon that point, I will briefly present my views in relation to the resolve. It relates to the qualification of four classes of persons; to soldiers in the army, and sailors in the navy of the United States, to sailors in the merchant service, and to students in seminaries of learning.

I take it that the law is well settled by the decisions of our judicial tribunals that the first class viz.: soldiers in the army of the United States, wherever they may be stationed, do not, by a change of their station, thereby change their home and domicile. They may, or they may not do it, but the fact that they have, by order, removed from one place to another, does not of itself give them a different domicile, nor is it a circumstance in determining where their domicile is. That soldiers thus situated cannot, by considering their home where they may be, make that their home, is a proposition too plain to be discussed before this Committee. Their domicile must depend entirely upon other circumstances, and wherever that may be, they are there entitled to vote.

The same rule applies to sailors in the service of the United States. Wherever they may be ordered, and however long they may be absent from their original domicile, they still retain it until they gain another somewhere else. The fact of his sailing in different parts of the world, or of being absent a longer or a shorter time in foreign or domestic ports is not a fact to effect their domicile, or in any measure to establish it.

Then there are other classes of sailors, such as those in the merchant service, in the common fisheries and in the whale fisheries, whose employment sometimes takes them away from their homes for four or five years. They come within the same rule. Let them be absent ever so long from their home here, still they retain it as their domicile, until they acquire one somewhere else.

[July 5th.

The mere fact of their absence in foreign ports, of itself does not deprive them of their home here. It may be that by stopping abroad and remaining, they may acquire a home there, and that would deprive them of their former domicile.

Then, Sir, we come to the last class of persons affected by this resolve-the class composed of students in colleges and other seminaries of learning, and though it may be difficult to decide all questions which may arise in relation to these, yet the same principles of law apply. The mere fact that a person becomes a student in your town, does not, of itself, according to this resolve, establish his domicile there. The only provision here is, not that he shall not acquire a domicile while a student in a seminary, but that, the fact that a student is engaged as such in a university shall not, of itself, make him a voter.

Now, there are, no doubt, a great many students in the different universities and seminaries of learning, who do not consider the places where these seminaries are located, as their home, and who never intend to make them their home. There are, also, undoubtedly, some individuals connected with these seminaries, who do intend to make them their home, and there may be some difficulty in determining in these cases where their home or their domicile is. But it seems to me that this resolve, of itself, is not to determine the student's qualification, nor to ascertain where his domicile is. You must take into view all the circumstances of the case in determining that. But, in this case, the student stands, in that respect, precisely with the hired man. It is very rare-and perhaps it never happens-that a man's intention is to change his domicile, or have any essential effect in determining any question in relation thereto. There may be, and undoubtedly are, cases in relation to wills, or the disposition of property, where the intention of the party may be inquired into in order to settle where his home is; but not so with a man claiming an interest by virtue of his residence.

All the circumstances connected with the domicile of the student must be inquired intothe circumstances of the place where he was when he entered college; the circumstances attending his residence in that place. You must throw the burden of proof upon him, because, until a man acquires a residence in some other place, he retains the domicile of his birth. That always remains and adheres to him until evidence is furnished that he has acquired a residence somewhere else.

I think it is perfectly sound, perfectly in accordance with the provisions of law, and perfectly in accordance with this resolve, that he shall not,

This principle was so well settled by law, that I entertained, at first, a good deal of doubt whether it was expedient to put such a provision into the Constitution; not that I had any doubt about the principle itself, but I thought we ought to be very cautious how we put provisions into the Constitution which did not relate to the great principles of fundamental law; and inasmuch as this was a well settled principle of law, I thought perhaps it would be better to allow it to remain as such. But when I came to reflect that in the formation of our government, the very first step we took was to decide upon the qualification of voters, I thought it was perfectly proper and expedient to go on and establish the details of that right in a manner that everybody could understand, and in a place where the selectmen and others could find it without difficulty, could become familiar with it, and could apply it in all cases requiring its application that come before them.

I am aware that this matter of convenience to the selectmen, to which I have alluded, has been made the subject of ridicule in this Convention, and I would not bring it in as a consideration entitled to very great weight in the determination of this subject. But if there are other considerations sufficient to establish the principle, I think that even the matter of convenience to our town officers is a matter entitled to some slight consideration in our actions as a Convention.

With these remarks I leave the subject. I hope the amendment now before the Committee will not prevail, because, in the practical operation of this resolve, I think it is more important to retain this provision than either of the others, inasmuch as it is a matter about which there seems to have been some difficulty heretofore.

Before I sit down, I will indicate my desire to have these resolutions acted upon separately, because in relation to the second resolution, I entertain great doubt whether it should be adopted. In fact, I think it ought not to be.

On motion of Mr. BIRD, of Walpole, the Committee then rose, and the President having resumed the Chair of

THE CONVENTION,

[July 5th.

The chairman, Mr. Giles, of Boston, reported progress, and asked that the Committee have leave to sit again.

Leave was granted.

On motion, the Convention adjourned until three o'clock, P. M.

AFTERNOON SESSION.

The Convention reassembled at three o'clock.

Qualifications of Voters.

On motion of Mr. BREED, of Lynn, the Convention resolved itself into

COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE,

Mr. Giles, of Boston, in the Chair, and resumed the consideration of the Report of the Committee on the Qualifications of Voters, the question pending being upon the motion to strike out, at the close of the first resolution the words, “or while a student of any seminary of learning."

Mr. SUMNER, for Otis. I hope the motion to strike out will not prevail. I do not apprehend that anything can be added in this discussion to the very full and clear argument which was submitted this morning by the gentlemen from Taunton, (Mr. Morton). It seems to me that he in this instance touched every point in the case with his usual clearness and ability. But I desire nevertheless to say a few words upon the subject.

It is said, in the first place, that the report-I speak more particularly of the first resolution, which I propose to treat as a whole, as well as in reference to the particular amendment now pending-I say it is said that this resolution is simply declarative of the law as it now stands. Well, Sir, that is a true statement of the case, but it does not strike me as any objection at all to incorporating the provision into the organic law of the land, because it is so declared by law. Why, Sir, many of the most important articles in our Bill of Rights are simply declarative of our civil rights; but they are not the less valuable in their place, and it is considered not the less necessary or desirable by all men that they should retain their places there. So, in relation the Declaration of Independence. It is merely a declaration; a mere recital, a mere rehearsal of our civil rights, and rights, too, which were familiar to the men who framed and adopted that declaration-our fathers of the Revolution-long before they gathered them together and embodied them in that instrument, but that is no reason for abolishing the Declaration of Independence.

The whole case, as embraced in the first resolve,