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But to return to the question of the district system. Its inherent justice and the completeness with which it effects what is desired being shown, it remains to consider the objections to which it is alleged to be exposed. I understand the argument to be in the first place, that there exists in the towns or quasi corporations of this Commonwealth, an absolute right of annual representation in the House of Representatives; this requires to be carefully scrutinized. If that right exists, I think we are met by an obstacle which cannot be overcome. I do not agree with the gentleman for Berlin, that the burden is upon those who propose it to show, that the district principle should be adopted. How do the facts stand? We are here with an acknowledged difficulty in the existing system, and it is confessed by all that the system is to be changed. A prin- | ciple which it is agreed is right in the abstract, is proposed for adoption, and that principle when applied, works out precisely the end which is desired. Now, when we have advanced as far in the argument as that, when we have succeeded in showing that the principle is a perfect one, and it will work out its perfect end, I think the burden is upon those who reject it to show that it should not be adopted. I think, then, that the gentleman for Berlin is in error in endeavoring to throw the burden of argument upon the advocates of the district system; I think the burden has shifted and is on the other side, to show why it should not prevail. But to return to the precise question.

Do the towns in this Commonwealth possess the right of representation? I think we are carefully to distinguish between an absolute inherent right and a usage growing out of convenience to the State, which has been accustomed to work out many of its objects through the instrumentality of town governments, incidental to which, while its population was not redundant, the right of town representation has, to a greater or less extent, been exercised, and thus, although such usage may have been continued for a long series of years we ought to distinguish between this and the absolute right to representation. If towns have the right to representation, upon what foundation does it rest? It is no where found in any frame of government in this Commonwealth set forth as a fundamental right. If it exist, it must be because it is necessarily inherent in the institutions; it must be an essential ingredient in town organization, and there ought to be added in proof of this, that it should be shown to be supported by an unbroken line of history. I will agree, Mr. President, that if the right of towns in this Commonwealth to a corporate representation

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could be supported by finding, in addition to a judgment that it is a necessary element to their useful existence, an unbroken historical support, looking back through the colonial, provincial and state history of Massachusetts, it ought to be sustained, unless there be some vital difficulty in working it out, which would justify us in throwing it aside. Let us look first at the matter of principle. Is it an essential ingredient in the existence, safety and prosperity of the towns, to have them represented as corporations? That of course, leads us to inquire in the next place what there is in the towns to represent. What laws are there which are to be passed in the course of legislation in this Commonwealth, that peculiarly affect the different towns in their corporate capacity? I am unable to discover anything of this kind, which would make it necessary that there should be this right of town representation. I admit that there may be occasional attempts to form new towns, or to set off here and there a farm from one town to another-there may be controversies with regard to such subjects, but this is merely incidental. I am looking at the great features of legislation; and I repeat the inquiry, has anybody ever known, or can anybody point out to this Convention, what there is in the towns as corporations that requires representation on this floor? The answer suggested is, that this is too narrow a view of the term "town"; that town means nothing more than the aggregate of the individuals who live in it, and that the right to representation is the right of the body of people that the town contains within its limits; but does that advance the argument? I would ask any gentleman if there is any greater right existing in the inhabitants of a town as such inhabitants to representation, than exists in any other class of individuals; what have they peculiar which requires distinct representation? What separate interests have people from the fact that they live in towns? Then, I say, that it does not advance the argument one hair to say, that it is not the representation of an inanimate thing, but the representation of a body of men inhabiting that inanimate thing, since their interests are identical with those of the people of other towns in other parts of the Commonwealth. It does not advance the argument a step to say, that it is the representation of men and not of an abstract idea.

But, although there are no corporate rights to be represented, and although I can discover no distinct and peculiar rights or interests attaching to men from the fact that, they inhabit towns which can be the foundation of a right to separate representation-yet it is said that the right has been

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conceded throughout the history of the Commonwealth, and so must be accepted-and cannot rightfully be changed. Take its colonial, provincial and State history; is it true, that the right of town representation has been uniformly recognized in this Commonwealth? Now, Sir, this subject has been very ably examined and discussed, and I think the result should be deemed conclusive. Without going over it chronologically, let me ask the attention of this Convention to the earliest and to the latest history of the Colony and State. Is it not true-do not the records of the Colony which have been produced and read to us by the learned gentleman from Cambridge, show conclusively, that in the earlier history of the government, towns containing less than a prescribed number of freemen were not by law allowed to participate in the government by electing a representative? If this be so, then this corporate right of representation has not an unbroken historical support. I will not stop to discuss the question raised by the gentleman from Dedham, (Mr. Wilkinson,) whether, at any time except for a period under the Charter of William and Mary, and still later under the Constitution of 1780, this supposed corporate right has been recognized and enjoyed, because that is somewhat debatable ground, and I do not choose to enter into it; but let us come down to a later period, and see how this right of towns to be represented has been dealt with. I speak of it as a right; and if it be a right, it is of course a right of annual representation. What have we been doing with that right for the last twenty years? Whence the authority-under what principle have towns, varying in number from sixtyfour to one hundred, been deprived of this inherent right, alleged to be so vital to their existence? How did you dare to make your alteration in the Constitution in 1836, and say that a large body of the towns of this Commonwealth should, for the future, have a fractional representation only in the House of Representatives?

