dorsed thereon a declaration signed by the case of an importation of merchandise subpurchaser, manufacturer, owner, or agent, ject only to a specific duty, it is lawful to setting forth that the invoice is in all re-dispense with an appraisement, our opinion spects correct and true, and was made at is that, in finding the duty properly assess-[628] the place from which the merchandise is to able upon this merchandise, it was obligabe exported to the United States; that it tory on the government officials to inquire contains, if the merchandise was obtained by into its value, and that therefore the duty purchase, a true and full statement of the was one regulated in some manner by the time when, the place where, the person from value thereof. The fact that it turned out, whom, the same was purchased, and the ac- in the present case, that the goods did not tual cost thereof, and, when obtained in any pay a less rate of duty than fifty per centum other manner than by purchase, the actual ad valorem, did not relieve the appraiser market value or wholesale price thereof at from inquiring into and determining the the time of exportation to the United States value of the goods. And if it was the duty in the principal markets of the country from of the appraiser, in order to enable him to whence exported; that such market value is fix the duty, to inquire into the value of the the price at which the merchandise described imported merchandise, he was entitled to in the invoice is freely offered for sale to all the aid afforded him in such an inquiry by purchasers in said markets, and that it is the production of a true and correct invoice. the price which the manufacturer or owner We cannot accept the contention of the immaking the declaration would have received, porters that, where articles of merchandise and was willing to receive, for such merchan-are entered and appraised, the inquiry dise sold in the ordinary course of trade, in whether the appraised value exceeds the en[627]*the usual wholesale quantities; the actual tered value is immaterial, unless, as a requantity thereof; and that no different in-sult of such inquiry, such articles have imvoice of the merchandise mentioned has been posed upon them ad valorem duties. or will be furnished to anyone; that, if the merchandise was actually purchased, the declaration shall also contain a statement that the currency in which such invoice is made out is that which was actually paid for the merchandise by the purchaser.

The seventh section as amended by section 32 of the act of July 24, 1897, provides that the importer, at the time he makes his entry, may make such addition to the cost or value given in the invoice as in his opinion may raise the same to the actual market value or wholesale price of such merchandise in the principal markets of the country from which imported; but no such addition shall be made to the invoiced value of any imported merchandise obtained otherwise than by actual purchase.

The importers had no right to determine for themselves in advance whether a specific duty or an ad valorem duty should be levied. The duty was to be regulated by the value of the goods. A duty at least equivalent to an ad valorem duty of fifty per centum had to be levied, and to determine what duty was leviable it was necessary for the collector and appraisers to be truthfully advised of the value of the goods.

It is urged that, as specific duties were actually assessed in the present case, it therefore appears that the importers were not benefited by the undervaluation; that the revenue has not and could not suffer anything by the undervaluation; and that a mere difference of opinion between the importer and the appraisers as to the value of the goods should not subject the former to an additional duty.

These and other provisions contained in the
acts of June, 1890, and July, 1897, compel us
But what might seem to be the hardship of
to perceive the importance attached by Con- such a case cannot justify the appraisers or
gress to the obligation put upon the importer the courts in dispensing with the require-
to furnish the appraisers and the collector ments of the statutes. The meaning and pol-
with a true valuation of the imported mer-icy of the tariff laws cannot be made to yield
chandise; and also the care taken to relieve
the importer from a hasty or ill-considered
valuation contained in the invoice, by giving
him an opportunity to raise such valuation
by voluntarily making such addition thereto
as to bring the same to the actual market
value, and by providing for an appeal by the
importer, if dissatisfied with the appraise
ment, to the board of general appraisers, and
from the decision of the board to the courts.
The contention on behalf of the importers
is, in effect, that there are only two classes
of merchandise to be considered,-one where
the duties are purely specific, and where it
is claimed no appraisement is required and
none is made, and the other where the mer-
chandise is subject to an ad valorem rate of
duty; and that the merchandise in question
in this case belongs to the former class.

to the supposed hardship of isolated cases.
Nor is it apparent that the enforcement of
the statutory requirements can be justly
termed a hardship to importers who take the
risk of an undervaluation. The burden of[629]
furnishing a true and correct invoice in such
a case is no greater than that imposed on
within the category of goods subject to an ad
other importers where goods are confessedly

Without deciding whether, even in the

valorem assessment.

