[20] son had died intestate, and leaving a widow, Upon the death of William H. Campbell, After the death of her husband in 1881 Moore was her business agent; and she resided alternately with one or the other of her two daughters, living on affectionate and confidential terms with them and their husbands; and at the times of the gift in question, and of her death, was at the house of Mr. and Mrs. Moore, in Georgetown. She died August 6, 1893, aged ninety-one years, and leaving a will, dated May 26, 1882, and duly admitted to probate, by which, after some small legacies, she devised and bequeathed all the residue of her estate, in equal thirds, to her two daughters and the seven children of her deceased son, and appointed her sons-in-law, Russell and Moore, executors of her will. the less necessary for us to go into a critical examination of the English chancery doctrine on this subject, for should the cases be found to countenance it, we should not be disposed to adopt or sanction the broad principle contended for, that the deed of a child to a parent is to be deemed prima facie void. It is undoubtedly the duty of courts carefully to watch and examine the circumstances attending transactions of this kind, when brought under review before them, to discover if any undue influence has been exercised in obtaining the conveyance. But to consider a parent disqualified to take a voluntary deed from his child without consideration, on account of their relationship, is assuming a principle at war with all filial, as well as parental, duty and affection, and acting on the presumption that a parent, instead of wishing to promote the interest and welfare [of], would be seeking to overreach and defraud his child. Whereas the presumption ought to be, in the absence of all proof tending to a contrary conclusion, that the advancement of the interest of the child was the object in view, and to presume the existence of circumstances conducing to that result." 12 Pet. 253, 254 [9: 1075]. Mr. Justice Story (who had concurred in that judgment) in the last edition of his Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence, which underwent his revision, and which was published in 1846, after his death, stated [21] the doctrine on the subject as follows: "The natural and just influence which a parent has over a child renders it peculiarly important for courts of justice to watch over and protect the interests of the latter; and therefore all contracts and conveyances whereby benefits are secured by children to their parents are objects of jealousy, and if they are not entered into with scrupulous It was contended by the plaintiffs that the court of appeals erred in holding that the burden of proving undue influence was up-good faith, and are not reasonable under the on them; and it was argued that by reason of the confidential relations between the donor and the donees the burden of proof was shifted upon the latter to prove the validity of the gift of the bonds. But the ruling of the court of appeals in this respect is supported by the decisions of this court, as will appear by an examination of those decisions. *In the leading case of Jenkins v. Pye, 12 circumstances, they will be set aside, unless third persons have acquired an interest under them, especially where the original purposes for which they have been obtained are perverted or used as a mere cover. But we are not to indulge undue suspicions of jealousy, or to make unfavorable presumptions as a matter of course in cases of this sort." And he supported this statement by large quotations from the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson in Jenkins v. Pye. 1 Story, Eq. Jur. (4th ed.) § 309. In Taylor v. Taylor, 8 How. 183 [12: 1040], decided at January term, 1850, after the deaths of Justices Thompson and Story, the opinion of Mr. Justice Thompson in Jenkins v. Pye and the passage in Justice Story's Commentaries (omitting the last clause, which was not in the earlier editions) were quoted by Mr. Justice Daniel as laying down the true rule upon the subject. While some expressions of that learned judge might seem to construe those authorities strongly in favor of presuming undue influence, the decision in that case, setting aside a deed made by a daughter to her fath er soon after her coming of age, ultimately proceeded upon overwhelming proof of undue influence, derived in part from the testimony of witnesses to significant facts; in part from too made to the long intimacy between father and son, the alleged usurpation by the lat evidence conclusively showing that nearly all the statements in the deed itself were utterly false, and in part from a letter writ-ter of absolute control over the life, habits, ten to the father by the daughter a few days before executing the deed and while they were living under the same roof, which, as the court declared, clearly appeared upon its face to be "a fabrication, designed to conceal the very facts and circumstances which it palpably betrays," and "not the production of an inexperienced girl, but of a far more practised and deliberate author." It has since, more than once, been recog22]nized by this court, that "the influence for which a will or deed will be annulled must be such as that the party making it has no free will, but stands in vinculis." Conley v. Nailor (1886) 118 U. S. 127, 134 [30: 112, 115]; Ralston v. Turpin (1889) 129 U. S. 663, 670 [32: 747, 750]. See also Mackall v. Mackall (1890) 135 U. S. 167, 172, 173 [34: 84, 87]. In Ralston v. Turpin, just cited, in which the object of the bill was to set aside deeds made to an agent by his principal, this court, speaking by Mr. Justice Harlan, recognized the rule of law that "gifts procured by agents, and purchases made by them, from their principals, should be scrutinized with a close and vigilant suspicion," and conceded that in the case then before the court the agent held such