TRADE-MARKS, Act of March 3, 1881 (see Jurisdiction, E 2): Warner v.
Searle and Hereth Co., 195.
ADMIRALTY.
See JURISDICTION, D;
MARITIME Law;
NAVIGABLE WATERS.
ADVERSE POSSESSION.
Title acquired by-Superiority over patent.
Adverse possession gives a title to land together with the remedies which
attach to the title as effectually as a conveyance from the owner. Ad-
verse possession under claim of right for the period prescribed by the
statute of limitations of the State of Utah after the act granting the
land and before a patent has been issued by the United States to the
Central Pacific Railroad Company for a part of its land grant within
that State, and not within its right of way, will prevail against the
patent. Toltec Ranch Co. v. Cook, 532; Toltec Ranch Co. v. Babcock,
542.
AMICUS CURIA.
See PRACTICE, 1.
APPEAL AND WRIT OF ERROR.
See FEDERAL QUESTION;
JURISDICTION.
BANKRUPTCY.
See JURISDICTION, A 1;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 7.
Municipal-Omission of stipulation as to remedies conferred by statute affect-
ing rights of holders.
A statute authorizing an issue of municipal bonds was amended by an act
increasing the amount authorized and also giving special remedies in
addition to, and not in lieu of, those given by the original act, but di-
recting that the bonds "shall on their face stipulate" that the holders
are entitled to the remedies contained in the amending as well as in
the original act, The bonds were issued after the amending act was
passed, and contained a statement that they were issued in pursuance
of the original act and only for the amount authorized thereby. They
did not contain any reference to the amending act or stipulation that
the holders were entitled to the remedies given thereby. Held, that
in the absence of such stipulation the holders were not entitled to the
remedies given only by the amending act. Hubbert v. Campbellsville
Lumber Co., 70.
See SURETIES;
WRIT AND PROCESS.
BURDEN OF PROOF.
See EVIDENCE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
JURISDICTION, A 6; D;
MARITIME LAW.
Hazeltine v. Central National Bank, 183 U. S. 118, followed in Schuyler
National Bank v. Gadsden, 451.
Huntington v. Worthen, 120 U. S. 101, followed in Smith v. Indiana, 138.
Logan County v. Townsend, 139 U. S. 67, followed in Schuyler National
Bank v. Gadsden, 451.
New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, followed in Board of Assessors v.
Comptoir National, 388.
Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Lewis, 162 U. S. 366, followed in United
States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 84.
Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650, followed in Allen v. Pullman Co., 171.
Pickard v. Pullman Co., 117 U. S. 34, followed in Allen v. Pullman Co.,
171.
Pullman Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420, followed in Allen v. Pullman Co.,
171.
The Belfast, 7 Wall. 624, followed in The Robert W. Parsons, 17.
United States v. More, 3 Cranch, 159, 172, followed in Louisville Trust Co.
v. Knott, 225.
CITIZENSHIP.
See NATIONAL Banks, 2;
JURISDICTION.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
JURISDICTION, E 2.
COMMERCIAL NAME.
See TRADE NAME.
See CARRIERS;
MARITIME LAW;
RAILROADS.
COMMON LAW.
See JURISDICTION, A 5, 6.
See DAMAGES;
EVIDENCE, 2, 3;
INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY, 1.
CONGRESS, POWERS OF.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
CONGRESS, ACTS OF.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
CONSPIRACY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.
1. Action under constitution, etc., defined.
A suit does not arise under the Constitution and laws of the United States
unless a dispute or controversy as to the effect or construction thereof
upon the determination of which the result depends appears in the
record by the plaintiff's diverse pleading. Arbuckle v. Blackburn,
405; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co., 526.
2. Contracts, impairment of.
Restraints upon governmental agencies will not be readily implied. There
are presumptions against the granting of exclusive rights and against
limitations upon the powers of the government. By the statute of
1891, cities in Missouri may erect and operate their own electric light
plants, or they may grant the right to persons or corporations to erect
and operate such plants for not exceeding a period of twenty years.
The city of Joplin by ordinance adopted subsequent to the statute,
granted such right for twenty years to a corporation which erected
and has ever since operated the plant. The ordinance conferred rights,
exacted obligations, fixed rates and provided for its written accept-
ance and the corporation so accepted it. By a later ordinance the city
provided for the issue of bonds to build its own plant. In an action
brought by the Light Company to restrain the erection of the plant
during the continuance of the twenty year term, on the ground that
the ordinance violated the Federal Constitution in that it impaired the
obligation of the contract existing under the ordinance granting the
franchise, held that as such ordinance did not provide that the city
would not erect its own plant no such provision could be implied:
that the fact that cities could elect under the statute of 1891
either to erect their own plants or grant franchises, could not in case
of their election to grant the franchise be construed as an implied
contract not to erect their own plants during the period for which
the franchise was granted. Joplin v. Southwest Missouri Light Co.,
150.