The administration of such laws cannot be narrowed to a consideration of every case as if it stood alone, and as if the only question was whether there was an actual intentior to defraud the government. Wide and long experience has resulted in the command that all importations of merchandise must be accompanied with a true and correct invoice stating the cost or market value. Like other importers, the present appellants must comply with this command, and if they have

failed to do so they must be held to be subject
to the additional duty imposed by the statute.
If the statutory regulations are found to be
too stringent, the remedy cannot be found
either in the courts, whose duty is to construe
them, or in the executive officers appointed to
carry them into effect, but in Congress.

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(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 630–635.) Appeal from supreme court of territory. On appeal from the supreme court of a ter ritory, if there is no finding of facts or statement of facts in the nature of a special verdict, it must be assumed that the judgment was justified by the evidence.

[No. 118.]

uary 30, 1899.

We have been referred to no decision of this court directly applicable to the case in hand, but Pings v. United States, 38 U. S. App. 250, is cited. That was a case arising under the tariff act of October 1, 1890 (26 Stat. at L. 567), where gloves were imported into the port of New York and were dutiable at $1.75 per Submitted January 10, 1899. Decided Jandozen, unless their value exceeded $3.50 per dozen, in which case they would be dutiable at fifty per centum ad valorem. The appraiser advanced their value in excess of ten per centum of the value declared in the entry and the propriety of this advance was not questioned. The appraised value, however, was not in excess of $3.50 per dozen. The collector held the merchandise liable to the additional duty prescribed by section 7 of the customs administration act of June 10, 1890. The importer's contention, that the additional duty should not be exacted because gloves of the kind imported pay a specific duty, and because the advance, although in excess of the ten per centum, was not sufficient to require him to pay the ad valorem duty exacted by the last proviso of paragraph 458 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, was sustained by the board of general appraisers. But the circuit [630] court held otherwise, and on appeal the circuit court of appeals for the second circuit affirmed the decision of the circuit court. The plaintiff alleged that he was in posThe court of appeals reviewing the provisions session as owner in fee, deriving it from one of the act of June 10, 1890, held that where Friday Neahr, commonly known as Mary F. the value of the goods determines the ques- Neahr, an unmarried woman over twenty-one tion whether they are to pay specific or ad years of age, by a deed dated October 14, valorem duty, appraisement is essential, and 1892. That the defendant, contriving to dethat it is to be expected that the statute fraud him (the plaintiff) and cloud his title should require the importer himself to state to the property, induced said Friday Neahr, the value of his goods faithfully and truth- by false and fraudulent pretenses, and withfully, and to enforce that requirement by ap-out consideration, to sign and acknowledge propriate penalties. The court said: "We see no reason for restricting the broad language of the statute, and concur with the judge who heard the case in the circuit court, that the statutes require that all imports be entered at fair value, and that the provision for increasing duties for undervaluations of more than ten percentum makes no distinction between specific and ad valorem duties, or between undervaluations that may affect the amount of regular duties and those that will not."

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the Territory of Arizona affirm-
ing the judgment of the District Court of
that Territory in favor of the plaintiff ad-
judging that the plaintiff is owner of certain
real estate in Maricopa County in that terri-
tory. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. L. E. Payson and Hamilton
Armstrong for appellant.

Messrs. A. H. Garland, R. C. Garland,
and E. P. Budd for appellee.

*Mr. Justice McKenna delivered the [631] opinion of the court:

This case was under another statute, in somewhat different terms, but the reasoning upon which that decision went is that which we have pursued in the present case, and meets with our approval.