relations, personal and otherwise, to the principal, as would enable him to exercise great influence over the latter in respect to the mode in which his property should be managed; that the principal trusted the agent's judgment as to matters of business more than the judgment of any other man; and that he had an abiding confidence in the agent's integrity, as well as in his desire to protect his interests. Notwithstanding all this, the bill was dismissed, because the plaintiff had failed to show that the deeds were obtained by undue influence, but, on the contrary, it appeared by the great preponderance of the evidence that "although their execution may have been induced, not unnaturally, by feelings of friendship for, and gratitude to, the defendant Turpin, the grantor acted upon his own independent, deliberate judgment, with full knowledge of the nature and effect of the deeds. It was for the donor, who had sufficient capacity to take a survey of his estate, and to dispose of it according to an intelligent, fixed purpose of his own, regardless of the wishes of others, to determine how far such feelings should control him when selecting the objects of his bounty." 129 U. S. 675-677 [32: 752]. and property of the former, efforts to pre- The principles established by these authorities may be summed up as follows: In the case of a child's gift of its property to a parent, the circumstances attending the transaction should be vigilantly and carefully scrutinized by the court, in order to ascertain whether there has been undue in In Mackall v. Mackall, above cited, influence in procuring it; but it cannot be which it was attempted to set aside a deed deemed prima facie void; the presumption is from a father to his son, it appeared that for in favor of its validity; and, in order to set twenty years the father and mother had been it aside, the court must be satisfied that it separated, and this son had remained with was not the voluntary act of the donor. The the father, taking his part, and assisting him same rule as to the burden of proof applies in his affairs, and the other children had with equal, if not greater, force to the case gone with the mother and taken her part in of a gift from a parent to a child, even if the [23] the family differences. This court, in the effect of the gift is to confer upon a child opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Brewer, with whom the parent makes his home and is speaking of the contention that the execu-in peculiarly close relations a larger share of tion of the deed was induced by undue in- the parent's estate than will be received by fluence, said: "In this respect, reference was other children or grandchildren. Applying these principles to the case at bar, it is beyond doubt that the relations in which Mary I. Campbell stood to her daughters and their husbands afford no ground for putting upon them the burden of disproving undue influence. Upon the question whether undue influence was in fact exercised, the record contains a mass of conflicting testimony, which is satisfactorily considered in the opinion of the court of appeals, and which it would serve no useful purpose to discuss anew. A series of decisions of this court has established the rule that successive and concurrent decisions of two courts in the same case, upon a mere question of fact, are not to be reversed, unless clearly shown to be erroneous. This rule, more often invoked in admiralty cases, is yet equally applicable to appeals in equity. Dravo v. Fabel, 132 U. S. 487, 490 [33: 421, 422]; Stuart v. Hayden, 169 U. S. 1, 14 [42: 639, 644]; Baker v. Cummings, 169 U. S. 189, 198 [42: 711,716]. There is one document, however, in the record, which was the subject of so much ar[25] gument at the bar, that a brief notice *of it, and of the circumstances under which it was drawn up, will not be out of place. The defendants, at the hearing, introduced in evidence a writing signed by Mary I. Campbell, and in the following terms: "Georgetown, D. C., October 6th, 1885. I have to-day voluntarily, without suggestion from anyone, given to my two daughters the 4% and 4 per cent United States bonds coming to me from the estate of my husband, amounting to thirteen thousand dollars at par, thus equaling their share with the amount received by their brother and his family." There was evidence tending to show that this writing was drawn up and signed at the request of Mrs. Moore, and de livered to her, on the day of its date, and had since been kept by her. It was argued, in behalf of the plaintiffs, that the procuring of this paper, containing the unusual and suspicious declaration that the gift of the bonds was made "voluntarily, without suggestion from anyone," together with the long concealment of the paper from the plaintiffs, was strong evidence of an intent to back up a fraudulent transaction. But this argument is fully met by evidence that the reason for the execution of this paper was that, three or four years before, Mary K. Campbell, the mother of the plaintiffs, had made an unfounded charge that Mrs. Moore had by undue influence procured the insertion of the legacies to herself and her sister in her father's will, and had only desisted from that charge upon receiving from Mary I. Campbell a written statement that it was "false in every particular." Under such circumstances, no suspicion of undue influence can arise out of the execution of the writing of October 6, 1885, or out of its not having been disclosed to the plaintiffs, which may well have been in order to prevent stirring up anew a family quarrel. In this respect, as in most others, the case wholly differs from that of Taylor v. Taylor, This case was before this court upon a former hearing (Pickering v. Lomax, 145 U. S. 310 [36: 716]), the report of which contains a full statement of the facts, which need not be here repeated. Upon that hearing the judgment of the