routed, and the French being thus victorious on that side, directed their whole force against the centre and the right. A want of decision on the part of General Eguia completed the ruin of the army; he did not venture to vary his orders as necessity required, without receiving fresh ones from Cuesta, at a time when Cuesta was in such a situation that it was impossible for them to communicate. The Spaniards fought bravely; but the failure of their cavalry, and the want of talent in their commander, rendered all individual courage fruitless. 7000, according to the French accounts, were left upon the field, 3000 made prisoners, 30 pieces of cannon were taken. The statement is not greatly exaggerated. Cuesta reported that the loss was very considerable, though it had not been ascertained, and that the number of officers whom he had lost amounted to 170. The day before the battle was fought, Sebastiani, with 20,000 men, routed the army of La Mancha before Ciudad Real, without any resis. tance, he says,—a circumstance which, if it were true, would be even more disgraceful to the conqueror than to the Spaniards, for in the same official report it was added, that the cavalry put more than three thousand of them to the sword: 18 pieces of cannon and 4000 prisoners, including 197 officers, were the fruits of this victory. Sebastiani was now at the foot of the Sierra Morena, on a line with Victor, and it was announced at Madrid that these victories secured the conquest of Andalusia. Cuesta's army they represented as dispersed and annihilated, and their own loss as inconceivably little, not more than three hundred in killed and wounded, and less than one at Ciudad Real. That the French obtained a complete victory is beyond doubt; the Spaniards have not attempted to conceal their defeats, nor to extenuate the loss, prone as they have been to underrate the strength of the enemy; but that the conquerors purchased their triumph dearly became manifest when it was seen that they derived no advantage from it. They pushed on a corps to the neighbourhood of Badajoz; but the Duke de Albuquerque was in that quarter, and being freed from the shackles of a commander of inferior talents, his military skill was again displayed, 700 of the enemy were slain, and 200 sent prisoners to Seville. This loss, added to what they had already sustained, checked their progress, and instead of advancing into Andalusia, as had been boasted at Madrid, they retreated from Lobon and Talaveruala. Cuesta was then enabled, without molestation, to take up a position not many leagues from the field of battle, having his advanced guard at Almendralejo. Here he collected the scattered troops, reinforcements were sent him, and in a few days he was as formidable as before the action. In his general orders he thanked the army for their good conduct on that day, excepting by name the regiments of cavalry which had precipitately and disgracefully taken to flight, and thereby occasioned the defeat. For this offence he suspended three colonels from their rank,-it does not appear that any heavier punishment was inflicted, grievously as it was deserved. The privates were disgraced by having one of their pistols taken from them, till by some act of valour they should regain the honour which they had lost: a more injudicious mark of disgrace than this, which deprived them of part of their weapons, and thereby rendered them less efficient in the field, could hardly have been devised. It was reported that the central junta, in consequence of the defeat, had fled from Seville; they, how ever, were better informed of the loss which the enemy had sustained, than to be dismayed at the issue of the battle; and their conduct was dignified as well as politic. They decreed a pension to the April 1. widows and orphans of all those who had fallen, in proportion to their rank and circumstances, a badge of distinction to all the corps whom the general should commend, with double-pay for one month, and they promoted all the officers who had distinguished themselves. They declared that the general and the great body of the army had deserved well of their country, and they conferred the rank of captain-general upon Cuesta. This measure was censured, and with good reason; for Cuesta had committed important errors in neglecting to defend the Puente del Arzobispo with an adequate force, in abandoning the strong pass of Miravete, where every advantage of position was in his favour, and in risking a battle afterwards upon ground which the enemy had chosen. The Duke de Urbino and Generals Lapena and Marina were displaced on suspicion of trea son. The great advantage which Cuesta enjoyed was, that his patriot ism was undoubted, and the soldiers had no fear of being betrayed by him the danger of being sold and sacrificed by the officers and generals was perpetually in their thoughts; and this was an additional evil arising from the system of appointing men of high rank to the command. The greater their possessions, the greater was their temptation to acknowledge the intruder : property is a pledge of attachment to a legitimate government; but in perilous times it has been found that it usually becomes a pledge of submission to any usurpation. The intruder and his partisans hoped that the defeat and dispersion of two armies at the same time would break the spirit of the government, if not of the nation, and that the su preme junta might be induced to se cure themselves and their own possessions by submission. According ly a Spanish traitor, by name Joaquim Maria Sotelo, addressed a letter from April 12. Merida to the vice-president, saying, that the greater num ber of the provinces of Spain had sufficiently suffered from the horrible effects of war and conquest, and now the rest were threatened with the same calamities. Filled with consternation, he said, at the defeats of Urbino and Cuesta, the honourable Spaniards at the court of Madrid, who could not contemplate without the most poignant grief, the utter desolation of their beloved country, had implored the king to alleviate the distresses of such provinces as were occupied by the French troops, and to prevent them in those which were not yet in their possession. To these prayers the king had attended, and had therefore ordered him to an nounce his compliance to the junta, and authorised him to consult with such deputies as the junta might think fit to appoint, on the best means of fulfilling his wishes. He could not suppose that they would refuse to take steps on which the salvation of Andalusia and the happiness of the whole kingdom de pended. And, as the business was most important in its character, and most urgent in the present