3. Contracts-Impairment of-Conflicting city ordinances.
An ordinance of a city of Kentucky before it became a city of the third
class giving a water company a right to make and enforce, as part of
the conditions upon which it would supply customers, all needful
rules and regulations not inconsistent with the law must be construed
as to the law, as it might be altered, and when the city becomes a city
of the third class and thus has power under the general law to pro-
vide the city with water by contract or by works of its own and to
make regulations for the management thereof and to fix prices to
consumers, an ordinance subsequently enacted during the life of the
franchise regulating the management of the waterworks and fixing
prices of the water which are not unreasonable, is not void as against
the water company under the impairment clause of the Constitution
of the United States. Owensboro v. Waterworks Co., 358.
4. Contracts-Provision of tax law exempting corporation not a contract.
A provision in a general tax law that railroads thereafter building and
operating a road north of a certain parallel shall be exempted from
the tax for ten years, unless the gross earnings shall exceed a certain
sum,
is not addressed as a covenant to such railroads and does not
constitute a contract with them, the obligations of which cannot be
impaired consistently with the Constitution of the United States.
Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 379.
5. Commerce clause—Repugnancy of state tax law.
The provision of the tax law of the State of Tennessee of 1887, that
sleeping car companies doing business in the State pay a certain sum
per annum per car and which by its terms applies to cars running
through the State as well as to those operated wholly within the State,
is repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution.
(Pickard v. Pullman Co., 117 U. S. 34.) The provision of the tax law
of the State of Tennessee of 1889, that sleeping car companies pay a
tax of $3000 per annum in lieu of all other except ad valorem tax for
one or more passengers taken up at one point within the State and
delivered at another and transported wholly within the State and
which does not refer to or affect the interstate business of the com-
panies, is not repugnant to the commerce clause of the Federal Con-
stitution. (Osborne v. Florida, 164 U. S. 650.) Such tax will not be
regarded as a disguised attempt to tax the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce if, under the laws of the taxing State, it is not
compulsory for a corporation engaged in interstate commerce to carry
on that part of its business which is wholly within that State. (Pull-
man Co. v. Adams, 189 U. S. 420); Allen v. Pullman Co., 171.
6. Cruel and unusual punishment-Diversity of sentence in similar cases.
Undue leniency in one case does not transform a reasonable punishment
in another case to a cruel one, and where the highest court of a State
has sustained the sentences of ten years each, imposed on two men
convicted with a third of a conspiracy to defraud, and such punish-
ment does not from the record appear unreasonable considering the
nature of the offense, this court will not set aside the judgment as
imposing a cruel and unusual punishment either on the facts or be-
cause the other person convicted was only sentenced to seven years.
Howard v. Fleming; Howard v. North Carolina, 126.
7. Due process-Hearing before assessment board.
In the apportionment of assessments for improvements due process of law
is afforded to the taxpayer if he is given an opportunity to be heard
before the body making the assessment; and, so far as the Federal
Constitution is concerned, the state legislature may provide that such
hearing shall be conclusive. Hibben v. Smith, 310.
8. Due process—Equal protection—Rights unimpaired by eight hour law.
In the exercise of its power a State may by statute provide that eight
hours shall constitute a day's work for all laborers employed by or
on behalf of the State or any of its municipalities and making it unlaw-
ful for anyone thereafter contracting to do any public work to require
or permit any laborer to work longer than eight hours per day except
under certain specified conditions. and requiring such contractors to
pay the current rate of daily wages. And one who after the enact-
ment of such a statute contracts for such public work is not by reason
of its provisions deprived of his liberty or his property without due
process of law nor denied the equal protection of the laws within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though it appear that
the current rate of wages is based on private work where ten hours
constitute a day's work or that the work in excess of eight hours per
day is not dangerous to the health of the laborers. Quære, whether
a similar statute applicable to laborers on purely private work
would be constitutional, not decided. Atkin v. Kansas, 207.
9. Due process-Equal protection-Commerce clause-Construction of and
prosecution under constitutional police regulation.
Where the constitutionality of a police regulation of a State is conceded,
the construction placed thereon, and prosecutions commenced in view
of such construction thereunder by an officer of the State in the dis-
charge of his duty do not in themselves constitute a deprivation of
property without due process of law, a denial of equal protection of
the law by the State, or any direct interference with interstate com-
merce, and afford no ground for the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
as a court of the United States. Arbuckle v. Blackburn, 405.
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