I submit, then, that this alleged right has no just foundation in necessity as connected with our town organizations, and that it is not inherent or a vital element, as it has been called, in the existence of the towns; and that the claim of its unbroken exercise cannot be supported historically. It had its origin in convenience, and not right or necessity, and has been so treated from the beginning. But by far the most important suggestion in favor of retaining the supposed right of towns to representation, is founded on an alleged principle of public policy, which, if violated, will lead to results deeply affecting our political system, and which cannot be compensated by any basis of representation, however equal and just. |

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Mr. President, I have listened with great delight to what has constituted this leading and almost engrossing topic of argument, the praises of those model institutions of government called towns, established here and throughout the New England States. Sir, there is not one word of that well-deserved tribute which I would abate or alter. I would yield to no man in my love, or admiration, or veneration, for a system that has produced such striking consequences; and having said that, I may be allowed to inquire, whether the next step in the argument is a solid step. Is it true?—and I think the whole argument turns upon this single consideration-is it true, as the gentleman for Berlin says, that the right of representation is a vital element in the healthy existence of towns? Is it true, as the gentleman for Erving has said, that this is an essential attribute in the existence of towns? Sir, let us see how that argument stands, for a moment. It is conceded upon all sides, that the great functions of town government will continue to be discharged as before, whether the right of representation be allowed to the towns or not. Every town will continue to administer its system of schools, almshouses, roads, taxes, and all else that pertains to its municipal character; and it will do this as heretofore-wisely and well; because whether we regard the benefits they confer, or the burdens they impose, they are too deeply interesting to be neglected. Now, Sir, upon this controverted question, how far the right of annual representation must be superadded, to give vitality to this town organization, we have a test in our own history. Will gentlemen from the smaller towns tell us whether they can see that the ceasing to exercise this function since the amendment to the Constitution, in 1836, has caused them to be dwarfed and lose any of their vitality? Since that amendment, a large number of towns in this Commonwealth that have been deprived of an annual representation, and some of them have been allowed to exercise the right very infrequently in each decennial period, have those towns gone to decay or become dilapidated? I put the question to those gentlemen who are conversant with this matter, if these valuable town organizations have dropped behind, or become enfeebled since 1836. Does any man see in them any symptoms of decay? And if this be not visible, not perceptible, if they still remain in vigor unimpaired, how can it be maintained that annual representation is an essential element, either for the existence, or for the full and entire usefulness of town organizations? Allow me to add, that my admiration for the system is so strong, that if it could be made even probable

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that, deprived of annual representation, the towns of this Commonwealth would cease to exhibit any of the great characteristics which have made them what they are, I should not hesitate to relinquish my attachment to the district or any other system, though based upon the principles of absolute equality and justice.

Mr. President: There is, connected with this subject of town representation, as matter of public policy, another consideration of great practical influence, namely, that towns are our schools for political education, and that the reward for diligence and success is political preferment. Perhaps this is a delicate topic to discuss in this place, and yet the true extent of its value must be determined in settling the policy of a district system. Now, it must be admitted that the political training resulting from the discussion and administration of municipal interests, is of great importance, and it has been effectively stated in this discussion. By the few, but not by the mass of solid men of the country, referred to by the gentleman for Berlin, it is sought as a source of political advancement. The chance of success in such pursuit is diminished by a change from a town to a district system. But the question still remains whether, if that incentive be diminished, the real benefits of town organization will be lost. In my judgment, so long as the important interests confided to the administration of the towns shall be unabridged, so long will they command the thought and attention of those whose interests are at stake, and the fact that political aspirants are thrown upon a wider field by the district, than by the town system, is entitled to no considerable weight in the determination of the question under discussion. Let me add, Mr. President, a word or two in regard to another idea, somewhat in the same line of argument, in relation to what has been called-and I think not happily called-a tendency to centralization. I think the language misapplied, because the term centralization, has been used heretofore to designate that system of government where even the smallest emanation of administrative power comes from one common centre, and nothing is left to be acted upon, independently, by the various remote members of the body politic. That was true of the French system, but of course nobody anticipates the peril, that at any time hereafter, the municipal affairs of the towns will be regulated or administered from the metropolis. The true idea intended to be conveyed by the term, is, a predominant influence in the cities, which will affect the political weight of the smaller towns. And what are these influences? The gentleman for Berlin, classes them thus. He