circumstances, Sotelo represented, that it would be improper to conduct it in writing, and that all the disputes and irregularities and doubtswhich it would otherwise cause might be complete-. ly obviated by a personal conference. On this ground, he hoped, from the honour and patriotism of the junta, that deputies would be named to confer with him. The junta replied, not to this traitor himself, but to Cuesta. "They had not forgotten, they said, the sacred character with which they were invested, and the solemn oath which they had taken, in unison with the wishes of the whole Spanish nation. If Sotelo were the bearer of powers sufficiently extensive to treat for the restitution of their beloved king, and for the immediate evacuation of the Spanish territory by the French troops, let him publish them in the usual form adopted by states, and they would be announced to the allies of Spain. The junta had no authority to listen to any treaty, or terminate any transaction, which was not founded on the basis of eternal justice. Any other principle of negociation, without benefitting the empire, would only tend to degrade the junta, which had entered into the most aweful engagements to bury itself beneath the ruins of the monarchy, rather than sanction any proposition which should diminish the honour and independence of the Spanish people. This answer they desired Cuesta to transmit to the intruder's agent, and they published the proposal and the reply. Perceiving, however, of what importance the safety of the government was to the patriotic cause, and the danger therefore of associating it in the minds of the people with any particular place of residence, in times when no place was secure, they published a decree April 18. upon this subject. It began by an avowal, that in their anxiety to provide a quick remedy for the calamities which had befallen the armies of La Mancha and Estremadura, they had imprudently hazarded their own safety by remaining at Seville But having provided for the reinforcement and equipment of the troops, and furnished all the supplies which were requisite for the defence of the four kingdoms of Andalusia, they had in cool consideration reflected, that their security was inseparable from that of the state; that the preserval of the deposit of the sovereignty entrusted into their hands was the first of their obligations ; and that they could not again expose it to the danger of being destroyed, without doing wrong to the nation which had confided it to them. The precipitation with which the tyrant of Europe advanced against Madrid in November, and sent troops towards Aranjuez, made it apparent that a principal object of his ferocions policy was to strike a mortal blow at the government, and, seizing the body which administered it, cut all the bonds of political association, and then throw the nation into confusion. These were still his objects: trusting more to his cunning than his force, he still pursued the government, hoping to get its members in his power, and then renew the infamous scenes of Bayonne, by compelling them to authorize his usurpation, or sacrificing them to his rage if they resisted his seductions and his menaces. Thus to degrade the government in the eyes of the nation itself would, he thought, be the best means of degrading the nation also, and reducing it to that utter servitude, which, in the insolence of his fortune, this tyrant designed to inflict upon Spain. To frustrate these aims, the junta decreed, that, whenever the place of their residence was threaten ed, or when any other reason should convince them of the utility of so doing, they would transfer the seat of government elsewhere, where they might preserve the august deposit of the sovereignty, and watch over the defence, the well-being, and the prosperity of the nation. And they declared, that, whatever the accidents of the war might be, the junta would never abandon the continent of Spain, while a single spot could be found in it where they could establish themselves for the defence of the country against the force and fraud of its perfidious enemy, as they had solemnly sworn to do. CHAP. XXIII. Capture and RecapCapture of Porto, State of the War in Galicia. Soult enters Portugal. ture of Chaves. General Freire killed by his Troops. and Massacre in that City. The Spaniards recover Vigo. Success of Romana at Villafranca. Perilous Situation of Soult. THE plans of the intruder were, that, when Sebastiani and Victor had defeated the armies of La Mancha and Estremadura, the former should advance into Andalusia, and make himself master of Seville, while the latter should enter Portugal by the side of Badajos, and co-operate with Soult, who was to advance from Galicia through the northern provinces. Success was considered as so certain, that, when the news of Cuesta's defeat reached Paris, the Moniteur affirmed that this engagement had laid Seville open to the French armies, and that probably by that time the capital of Portugal was in their possession also. The unexpected and unexampled rapidity with which the Spanish troops again assembled after their dispersion, and the shock which Victor received from the Duke of Albuquerque, frustrated the intended movements on the side of the Sierra Morena and of Alentejo. Soult meantime, ignorant of this fortune, (for the communication by way of Salamanca was cut off by Sir Robert Wilson's indefatigable legion) proceeded to execute his part of the combined operations. Marshal Ney, between whom and Soult no very cordial feelings of good VOL. II. PART I. will existed, had been appointed governor of Galicia. He had still a predominant force after Soult's army was departed; there were garrisons in every town which was sufficiently important, either for its size or situation, to require one, and the French had complete military possession of the country. But they had yet to subdue the spirit of the people; and the Galicians, who had no longer an example of panic and disorder before their eyes, carried on the war in their own way. Captain M'Kinley in the Lively frigate, with the Plover sloop under his command, arrived off the coast to assist them. He discovered none of that apathy for their own country, none of that contented indifference who was to be their master, none of that sullen and ungrateful dislike of the English, of which the retreating army had complained so loudly; he heard from them nothing but expressions of gratitude to the British government and praise of the British nation; he perceived in them the true feelings of loyalty and patriotism, and saw in all their actions the most enthusiastic ardour, regulated by a cool and determined courage. The French at 2 N |