anity enjoins. Now, if he lives in the habitual violation of the precepts of the Gospel, he perjures himself, and adds to his other crimes the sin of hypocrisy. But the sceptic, however erroneous his opinions, may be a very good member of society, and practically adhere to the ethics of the New Testament. And at any rate, he cannot gain anything by avowing his opinions, though a parson, by taking the oaths, may enjoy the revenues of two or three benefices.

There is also another point of view, in which the comparative guilt of the two parties might be estimated-The derivative or consequen tial evil; that is to say, the injury done to society by the infraction of the law, is infinitely more serious in the case of the clergyman, than in that of the sceptic. For the situation of the first invites confidence, he is looked up to as a model of imitation, his actions are cautiously observed, and his parishioners regulate their own conduct by that of their spiritual instructor. Now as the virtuous or vicious habits of a large district depend on his influence, the severity of punishment ought to be apportioned to the degree of mischief which is likely to result from this example. Contrasted therefore with the sceptic, the parson is infi

nitely more dangerous; for the former is generally regarded as one rather to be shunned than courted, nor is it probable, that any large portion of the community will regulate their lives by a standard, which is branded as ignominious and wicked.

Let us recapitulate the substance of this section. In reply to those who maintain, that Christianity is part and parcel of the law of the land, it has been shown that this assumption depends on the dictum of Lord Hale, whose opinion on this subject is not entitled to the same respect and deference, as on the general rules of law. We have explained the origin of the common law, and the meaning of the words “time of legal memory;" from which it is evident that if Lord Hale be correct, no great credit or respectability is thrown on the Christian religion, if we consider the spirit of the times, in which this law must have been passed. The improbability of the fact is almost raised into an impossibility, by reflecting that few persons could read, that printing was unknown, and that whatever slander was propagated, must have been by conversation. It is for

every reader to determine for himself, whether we have been successful in refuting the dictum of Lord Hale. Let the personal weight

of his character be placed in one scale, with his avowed bigotry; and in the other, the arguments against the probability of his assertion being true, as drawn from history and common

sense.

CHAPTER II.

ON THE INEXPEDIENCY OF PROSECUTIONS FOR

RELIGIOUS OPINION.

ACCORDING to the division laid down at the beginning of the last section, we proceed to point out the inexpediency of prosecutions for religious opinion. This branch of the subject will, for the sake of perspicuity, be arrayed under the following heads. First, it is proposed to show the utter impossibility of drawing any line between free and forbidden discussion sufficiently marked, to be of any practical utility. Secondly, to prove from history the inadequacy of punishment to produce uniformity of opinion. Thirdly, to show that no legislative body, in a free country, where the true principles of legislation are acted upon, have any right to interfere in matters of religious opinion,

Proceeding, then, in the order above mentioned, we shall endeavour, in this section, to show the utter impossibility of drawing a line

between free and forbidden discussion, sufficiently marked to be of any practical utility.

It is the glory and boast of those who pursue mathematical science, that the study of it gives rise to none of those angry and interminable disputes which flow from the discussion of politics, or the investigation of morals. Demonstration is the very essence of mathematics, and as the accuracy or falsehood of every proposition is determined by fixed and acknowledged data, no theory, or system, however plausible, can hope to receive encouragement, unless supported by solid and substantial argument. The science is in no respect speculative; it addresses itself to the judgment, not to the passions: it admits no conjectures or surmises on the contrary, all is certainty and fact. "An oval is never mistaken for a circle, nor an hyperbola for an ellipsis. The isoceles and scalenum are distinguished by boundaries, more exact than vice or virtue, right or wrong. ** Mr. Locke maintained, that morality was as capable of demonstration as mathematics, and was of opinion that the obscurity which prevailed in the discussions of it, was to be attributed solely to the abuse and imperfections of language. Towards the conclusion