This is a suit to quiet title to a lot in the city of Phoenix, Arizona, described as lot 8 in block 1 in Neahr's addition to said city. The appellee was plaintiff in the court below and the appellant was defendant, and we shall so designate them.

an instrument in writing, the contents of
which were unknown to her, which instru-
ment was a conveyance to him from her of
the property, and in which she was induced
to fraudulently state that she was not of law-
ful age when she executed the deed to the
plaintiff, and that said instrument was re-
corded in the office of the county recorder of
Maricopa County, "all to the great injury of
this plaintiff in the sum of five thousand dol-
lars." Judgment was prayed that the in-
strument to Marshall be delivered up and
canceled, and that plaintiff have damages in
the sum of five thousand dollars, and for gen-
eral relief.

The answer admits that Friday M. Neahr
was seised in fee of the property, and ex-
Our conclusion is that the questions certi-ecuted a deed therefor to the plaintiff, and
fied to us by the judges of the Circuit Court
of Appeals should be answered in the affirma-
tive, and it is so ordered.

Mr. Justice Peckham dissented. 172 U. S.

that he entered into and was in possession
thereof, and that he (the defendant) ob-
tained a deed therefor on the 25th day of
October, 1894.

The answer puts in issue all other aver-

"And it is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that said defendant Norton Marshall take nothing by his cross complaint filed herein, and that said plaintiff Peter T. Burtis do have and recover of and from the said defendant Norton Marshall his costs and disbursements herein, taxed at $53.30."

A motion for a new trial was made and denied, and an appeal was then taken to the supreme court of the territory, which affirmed the judgment of the district court. To review the judgment of the supreme court this appeal is prosecuted.

ments, and alleges by way of cross complaint | title to said premises or any part thereof by that when Friday M. Neahr executed the virtue of said deed. deed to plaintiff she was under twenty-one [632]years, to wit, nineteen years, which plaintiff knew. That Friday M. Neahr derived the property from her father by a deed of gift, in which it was expressly provided and limited that she should have no power of disposition of said premises until she arrived at the age of twenty-one years, which plaintiff knew. That she attained the age of twentyone on the 7th of September, 1894, and on the 24th of October, 1894, she "executed, acknowledged, and delivered to this defendant, for a valuable consideration, then and there paid to her by the defendant, a deed of conveyance in writing, with full covenants of seisin and warranty, conveying to this defendant the lands and premises described in the plaintiff's complaint herein, and therein and thereby said Friday M. Neahr expressly revoked and disaffirmed the aforesaid attempted conveyance of said premises to the plaintiff, and this defendant thereupon became, ever since has been, and now is the lawful owner of said premises and the whole thereof, and entitled to possession thereof; that said plaintiff has no right, title, claim, or interest whatsoever in said premises, and the claim of the plaintiff to ownership thereof is without foundation and against the rights of this defendant, and is a cloud upon the title of this defendant to the said premises." Wherefore the defendant prayed that the deed to plaintiff be declared invalid and he be enjoined from setting up any claim to the property, and that defendant be adjudged the owner.

A trial was had on these issues before the court without a jury, and judgment was given for the plaintiff.

There are fourteen assignments of error, some of which attribute error to the judg ment, some to the supposed finding of the court of the validity of the deed to plaintiff and invalidity to that of defendant, and assigning ownership of the property to the former and nonownership to the latter. The second and third assignments of error are as follows:

2. "The said court erred in refusing to sustain the errors assigned on the appeal to it from the district court.

3. "The said court erred in refusing to reverse the said cause for the errors of the district court assigned."

Adverting to the errors assigned on appeal to the district court, those which were based on the action of the court other than the judgment were in refusing a new trial and "generally in admitting improper evidence offered by the plaintiff, to which the[634] defendant duly objected and took exception, as appears fully in the bill of exceptions."

