JULY government, ought to be bound, by oath, to support the articles of union.

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"XXI. Resolved, That the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the convention ought, at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congress, to be submitted by an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider and decide thereon.

"XXII. Resolved, That the representation in the second branch of the legislature of the United States consist of two members from each State, who shall vote per capita.

"XXIII. Resolved That it be an instruction to the committee, to whom were preferred the proceedings of the convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property and citizenship, in the United States, for the execu tive, the judiciary, and the members of both branches of the legislature of the United States.

During the protracted debates which took place in the discussion of the foregoing resolutions, the most important were on the third and fourth. On the one hand, the larger States demanded that the members of both houses in the national legislature should be elected by the people according to population, so as to secure to them a preponderating influence in both. On the other hand, the smaller States, feeling that such a mode of representation would set them at the mercy of the larger, insisted on an equality of representation in each house; so that the States, large and small, might be equal in their voice and vote in the assembly of the Union. The arguments advanced on both sides are profoundly interesting, and we give the most important of them in the words of Mr. Luther Martin, a distinguished member of the convention. The italics are his.

"The advocates of unequal representation," he says, in his celebrated letter," urged that, when the Articles of Confederation were formed, it was only from necessity and expediency that the States were admitted each to have an equal vote; but that our situation was now altered, and therefore those States who considered it contrary to

their interest would no longer abide by it. They said no State ought to wish to have influence in government except in proportion to what it contributes to it; that if it contributes but little, it ought to have but a small vote; that taxation and representation ought always to go together; that if one State had sixteen times as many inhabitants as another, or was sixteen times as wealthy, it ought to have sixteen times as many votes; that an inhabitant of Pennsylvania ought to have as much weight and consequence as an inhabitant of Jersey or Delaware; that it was contrary to the feelings of the human mind-what large States would never submit to; that the large States would have great objects in view, in which they would never permit the smaller States to thwart them; that equality of suffrage was the rotten part of the Constitution, and that this was a happy time to get clear of it. In fine, it was the poison which contaminated our whole system, and the source of all the evils we experience.

"This is the substance of the arguments-if arguments they may be called-which were used in favor of inequality of suffrage. Those who advocated the equality of suffrage took the matter up on the original principles of government. They urged that all men, considered in a state of nature, before any government is formed, are equally free and independent, no one having any right or authority to exercise power over another, and this without any regard to difference in personal strength, understanding, or wealth--that, when such individuals enter into government they have each a right to an equal voice in its first formation, and afterwards have each a right to an equal vote in every matter which relates to their government: that if it could be done conveniently they have a right to exercise it in person; where it cannot be done in person, but, for convenience, representatives are appointed to act for them, every person has a right to an equal vote in choosing that representative who is intrusted to do, for the whole, that which the whole, if they could assemble, might do in person, and in the transacting of which each would have an equal voice :--that if we were to admit, because a man was more wise, more strong, or more wealthy, he should be entitled to more votes than another, it would be inconsistent with the freedom and liberty of that other, and would reduce him to slavery.

"Suppose, for instance, ten individuals, in a state of nature, about to enter into government, nine of whom are equally wise, equally strong, and equally wealthy; the tenth is ten times as wise, ten times as strong, or ten times as rich: if, for this reason, he is to have ten votes for each vote of either of the others, the nine might as well have no vote at all—since the whole nine might assent to a measure, yet the vote of the tenth would countervail and set aside all their votes. If this tenth approved of what they wished to adopt, it would be well; but if he disapproved, he could prevent it; and in the same manner he could carry into execution any measure he wished, contrary to the opinions of all the others, he having ten votes, and the others altogether but nine. It is evident that, on these principles, the nine would have no will nor discretion of their own, but must be totally dependent on the will and discretion of the tenth; to him they would be as absolutely slaves as any negro is to his master. Hence it was urged, the inequality of representation, or giving to one man more votes than another, on account of his wealth, &c., was altogether inconsistent with the principles of liberty; and in the same proportion as it should be adopted, in favor of one or more, in that proportion are the others enslaved. It was urged that, although every individual should have an equal voice in the government, yet even the superior wealth, strength, or understanding, would give great and undue advantages to those who possessed them that wealth attracts respect and attention; superior strength would cause the weaker and more feeble to be cautious how they offended, and to put up with small injuries rather than engage in an unequal contest. In like manner, superior understanding would give its possessor many opportunities of profiting at the expense of the more ignorant.