supreme court of Illinois was reversed, and the case remanded for a new trial, which resulted in a judgment for Pickering, the plaintiff, and in an affirmance of that judgment by the supreme court of Illinois. Lomax v. Pickering, 165 Ill. 431. To review this judgment a second writ of error was sued out from this court. Messrs. John M. H. Burgett, James Maher, and A. W. Browne for plaintiff in error. Mr. John P. Ahrens for defendant in error. [20] to McClure in the approval of the President by about a month, viz.: Horton, January 21, 1871; McClure, February 24, 1871. The common source of title in this case was Alexander Robinson, an Indiar, to Defendant, however, relies upon the fact whom the lands were patented by President that the McClure deed was recorded with the Tyler, December 28, 1843, under the provi-approval of the President indorsed thereon sions of art. 4 of the treaty of Prairie du March 11, 1871, while plaintiff's deed with Chien (7 Stat. at L. 320), subject to the such approval was not recorded until March following proviso: "But never to be leased 12, 1873. The real question then is whether or conveyed by him" (the grantee), "them, the recording of the Horton deed of July 16, his or their heirs, to any person whatever, 1861, without the approval of the President without the permission of the President of indorsed thereon, was notice of plaintiff's the United States." The lands were subse- title to subsequent purchasers. quently allotted and set off to Joseph Robinson, one of the patentee's children. by a decree in partition of the Cook county court of common pleas. Pickering claimed title through a deed from Joseph Robinson and wife to John F. Horton, dated August 3, 1858, recorded July 16, 1861, but without the approval of the President indorsed thereon. The deed was, however, submitted to and approved by the President, January 21, 1871, and a certified copy of the deed with such approval recorded March 12, 1873. Lomax's title was by deed from Joseph Robinson to Alexander McClure, datei November 22, 1870, submitted to and approved by the President, February 24, 1871, and recorded March 11, 1871, in Cook county. By section 30 of the conveyancing act of Illinois, it is provided that "all deeds, mortgages, and other instruments in writing which are authorized to be recorded shall take effect and be in force from and after the time of filing the same for record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice, and all such deeds and title papers shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent purchasers without notice until the same shall be filed for record." The supreme court of Illinois [165 Ill. 436] was of opinion that the deed to Horton was entitled to record, although it had not received the approval of the President. In [29] delivering the opinion of the court Mr. Justice Craig observed: "As respects the apUpon the first trial, plaintiff's chain of proval of the President, required by the title being proved, the defendant Lomax in-treaty and the provision in the patent to rentroduced no evidence,' but at the close of der the deed effectual, we do not think the plaintiff's testimony moved that the case be recording laws have any bearing upon it. dismissed upon the ground that the deed of There was a record of the approval of the August 3, 1858, from Joseph Robinson and President in the Department at Washington, wife to Horton was made in direct violation and that record was notice to all concerned of the terms of the patent, which required from the time it was made, and we do not the approval of the President to the convey think the recording laws of the state reance. This motion was granted, the court quired a copy of that record to be recorded being of opinion that Robinson had no in the recorder's office where the land is loauthority to convey without obtaining prior cated. A record of that character is simipermission of the President, and that the lar to a patent issued by the President for subsequent approval of the deed was invalid. lands that belong to the government, which Thereupon judgment was rendered for the is not required to be recorded in the county defendant, which was affirmed by the su- where the land is located." preme court of Illinois. 120 Ill. 293. The case was reversed by this court upon [28] the ground that the approval subsequently given by the President to the conveyance was retroactive, and was equivalent to permission before execution and delivery. The case went back for a new trial, when Lomax put in evidence the title above stated, relying upon a sentence in the opinion of this court to the effect that "if, after executing this deed, Robinson had given another to another person with the permission of the President, a wholly different question would have arisen." Judgment having been rendered for the plaintiff, the case was again taken to the supreme court of the state, which was of opinion that the defendant did not stand in the relation of a bona fide purchaser to the property. Even if this be not a construction of the state statute binding upon us, and decisive of the case, we regard it as a correct exposition of the law. The deed is an ordinary warranty deed upon its face, signed by the parties, and regularly acknowledged before a justice of the peace. There was nothing to apprise the recorder of any want of authority to convey, or to justify him in refusing to put the deed on record. Whether the grantors had authority to make the deed as between themselves and the grantees, or subsequent purchasers, is a matter which did not concern him. Though the deed might be impeached by showing that the grantor had no such authority, the record was notice to subsequent purchasers that they had at least attempted to convey their interests. It will be observed that the deed to Horton A deed may be void by reason of the inof August 3, 1858, antedated the deed to Mc- fancy or coverture