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THE NEW YORK
ASTOR, LENOX AND
Entered, according to the Act of Congress, by THOMAS C. UPHAM,
in the Clerk's office of the District court of Maine.
PRESS OF J. GRIFFIN, BRUNSWICK.
The present work has been prepared in the hope of promoting a more general acquaintance with an important department of sci
As it is designed chiefly for those who are young, and are in a course of education, it lays claim to no other merit, than what might ordinarily be expected in a text-book, founded on the inquiries of many valuable writers. Guided by their researches, it endeavors to give a condensed, but impartial view of Mental Philosophy, so far as its principles are understood at the present time; and the writer has learnt from a number of esteemed instructers of youth, that his design is approved by them. He is by no means insensible to this favorable sentiment; and if the present work should prove to be the means of awakening an increased interest in mental science, he will feel himself amply rewarded for whatever trouble its preparation may have occasioned.
The Philosophy of the Mind has grown up like other sciences, from small beginnings. Many propositions, coming too in many instances from able writers, have been thrown aside; truth has been sifted out from the mass of error, until at last a great number of important principles is ascertained. But while it is exceedingly necessary, that our youth should be made acquainted with these principles, it is impossible that they should go through with all the complicated discussions, which have been held in respect to them. Many of the books, in which these discussions are contained, have become exceedingly rare; and if they were not so, no small number of students, who are now in a course of as thorough an education as our country affords, would not be able to purchase them. And besides, by placing before the student a mass of crude and conflicting statements, his mind becomes perplexed. To be able to resolve such a mass into its elements, and to separate truth from error,
implies an acquaintance with the laws of the intellect, and a degree of mental discipline, which he is not yet supposed to have acquired; and hence, instead of obtaining much important knowledge, he becomes distrustful of every thing.
Now these evils, saying nothing of the loss of time attendant on such a course, are to be remedied in the same way as in other sci
In other departments of learning, ingenious men discuss points of difficulty; conflicting arguments are accumulated, until the preponderance on one side is such that the question in debate is considered settled. Others employ themselves in collecting facts, in classifying them, and in deducting general principles, and when all this is done, the important truths of the science, collected, from such a variety of sources, and suitably arranged and expressed, are laid before the student, in order that he may become acquainted with them. Very seldom any one thinks it advisable, that the pupil, in the course of an education limited to a very few years, should be obliged to attempt an acquaintance with every scientific tract and book, whether of greater or less value. It is neither desirable nor possible, that he should be made to consult all the Memoirs of Institutes and of Royal Societies; and still less to read the multitudes of half formed suggestions, which are either struck out in the momentary heat of debate, or are developed from all quarters in the natural progress of the mind. It belongs rather to professional men and to public instructers, to engage in this minute and laborious examination, and to present those, whom they instruct, with the results of their inquiries. It may indeed be desirable to give them some knowledge of the history of a science, and to point out such authors as are particularly worthy of being consulted by those, whose inclination and opportunities justify more particular investigations. But this is all, that is either demanded, or can be profitable in the ordinary course of education. And this is what is attempted to be done in the present work.
It has been my desire and endeavor, as was intimated at the beginning of these remarks, to give a concise but correct view of the prominent principles of Mental Philosophy, so far as they seemed at present to be settled. The statement of these principles is attended with a perspicuous summary of the facts and arguments, on which they are based ; together with occasional remarks on the objections, which have been made from time to time.
In selecting facts in confirmation of the principles laid down, I have sought those, which not only had a relation to the point in hand, but which promised a degree of interest for young minds. Simplicity and uniformity
of style have been aimed at, although in a few instances the statements of the writers referred to, have been admitted with only slight variations, when it was thought they had been peculiarly happy in them. As
my sole object was the good of young men, I did not feel at liberty to prejudice the general design, by rejecting the facts, arguments, and in some cases even the expressions of others. And it may be added here, in respect to this department of science in general, that entire originality is out of the question. A person, who should attempt to give a sketch of the human mind, without consulting and availing himself of the learned and judicious labors of Locke, Reid, Stewart, De Gerando, Cousin, and many others, would succeed only in exposing his own unwise presumption.
It is impossible, that any one man, however respectable his talents, should acquire, by his own unaided exertions, a full acquaintance with this subject. Aristotle possessed one clear view, viz, that of the connection of the intellect with the material world, and of the external origin of knowledge in general; Plato, on the other hand, directed his attention chiefly to the internal origin of thought. Locke had the sagacity to combine these two great views; and his plan has been carried out more decisively and fully by his succes
And it is thus throughout, both in respect to the intellectual, and the sentient or active part of our nature. One has sketched the plan; another has corrected and enlarged it. One has pointed out the sources of materials; while others have hastened
procured them; and others again have been employed in putting them together, and in ornamenting the completed edifice.
THOMAS C. UPHAM.
Bowdoin COLLEGE, (Maine,) SEPTEMBER, 1839.
INTRODUCTION. ! The soul's immateriality indica-
ted by the feeling of identity 17
Nature of such preliminary state-
Of the name or designation given correspondence
4 The great works of genius an ev-
12 Of relative suggestion as a ground
This primary truth not founded of belief
13 Of reasoning as a ground or law
CHAP. II.-IMMATERIALITY OF THE
Chap. IV.- -GENERAL CLASSIFICA-
On the meaning of the terms, ma-
terial and immaterial
14 The mind may be regarded in a
Difference between mind and mat- threefold point of view 30
ter shown from language
15 Evidence of the general arrange-
Tbeir different nature shown by ment from consciousness 31
their respective properties 16 Evidence of the same from the