There is no other specification of error in the admission of testimony and there is no specification in the briefs as required by rule 21. Lucas v. Brooks, 18 Wall. 436 [21: 779]; Benites v. Hampton, 123 U. S. 519 [31: 260]. Indeed, error on admitting testiThe statement of counmony is not urged at all and probably was not intended to be. sel is:

"The errors assigned reach every possible phase of the case, and need not be specifically referred to here.

"The judgment appealed from, being gen eral, requires an analysis of the case. "The only possible questions may be said to be

"1. That Neahr was of full age when she made the deed to Burtis, October 14, 1892.

The judgment recited that"Evidence upon behalf of the respective parties was introduced and the cause was submitted to the court for its consideration and decision, and, after due deliberation, the court orders that plaintiff have judgment. "Wherefore, by reason of the law and the premises aforesaid, it is ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the plaintiff Peter T. Burtis is the owner of the following described real estate, situate in Maricopa County, Arizona Territory, to wit [describing it]; and that said defendant Norton Marshall is not the [633]owner of *said lot number eight (8) in block number one (1) of Neahr's addition or of any part thereof, and that the deed of said premises heretofore executed by Friday Mary Neahr to said Norton Marshall, of date October, 1894, and recorded on the 29th day of October, 1894, in book 37 of deeds, page 55, in the office of the county recorder of said county of Maricopa, is invalid and of no effect, and the same is hereby annulled and canceled, and the said defendant Norton "5. That she was bound to restore the conMarshall has acquired no claim, title, or right by virtue of said deed in or to the prem-sideration to Burtis before an effective disises described therein, to wit, said lot num-affirmance. ber eight (8) in block number one (1) of said Neahr's addition to the city of Phoenix, and said defendant is hereby forever restrained and enjoined from asserting any claim or

"2. If not, that she failed to disaffirm within a reasonable time after attaining her majority.

"3. That she ratified her deed to Burtis before deeding to Marshall and after attaining majority.

4. That she was estopped to disaffirm, by her own act in averring her majority in executing the Burtis deed.

"6. That Marshall, knowing the prior deed to Burtis, could not take title to himself in October, 1894.

"The first three propositions present pure172 U. S

ly questions of fact, and upon this record it is impossible that the court below could have based its judgment upon an affirmance of either of the three.

"The last three propositions present solely questions of law, and these it is confidently submitted are only to be resolved in favor of appellant."

We are not required, therefore, to review the rulings of the district court on admission or rejection of testimony. Does the record present anything else for our determination? In Idaho & Oregon Land Improv. Co. v. Bradbury, 132 U. S. 509 [33: 433], this court said, by Mr. Justice Gray, that "Congress has prescribed that the appellate jurisdiction of this [635]court over *judgruents and decrees' of the ter


mistaken his remedy and must resort to am-
other proceeding for damages.
[No. 125.]

Argued January 12, 1899. Decided January


30, 1899.

'N ERROR to the Court of Errors and Ap-
-peals of the State of New Jersey to review
a decree of that court dismissing the appeal
in this case and remanding the case for an
execution of the decree of the Court of Chan-
cery of that state perpetually enjoining the
defendant, John McQuade, in a suit by the
inhabitants of the city of Trenton from in-
terfering with or removing a sidewalk and
curbing. Writ of error dismissed.

See same case below, 52 N. J. Eq. 669.
Statement by Mr. Justice Brown:
This was a bill in equity filed in the court
of chancery of the state of New Jersey by
the Inhabitants of the City of Trenton
against John McQuade, to enjoin him from
interfering with the relaying of a certain
pavement and the resetting of the curb and
gutter in front of his premises, in the city
of Trenton.