"Having thus established these principles with respect to the rights of individuals in a state of nature, and what is due to each on entering into government-the principles established by every writer on liberty--they proceeded to show that states, when once formed, are considered, with respect to each other, as individuals in a state of nature; that, like individuals, each state is considered equally free and equally independent, the one having no right to exercise authority over the other, though more strong, more wealthy, or abound

ing with more inhabitants--that, when a number of states unite themselves under a federal government, the same principles apply to them as when a number of individual men unite themselves under a state government that every argument which shows one man ought not to have more votes than another, because he is wiser, stronger, or wealthier, proves that one state ought not to have more votes than another, because it is stronger, richer, or more populous; and that by giving one state or one or two states more votes than the others, the others thereby are enslaved to such state or states having the greater number of votes, in the same manner as in the case before put of individuals, when one has more votes than the others--that the reason why each individual man, in forming a state government, should have an equal vote, is because each individual, before he enters into government, is equally free and independent; so each state, when states enter into a federal government, are entitled to an equal vote, because, before they entered into such federal government, each state was equally free and equally independent--that adequate representation of men, formed into a state government, consists in each man having an equal voice; either personally, or if by representatives, that he should have an equal voice in choosing the representatives--so adequate representation of states in a federal government consists in each state having an equal voice, either in person or by its representative, in everything which relates to the federal government—that this adequacy of representation is more important in a federal than in a state government, because the members of a state government, the district of which is not very large, have generally such a common interest, that laws can scarcely be made by one part oppressive to the others without their suffering in common; but the different states composing an extensive federal empire, widely distinct one from the other, may have interests so totally distinct, that the one part might be greatly benefited by what would be destructive to the other.

"It was said that the maxim that taxation and representation ought to go together was true so far that no person ought to be taxed who is not represented; but not in the extent insisted upon, to wit, that the quantum of taxation and representation ought to be the same; on the contrary, the quantum of representation depends upon the quantum of freedom, and therefore all, whether individual

states or individual men, who are equally free, have a right to equal representation—that to those who insist that he who pays the greatest share of taxes ought to have the greatest number of votes, it is a sufficient answer to say, that this rule would be destructive of the liberty of the others, and would render them slaves to the more rich and wealthy-that if one man pays more taxes than another, it is because he has more wealth to be protected by government, and he receives greater benefits from the government; so, if one state pays more to the federal government, it is because, as a state, she enjoys greater blessings from it; she has more wealth protected by it, or a greater number of inhabitants, whose rights are secured, and who share its advantages.

"It was urged that, upon these principles, the Pennsylvanian, or inhabitant of a large state, was of as much consequence as the inhabitant of Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, or any other State That his consequence was to be decided by his situation in his own state; that, if he was there as free, if he had as great share in the forming of his own government, and in the making and executing its laws, as the inhabitants of those other states, then he was equally important and of equal consequence. Suppose a confederation of states had never been adopted, but every state had remained absolutely in its independent situation, no person could, with propriety, say that the citizen of the large state was not as important as the citizen of the smaller. The confederation of states cannot alter the case. It was said that, in all transactions between state and state, the freedom, independence, importance, and consequence, even the individuality of each citizen of the different states, might, with propriety, be said to be swallowed up or concentrated in the independence, the freedom, and the individuality of the state of which they are citizens; that the thirteen states are thirteen distinet, political, individual existences, as to each other; that this federal government is, or ought to be, a government over these thirteen political, individual existences, which forms the members of that government; and as the largest state is only a single individual of this government, it ought to have only one vote; the smallest state, also being one individual member of this government, ought also to have one vote. To those who urged that the states having equal suffrage was contrary to