of the grantors, and yet Clure of February 22, 1870, by more than may be, under the laws of the state, entitled twelve years, and was recorded July 16, 1861, to record and notice to subsequent purchaswhile the deed to McClure was recorded ers. While the record of a void deed is of March 11, 1871, nearly ten years thereafter. no greater effect than the deed itself, and is The deed to Horton also antedated the deed not such notice as will give protection to a bona fide purchaser, yet it may, under cer- |corder's office in Cook county, and when Motain circumstances, be a notice to intending Clure took his deed of November 22, 1870, purchasers, or third persons, that the grant- and obtained the approval of the President or has intended and undertaken to convey of February 24, 1871, he took it with the his title. Thus, in Morrison v. Brown, 83 chance that the Horton deed had already Ill. 562, a deed of trust executed by a mar- been approved and that the power of the ried woman, her husband not uniting there- President had been exhausted. The approval [30] in, *to secure the purchase money of the prop- by the President of his deed was doubtless an erty, though void as a conveyance, was never-inadvertence, and, in view of the fact that he theless held to be an instrument in writing had already approved the Horton deed, a relating to real estate within the statute of nullity. By his approval of the first deed Illinois, and, when recorded, constructive no- the title of Robinson was wholly devested, tice to all subsequent purchasers of the lien and there was nothing left upon which a of the original vendor upon the same for the subsequent approval could operate, unless unpaid price. The court took the ground we are to assume that such subsequent apthat while married women had no force or proval in some way revested the title in Robpower to create a lien, subsequent purchas- inson and passed it to McClure. No new deers occupied the same position as they would livery was necessary to pass the title to Horhave done had the instrument been read to ton. United States v. Schurtz, 102 U. S. them before they became interested in the 378 [26: 167]; Bicknell v. Comstock, 113 U. question. S. 149 [28: 962]; Gilmore v. Sapp, 100 III. 297; Gallipot, Bruner, v. Manlove, 2 Ill. 156. No injustice was done to McClure, since he already had notice, both by the record and by Robinson's statement, that he had conveyed the land, and an examination of the record in Washington would doubtless have shown that the prior deed had received the approval of the President. The two deeds stand in the relation of two patents for the same land, the second of which is uniformly held to be void. So, in Tefft v. Munson, 57 N. Y. 97, the record of a mortgage prior to the acquisition of title by the grantor was held to be constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser in good faith, and, under the recording act, giving it priority to the title. See also United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381; Alderson v. Ames, 6 Md. 52; Stevens v. Hampton, 46 Mo. 404. In this case, however, it appears from McClure's own statement that when Robinson came to him in 1870 to sell him his right to the land, he told him that he had already sold the premises, but without the approval of the President, and that McClure sent his own attorneys to examine the record. He thus had not only constructive, but actual, notice of the Horton deed. The approval of the President was no proper part of the deed. The language of the restriction in the original patent was "but never to be leased or conveyed by him [the grantee], them, his or their heirs, to any person whatever, without the permission of the President of the United States." How that permission should be obtained or expressed is left undetermined by the proviso. We see no reason why it might not have been by a memorandum at the foot of the petition for approval, or even by a letter to that effect. The essential fact was that permission should be obtained and expressed in some form, of which, in all probability, a record was kept in the Department. Indeed, we think it sufficiently appears that at the time the deed to McClure was approved by the President, February 24, 1871, [31]*there was on file in Washington the approval There is nothing in the fact that the partition proceedings, under which Robinson obtained title to the land in dispute, were not approved by the President. Not only were these partition proceedings set forth as a part of the record of the case at the time he approved the Horton deed, but as already held in the prior case (p. 316 [36: 719]), [32] such approval was retroactive, and operated as if it had been indorsed upon the deed when originally given, and inured to the benefit of Horton and his grantee, "not as a new title acquired by a warrantor subsequent to his deed inures to the benefit of the grantee, but as a deed, imperfect when executed, may be made perfect as of the date when it was delivered." The judgment of the Supreme Court of Illinois is therefore affirmed. ROBERT G. WILSON, Piff. in Err., บ. EUREKA CITY. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 32–37.) City ordinance, when not unconstitutional. of the President of the prior deed to Horton. There was put in evidence a certificate of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, signed March 7, 1896, to a certified copy of the Horton deed, with an affidavit as to the loss of the original, a further affidavit that the sale was an advantageous one for Robinson, and the approval of the President, dated January 21, 1871. It does not directly appear when the approval of the President was put on file in the office of the Commissioner, but we think the presumption is that it was filed as of its date. There was nothing requiring Submitted January 17, 1899. Decided Feb that this approval should be filed in the re ruary 20, 1899. |