ritorial courts in cases of trial by juries
shall be exercised by writ of error, and in all
other cases by appeal;' and 'on appeal, instead
of the evidence at large, a statement of the
facts of the case in the nature of a special
verdict, and also the rulings of the court on
the admission or rejection of evidence when
excepted to, shall be made and certified to
by the court below,' and transmitted to this
court with the transcript of the record. Act
of April 7, 1874, chap. 80, § 2 (18 Stat. at The bill averred in substance that a change
L. 27, 28). The necessary effect of this en- of grade on the street in front of the premises
actment is that no judgment or decree of the of the defendant was made by a city ordi
highest court of a territory can be reviewed nance, at the special request of the Pennsyl-
by this court in matter of fact, but only in vania Railroad Company, upon an agree
matter of law. As observed by Chief Justice ment by the latter to make the changes, to
Waite: 'We are not to consider the testi- carry off all the surface water diverted or
mony in any case. Upon a writ of error we changed by the alteration, and to indemnify
are confined to the bill of exceptions, or ques- the city; but that the defendant, McQuade,
tions of law otherwise presented by the rec-who owned a lot upon the street in question,
ord; and upon an appeal to the statement of not only notified the workmen to desist from
facts and rulings certified by the court be-changing the grade, but forcibly interfered
low. The facts set forth in the statement
which must come up with the appeal are con-
clusive on us.' Hecht v. Boughton, 105 U. S.
235, 236 [26: 1018]." See also Salina Stock
Co. v. Salina Creek Irrig. Co. 163 U. S. 109
[41: 90]; Gildersleeve v. New Mexico Mining
Co. 161 U. S. 573 [40: 812]; Haws v. Victo-
ria Copper Mining Co. 160 U. S. 303 [40:
436]; San Pedro & Cañon Del Agua Co. v.
United States, 146 U. S. 120 [36: 912];
Mammoth Mining Co. v. Salt Lake Foundry
and Machine Co. 151 U. S. 447 [38: 229].

There were no findings of facts by the district court or by the supreme court, hence no "statement of facts in the nature of a special verdict," and we must assume that the judgment of the district court was justified by the evidence, and the judgment of the Supreme Court sustaining it is affirmed.


JOHN MCQUADE, Plff. in Err.,

with their work by throwing hot and cold water on the men engaged in such work, and thus tried to prevent its being carried on; and that after the pavement had been relaid in front of his property he tore it up, and rendered it nearly impassable for pedestrians by digging a hole in the sidewalk in front of his premises, and keeping the same filled with water.

In his answer, defendant denied that the railroad company had provided means to carry off the surface water, and alleged that the provisions made were utterly inadequate, and that his property had been damaged by the overflow of water into his cellar. He[637] further averred that the change of grade authorized by the city ordinance was not a proper change of grade, but that the alteration related to the construction of approaches to an elevated bridge, and was a matter over which the common council could not exercise any legal authority whatsoever; that by the attempted alteration of the grades, the surface water, instead of passing through the street, was caused to accumulate immediately in front of the defendant's property, and was likely to overflow the sideAn injunction by a state court against inter- walk and into the defendant's cellar; ference with the construction or maintenance that if the sidewalk in front of defendant's of a sidewalk and curbing in front of defend- property were raised to the grade mentioned ant's premises, where he has forcibly inter- in the ordinance, the cellar windows of his fered, claiming that his property is being house would be practically closed up and his a Federal question, when the court assumes free access to the street greatly impaired; his right to damages, but holds that he has that the alteration of the grade was a work 172 U. S.


(See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 636–640.)

Federal question.

taken without compensation, does not present


*Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opin-[638] ion of the court:

carried on at the expense of and for the sole
benefit of the railroad company; that such
company had no authority under the law to The principal contention of the plaintiff
do the work and thereby damage defendant's in error (the defendant below) is that, as he
property without first making compensation had never been con pensated in damages for[639]
for the damage he would sustain by reason the injury to his property by altering the
of such work; and that he had a right to pre- grade of the street in front of his lot, he had
vent the completion of the work until he a right to abate the nuisance caused by the
should have received full compensation for proposed changes, and that in the refusal of
all damages he would sustain by such work, the state court to recognize this principle
and hence that complainants were not en- he had been deprived of his property without
titled to the relief prayed for. Further an- due process of law within the meaning of the
swering, he insisted that under the Consti- Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Con-
tution of the state he had a right to free ac-stitution.
cess to the street from his property and to But no such question was raised in the
the free admission of light and air; and that pleadings, unless the allegation of the an-
no alteration in the grade of the street could swer that the plaintiffs had no right to make
be lawfully made until a proper method of the alterations in question without first com-
procedure should have been prescribed by the pensating defendant for his damages be
legislature for the exercise of the power of treated as equivalent to an allegation
eminent domain, "whereby this defendant that his property had been taken without
may receive proper and adequate compensa-due process of law. The right of the defend-
tion for the damage that will result to him ant to damages was, however, assumed in the
by said alteration of grades and exclusion opinion of the vice chancellor, who disposed
of light and air."
of the answer by saying that the defendant

The case was heard upon the pleadings and had mistaken his remedy, and must resort
proofs, and a decree rendered that the defend-to another proceeding against the city for
ant be perpetually enjoined from interfering his damages. This was beyond all doubt a
with the completion of the sidewalk and
curbing, and from removing or interfering
with the pavement, sidewalk, or curbing af
ter the same shall have been completed.
[638] *In his opinion the vice chancellor put the
casc upon the grounds that the defendant had
no right to take the law into his own hands
and bid defiance to the city authorities; that
the city being liable for damages sustained
because of the want of repaired streets, and
having undertaken to repair them according
to the grade which had been prescribed, the
court was justified in enjoining defendant
from any interference; that the only question
at issue was one with respect to the damages
to which McQuade was entitled; that he
might have ascertained these before the city
or railroad company took any steps, but that
he allowed the company to go on and make
all the changes necessary without taking di-
rect proceedings to compel them to ascertain
the damages and compensate him; and that
he has still an ample remedy for a redress of
his grievances without interfering with the
right of the public to the use of the street in
front of his dwelling.

From this decree McQuade appealed to the court of errors and appeals upon the ground that under such decree the complainants were permitted to take and damage his property for public use without compensation, because no procedure for taking and injuring his property in the manner set forth had been prescribed by the legislature, and "because the decree is in sundry other respects contrary to the Constitution of the United States and to the law of the land." The petition of appeal was dismissed by the court of errors and appeals and the case remanded for an execution of the decree. No written opinion was delivered.

Mr. David McClure for plaintiff in error.
No counsel for defendants in error.

ruling broad enough to support the decree
regardless of any Federal question that
might possibly have been raised from the al-
legation of the answer. In his petition for
an appeal, defendant repeated his allegation
that his property had been damaged without
compensation, and averred generally that
the decree was contrary to the Constitution
of the United States, but made no specific al-
legation of any conflict therewith. As the
court of errors and appeals delivered no
opinion, it is impossible to state definitely
upon what ground the decree of the vice
chancellor was affirmed. The presumption
is that it was satisfied with the opinion of
the court below, and affirmed the decree for
reasons stated in the opinion of the vice chan-
cellor; but, however this may be, it is quite
evident that a Federal question was not
necessarily involved in the case, and hence
that this court has no jurisdiction. Kau-
kauna Water Power Company v. Green Bay
& M. Canal Co. 142 U. S. 254 [35: 1004];
Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S.
574 [28: 1084]; Eureka Lake & Y. Canal Co.
V. Yuba County Super. Ct. 116 U. S. 410
[29: 671].

We have repeatedly held that even the de-
cision by the state court of a Federal ques-
tion will not sustain the jurisdiction of this
court, if another question not Federal were
also raised and decided against the plain-
tiff in error, and the decision thereof be suffi-[640]
cient, notwithstanding the Federal question,
to sustain the judgment. Much more is this
the case where no Federal question is shown
to have been decided, and the case might
have been, and probably was, disposed of
upon non-Federal grounds. Harrison V.
Morton, 171 U. S. 38 [43: 63]; Bacon ▼.
Texas, 163 U. S. 207 [41: 132], and cases

The writ of error in this case must therefore be dismissed.

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