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says, first, there is a centralization of population, next, that of wealth, next, of talent, and last, that of the press; and, upon these assumed or admitted condition of the facts, he justifies the gross inequality in the distribution of political power, which the pending scheme proposes. Now, Mr. President, my difficulty is, that if the supposed facts furnish a proper principle to be acted upon in determining political rights, it is not carried out thoroughly, and in detail. Take, for instance, the element of wealth, as one of the grounds on which political power should be abridged. Sir, we have undergone a very strange revolution in that respect. Property was at one time deemed an essentially conservative element, fit, of itself, for a basis of representation in one branch of your legislature. In the present view, it is to be a ground for diminishing the political weight of the communities, where it is held, as compared with other communities. Now the difficulty with this, as a principle, is, that those who use it would hesitate to work it out and reduce it to its true results. Why apply the principle to wealth as it is aggregated in the cities, and not to the wealth of the towns of the Commonwealth? Why not graduate political power by a scale framed upon your decennial valuation, or descending still lower, why not distribute political rights so that the wealthy man shall have at the ballot-box, a fractional part only, of the power that is enjoyed by the poor man? The principle leads to a result which no statesman would dare to adopt. There does not exist, and never has existed, a government which has attempted to make a distinction of that sort, abridging the political rights and weight of communities or men, in consequence of their possession of property. If it were worthy of any regard as a basis, it should be applied equally and throughout. An arbitrary application of it to cities, and that too without determining its precise value, or weight, would be a tyrannical exercise of the power of numbers, without principle. A further justification is asserted to exist in the necessity of having the government constituted with checks and balances. The member for Berlin says, as we have got a Senate founded upon a popular basis, why put the House upon the same basis? He desires a check of one branch upon the other. Who ever heard of carrying out a system of checks and balances by arraying one portion of a house against another portion of the same house? Who ever heard in a political organization of checking community against community, wealth against poverty, talent against inanity? Can any government based upon principles to be justified only by a supposed

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necessity of setting class against class, wealth against poverty, intelligence against a want of it, really have any standing or endurance?

Mr. President: I have about concluded all I have to say. I desire to add but a few words in relation to an ingenious argument advanced by my friend for Manchester, (Mr. Dana). His justification for depriving the cities of their equal political weight, is, if I understand it, this. He says that the cities have voluntarily consented to become such, and thus parted with the power of deliberative bodies, incident to town organization. He says, let us take them at their word. Having consented to become organized as a representative government, having no longer the power of deliberating, treat them as a whole, for the purpose of finding out their maximum of representation, and this done, district them into towns of convenient size-but without the relative political weight of such towns. Now I thought I saw in that, the struggle of a ingenious mind to support a foregone conclusion. I thought I saw, when the argument was made, that my friend for Manchester desired to be convinced that some principle could be found upon which the taking from the cities their otherwise just political rights, could be justified, and that without this he could hardly be induced to adopt the proposition which he was attempting to enforce. Now, has his assumed ground any real foundation? What is the origin of our cities? Why are city governments formed? Are they formed by a voluntary act, from choice or caprice? Or is it not a controlling necessity that drives the people to a form of city government? The history of the formation of cities in this Commonwealth, I take to be this. When the population of a town becomes so large that the masses of men who come together in primary assemblies, cannot deliberate, when the orderly conducting of business becomes impossible, something must be done. And from this condition of things, has sprung the cities of this Commonwealth, and that is their true origin. Now, Sir, I ask, when compelled by necessity, because they are too populous to meet in a body and deliberate, to place themselves under the form of a city organization, and divide themselves into wards, to carry on their government, whether it is quite fair to say that they have parted with their power to deliberate by their own act, and may be justly disfranchised in the mode proposed?

If that argument can commend itself to my friend for Manchester, and if he finds in it a sufficient reason for adopting the proposed scheme, it must be, I think, that he is content to accept, in political affairs, a basis of action less satisfac

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tory, than under almost any other circumstances, he would be willing to submit to.

Mr. President: It is said by the gentleman for Berlin, (Mr. Boutwell,) that nobody lauds the existing system, or vindicates it. The reason is, that by the common consent of all, it is defective, and is growing more so with advancing years. I do not think, however, the gentleman is quite fair, when he says that the argument in favor of the district system, should be distrusted at the outset, from the fact that it comes from those who were opposed to the calling of this Convention. It has been explained, again and again, that for several years the existing system has been unsatisfactory to all parties, and efforts have been made in the legislature, without distinction of party, to amend it. Gentlemen may well be restless under the operation of the present system, and yet prefer to remedy the difficulty in the way pointed out by the present Constitution. I think the argument not worthy the general merits of that able speech of the member for Berlin.

But to return. We must adopt some system. We may patch up the present one, for such, in effect, is the proposed scheme of the member from Lowell, and we may struggle on with it a little longer, and that is all that can be hoped from it. The argument against this proposition is, that it lacks every element of principle by which the mind can be governed in adopting it, and it wholly fails to justly accomplish any of the great ends which all agree to be desirable. In contrast with this we have a plan which is admitted to be sound in principle, and founded in the loftiest political, as well as moral, justice. I speak of its great features, and not of the question, whether it should rest on a basis of population or legal voters. It is a plan that works out every end we have in view, and that justly and completely. And we are met only by the suggestion, that existing institutions forbid its adoption-that there are corporate rights which are violated by it, and therefore, it is wiser to fold our hands and wait until we are obliged again to face the difficulty. When that time comes, all will admit, that the only system which can be adopted, is a district system, and the advantages, if any, of postponement, can be obtained only at the expense of a sense of wrong and injury.

I know, that in regard to the district system, I am speaking to weary and unwilling ears, and I feel that I speak in vain. In regard to the system of town representation, I feel, and I say it with regret, that that may be said of it which Locke said of eloquence: "It has too prevailing beauties in it to suffer itself ever to be spoken

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against, and it is vain to find fault with those arts of deceiving wherein men find pleasure to be deceived."

Mr. ABBOTT, of Lowell. I desire to offer an amendment to the third resolve, by striking out, after the word "published," the following:

And in all apportionments after the first, the numbers which shall entitle any city or town, to two, three, four, or more representatives, shall be so adjusted, in proportion, as herein before provided, that the whole number of representatives, exclusive of those which may be returned by towns of less than one thousand inhabitants, shall not exceed three hundred and seventy-five in one thousand eight hundred and sixty, or be increased more than ten in any one decennial period thereafter.

[July 8th.

of this system will be, that in 1860, taking the tables given in the report of the Secretary of State to the legislature in 1852, you will have one hundred and seven representatives to divide among the large towns and cities which may be entitled to more than one. If the increase of population goes on as it has, mainly in the larger towns, the result of fixing a number, beyond which the House shall not increase, is, that the increase in the larger towns is a positive injury to each one of them. Having but a certain number of representatives to divide among the whole number of towns and cities entitled to more than one, by increasing the number of such corporations, the less each one will have, and by increasing their population the larger will be the number required for each additional representative. As, for ex

And inserting, in lieu thereof, the following:- ample, if the number of towns and cities entitled

And in all apportionments after the first, the number which shall entitle any city or town to two, three, four, or more representatives, shall be increased or decreased in the same proportion as the population of the whole Commonwealth shall have increased or diminished since the last apportionment.

I desire simply to state to the Convention the reason for offering this amendment. In looking at this resolve I think it must have suggested itself to the Convention, that there would be serious trouble after the first apportionment after the adoption of this amendment in working out and getting the ratio by which to divide the representatives among the larger towns. If the thing can be done practically, I am free to say I have not been able, from the attention I have given to it, to obtain precisely the modus operandi by which it can be worked out. At any rate, it is not so plain, certain, and apparent, as a provision in reference to this important subject ought to be, nor so plain that the rule can be appreciated and understood by every person in the Commonwealth.

There is another objection to the proposition, as it now stands, which is, that by the provision limiting the House to three hundred and seventyfive, with the increase of ten from 1860 to 1870, and every ten years after, you, in fact, are absolutely punishing the larger cities and towns for an increase of their population. In the first place, you have the towns with under one thousand inhabitants, which have half a representative, that is, one every other year; and then all the remainder of the towns and cities, two hundred and sixty-eight in number, which, without regard to their population, have one representative each year. Now, the result of the working

to more than one representative is increased by ten, the number to be divided among such towns and cities remaining fixed, you, of course, must decrease the number apportioned to each town, as you have to divide the same fixed numbers among a larger number of such towns and cities; and if the population in the same municipal corporations is doubled in amount in any ten years, then, where before four or five thousand was the number required to obtain one additional representative, it would require eight or ten thousand for the same purpose. Thus, very apparently, by the resolve as it stands, an increase of population in the large towns would work a decrease of political power to each individual inhabitant.

I apprehend that the advantages in the amendment I propose, are these: in the first place, it states something that is clear and appreciable, something that can be understood by every one who reads the resolves. We know, at any rate, what we are voting for; we know that the number of four thousand, which is established in the first resolves, will be increased for the third and succeeding representative just in proportion to the increase of the population of the Commonwealth. The proposition has, at least, the benefit of being intelligible, the benefit of being so plain that he who can read it can understand it. In the next place, it obviates the objection to the proposition as it stands, that an increase of population in the large towns will positively work to each inhabitant a decrease of political power.

It may be said, in answer, that it will provide for too large a House. That may be brought as an objection to bear against its adoption; but by going into the calculation, gentlemen will find that it does not provide for a House unreasonably large.

I desire to say, before I sit down, that this is

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